Individual differences and sensitivity to cues of reinforcement by Rowland, Leonard Anthony
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND
SENSITIVITY TO CUES OF REINFORCEMENT
BY
LEONARD ANTHONY ROWLAND
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHOLOGY
BEDFORD COLLEGE 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
1980
ProQuest Number: 10098392
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10098392
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
ABSTRACT
Mischel (1968, 1973), challenged the trait approach to the 
study of individual differences by claiming that traits lacked 
predictive utility and that people did not display the degree 
of consistency pre-supposed by traits. It is suggested here 
that often the real difference between those who espouse the 
idiographic and those who espouse the nomothetic approaches 
is one of emphasis. It is, therefore, proposed that a theory 
which provides a biological basis for differential 
conditionability might prove to be a useful point from which 
to start building a theory of personality which integrates 
these two approaches.
Two theories, Eysenck's and Gray's, initially looked 
promising and so predictions drawn from these were compared in 
a series of three conditioning experiments. No support was 
found for Gray's theory, and although a degree of support 
was found for Eysenck's theory it was concluded that this 
theory lacked heuristic value. People were found to - :
condition with remarkable efficiency, however.
Experiments four and five followed up some speculations as to 
the nature of anxiety, looked at consistency both behavioural 
and self-rated and again put predictions drawn from Gray's 
theory to the test, but this time abandoning Gray's assumption 
that differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement is 
related to the introvers ion-extravers ion dimension, and looking 
at differential sensitivity as a performance variable.
Evidence was found supporting Gray's speculation with 
respect to differential sensitivity.
No evidence of behavioural consistency was found, and 
no support for a general factor of consistency was found when 
self ratings of consistency were examined.
Cognitive variables did, however, appear to be important 
in determining behaviour.
It was concluded that Eysenck's theory was not robust 
enough to form the basis of the type of theory proposed here, 
Gray's theory needs some major modifications, especially in 
relation to the assume^ relationship between active avoidance 
and appetitive reinforcement.
It seems that whether or not consistency will be 
observed is determined by many factors, not least of which is 
the complex relationship between situational and cognitive 
variables.
It is suggested that conditioning may well play an 
important part in determining behaviour and it might prove 
fruitful to follow the lead offered by Pavlov, Teplov and 
Nebylitsyn and move from properties of conditioning and of the 
nervous system to theories of personality, rather than the 
other way round.
It is also suggested that we should be working towards 
a theory which explains both why, and in what ways people were 
different and similar, a theory which set itself the target of 
describing and explaining the relationships between individual 
abilities, conditioning and cognitive factors, such as the use 
made of strategies.
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CHAPTER I: THE CONSISTENCY PROBLEM
1:1 TRAITS AND CONSISTENCY:
"Penuriousness is economy carried beyond all measure.
A Penurious man is one who goes to a debtor for his half obol 
interest before the end of the month. At dinner where 
expenses are shared, he counts the number of cups each drinks, 
and makes smaller libations to Artemis than any one.......
If his wife drops a copper he moves furniture, beds, chests
and hunts in the curtains  (P)enurious men have hair cut
short and do not put on their socks until mid-day; and when 
they take their cloak to the fuller they urge him to use 
plenty of earth so that it may not be spotted so soon. 
"(Theophrastus (372-287 B.C.) quoted by Bem & Allen, 1974),
Amusing as the above quotation might be, it serves also 
to emphasise the length of the pedigree of the trait theory.
The famous physician Galen proposed the typology of the four 
humours: melancholic, choleric, sanguine, and phlegmatic.
Immanuel Kant subscribed to the same classification, and more 
recently Wundt (1903) has observed: "The ancient differentiation
into four temperaments.... arose from acute psychological 
observations of individual differences between people.... the 
four fold division can be justified if we agree to postulate 
two principles in the reactivity of affects; one of them 
refers to the strength, and the other to the speed of change 
of a person's feelings, "(pp.637-638; quoted by Eysenck &
Rachman, 1965, p.17).
With such along history and having been espoused by
such illustrious adherents the trait theory is not to be 
lightly dismissed, nevertheless both this approach to the
20
Study of personality and the personal consistency in 
behaviour which it is as summed to imply have recently attracted 
a considerable amount of criticism. Role theorists (e.g. 
Coffman, 1959, 1961, 1968; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Mead, 1934) 
have stressed the variability of behaviour, but paid scant 
attention to the intra-organismic factors which might prove 
important in the production of behaviour.
Mischel*s book "Personality and Assessment" (1968) 
has proved to be the herald of numerous. articles both defending 
and attacking the trait approach to the study of personality, 
as well as serving to revitalize the search for new methodologies 
and paradigms in the field of personality study. He has 
challenged (1968, 1973) what he sees as being generally assummed 
in personality psychology: "that personality dispositions - 
or traits - the basic units of personality study are relatively 
stable, highly consistent attributes that exert widely 
generalized effects on behaviour." (Mischel, 1973, p.253). 
Having reviewed the relevant literature he proposed the thesis 
that situations are of critical importance in determining 
behaviuur, and with the exception of responses dependent on 
intellective factors (e.g. cognitive style, problem solving 
etc.) correlations between responses made in different 
situations, by the same individual, are typically in the 
order of .2 to .3. Correlations too small to persuade one 
that people display consistent behaviour across situations.
Personality theory is not dismissed out of hand; 
psycho-dynamically oriented theorists, he acknowledges, have 
attempted to come to grips with the fact that behaviour is, 
to some degree, situation specific, by proposing a genotypic- 
phenotypic distinction. They have argued that "divers 
behaviour patterns serve the same enduring and generalized 
underlying dynamic or motivational dispositions.
21
"(Mischel, 1973, p.253). The approach, he admits, is 
"inherently logical", but it must be evaluated on the basis 
of the utility of its predictions. These predictions, he 
claims, have not been notably successful. In other words a 
theory is useful if it increases predictive power and 
psychodynamic theories have not been found to satisfy this 
criterion.
Psychiatric tests, he concluded, also have poor utility, 
and in illustration he reports a study by Lasky et al (1959) 
which discovered a correlation of .61 between incidence of 
rehospitalization and the weight of the patient's file holder, 
a relationship much stronger than with any reported test 
measured trait. Besides using this experiment to emphasize 
the poor utility of the trait approach, he also employs it 
as a salutary lesson in the dangers of as summing that a 
correlation reflects what it may not reflect - a causal 
relationship. Traits, then are "lost causes" and require, 
rather than provide, explanation.
Mischel's own position has not remained unassailed, and 
two points seem to have been most often critisized; (1) that 
individuals display no consistency in behaviour; (2) that 
situations are the primary determinants of behaviour. The 
focusing of criticism on these two points is unfortunate; 
Mischel, himself, has explicitly disavowed these as his own 
opinions (cf. Mischel, 1973, p.254, 262), and they add little 
to understanding in the area. Although in justification of 
the criticisms it must be said that Mischel does appear to 
modify his position with : respect to the importance of
situational influences between 1968 and 1973.
Alker (1972) attempting to champion the consistency 
cause quotes a study by Opton & Lazarus (1967) which, he claims, 
demonstrates that people are more consistent that Mischel
22
would allow. Whether or not this study does demonstrate 
consistency in behaviour is in iteelf questionable, but any 
such discussion is rendered unnecessary by the results of 
subsequent studies by Averill, Olbrich & Lazarus (1972).
They report that two follow-up studies have failed to confirm 
the results of the original study.
Block (1968, 1977) has proved to be one of Mischel*s 
severest critics. He even goes so far as to note that 
Mischel*s review of the literature is "quite brief, 5,507 
words and less than 16 pages.". "Obviously, Mischel*s 
conclusion, whatever its degree of correctness, cannot be 
supported by so brief, selective and undetailed a literature 
presentation." (1977, p.42).
More seriously, however, as a criticism of Mischel*s 
position, he reports findings of a study which collected data 
on individuals when they were in junior, high school, senior 
high school and during their fourKdecade.  ^ (These data are 
reported more fully in "Lives through Time" (1971)). From 
these longitudinal data he concludes that both data collected 
from well done observer rating studies and self report 
studies demonstrate impressive personal consistencies, and 
that these two types of data are found to be strongly related. 
The evidence for personal consistency from studies employing 
behavioural test responses is, however, "erratic".
Block, of course, sees data such as this as being 
seriously damaging for Mischel*s cause, but there is infact 
no need for Mischel to object to any of these conclusions - 
they fit well enough with his general thesis. What is 
substantially different between the two authors is their 
emphasis, and the implications they draw from such data.
As has already been observed, Mischel has never denied 
that there is some consistency in behaviour, it is the degree 
of consistency, which he feels is generally assummed to
23
to which he objects.
Similarly Mischel has continually objected that rating 
tests when they do not specify either the situation or the 
behaviour of interest function as projective test, with the 
result that traits have more to do with perception than 
behaviour, and a great deal to do with the use of labels,
Mischel concedes that trait labels may in fact function as 
quite good descriptions of 'average* behaviour, but, as Block 
himself reports in relation to behavioural test data, they 
are poor predictors of what a person will do in a specific 
situation on any particular occassion. The major division 
between the two authors is Mischel *s contention that regarding 
behaviour as caused by traits, and, consequently, as relatively 
stable, has not in fact proved to be a particularly fruitful 
approach. The problem in the causal trait approach is 
occassionaly glimpsed in Block's writing, particularly when 
wanting to claim that an underlying trait is real, he is forced 
into the position of having to contend that the observed 
behaviour is less important, dismissable, even, in a sense, 
unreal.
Mischel marvels at the extra-ordinary adaptiveness 
and resulting behavioural discrimination which enables the 
individual to deal with an ever changing environment, but the 
net result of this adaptibility, he believes, is the extreme 
difficulty experienced in demonstrating any impressive cross- 
situational consistency. Block's T-data reflect this dis­
criminative facility, in Mischel*s eyes, but, he suggests, 
that to Block "objective measures of on-going behaviour" are 
limited, trivial and artificial.
Alker (1972) and Bem (1972) have argued this point of 
specificity and cross-situational consistency by throwing 
quotations from Mischel at each other. Alker quotes Mischel
24
as saying: "Validity,,,, requires convergence between
responses to maximally different independent stimulus 
measureso "(Mischel 1968, pp 13-14). On this he comments :
"This statement is tantamount to asserting a direct antithesis 
between trait psychology and any instance of limited response 
generalization. "(Alker, 1972, p.8). Bem counters by quoting, 
"The results of construct validation research... provide 
evidence for the utility of categorizing behaviour in accord 
with the particular construct. "(Mischel, 1968, p.100).
Both authors seem to be obscuring rather than clarifying 
Mischel®s general thesis by ignoring his theme and so placing 
statements outside their context. As already stated one 
criterion Mischel repeatedly uses in assessing the value of 
trait theories is their utility, as measured by their ability 
to predict future behaviour. With this in mind Mischel has 
pointed out that the commonly employed concepts of reliability 
and validity are not quite so distinct, in practice as 
opposed to theory, as is often implicitly assummed. When 
investigating reliability one looks at responses to maximally 
similar stimuli, e.g. the same test, or two halves or versions 
of a test presented on different occasions. When investigating 
validity one looks at responses to maximally different stimuli. 
Thus the distinction between the concepts of reliability and 
validity is, at least in part, a reference to the degree of 
generality of responding to which one wishes to refer.
It is with reference to the generality of responding, or the 
stimuli which trait theories have assummed to be equivalent, 
that Mischel concludes that people are, infact, relatively 
situation specific, or discriminating between stimuli.
Mischel*s position still allows, as a theoretical possibility, 
although Mischel himself obviously doubts that such a theory 
is possible, that a theory could exist which would predict
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which stimuli, objectively distinct stimuli, would elicit 
identical responses from people, or at least some groups of 
people, Mischel*s point, with reference to theories that 
exist, is the simple one, that trait theories have failed to 
do this. Rather than the quotation offered by Bem, I 
think Mischel*s position is more succinctly expressed when 
he says: "It may be more meaningful to talk about the
utility of both constructs and tests than their 
validity" (1968, p.100).
Partly in an attempt to weaken Mischel”s empirical 
point that traits have not^in.fach facilitated prediction 
Block (1977) has complained that perhaps as many as 90% 
of the studies reported in the personality field are 
methodologically unsound, inadequate, "without conceptual 
implications, and even foolish" (p.39). The weaknesses he 
lists are: lack of proper operational definition^ behavioural
hypotheses which fail to reflect the complexisty of the concepts 
being studied, and the unreliability of measures employed; 
and the unnecessarily low power of the research designs 
employed.
Whether or not these points are valid, and there seems 
no reason to dismiss them totally, even if one feels Block is 
exagérâting the situation somewhat, they serve to focus the 
attention of Block and others on the one point which Mischel 
easily counters - whether or not people show cross-situational 
consistency. Mischel*s ready answer is that he has never 
claimed people where totally inconsistent. Similarly even 
if people are found to be totally consistent it does not 
prove that the trait approach is correct.
The real heart of Mischel*s attack seems to be that to 
explain behaviour in terms of unobservable, infered, intro- 
organismic, relatively enduring variables is not a fruitful
26
approach. To a great extent many theorists (e.g. Alker, Block 
Epstein, Sarason, Watchel) who have contributed to this 
debate have allowed themselves to be side tracked by permit­
ting the issues of the validity of traits and of consistency 
to become inextricably intertwined. They have, I feel, 
in the course of the debate allowed the issues of consistency 
and response equivalence to assume a more central and 
important position in the trait approach than, in other 
circumstances, might have been the case.
Mischel stressed the variability of behaviour in part 
to emphasize the important influence situational variables 
can have on behaviour. It seems that the trait approach has 
been employed to counteract this emphasis on situational 
importance. Indeed Bowers (1973), amongst others, has 
attacked Mischel for being a "situationalist", and assumming 
that all behaviour is dependent solely on situational variables, 
It is unfortunate that people are prepared to take these fixed 
positions; Mischel for his part has acknowledged that to say 
that trait theories are not useful is not equivalent to 
saying situations are all—determining.
The unfortunate nature of the position adopted by 
those trait theorist who stress consistency in response to 
Mischel's challenge is emphasised by Goldberg (1972), who 
claims that "an enormous amount of poppycock" has been 
expressed in the name of science, and that the "classical 
psychometric" position is that situations "constrain" 
individual differences, though the rank order of individuals 
on a trait should remain "relatively invariant across
situations".
It is worth noting in passing that this "more 
reasonable" trait approach of Goldberg's is in fact nearer 
to what Argyle & Little (1972) designate as a dispositional
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model and less an example of what Ekehammar (1974) calls 
"personologism", which is used "as a label for those advocating 
stable intraorganismic constructs, such as 'traits', 'psychic 
structures' or 'internal dispositions' as the main determinant 
of behavioural variation." Ekehammar includes both Alker
(1972) and Watchel (1973) in this class of theorist.
Wallach & Leggett (1972) have also made the point that 
the validity of traits is a quite separate issue from the 
consistency one. In their case they have come down in favour 
of consistency, as opposed to situational specificity, but 
nevertheless against traits as the guiding principle. They 
argue that instead of looking at behaviours which it is felt 
might function as a sign of some hypothesized trait, we should 
be studying behaviours that require no justification beyond them­
selves as objects of study.
While on the one hand there is a deal of sound common 
sense in this view, one might even wish to claim that this is 
exactly what most experimental psychologists, in fact, do. On 
the other hand it appears to miss the point of the controversy. 
In studying specific behaviours, each from its own intrinsic 
interest, though we may well amass large amounts of informative 
and interesting data we will be no nearer to the answer of 
the question which is central to personality psychology - 
how behaviour, as a whole, is organized; why there are 
consistencies and variabilities. Of course there may be no 
overall organization of behaviour, but it is difficult to see 
how we will discover this with out asking relevant questions.
If Wallach and Leggett do find that people are consistent 
how are they to explain the consistency?
In an attempt to demonstrate that people are consistent, 
and not simply situationally specific in the behaviour they 
display, Wallach and Leggett followed up some work by
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Sechrest and Wallace (1964) which looked at "the stylistic 
aspects of drawing" - in this case the size of a drawing as 
defined by its height and area. Nursery school children were 
required to draw either a Santa Claus (experimental group) 
or a man (control group) on three occassions, 1st - 7th 
December, 15th - 21st December, 5th - 12th January. They 
report their results as supporting the consistency hypothesis 
and failing to confirm the situational specificity hypothesis. 
The results, however, are not unequivocal. There was a 
steady rise in the size of the Santa drawing over the three 
trials, while the size of the man showed a steady decline in 
size. The net result of this was, of course, that while the 
three trials were not found to be significantly different 
the trials x conditions interaction was found to be significant. 
This result must, I think, be explained before it can be 
claimed that the study demonstrates personal consistency.
In favour of the consistency hypothesis are the 
correlations between trials, these are typically in the .5 -.6 
range. This suggests that there is infact considerable 
personal consistency. However, although these correlations 
are a substantial improvement on the typical .2 - .3 
correlations,which Mischel reports, personal consistency is still 
contributing less than 40% of the observed variance and hardly 
justifies Wallach and Leggett's claim that the effect of any 
situational variables must, at best be quite small. Until 
we know with what situational similarities and differences we 
are dealing, what proportion of the variance was contributed 
by the mode of testing and responding, and to what degree these 
facilitate or hinder the emergence of consistent behaviour, it 
appears to be impossible to. make any firm statement as to the 
magnitude of the situational effects.
This study is important, however, in that it failed to
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replicate earlier findings which were regarded as supporting 
the situationalist position, although it is questionable 
whether situational specificity was, in fact, tested with all 
the testing sessions being so near to Christmas. Endler
(1973) has also questioned the reliability of these particular 
behavioural responses, and in view of the fact that in two 
experiments different results were obtained comments; "the 
most reasonable interpretation at present (of this data) is that 
the results are inconclusive with respect to the consistency - 
specificity issue.... (l)nconsistent results from two 
different experiments do not mean consistent behaviour" (p.299).
Another approach to the consistency issue has been 
espoused by both Alker (1972) and Bem (1972). This is the 
Moderator variable strategy approach. Alker goes so far as 
to suggest that this strategy, as exemplified in the studies 
on risk taking (Kogan and Wallach,1964, 1967), might 
constitute a paradigm shift. Wallach is not convinced of the 
revolutionary potential of this approach, and rather sees the 
whole thing as a "Small, conservative modification of view 
point," (Wallach and Leggett, 1973, p.311) providing no 
answer at all to the negative results with regards to the 
consistency issue. Mischel appears to share Wallach and 
Leggett's reluctance with respect to the utility of the 
moderation approach. He (1968) cautions that most of the 
interactions observed are not predicted, and explanations of 
them are offered post-hoc, with the consequence that great 
caution must be exersized in any attempt to interpret them.
Bem, however, seems altogether more optimistic and 
comments that "Mischel* s observation that behavioural 
consistencies are situation specific can be translated into 
the assersion that individual difference are themselves 
a function of situational moderators.("1972, p.21)
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Though he does acknowledge that the approach is rather 
empty until one can predict on a priori grounds which 
variables will serve as moderators. Nevertheless he sees 
this type of approach as permitting, at least, the prediction 
of (1) certain behaviours (2) across certain situations (3) 
for certain people.
Both Bem and Alker cite Wallach as being one of the main 
exponents of this new paradigm, but, as already noted, he 
displays considerably less enthusiasm than either for its 
utility. He comments that the data from the risk taking 
studies is far from clear and exemplifies his point by noting 
that while (a) Bem suggests consistency should be highest for 
those individuals scoring high on the defensiveness moderator 
and low on test anxiety (b) Alker believes that it should be 
greatest for individuals scoring high on both dimensions. 
Wallach, himself, claims the data supports neither contention 
strongly, being as strongly against as it is in favour of 
either position. The most telling point is, however that 
"subsequent attempts at replication have not been marked by 
success in any clear way either" (1972 p.312)
The work on expressive behaviour also cited by Bem 
fares no better at the hands of Wallach and Leggett. They 
suggest two main reasons for the effect of moderators being 
so unstable (1) Internal processes are sufficiently subtle 
to defy capture by the kinds of theorizing that have been 
advanced. (2) Moderator effects are statistically complex.
1:2 VARIABILITY IN CONSISTENCY
A rather more positive approach to the problem is to 
propose that consistency is, itself, a dimension along which 
people may be thought to vary and, consequently, consistency 
itself becomes a moderator variable. I will refer briefly
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here to three studies, Bern and Allen (1974), Campus 
(1970, 1974), and Woodruffe (1978) which have addressed 
themselves specifically to this problem.
Bem and Allen (1974) argue in favour of an 
idiographic approach to personality, and claim that nearly 
all the research in personality is based on the assumption 
that a particular trait, or set of traits, is universally 
applicable. Whereas the idiographic approach acknowledges 
that individuals will each have their own meaningful dimensions 
and equivalence classes, with the result that to the degree 
that subject and experimenter fail to agree on equivalence 
classes it will be impossible to find consistency.
It is worth noting in passing that although it may be 
true, if undemonstrated, that people are consistent within 
their own idiosyncratic systems, Bem and Allen are sowing the 
seeds of confusion by using the term consistency in two 
different senses; one a (relative), correlational sense, 
the other an absolute or variance sense. This issue will 
be returned to later.
Bem and Allen compared individuals who rated themselves 
as high or low in variability on two traits, friendliness and 
conscientiousness. The data for friendliness was comprised 
of ratings of the subject by father, mother, peer and self.
Each of these sets of ratings was reduced to a compound 
score made up from a global rating and a twenty- four item 
scale for friendliness, plus two observational ratings, one 
for frequency and duration of vocalization in a group 
discussion, the other the latency of initiating a conversation 
with a stooge in a waiting room. The standard deviation of 
scores across these measures (situations) was used as the 
measure of the individuals variability. As predicted a 
significant difference was found between high and low self
32
reported variable subjects in variability for friendliness 
across situations. Interestingly all six measures correlated 
more highly with E.P.I. extravers ion for low than for high 
self rated variable subjects (mean correlations, ,51 for low 
variable Ss, .31 for high variable Ss).
For conscientiousness they used ratings from the same 
four sources plus three observational measures: promptness in
returning forms, amount of required course reading done, and a 
rating of neatness. For this dimension, conscientiousness, 
the global rating by the subject did not correlate with the 
situation item questionaire, the latter reflecting the - 
experimenters* conception of the dimension, the former the 
subjects. The reported correlation was .62, (the same 
correlation for the friendliness dimension was .84). As 
already noted this in itself would lead to a lack of observed 
consistency. The authors, therefore, constructed a new 
variance score - the ratio of the variance on 23 items of the 
conscientiousness scale to the variance over all 84 items of 
the questionaire, which included traits other than conscientious­
ness and friendliness. Though the authors claim to have again 
confirmed their hypothesis, the situation is much less 
satisfactory with this new method of calculating variance.
Their hypothesis was: **Individuals who identify themselves
as consistent on a particular trait dimension will in fact be 
more consistent cross-situationally than those who identify 
themselves as highly variable**, (p. 512). The consistency 
refered to is, of course, across situations deemed relevant 
to the trait by the rater, but this new measure looks at 
variability across situations thought révélant to the trait by 
the experimenters as compared with total observed questionaire 
variance. The conclusion should be that people who rated 
themselves as being low in variability on the dimension of 
conscientiousness are relatively less variable in relation to
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situations, thought to be relevant to the trait by the 
experimenters, as compared to the total variance across 
situations thought to be both similar and dissimilar, than are 
people who rate themselves as being more highly variable on 
this dimension.
Woodruffe (1978) makes a similar point when he objects;
**those who are highly variable on the other items as well as on 
conscientiousness will score the same as those who are extremely 
non-variable on both", (p.92). This measure takes into account 
not only variance within, but also between traits.
Woodruffe has also pointed out that even in relation to 
the friendliness dimension variability, or consistency, was not 
adequately measured, as the score of variability was, in part, 
made up of differences between the scores of the different raters 
which may, or may not, reflect actual variability in behaviour.
It should more correctly, have been called variability in ratings 
of friendliness.
Campus (1970, 1974) was more interested in a general 
dimension of consistency, as opposed to Bem and Allen's trait 
specific consistency. She required subjects to provide TAT 
stories which were then rated, by the subjects themselves, for 
each of 17 needs. Campus, on the basis of her results,concluded 
that the consistent person responds in such a way as to maintain 
a constant self-image, while the inconsistent individual changes 
his view of himself in accordance with the demands of the 
situation, he is situationally bound. Woodruffe (1978) has point­
ed out that, in fact, her conclusions must be rather more limited 
than this as she has nowhere demonstrated a relationship between 
self-image and behaviour. It would have been far more useful had 
Campus attempted to define the individual's self image 
independently, rather than, as she did , using the same 
data first as a measure of consistency and then as a form 
of self description, and then to go on to relate these
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two in a factor analysis. This latter aspect of her 
methodology leads one to question the validity of her results. 
Campus, herself, seems to be tiot entirely happy with the 
situation and indicates that more work, particularly with 
behavioural data, must be done before any degree of generality 
can be as summed.
Despite the fact that one must be cautious in accepting 
the link Campus suggests between self-image and consistency, 
she has, nonetheless, demonstrated that people do differ to 
the extent which they are consistent in presenting needs in 
different situations (TAT stories).
Woodruffe (1978) like Campus is most interested in global, 
rather than trait specific, consistency. He suggests that 
individual differences in consistency may, at least to some 
degree, be the result of having a more or less 'definite* 
concept of oneself. He reports a study in which each subject 
was rated on 14 nine point scales by a minimum of eight raters 
known to that subject. Apparent variability for each 
dimension for each subject was calculated as the sum of the 
absolute deviations from the mean across raters for that 
dimension divided by the number of raters used; the sum total 
of dimension-specific variability scores was used as the global 
variability score. An incongruity score was also calculated, 
this was the number of occasions on which raters attributed 
to the subject the opposite characteristic to that which the 
subject had attributed to himself.
At the global level variability correlated with non- 
definiteness of subjects about themselves .58 (p .001) 
although at the dimension specific level only four out of a 
possible 14 correlations reached significance. Non­
definiteness was found to correlate .4 (p < .001) with 
incongruity.
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When the data was subjected to factor analysis, the 
first factor to emerge,accounting for 32.5% of the observed 
variance, was loaded on by variability, non-definiteness, 
intolerance of ambiguity (negatively) and preference for 
simplicity (negatively).
One is tempted to put the same objection to this study 
as that levelled at the Bem and Allen study; that we might be 
looking at the variability in rating behaviour rather than 
variability in the behaviour of the subject. Woodruffe has, 
however, considered this point and observes that the emergence 
of the predicted correlations between his apparent variability 
measure and other variables hypothesized as influencing consistency 
attests to the validity of the measure as a measure of 
behavioural variability. This point is particularly strong 
with respect to non-definiteness of presented personality, 
which occupies a central position in his arguement, and 
also receives support from the fact that non-de finiteness is 
also found to correlate significantly with incongruity ratings.
If one accepts these arguements, and in as far as they 
reflect the standard method of validating any psychometric 
test, they seem reasonable, then we can regard Woodruffe*s 
measure as being some kind of index of behavioural variability 
—f:. which is a step in the desired direction. The only 
reservation I have is that the arguement is rather one sided.
If the predicted correlations do not emerge then it is not 
immediately clear whether this is because the measure does not 
in fact measure the type of variability one is interested in, 
or because the hypothesized relationships between variables 
do not, in fact, exist. We do not have an independent test 
of these hypotheses. This arguement becomes important in 
relation to the question of vdiether consistency is a global 
or trait specific dimension. Woodruffe*s data are much
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stronger in support of the global arguement, but support for 
the trait specific position may be weaker simply because it 
is based on a smaller data sample. If the measure of 
variability is rather insensitive then the correlations of 
dimension specific variability may well fail to reach 
acceptable levels. We have no way of knowing, of course, 
at this stage how sensitive the measure is. No correlation 
reported exceeds .6 . This may be either because of the 
effect of other variables, or a lack of sensitivity of the 
measure of variability itself, or, of course, because no 
relationships do in.fact exceed this magnitude.
Although Woodruffe *s data do favour the global trait 
it would be a misrepresentation of his position, I think, to 
state that he would interpret it as exclusively supporting the 
global position and casting doubt on the trait specific 
hypothesis.
Despite the various criticisms which might be levelled 
against these three studies, taken together they do suggest 
both that individuals do not all see themselves as equally 
consistent, and it seems probable that this is a reflection 
of, or is reflected in, their behaviour. This strategy of 
using consistency itself as a moderator-variable may, in so 
far as people do vary in their consistency, demand some 
qualification of the emphasis often currently placed on 
inconsistency.
The fact, then, that at least some people do display 
consistency together with Bem and Allen* s suggestion that 
at least on personally important dimensions^all people will 
display some consistency, might be added to Mischel*s (1973) 
suggestions of why trait theories are so tenacious. He 
suggests that people tend to go beyond the observation of 
some consistency to construe a much greater degree of
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consistency. Similarly people will interpret a small sample 
of behaviour as if it is representative, or reinterpret new 
behaviour to conform with pre-existing "cognitive structures 
or implicit personality theories". Consequently **recall based 
trait ratings may yield data that are systematic but un­
related to results based on direct observation of on-going 
behaviour as it occurs **. (1973, p. 264)
Mischel also refers to a study by Jones and Nisbett 
(1971) who noted that subjects attributed the behaviour of 
others to enduring consistent dispositions while the cause 
of their own behaviour was attributed to specific transient 
factors. Such things as constant physical appearance, 
cognitive style, intellective ability and a restricted set of 
roles will all play a part in creating the impression of 
consistency.
Not all Mischel*s hypotheses, however plausible 
they might be, have been confirmed when put to the test.
Hayden and Mischel (1976) looked at the effect of initial 
impression on the interpretation of subsequent behaviour.
They concluded that although initial impression may create 
some bias, such impressions, at least in the experimental 
situation, were easily changed in the light of new information. 
"It is the properties of the subsequent behaviours themselves 
that seemed by far the major determinants of the inference 
of underlying motives." (1976, p.122)
Some support, was found for the hypothesis that 
subsequent behaviours congruent with initial impressions are 
seen as manifestations of the "real self**, while incongruent 
behaviours were more likely to be seen as due to external 
transitory factors thus allowing the observer to maintain his 
impression of personal consistency.
Concluding this section one might wish to place two
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qualifications on Mischel*s earlier emphasis on variability.
On the one hand people vary in the extent to which they 
exhibit consistency. It is now necessary that this be 
demonstrated at the behavioural level, and to determine 
whether it is a global feature of individuals, or peculiar 
to specific traits, or both. On the other hand people do 
appear to be aware of inconsistencies in behaviour, but, not 
unnaturally, they prefer a parsimonious explanation of 
behaviour which allows them to preserve an attitude of 
consistency.
1:3 INTERACTIONISM
Up until this point in concentrating on consistency 
I have implied that either the person,/or tertain 
characteristics proper to the person, or the situation is 
the major determinant of observed behaviour. Many theorists 
have rejected this position, however, and instead adopted 
what has been termed an interactionist position.
Ekehammar (1974) has defined interactionism as **the synthesis 
of personologism and situationalism, which implies that 
neither the person per se nor the situation per se is 
emphasized, but the interaction of these two factors is 
regarded as the main source of behavioural variance.** (p. 1026).
Ekehammar claims that interactionism may be traced as 
far back as Aristotle, though somewhat more recently the 
position has been advocated, again according to Ekehammar, 
by Kantor (1924, 1926), Lewin (1938), Tolman (1935,, 1951),
Angyal (1941), Murray (1938, 1951), Murphy (1947), Rotter (1954), 
Jessor (1956, 1958), Sullivan (1953, 1964), Leary (1957).
The major distinguishing feature between the classical 
interactionist and his modern successor, according to 
Ekehammar, is that while the former put forward comprehensive
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personality theories without real empirical support, the latter 
present their propositions with empirical support, but in 
the absense of an elaborate theory.
Ekehammar goes on to suggest that the modem, empirically 
based interactionism can be divided up into four major groups 
of studies, connected with the work of Raush, Endler, Moos and 
Magnus son respectively. No attempt will be made here to 
examine these studies in great detail, but it will be useful 
to indicate the general trend of their findings.
Raush is important for, amongst other reasons, being 
one of the first to espouse the interactional point of view in 
the empirical study of personality. Perhaps more importantly, 
in view of Mischel*s criticism of the poor predictive ability 
of type and trait theories, Raush’s approach to the problem 
might well prove more useful than some of the others (e.g.
Endler*s partitioning of variance approach). Raush (1965) 
observed that there will always be a greater 'error* variance 
when dealing with humans than when working with lower species 
simply because man has a greater potential for adaptation.
It maybe worth bearing this in mind when discussing the 
complexity of human behaviour. One side of the coin spells 
frustation for the theorist, the other survival for the species.
Raush*s studies (1965, 1972, Raush, Dittman and Taylor 
1959a, 1959b, Raush, Farbman and Llewellyn 1960) are mainly 
concerned with the observation of hyper-aggressive boys in 
residential care. They represent an improvement on those 
studies of consistency already cited in as far as they employ 
the observations of actual behaviour, even if one objects that 
the behaviours are ’interpreted* along the trait dimensions 
of aggressiveness and dominance. The children were observed 
in a variety of settings on two occaslo^^s 18 months apart; 
alnd at different times were compared, statistically, with two
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other groups of normal children. The general trend of 
their findings appears to have been that as the boys matured 
and showed some improvement they displayed a greater 
differentiation between situations. The normal boys showed 
this differentiation to an even greater extent. Raush 
interprets the pattern of results obtained as follows: "The
unique confluence of child and setting contributed far more 
to behaviour than did the summation of individual differences" 
(1959, p.229), In 1960 looking at the point the other way 
around he remarked "although individuals may differ across 
a variety of situations, and situations may differ across 
individuals, much may be lost in the artificial separation 
of the components" (1960, p.329).
By 1965 Raush was using the term Interaction in a 
somewhat different sense from before. He now looks at the 
extent to which a response can be predicted by knowing its 
antecedent act. He reports about a 30% predictability.
Woodruffe has suggested that there may well be consider­
ably more individual consistency than is reflected in these 
studies. This must in some sense be true for, if in no 
other way, the hyper-aggressive boys must be relatively 
consistent across situations with respect to their hyper­
aggression. Indeed Raush (1965) has commented that both 
situations and behavioural events are less discriminable for 
the very disturbed children. It is possible that the 
consistency of the individual is lost within the homogeneity 
of the group;
Despite the fact that Raush*s studies may under 
estimate the importance of individual differences, they do 
serve to emphasize the importance of the interaction between 
person and situation, and indeed between person and person, 
in determining behaviour.
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Two studies by Moos (1968, 1969) follow on naturally 
from the Raush work in as far as they look at both patients 
and staff in a theraputic community. The first study 
employed the questionaire method, but unlike most studies 
of this type feelings were recorded either during, or immediately 
after each of eleven situations. The results can be briefly 
summarized as follows, though it should be remembered when 
comparing staff and patient the two sets of data were 
analysed separately
(1) Individual differences were more important determinants 
of response for patients than for staff members.
(2) Individual differences were more important than settings 
for patients.
(3) Settings were more important than individual differences 
for staff members
(4) The interation was more important than either main effect, 
individual difference or the situation.
Although once more the importance of the interaction 
is clearly demonstrated nevertheless the data do suggest 
that both the situational and individual differences are also 
important. It is, however, the interaction which most 
impresses Moos and he comments: "settings may elicit
consistent reactions from all staff; however, individual staff 
members also react differently to different settings" (p.58).
In a follow up study Moos looked at both questionnaire 
responses and actual behaviour. The two types of data are 
not directly comparable, for whereas the questionnaire data 
reflects trait type dimensions, the behaviour recorded is at 
a more molecular level including nodding, scratching, talking, 
smoking, hand and arm movement, and general movement and 
shifting. These data were collected on two occas»o*vxv three 
months apart. Person differences accounted for 0-45% of the
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variance, differences between situations 0-18%, and the 
interaction 9-38%, So once more he found, for a clinical 
group, that individual differences are more important than 
settings, with the interaction always proving to be relatively 
important. The results were much the same for the behavioural 
data, though, as might be expected, some variables were more 
situationally determined e.g. talking, while for others the 
person was the more important determinant e.g. smoking.
I feel that caution must be exercized in interpreting 
these results. As already noted the data for patients and 
staff was analysed separately and comparisons between the 
various proportions of variance attributed to the variables 
is made difficult by the fact that (a) the sample of situations 
was not identical for the two groups, (b) twice as many patients 
as staff were sampled. This second point becomes even more 
important when it is realized that the staff were observed only 
in ward setting where the roles they were expected to play and 
duties they were expected to perform in consequence of their 
position were more precisely prescribed, and may well have 
introduced an artificially inflated degree of homo-geneity in 
this group.
That this might not be the whole story is at least, 
suggested by the fact that those patients regarded as more 
* normal * were also found to be more sensitive to situational 
influences, the same pattern as reported by Raush.
Moos' findings then, in line with those of Raush and 
appear to indicate that adjustment may be related to sensitivity 
to settings, that individual differences too are of importance, 
but that the interaction between the two is always relatively 
important.
The next group of studies to be considered are those 
reported by Endler and his co-workers. These studies seem
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important because of their popularization of the partitioning 
of variance technique, and of the use of S.R. inventories.
In the first paper of this series (Endler, Hunt and 
Rosenstein, 1962) an S.R inventory of anxiety was employed.
This sampled 14 modes of response across 11 situations.
On the basis of this study they concluded that situations 
were substantially more important than individual differences 
in determining behaviour. By 1966 Endler and Hunt acknowledged 
that the simple comparison of the means square from the 
analysis of variance was not an appropriate method of looking 
at this problem, and consequently reanalysed the earlier data 
together with some new data. This new analysis indicated that 
in all cases sampled the proportion of variance attributed to 
person effects was greater than that attributed to situation 
effects. The results range from 5.75 to 10.42% for person 
effects, 5.25 to 7.29% for situation effects, while the 
interaction always contributed around 10% of the variance.
Modes of response too, as might be expected, consistently 
contributed a substantial proportion of the observed variance.
In a 1969 report (Endler and Hunt 1969a) data are 
reported which indicate the extent to which previous results 
can be generalized. They increased the number of samples,
22 male samples, 21 female samples, the number of situations 
and the number of modes of responses. Even with this 
increased range of sampling the variance contributed by 
situational differences never exceeded 15% (13.7%) for males 
and 20% (19.9%) for females, nor that from individual differences 
10%, the two way interaction (person x situation) usually 
contributed approximately 10% of the variance./
In a further study (Endler and Hunt, 1969b) Endler and 
Hunt compared the results of an S.R inventory for Hostility 
with those of the anxiousness S.R inventory. Here it was
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found that of the total observed variance a substantially 
larger proportion was contributed by individual differences 
for the hostility, than for the anxious, dimension. The 
relevant figures are, for men: anxiousness 4 .44%, hostility
19.08%, for women: anxiousness 4.56%, hostility 14.82%, with
the person by situation interaction again consistently around 
the 10% level. Most of the increase in the importance of 
the person seems to be accounted for in terms of a decrease 
in the importance of modes of response. This really raises 
the question of whether or not modes of response should be 
included in the analysis of this kind of data. Cartwright 
(1975) has pointed out that "subjects do notresjpond to the modes 
of response; they respond through the modes" (p.410). The 
point here is that if one is interested in the trait termed 
anxiety the way it is expressed is substantially irrelevant 
and these modes of expression, when included in the analysis, 
will contribute variance which serves to obscure the person 
and situation effects. It can also be argued that it is 
inappropriate to employ modes of response which are functionally 
equivalent from the individual’s point of view. These 
points turn to a large extent on what we mean when we talk 
of a person being consistent, and this will be returned to 
later.
Woodruffe has observed that the modes of response 
employed may not, in fact,be comparable which,if true,might 
indicate as Endler and Hunt (1968, p. 314) claim, that we can 
not generalize, with reference to consistency across traits. 
Though it may in fact be true that different dimensions do 
operate differently it can hardly be claimed that this has 
been demonstrated in the present experiment. What Endler 
and Hunt have shown is that the modes of responses they 
thought to be relevant to the anxiousness dimension showed.
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relative to other sources of variance, more differences 
between themselves than did those modes of response thought 
to be relevant to the dimension of hostility. They certainly 
seem to claim too much, on the basis of the reported data, 
when they say "individual differences in the intensity of a 
trait of hostility are genuinely more prominent than individual 
differences in the intensity of a trait of anxiousness", (p.314).
In 1973 responding to criticisms by Alker (1972) an 
attempt was made to increase the range of individual differences 
by including data from neurotics and psychotics, as well as 
'normals', in the analysis. When the data from the three 
groups were analysed together person differences were found 
to contribute 9.66%, situations 16.11% and the person by 
situation interaction 18.14% of the observed variance.
However, for the three groups separately individual differences 
contributed 0.93 to 4.2% for the 'normal' groups; 12.13% 
for the neurotic sample and 18.78% for the psychotic sample, 
of the total variance. The proportion of variance contributed 
by situational differences was reduced for : both clinical 
groups, and the person by situation interaction was also 
found to be reduced for the psychotic group. Results again 
reminiscent of Raush's and Moos'.
Following Endler's line of reasoning both the person 
and the situation are important to some extent, but it is the 
interaction between the two which seems to be of special 
importance. Despite the effort expended by Endler and his 
co-workers in dividing up variance he does not seem to be able 
to offer any pronouncement more substantial than Mischel's 
observation that the relative importance of each source of 
variance will depend on the situations, behaviours and 
individuals sampled, and to take up any more fixed a position 
would be to create a pseudo-controversy.
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Several other studies have employed this S.R inventory 
and partitioning of variance approach (e.g. Sandell, 1968,
Larr, Suziedelis and Kinnane, 1969, Bishop and Witt, 1970; 
Endler and Okada, 1975, Golin and Nar.tz, 1976, Zuckerman and 
Mellstrom 1977, Dworkin and Kihlstrom 1978) but they are of 
interest mainly with respect to particular traits and behaviours 
and are less relevant to the consistency - interaction issue.
The final set of studies to be discussed in this section 
are those by Magnus son and his co-workers, particularly 
Ekehammar. There are two major differences between these 
studies and those already discussed, the first is the stress 
placed on the psychological, as opposed to physical, 
environment; and the second is that they follow in the 
correlational tradition of personality research. In 1968 
Magnusson, Gerzon and Nyman reported the results of an 
experiment in which the subjects had been observed and rated 
on two occasions -. Ratings were made along a number of 
trait-like dimensions, and amount of (length of) talking time 
was recorded. Two variables were manipulated.
(1) Whether or not the subject was part of the same group on 
the two occasions
(2) VJhether or not he was required to perform the same task
on both occasions.. This yields four conditions. Results
were correlated across the two occasions '. Ekehamman (1974) 
summarizes the findings as follows: "The analysis showed
that the relationship was random when both group composition 
and task were varied simultaneously, whereas the co-efficients 
were moderate to high when the two situations were identical 
and differed either in group composition or task" (p.1038).
This summary is not strictly true, at least for the "length
of talking time" measure, were a correlation of .418 is 
reported for the maximum dissimilarity condition. This is
the smallest of the four correlations, but still larger than
most of those Mischel (1968) reports. It is also worth
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noting in passing that the condition: of maximal similarity ;does 
not yield the highest correlation, this is associated with a 
constant task, but a changed group (.636 - .895). Too much 
should not be made of these points, however, partly because 
apart from the "length of talking" measure, the condition of 
maximal dissimilarity does usually yield a correlation 
approximating zero, as Ekehammar claims; so the moderate 
correlation associated with this one measure is not systematic­
ally replicated. With regard to the maximally similar condition, 
this may well be maximally similar in objective terms, but 
Magnusson has stressed that it is subjective similarity that 
is of critical importance.
On the basis of these results Magnusson concluded that 
behaviour showed a poor generality and consequently the trait 
approach must be abandoned and he opted for an inter-actionist 
approach as the most useful alternative.
A later study by Magnusson and Ekehammar (1975) seems 
in many ways, to be the high water mark of the empirical 
research in relation to interactionism. Whereas most 
research has been primarily concerned with demonstrating that 
no one source of variance is the sole determinant of behaviour, 
there has been some reluctance to take up the challenge of 
explaining how the variables interact. This study does not 
answer the question, but it does appear to be making a 
step in that direction by taking up Hunt's (1965) challenge, 
when he said "...from either understanding variations in 
behaviour or making clinical predictions, we should be looking 
towards instruments that will classify people in terms of the 
kinds of responses they make in various situations".
Magnusson and Ekehammar attempted to come to terms 
with this problem by reducing the number of situations 
sampled to 3 types, or équivalete classes, and responses to
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two équivaleVIce classes. This was achieved by employing 
factor analysis. They classified the subjects into "homo­
geneous groups on the basis of their anxiety profiles for 
different types of reactions across different categories of 
situations". For this they used the method of latent 
profile analysis. Both the situations and the responses 
employed were thought to be relevant to the trait of anxiety.
Three profiles were extracted for both males and 
females. The definitions of the two sets are substantially 
similar and so I will quote only those for females, as an example 
of the type of profiles described: Profile I is characterized
by (a) a low anxiety level (b) high trans-situational 
consistency (c) high response consistency; Profile II by 
(a) a high level of anxiety, (b) comparatively high trans- 
situational consistency and (c) a low response consistency; 
Profile III by (a) a moderate anxiety level (b) low trans- 
situational consistency and (c) low response consistency.
The problem with this study, interesting as these 
profiles are, is that no attempt has been made to demonstrate 
that the inclusion of the situational and response consistency 
elements results in a predictive ability superior to that of 
the traditional trait theory which employs only the first 
of the three elements in these profiles. Nor, indeed, that 
this method of describing people and predicting from the 
descriptions is superior to asking people specific questions 
about specific responses,in specific situations. In other 
words even if we are unclear about the manner in which 
elements do interact,does a method which explicitly 
acknowledges the interaction of elements permit a greater 
generalization or predictiveness than do more traditional 
approaches?
Another disappointing aspect of the study is that
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although the authors talk at length about how the individual 
functioning and the uniqueness of the individual is important 
we are still presented with averaged group data.
The problem really is whether the mean group equivalence 
classes for situations and responses are those of particular 
individuals. Magnusson and Ekerhammar attempt to come to 
terms with this problem in a later paper (1978) when they try 
to evaluate, empirically, what they see as a central tenet 
of the interactionist position that "behaviour should be more 
similar across situations which are perceived as similar i.e. 
situation response data would then be congruent to situation 
perception data for single individuals". They continue,
"the view presented above is a crucial point in the 
interactionist interpretation of behaviour" (p.42)
They then report data which supports this position that 
individuals do behave more similarly across situations 
perceived by them as being similar. However, these findings 
cannot be generalized too enthusiastically at this stage 
because only self report data, no actually observed data, 
were used. Magnusson and Ekehammar acknowledge that it is 
necessary for sdinilar demonstrations to be made employing 
other types of data.
While the work of all these groups was probably 
necessary for a useful appreciation of the complex determinants 
of behaviour, that of Magnusson and Ekehammar is somewhat more 
impressive than the rest. They have attempted to synthesize 
the interactionist approach and use it, albeit in a limited 
way in describing people. They have also done more than 
pay lip service to the contention that each individual will 
interpret situations differently and, consequently, behave 
differently.
Out of the substantial literature on this topic two
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other papers need to be mentioned, even if only briefly.
The first, by Argyle and Little (1972), points to four 
rather than three, approaches to personality. These are 
the trait, and situationalist, the interactionist and what 
they term the dispositional approaches. According to the 
dispositional approach the behaviour of the individual does 
vary across situations, but at the same time individuals 
maintain a constant rank order across situations. Tliis 
is distinct from the interactionist approach in that 
according to this latter approach not only do people differ 
across situations, but the pattern of responding is 
idiosyncratic. Strictly speaking only this last approach is 
interactional in the statistical sense of the term, but most 
authors when talking of interactions are referring to the 
conjoint action of both the person and the situation and in 
this sense the dispositional model is also an interactional 
model.
In the empirical section of their paper they report 
results consistent with others already discussed. At least 
in as far as percentage of variance is an indication of 
importance as a determinant of behaviour neither the person 
nor the situation are the sole determinants of behaviour and 
neither the trait or situational models, as described by 
Argyle and Little, are supported. However, in as far as these 
variables do account for some portion of the observed 
variance, following the same line of reasoning, one can 
dismiss neither the person nor the situation as individually 
unimportant, as opposed to their importance in the interaction, 
as a determinant of behaviour. Argyle and Little plumb for 
the interactional model, dispite the fact that their data 
do not offer unequivocal support for this position.
The final paper is one by Bowers (1973). Although he
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makes several salient points about the i V©<*tcomings of the 
situationalist position this paper is of interest here 
primarily because it reviews studies where the proportion of 
variance accounted for by the person, the situation and the 
interaction between these two is reported, over the 19 studies 
reviewed the mean proportion of variance accounted for by 
individual difference is 12.71%, by the situation 10.17%.
The interaction contributes more of the variance than 
either of these main effects in 14 of 18 comparisons. In 
8 of the 18 comparisons the interaction accounts for a 
greater proportion of the variance than the sum of the two 
main effects.
So even with this larger sample, at least as far as 
the partitioning approach is concerned, although the 
interaction appears to be of primary importance neither the 
person nor the situation can be dismissed as unimportant.
1:4 LIMITATIONS OF INTERACTIONISM
Ekehammar (1974) concluded his review of interactionism 
by proclaiming: "Thus, if interactionism is not the
Zeitgeist of to-day*s personality psychology, it will 
probably be that of to-morrow’s" (p.1045). This 
proclamation seems to be based on faith rather than evidence, on 
the belief that recent empirical studies have developed tools 
which permit the proper testing of the interactionist hypothesis. 
Do the analysis of variance studies really test the classical 
interactionist positions?
The two most common terms, consistency and interaction, 
are employed so loosely that people are using them to mean 
quite different things. It has already been remarked that 
Lay (1977) has accused Bem and Allen (1974) of switching 
between meaning of the term consistency, in mid-article.
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To quote him at length; "consistency is (sometimes) viewed in 
terms of inter-subjective differences in behaviour between 
situations, the lack of differences implying consistency.
This view is implicit in all studies employing a variance 
component analysis. In contrast, cross-situational 
consistency may be defined in terms of the relationships of 
behaviour across situations (over subjects), high correlations 
between situations implying consistency regardless of absolute 
differences. This latter view is entailed in any correlational 
analysis of behavioural consistency. People may then exhibit 
differences in their level of behaviour across situations 
but nevertheless still be ’consistent* in the sense of 
maintaining relative ranks across those situations", (p.143).
The first of the two meanings of consistency, referred 
to by Lay, is tied to an absolute view point. Not only 
absolute consistency, but also includes the assumption of 
absolute, as opposed to relative, measurement, otherwise the 
comparisons made can have no meaning. But, particularly 
where questionnaire and self rating data is concerned, it is 
doubtful if any of the data employed in looking at consistency 
ever reaches this absolute status. This is a practical 
point with relevance to the type of data proper to the 
variance model. It is not supposed to be,an observation 
in favour of, or against, either meaning of the term.
Although, of course, in as far as inappropriate data has been 
used it does weaken the claim that a particular ’type’ of 
consistency has been, or has not been, demonstrated.
Magnus son and Endler (1977) have indicated that the 
issue is even more confused by pointing out a third distinct 
meaning of the term. If the first two meanings of the term 
may be called absolute and relative consistency respectively, 
then these authors suggesfeH-hat'-ooherence is a suitable
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Synonym of the third meaning. Coherence refers to an observed 
lawfulness of behaviour, which permits a degree of prediction, 
but the regularity is found in the pattern of responding 
rather than in a set of stereotyped responses.
Magnusson and Endler pointed out that when discussing this 
problem, what might be termed the context of consistency is of 
considerable importance, that is whether one is referring to 
consistency across similar or dissimilar situations. It some­
times seems as though some anti-trait theorists amsume that once 
a person has been defined as belonging to a particular type, or 
located at some point on a dimension then it is legitimate to 
compare his behaviour across any two situations as summing the 
trait theorist would predict exactly the same response in both.
Of course, no trait theorist has ever claimed this. Most trait 
theorists would claim that there are a limited number of 
situations relevant to any one dimension or trait. Even then 
behaviour would be expected to be more similar the more similar 
the situations were. Similarity still needs to be defined, of 
course, and definitions either in terms of perception or in terms 
of relevant traits, without care, could easily become circular. 
One might, of course, regard the fact that no trait is useful for 
prediction in every situation, and possibly that no trait is the 
most relevant way of describing every individual, as yet another 
weakness of the trait approach to personality.
One might decide to follow, for example, Bem and Allen 
and limit the discussion of consistency to traits relevant 
to the individual; or alternatively talk only of consistency 
across ’similar* situations. These solutions would not, I 
think, solve the problem of whether or not people are 
consistent because they miss the heart of the problem. The 
clue to the real problem of consistency lies in the fact that 
the term itself is used in a variety of ways. The problem is 
not simply a linguistic one, although the literature no doubt
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has been greatly multiplied by the fact that people were 
misunderstanding each other. The real disagreement seems 
to be one of emphasis. Different groups of theorists want 
to stress different aspects, or view points, of human 
behaviour; its adaptiveness, its lawfulness, its ordjerliness, 
its idiosyncratic but regularly patterned aspects. It is 
like a mass exercise in Kelly’s constructive alternativism.
Most of the view points bring with them their preferred 
types of causes but these are usually inferred from the 
behaviours they purport to explain, and the most interesting 
statements are usually about observables and relationships of 
observables. Even if one is interested iii-the: causes',-these 
seldom are as mutually exclusive as might appear to be the case 
when reading some authors. It is perfectly possible that a 
particular type of nervous system might be labelled, at the 
behavioural level, with a trait name, but might also 
facilitate or hinder learning, which in turn might lead to 
the subject describing various sorts of experiences.
In other words to a substantial degree the controversy 
lies in as sum I things - view points - to be mutually 
exclusive when they are, in fact, not. They are all, if 
you wish, special views of the truth. We might also follow 
Ryle and point out that often we assume that all ’causes 
are of the same type, when in fact they are not. We are 
making category mistakes.
One might regard the three meanings attributed to 
consistency as three levels of generalization, or of specificness 
There is no necessity to have a one to one correspondence, a 
regularity of correspondence, between levels. It may be 
impossible to translate from one level to another without 
distortion, and loss of peculiar and useful insights which 
characterize a particular approach. For example, while it
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seems evidently true that vhat a person perceives as being 
relevant in a situation will determine his behaviour, 
nevertheless it seems patently wrong to suggest that we can 
have no idea of what he will do unless we know exactly what 
he thinks. Our lives are mostly made up of predictions of 
what others will do. Predictions made on the basis of our 
impressions of others and vhat we feel is relevant in the 
situation. These predictions may, admittedly lack precision, 
are at times wrong, but are normally good enough for us to 
avoid disaster, and to interact with others quite successfully.
The interactionist position is often seen as the way 
forward because it attempts to weld different types of elements 
together to give improved prediction, but does it, in fact solve, 
the consistency problem? Ekehammar places great hope in the 
new ’tool* developed by the interactionist, the partitioning 
of variance technique. As reported above the person by 
situation interaction is consistently found to contribute a 
substantial proportion of the observed variance. Therefore, 
it is argued, the interaction is of substantial consequence. 
Golding (1975) maintains that conclusions drawn from the 
partitioning of variance studies "a propos the theoretical 
issue of consistency are logically specious." (p.279).
He presents a matrix of hypothetical data in which 
perfect rank order is maintained across situations by people, 
and across people by situations. Despite this consistency, 
rank consistency, utilizing the normal method of variance 
partitioning, both person and situation are attributed with 
only a trifling proportion of the variance. When Golding 
employs his *generalizability co-efficient*, however, this 
rank consistency is clearly reflected. He observes at one 
point, "In order to index consistency across situations in 
the rank order sense, differences across situations - their
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tendency to elicit differing magnitudes of behaviour in 
question (situation main effects) are irrelevant." (p.281).
Of course, this is true if one is interested exclusively in 
rank order consistency, but it should be noted that people 
were, in the example,inconsistent, in the absolute sense.
They behaved differently in different situations.
It seems that Ekehammar *s faith is some \diat misplaced; 
the most appropriate method of calculation, depends on the 
form of consistency, or regularity, in which one is interested. 
The tool is ' contributing its own problems. The whole 
exercise of partitioning variance seems to be misguided. It 
was useful once to partition variance, by what ever method, 
to demonstrate that there was no single source of variance in 
behaviour. Perhaps a repetition of the exercise was justified 
to indicate that divers samples will give comparable results,
A third study might be justified if it demonstrates that the 
results may be different for different traits. Continual 
repetitions of the technique do not, however, add to our 
understanding of the "interaction". Continual repetition that 
it is important does not provide theoretical insight.
Indeed, it is not clear that the ’new tool* is an 
appropriate way of looking at the type of interaction proposed 
by Ekehammar *s classical inter act ionist s. As with consistency, 
loose, imprecise use of terminology has resulted in confusion. 
Olweus (1977) goes even further in his condemnation of the 
variance technique: "The variance component technique as used
in this context appears to have brought about more confusion 
than clarity." (p.224).
Simply dwelling on the short comings of this technique 
brings us no nearer to the solution of the problem, A more 
appropriate next step would be to follow authors like 
Bandura (1977) and Olweus (1977) and attempt to make explicit
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what is meant when it is claimed that behaviour is the product 
of an interaction. Bandura has outlined three possible 
interactionist approaches:-
(1) A unidirectional notion of interaction, where the 
person and the situation are treated as independent entities 
which combine to produce behaviour. This is often signified 
by the formulation: B = f(B,E) (B = behaviour; P = person;
E = environment).
(2) A bidirectional approach, which acknowledges that the 
person and environment influence each other, but retains a 
unidirectional view of the course of behaviour. B =f (P^E)
(3) The third approach he calls reciprocal determinism, 
here "behaviour, other personal factors, and environment all 
operate as interlocking determinants of each other" (pp.9-10).
B 4--- > E
Olweus (1977) has proposed essentially the same group 
of meanings for the term interaction (1) "unidirectional 
interaction, namely how two or more independent variables 
(person and situation variables) are combined or connected 
in their relationship to a dependent variable, the individual’s 
behaviour or reaction". (P.225).
(2) An interdependency of person and situation, the types of 
inseparability referred to by Bowers (1973), "In sum , the 
situation is a function of the person in the sense that the 
observer’s cognitive schemes filter and organize the environment 
in a fashion that makes it impossible ever to completely 
separate the environment from the person observing it."
(Bowers, 1973, p.328).
(3) The third form of interaction differentiated by Olweus 
is Bandura’s reciprocal determinism "Here the individual and
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the environment are seen as mutually influencing one another 
and the emphasis is often on processes over time: Environmental
events effect the person’s responses, which in turn affect 
the environment, which again influences the person’s responses, 
etc." (Olweus, 1977, p.225).
The time element though important, is less important 
for Bandura who feels that though logically separable it is 
misleading, and in fact impossible, to separate out e.g. 
the person and his behaviour, or the environment and the 
person. In this sense models ’2’ and ’3’ are clearly related,
(4) The .final meaning of the term offered by Olweus is the 
meaning of interaction normally associated with analysis of 
variance - i.e. a statistical interaction. "As in the first 
mentioned meaning it is here a matter of unidirectional 
interaction of quite a special character", (p.225)
In reviewing interactionism Ekehammar (1974) observed 
"The empirical evidence supported almost witjiout exception the 
interactionist view, which means that the relative magnitude 
of the Person x situation interaction variance was usually 
greater than the relative magnitude of person or situation 
variance," (p.1034),
This seems to indicate quite clearly that Ekehammar has 
restricted himself to just one meaning of the term interaction 
and consequently pre-empted what appears to be the most 
important question: How are personal, situational and
behavioural variations related?
Even if the question Is reformulated as "How do 
individual differences and situations combine in evoking 
behaviour?" (Olweus, 1977, p.226), thus slanting the 
question towards a unidirectional meaning of interaction 
(meanings' ’1* and *4 *), the question may be answered in ways 
which do not include a statistical interaction.
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Olweus provides two examples. The first exemplifies 
the situation where the statistical interaction is a partial 
determinant of behaviour;
B = a + b^ + bgXg + b^X^'X^
(a,b = constants, x^ = values or a person variables, X^ = 
values or a situation variable. In the second the statistical 
interaction is quite unimportant:
B = a + b^X^ + b^X^
So the anova approach is properly applicable only to 
the investigation of one meaning of the term interaction and 
as such is no good as a tool for investigating which is the 
correct, or even most useful, meaning of the term. It has already 
been pointed out that some meanings of the term do not really 
allow a meaningful distinction between person and situation 
and so to talk of how they might combine would be a nonsense.
Raush (1977) made this point quite forcefully when he remarked 
that the division between person and situation, or *me* and 
^not-me* as he calls it, is "somewhat elastic and not wholly/ 
fixed" (p.290). He gives the example of spectacles and beards 
which though definable as objects apart from *me* nonetheless 
have such an intimate relationship with 'me* that I cannot 
feel ’myself* without them. This, clearly has overtones of 
James’ concept of the ’Material Self’. Marriage, in terms 
of the person - situation distinction, is an even more vexed 
question. Raush’s own empirical work certainly does not 
belong to the unidirectional,let alone statistical, concept 
of interactionism. He introduces the concept of time, chains 
of events and reciprocal relations between, in particular, 
individuals.
It seems to be a truism that both the person and the 
situation bear an important relationship to behaviour. As 
for interactions Mischel (1973) has objected that they are
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difficult to interpret, often post hoc, and not replicable.
Nisbett (1977) has objected that they lack any real precision, 
and in consequence are notoriously difficult to disprove.
They are resorted to only, or at least mainly, he claims, 
when the main effects have failed, whereas one should not 
look at interactions until one is sure of the main effects.
Whether or not these criticisms are justified it seems they 
are levelled exclusively at the statistical form of inter­
actionism. This is the form which, certainly here, has born 
the brunt of the criticism, but I feel it would be short 
sighted to abandon this technique at this stage, though it 
certainly must not be persued to the exclusion of others.
None of the types of theory referred to here may in 
the end prove to be true. Indeed it seems un likely that any 
one theory will prove to be universally useful. Until one 
of them emerges as having a clear advantage, then, it seems 
most sensible to pursue them all, or attempt syntheses of them. 
There is always a danger of attempting to predict beyond the 
range of convenience of a theory, or to attempt facile translations 
of theories thus distorting them or denuding them of their 
complexity. To complain that a particular theory does not 
predict at a more or less general level is usually inappropriate. 
More relevant criticisms seem to be that it is not explicit 
as to its level of generality/specificity; and appropriate 
predictions drawn from it are inaccurate or inconsistent, or 
that it is surpassed in its range of predictions by another 
theory.
Mischel challenged the trait position because he 
found that people were less consistent than he felt they ought 
to be if trait theories were correct. The issues of 
consistency, traits, and person-situation relationships have 
since then been looked at some times as related and at other
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times as independent issues. It has already been pointed 
out that there are different levels of personal consistency 
and different ways in which the person - situation relationship 
can be viewed. The weakness of the trait position is that 
the traits must be inferred from the things they are purported 
to cause. However there are fewer problems if we read the 
statement, "He is talking because he is an extrovert", as 
a dispositional statement, rather than a mechanical cause - 
effect one. That is, if the statement is of the sort: 
Extroverts are the type of people who do social things and 
it can therefore be expected of him that he will talk; rather 
than of the sort: there is something internal to this person
which is labelled extroversion and it is this which causes him 
to speak.
Traits may also be seen to be useful at another level, 
or within another system of explanations. People may employ 
traits as categories which determine their responses. Thus 
if having categorized a person predisposes us to behave towards 
that person in a particular way, then the trait may, in some 
respects, be viewed as being as ’real* as the intra- 
organismic variables which are hypothesized to govern 
adaptiveness.
Some theorists have suggested recently that the next 
step in the study of personality might be an attempt to 
categorize situations. This, as an exercise on its own, does 
not seem to me to be a promising direction. It may or may 
not be a sensible thing for personality psychologists to talk 
about people to the exclusion of situation, to do the converse 
certainly does not seem sensible. A categorization of 
situations can only be usefully performed as an integral part 
of a theory of personality which employs individual variables, 
situational variables and their relationship.
Ç2
Rather than attempt to be exhaustive this review has 
attempted to indicate that there is considerable dis­
satisfaction with the traditional trait theory approach to 
personality psychology; that situational as well as 
individual variables and their relationships are being 
seen as more important than they were previously. However nei­
ther simple notions of consistency and interactions nor 
one single research tool appears to be any more universally 
applicable than are the trait theories they are attempting 
to succeed. It was suggested that the trait approach and the 
variability, or adaptability approaches may not, in fact, be 
antithetical. It will be suggested later that it may be 
possible to marry the idiographic and the nomothatic 
approaches to personality in a single theory.
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CHAPTER II: SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
Mischel (1968, 1973) observed that there was nothing 
inherently illogical about type and trait theories, their 
problem was a pragmatic one - they did not work. However 
almost twenty years before Mischel®s pronouncements Ryle 
(1949), in his influential book "The concept of Mind", had 
pointed out that the problems were more fundamental, the 
status of dispositional concepts was often misunderstood with 
the result that invalid conclusions were frequently drawn. 
"There is, however, a special point in drawing attention to 
the fact that many of the cardinal concepts in terms of which 
we describe specifically human behaviour are dispositional 
concepts, since the vogue of the para-mechanical legend 
has led many people to ignore the ways in which these concepts 
actually behave and to construe them as items in the 
descriptions of occult causes and effects. Sentences 
embodying these dispositional words have been interpreted as 
being categorical reports of particular but unwitnessable 
matters of fact instead lof being testable, open hypothetical 
and what I shall call * semi-hypothetical® statements (p. 113). 
So dispositional words do not refer to causes but to one or 
more episodic events.
Enjoyable as it might be to high light the short­
comings of other theories, and to point out that they do not 
perform the job they purport to do, the exercise may well 
prove to be fruitless if some alternative principles for the 
organization or explanation of behaviour are not offered.
The alternative set of principles offered by both Mischel 
(1973) and Bandura (1977) is embodied in what is known as
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social learning theory. As these authors explicitly relate 
social learning theory to the issues of consistency and 
interactionism I shall restrict this outline of the theory 
to the form in which it is presented by these two authors.
As an alternative to internal motivators and 
dispositions social learning theory stresses the importance 
of learning in determining behaviour. There has also been 
an attempt made to include in the theory findings from diverse 
areas of psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, 
with the result that its formulations have moved away from 
the more mechanical ones associated with animal studies 
and place greater stress on the cognitive aspects of learning 
set, the generation and abstraction of rules, the role of 
language and in particular observational and vicarious learning.
As Mischel has remarked "the term * behaviour® has been 
expanded to include virtually anything that an organism does, 
overtly or covertly, in relation to complex social and 
interpersonal stimuli". (1973, p.268).
Mischel summarizes the aims of social learning theory 
as follows : "The proposed cognitive social learning approach
to personality shifts the units of study from global traits 
inferred from behavioural signs to the individual°s cognitive 
activities and behaviour patterns, studied in relation to the 
specific conditions that evoke, maintain, and modify them and 
which they, in turn, change." (1973, p.265).
The two authors present essentially similar points of 
view the major difference being that while Mischel largely 
limits himself to person variables relevant to learning 
Bandura devotes more time to describing the general 
determinants of behaviour. So while Bandura outlines 
four processes, attentional, retentional, motor reproduction 
and motivational, which determine what is learned, Mischel
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stresses the importance of various competencies, both 
cognitive and behavioural, which may be sub summed under the 
various processes,
Mischel suggests that, because of the importance of 
the organization and transformation of information cognitively, 
a person's intellective abilities will be critical 
determinants of his behaviour. He goes so far as to suggest 
that the first factor to emerge from many analyses of personality 
data, and often labelled adjustment or ego-strength, may well 
be an intellective factor. With those of greater intellectual 
ability displaying more appropriate responses, (or at least 
reporting that they do.). Consequently he believes that the 
best predictors of social and interpersonal adjustment are 
these intellective factors.
Of course, what a person will le a m  to do is determined 
not only by his cognitive but also by physical abilities.
Factors such as whether one has‘available behaviours or skills 
which maybe combined to form a more complex behaviour, and the 
availability and accuracy of feed back may all facilitate, 
or retard, the development of a skill.
What will be learned will also depend to a considerable 
extent on the encoding strategies employed. When Mischel 
discusses encoding strategies he appears to mean something 
like personal constructs as proposed by Kelly (1955). As 
Bem and Allen have pointed Out these constructs may or may not 
overlap with those of the observer, and to the extent that they 
do not the individual will appear, from the observeras point 
of view, inconsistent, or to have failed to leam a particular 
response. This is not to say, of course, that even within 
one's own system one will behave with perfect consistency.
To the extent that the perception and encoding of new information 
will be dictated by the existing schemata (organization) so
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as to allow integration and facilitate prediction we can 
expect substantial consistency - though more widely for 
behaviours with greater functional utility than those more 
closely related to specific stimuli. To the extent that 
the existing schemata prove to be inadequate we can expect 
less consistency. Looking at the problem from this view 
point we would also predict that the individual focusing 
on certain aspects of his behaviour - those he regards as 
having functional significance - may well construe himself 
as consistent while others e.g. the psychologist, focusing on 
aspects that are conceived as being of theoretical significance, 
might well "objectively" regard him as lacking cross situational 
consistency.
Mischel*s various points could be subsummed under 
Bandura®s retentional process which includes both symbolic 
coding and cognitive organization. He also includes both 
symbolic and motor rehearsal of particular behaviours. With 
respect to attention Bandura remarks that such factors as the 
sensory capacity of the observer and his arousal level will 
play their part. As for the variations in encoding 
strategies here Bandura points out that perceptual set will 
play its part too in determining just what will be observed, 
and so be available for encoding. Again with reference to 
consistency this leads to the prediction that if a different 
set is being employed , on different occasions, then even 
objectively identical situations may well elicit different 
responses.
Bandura also introduces past reinforcement at this 
point, not simply as a mechanical device for strengthening 
learning, but rather, he suggests that/previous reinforcement 
may lead one to attend to, or focus on, certain aspects, 
because it is these which have proved, in the past ,to be
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indicators of the availability, or probability, of reinforcement. 
The importance is not so much that a particular element of the 
situation a reliable indicator of the likely outcome, but 
that the individual believes it to be so, and consequently 
attends closely to it.
Of course, what is learned is not dependent solely on 
the observer, such characteristics of the stimuli as its 
distinctivehess, complexity, commonness, and functional 
value will all have their consequences.
The last process in the learning chain proposed by 
Bandura is the motivational stage* This is the stage at which 
reinforcement is often called upon to bear a heavy load of 
explanation. Reinforcement has an important role to play in 
social learning theory too, but Bandura has rejected any 
automatic S-R view of learning. Instead he favours the view 
that the importance of reinforcement is not so much in learning 
as in the regulation of behaviour. Rewards are important in 
learning in as far as they create anticipation. When it is 
believed that a particular behaviour will lead to reward, 
or the avoidance of punishment, then it is more likely that 
attention will be focused on that behaviour, that it will be 
coded, stored and rehearsed. Referring to experiments by 
Bandura, Grusec and Menlove (1966) and Rosenthal and 
Zimmerman (1977) Bandura concludes that once attention
is drawn to modelled activities incentives fail to increase 
the amount of learning. He goes on to observe that if 
operant conditioning is viewed in this light it is merely a 
special case of observational’learning, where what is observed 
is the efficacy of one's own behaviour.
The stress placed on observational learning might lead 
one to conclude that if social learning theory were correct 
then originality could not exist and people must turn out to
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be mere carbon copies of each other. In fact, people do 
behave in original ways; how does the theory deal with this 
state of affairs? Bandura points out that the individual 
is not exposed to a single model but to many, besides the 
people he actually knows there are others he may observe from 
time to time. He may acquire new patterns of behaviour via 
the written or spoken word, either from descriptions of the 
behaviour of others, real or imagined, or from explicit 
instructions. There is also television which provides a 
potentially rich source of models. Even the range of models 
is not the whole story, the individual is more than a patchwork 
of modelled responses. New responses, and patterns of 
responses, may be synthesized from acquired ones as these 
acquired ones prove to be of greater or lesser functional value. 
In the environment peculiar to the individual original 
syntheses will be facilitated by differential rewards and 
punishments of specific aspects of the new responses.
In addition to these features Bandura, as already 
noted, rejects the view that responses are merely added to­
gether in a mechanical way, peripherally. Instead he stresses 
the importance of central mechanisms. , This gives rise to what 
he calls abstract modelling. That is people go beyond the 
response which is modelled and attempt to extract the salient 
features, and to formulate rules which will themselves be 
used later as the guiding principles of behaviour, new, 
possibly original, behaviour. It is in this way, Bandura 
suggests, that language may bé learned.
Other people serve not only as models of behaviour^ 
but often as cues to elicit a particular behaviour. They 
may also serve as inhibitors or disinhibitors, stimulus 
enchancers or emotional arousers.
In line with the view that people are not merely pushed
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and pulled by internal motivators and external "stimuli 
Bandura argues that we do not merely respond but we also 
interpret. This point is intimately related to the ideas of 
abstract modelling, rule extraction, and anticipation. It 
is not the simple pairing, he maintains, of stimulus or response 
with a particular outcome, which is important, but the degree 
of predictability, or magnitude of the correlation derived 
which is important. He argues that if this were not the 
case then partial reinforcement could not work. For these 
schedules to be effective they must be based on the belief 
that a certain proportion of responses will be rewarded, 
rather than the response being controlled by its immediate 
consequences. Certainly, at least with humans, with whom 
we can communicate in a way we cannot with other species, it 
is far more economical to tell them that specific conditions 
will obtain, than to allow them to discover this for them­
selves. Verbal instructions are effective with humans. 
Similarly if condition X is seen to follow response Y, the : 
individual may not make the 'appropriate* response if he 
believes that these contingencies no longer apply.
One of the variables which may persuade one that the 
observed contingencies apply generally, is the degree to which 
one can identify with the model. Bandura reports a study 
by Crooks (1967) in which cries of distress were heard each 
time the model monkey touched certain objects. In a free 
play situation the observer monkey avoided these objects.
Effects such as these are hightened if the observer has 
experienced pain along with the model, and of course lessened 
if he has never experienced pain (Church (1959) ). This 
may be why phobics respond with modelled behaviour more 
readily vdien it is performed by an incompetent model, with 
whom' they can identify, rather than when a facile efficient
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performance is witnessed. In the same vein, Stotland (1969) 
reports that people respond more emotinally to the sight 
of a person undergoing pain if they imagine how they, 
themselves, would feel in the situation rather than how 
the other person feels.
The underlying theme Bandura is presenting seems to 
be that observation on its own does not of necessity give rise 
to learning, predictability is a critical determinant. This 
may, in part at least, explain why animate, as opposed to 
inanimate, objects are more likely to become phobic objects - 
they are less predictable.
It would be foolish to go to the extreme and say 
awareness was the whole answer and all behaviour was under 
voluntary control. This seems patently not to be the case. 
Phobics, for example,are often painfully aware that their 
behaviours are irrational, but, nonetheless, cannot gain 
voluntary control over them. Bandura has suggested that 
certain situations may arouse fearful or anxiety producing 
thoughts which in themselves are not under voluntary control. 
Self arousing events may have two components one of which is 
modifiable voluntarily, the other requiring disconfirming 
experience.
I am not too convinced by Bandura's sally in this 
direction. At times he appears merely to relate events 
which are already adequately described, this is not always 
a futile exercise, alternative construing sometimes provides 
insight, but I am not sure it does here. The elements which 
satisfy me least are his rather too free use of mentalistic 
terms such as voluntary, awareness and rational. Earlier 
aspects of the theory also use mentalistic concepts, but 
these are more clearly tied down, concepts such as anticipation 
and abstraction clearly indicate, within the reference of
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the theory, the ability to generalize and predict and 
organize episodic events to a greater extent than is possible 
with what might be called a naive peripheral behaviourist view 
point. The theory could undoubtedly be improved if it was 
acknowledged that all explanations do not necessarily observe 
the same laws of relationship, but this does relatively 
little damage to the theory up to this point. The theory 
only seems to become really vague, and not particularly 
useful, when the concepts of volition and awareness are 
introduced. They do not appear to be adequately thought 
out or defined. What are the mechanics and relations of the 
two? Does volition affect or effect behaviour? If it does 
what does it mean to say some phobias are partly under 
voluntary control? Is the behaviour changed or is it not?
By phobia does he mean more than behaviour e.g. what the 
person says, his physiological reactions, and his behaviour, 
with only one part under voluntary control? This is really 
not satisfactory. It is well known that these three aspects 
are not well correlated. What do we conclude if somebody 
reports fear but does not behave with avoidance? That he 
is a self-report phobic, but not a behavioural one? If 
he says he is not afraid but behaves as though he is - that he 
has voluntary control over his reports but not over other 
behaviour? or that there are two 'volitions'? or, as we do not 
know the relationship between volition and awareness, that 
he is aware of what he wants to say but not of what he wants 
to do, or vice versa.
Ryle has argued that volition was introduced as a 
close relative of responsibility, but if it is looked at 
closely it fades away into an infinite regression. One is 
responsible for an act only if one wills it, but does one 
have any responsibility for willing? Is it voluntary?
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If not surely the act can not be culpable or praise worthy. 
Therefore voluntary control of volition must be postulated 
and voluntary control of these and so on. Similarly 
exactly how volition and awareness influence behaviour is not 
made explicit.
These points are made less as an attack on any 
philosophical position Bandura may hold but simply to point 
out that these terms, as he uses them do not appear to increase 
our predictive powers beyond the point allowed by existing 
descriptions and explanations. Nor are they defined with 
such precision that they provide explanations of greater * 
parsimony.
To return to outlining the theory, both Mischel and 
Bandura stress the importance of expectancies. Mischel 
talks of stimulus and behavioural expectancies, while 
Bandura adds, what he calls, "efficacy expectations", 
the belief in ones ability to perform the activities.
That is even if a person believes a certain outcome will 
follow reliably a specific behaviour he is less likely to 
attempt the activity if he believes he cannot complete it 
successfully. Various factors will influence this belief: 
success at similar tasks in the past, the availability of 
sufficient information to instruct oneself through the task, 
vicarious experiences, either watching or being told about 
the performance of others,' persuasion and exhortation either 
by oneself or others, and one's emotional state. Yet other 
factors will influence whether or not one attempts the activity.
Expectancies and contingency rules govern which 
behaviour will be performed, and this will be the one which 
leads to the subjectively most valued outcome available.
If the situation contains some specific information it will 
be this which determines behaviour. Whereas if there is no
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particular information of specific salience,behaviours of 
general functional utility will be employed, "A persons 
expectations mediate the degree to which his behaviour shows 
cross-situational consistency." (Mischel, 1973, p.272)
The individual will, of course, believe that particular 
stimuli will, at times, predict, more or less reliably, 
specific outcomes. These relationships may be idiosyncratic 
or held in common by a culture. Mischel has observed that in 
reality the relationship may be no better than a correlation 
of .2 or .3, but this might well be good enough to reliably 
elicit a response if a partial reinforcement schedule 
prevails. Of course the subjective value of the outcome 
will be of critical importance, but even here perfect, absolute, 
consistency is not predicted. Factors such as the rewards 
or punishments others receive will alter the value of the 
experienced out come, the self evaluation employed, social and 
physical,conditions obtaining will all have their effects.
Extrinsic rewards are obviously of importance, as 
are intrinsic ones e.g. stepping out of the rain, but both 
of these seem to have a larger part to play in the regulation 
of behaviour, rather than the learning of it. After all a 
skill may not be interesting, intrinsically rewarding, or 
of use in obtaining external rewards until it can be performed 
competently. External incentives can be used to maintain 
performance until proficiency is established, but this is 
usually not the case. Nor do men appear to be totally at 
the mercy of external reinforcement, not only are courses of 
action pursued in the absence of external reinforcement, but 
at times in spite of the existing reinforcement contingencies.
It is for this reason that both Mischel and Bandura lay great 
stress on the importance of self-evaluation and self 
reinforcement.
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Bandura, having reviewed a number of relevant studies, 
concluded that conditional self-reward is, or at least can be, 
learned from models and goes on to comment: "Once achievement
standards are adopted through example or percept, self regard 
becomes conditional upon valued attainment." (p.143).
The overall result of this state of affairs is that 
positive self-regard, and avoidance of negative self-regard, 
become the primary incentives themselves, with external rewards 
merely helping to maintain these standards, and providing 
differential support for the more and less adaptive ones.
On the importance of this internal regulatory system Mischel 
comments: "A comprehensive approach to person variables must
take account of the individual®s self regulatory systems.
These systems include: the rules that specify goals or
performance standards in particular situations: the consequences
of achieving these criteria; self instruction and cognitive 
stimulus transformations to achieve the self control necessary 
for good attainment; and organizing rules (plans) for 
sequencing and termination of complex behavioural patterns in 
the absence of external supports and, indeed, in the face of 
external hinderances." (1973, p.275).
The highest standards are not always u^^held, and 
the methods used to avoid the activation of negative self- 
evaluative processes have long been outlined by social 
psychologists. Such processes as: attempting moral
justification, or employing euphemistic labels,are used; 
or alternatively minimizing, ignoring or misconstruing the 
consequences of one's behaviour; or a third form of strategy 
is to dehumanize the victim, or attribute to him the blame 
for one's behaviour. "It is self-exonerative processes 
rather than character flaws that account for most 
inhumanities", declares Bandura (p.158).
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The story appears to have come almost full circle, 
starting with the main emphasis on individual differences 
and intra-'Organismic variables, moving on to an appreciation 
of the importance of situational variables, and then on 
again to the importance of individual differences and variables 
which are inferred from their consequences. So that towards 
the end of his book Bandura, sounding rather like Allport, 
says, "environment is only a potentiality until it is 
actualized by appropriate behaviour." (p.195)
People construe situations, have expectations of 
outcomes, perform behaviour vhich in turn either demands a 
new construction of the situation or gives rise to new 
expectations. Which comes first the person or the situation? 
It is really a hen and egg type problem and Bandura believes 
it is better to appreciate the intimate relationship, or 
reciprocal determinism as he calls it, than pretend that one 
element is of paramount importance. It is for this reason 
that he rejects the partitioning of variance type approach to 
the problem and the more simple statements about interaction. 
"Because personal and environmental sources of influence 
function as inter-dependents rather than separate determinants, 
research aimed at estimating what percentage of behavioural 
variation is due to persons and which to situations does not 
throw much light on the interactive aspects of regulatory 
processes. Nor is evidence that much of the variation is 
usually due to joint effects of personal characteristics and 
situational conditions especially instructive. Rather, to 
elucidate the process of reciprocal interaction between 
personal and enviromental influences, one must analyze how 
each is conditional on that of the other." (p. 197).
It is for this reason that Bandura supports the research 
approach adopted by Raush. We can all call to mind people
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who by their own behaviour force others to confirm their 
hypotheses, as Raush*s hyper aggressive boys do. Or imagine 
two rats in a Skinner box one pushing, o. lever thus avoiding 
punishment, the other not,and experiencing the punishing 
environment which remains only a potential for the first 
rat. So separation of the person the environment and 
behaviour is always some what arbitrary and artificial
Despite the fact that social learning theory stresses 
the importance of the individual and intra-organismic, 
unobservable variables it is a very different type of theory 
to trait theories. Some might argue that it merely makes 
explicit what is often implicit in trait theories, or that the 
problem with trait theories is more to do with the manner in 
which they are employed than what they attempt to say. I 
have no doubt there is some truth in these objections. 
Nevertheless social learning theory is attractive because it 
starts from the observation that people are different and^  
within their own behaviour, variable. Despite the dis­
satisfaction already expressed with the way the intra- 
organismic variables are employed, and the additional uneasiness 
that they are at times employed simply to replace rather 
laborious but adequate descriptions, they seem more attractive 
than those employed by trait theorists (a) because they are 
integrated in a wide, more generally applicable theory
(b) because it seems, at this stage, to be a more straight 
forward exercise to link them both to physically observable 
structures, and to observable lawful relationships.
This second point seems to me to be important because 
it suggests that if, - for example, dimensions of the 
nervous system can be described, which form the basis for 
individual differences in abilities to learn - the kind of 
work Pavlov, Teplov, Nebylitsyn and others of that school
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have been reporting - then at a gross level we will be able 
to describe people on trait—like dimensions, but also 
preserve the. necessity of requiring detailed information 
before specific predictions can be made.
One other remark needs to be made before I close this 
section. Neither Bandura nor Mischel attempt to come to 
terms with the thorny problem of what constitutes an 
explanation. At one point Bandura observes that conditioning 
does not provide an explanation of behaviour merely a 
description of it. I think if he had allowed more space for 
the development of the idea he may have been forced to conclude 
that many of the statements which trait theories make now are 
perfectly acceptable. Often we attribute to them a status which 
is not properly theirs and this results in confusion, but in 
so far as they serve as useful descriptions and categorizations 
of behaviour they are both useful and desirable. It is not 
always advantageous to have descriptions in miniscule detail 
employing large numbers of variable.
In summary then in as far as social learning theory, 
despite its limitations, attempts to draw together the findings 
of different areas of psychology and in as far as it explicitly 
acknowledges the intimate relationships between people, 
situations and behaviour it is considered an appropriate 
starting place from which to attempt to understand either 
individual differences or behaviour.
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CHAPTER III: EYSENCK’S THEORY OF PERSONALITY
3:1 INTRODUCTION
It has been claimed in the previous chapters: (a) that 
people tend not to behave with absolute consistency; (b) that 
the term ’consistency* has been used in a rather loose manner, 
leading to some confusion, and that it seems unlikely that 
trait theorists would maintain that people are absolutely 
consistent; (c) that statements to the effect that both the 
individual and the situation are important determinants of 
behaviour, or that these two interact with each other, verge 
on being tautological.Without greater elaboration they are X  
useless in helping to predict behaviour or understand individual 
differences; (d) that the application of learning principles, 
with the explicit acknowledgement that people differ in their 
abilities, would help us in appreciating the organization
of behaviour.
It might appear at this stage that this emphasis on
the uniqueness of the individual and preference for an 
idiographic approach to personality study is complemented by 
an implicit assumption that there can be no possibility of 
nomothetic generalization. It is not necessary, however, 
that the idiographic and nomothetic approaches should be
viewed as mutually exclusive.
It seems probable that within a single culture, and 
possibly to a lesser degree within a single species, there 
will be a considerable degree of similarity in both reinforcement 
history and generalization, there is certainly a considerable 
pressure to conform. This, one would expect to produce an 
overwhelming similarity between individuals, but, it has
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been argued, people are, to a substantial extent, quite 
different from one another. One reason suggested for these 
differences was that individuals have differential learning 
ability. However this bald statement, if elaborated, could 
supply the basis for broad generalizations about individuals, 
or groups of individuals. If we elaborate the statement 
that people differ in their ability to leam or condition 
and instead construe this ability in dimensional terms, the 
dimension running from ’good* learners, or conditioners, to 
’poor* learners, or conditioners, then we ought to be able 
to make some fairly broad statements about people, at least 
with reference to behaviours which are as summed to be learned. 
At this stage we would be making dispositional statements 
and be in some danger of becoming embroiled in circularity.
One way of breaking out of this circularity would be to 
suggest a neurological basis for our conditionability 
dimension, thus providing a priori grounds for the prediction 
of differential conditionability. This, in turn, would 
have the effect of leading us to claim that to be identical 
in behaviour two people would need to have not only identical 
learning histories but also identical nervous systems, or 
at least a functional equivalence in the interaction of 
learning and nervous system. The addition of a nervous 
system dimension might also provide us with a richer set of 
hypotheses; the nervous system differences underlying 
differential conditionability may also give rise to other 
more or less predictable differences in observed behaviour.
This is only one of a potentially infinite number 
of possible solutions of the generality-specificity problem. 
However, viewed in this light theories such as Eysenck* s 
biological model of personality do provide a possible link 
between the nomothetic and idiographic approaches, and. obviate
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the necessity of proposing two types of theory, one attempting 
to predict and explain the fine detail of behaviour and 
stressing the differences between people, the other supplying 
dispositional and patterned descriptions of behaviour and 
emphasizing the similarities between individuals,
3:2 EYSENCK’S THEORY AND CONSISTENCY
A convenient way to start the discussion of Eysenck’s 
theory is by ’locating’ it in the Consistency-interactionist 
issue. In his book "The Structure of Human Personality" 
(1960) Eysenck offers the following definition of personality: 
"Personality is the more or less stable and enduring 
organization of a person’s character, temperament, intellect 
and physique, which determine his unique adjustment to the 
environment", (p.3). The fact that he feels it necessary to 
include the term ’organization’ in his definition, in itself, 
indicates he would not be keen on espousing any specificity 
view of personality. Perhaps more importantly he conceives 
of the organization, rather than behaviour, as being "stable 
and enduring", which might be read as implying that what 
consistency there is to be found must be sought in 
generalized patterns of behaviour^ what was earlier termed 
coherence, and rank order consistency, but not at the level 
of absolute consistency.
Eysenck is proposing a nomothetic theory and places 
the emphasis on the relative consistency and coherence of 
behaviour, but it would be a misrepresentation of his 
position to suggest that he rejects, in consequence, any 
possibility of specific responding. After an extended 
discussion on Hartshome and May’s (1928) study on the 
moral behaviour of children he observes: "There is truth
in the contentions of the adherents of the theory of
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specificity, as well as those of the adherents of the 
theory of generality; the problem ceases to be a theoretical 
one, and becomes instead quantitative and empirical". (1960, 
p. 8-9). (The previous chapters illustrate the danger of 
dismissing the problem quite so easily).
Nevertheless it is statements at the typological level 
on which Eysenck concentrates, believing these to be of 
particular importance. Indeed he observes "Classification 
is an absolutely fundamental part of the scientific study of 
personality; a satisfactory typology is as necessary in 
psychology as was Mendeleyeff * s Table of Elements in Physics". 
(Eysenck and Rackman, 1965, p. 15). He views his three 
dimensional model of personality as going someway towards 
this ideal.
However he does provide an explicit description of the 
relationship between the specific responses people make and 
the more generalized typological level \diich he proposes.
"We are dealing with four levels of behaviour 
organization. At the lowest level, we have the specific 
responses.... These are acts, such as responses to 
experimental tests or to experiences of everyday life, which 
are observed once, and may not be characteristic of the 
individual. At the second level, we have what are called 
habitual responses.... These are specific responses which 
tend to occur under similar circumstances, i.e. if the test 
is repeated, a similar response is given, or if the life 
situation recurs, the individual reacts in a similar fashion. 
This is the lowest level of organization; roughly speaking, 
the amount of organization present here can be measured in 
terms of reliability coefficients, i.e. in terms of the 
probability that on repetition of a situation behaviour will 
be consistent.
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"At the third level we have organizations of habitual 
acts into traits.•• These traits - irritability, persistence, 
rigidity, etc. - are theoretical constructs, based on observed 
inter-correlations of a number of different habitual responses; 
in the language of the factor analyst, they may be conceived 
of as group factors.
"At the fourth level, we have organization of traits 
into a general type; in our example, the introvert. This 
organization is based on observed correlations, this time on 
correlations between the various traits which between them 
make up the concept of the type under discussion. Thus in 
our example, persistence, rigidity, subjectivity, irritability, 
and various other traits would form a constellation of traits 
inter-correlating among themselves, thus giving rise to the 
higher order construct, the type". (Eysenck, 1947, quoted 
Eysenck, 1960, p.13-14).
Thus the theory is made up largely of, what have been
termed, dispositional statements, with each higher 
order abstraction being a more generalized summary of groups 
of specific responses which have been found to correlate.
When Eysenck says, "persons who behave in a social manner 
in one situation tend to behave in a social manner in other 
situations." (1967, p.37). He cannot be arguing for an 
absolute consistency, but rather that people who display those 
specific and habitual responses sub summed under the trait 
title of sociability in one situation are likely to display 
those or similar behaviours in other situations. Further, 
as we are dealing with a correlational system, those 
individuals who emit relatively large numbers of social 
responses in one situation, in other situations will also emit 
large numbers of social responses, relative to other people, 
although their absolute level of "behavioural" sociability may
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not be constant from situation to situation. I say "behavioural" 
sociability because Eysenck might well claim that the level of 
sociability is, in fact, relatively constant at least in as far 
as it is a property of the nervous system. That is, the 
genotypical sociability, or extraversion, is constant, though 
its phenotypical manifestations may display some inconsistency.
As already observed the genotypical-phenotypical distinction saves 
Eysenck from the circularity of the : "he is sociable because
he is an extravert, and he is an extravert because he is sociable", 
type. It is at the phenotypical level that situational 
influences are /hypothesized as having their major effect.
"Primary traits, such as sociability, impulsivity, ascendency, 
optimism, and so on, which combine to make up our phenotypical 
concept of extraversion, arise through the confluence of a 
person's genotype, i.e. his excitation/inhibition balance, with 
a great variety of environmental influences." (1967, p220-221).
He offers the following diagramatic sketch of the relationship 
between the genotypic and phenotypic levels.(cf.Fig.3;1)
PERSONALITY PHENOTYPE
ENVIRONMENTAL
INFLUENCES
'3'
Behavioural
Habits
(Traits)
EXTRAVERSION-
INTROVERSION
PRIMARY TRAITS
Sociability 
Impulsivity 
Ascendance 
Optimism 
Etc.
Vigilance Conditioning
'2 *
Laboratory
Phenomena
Perceptual
After-effects
I.R.P.s
Sensory
Thresholds
Speed & 
Accuracy
Level of 
Aspiration
Theoretical 
’1* Construct: Genotype
EXCITATION/INHIBITION
BALANCE
FIG 3:1 Relation of Personality phenotype to genotype and 
environment.
(From Eysenck, 1967, p.220).
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3:3 THE DIMENSIONS OF PERSONALITY
As far the actual structure of Eysenck's model, he 
proposes that there are three major dimensions of personality: 
extraversion - intraversion, neuroticism and psychoticism. 
Working on the correlational principles outlined above he 
arrives at these three factors largely on the basis of 
factor-analysis, but he argues that they have a validity 
beyond the factor analytic technique. In fact he claims to 
have found similar dimensions in macaco mulatto monkeys, 
again using a factor technique. (Chamove, Eysenck and 
Harlow 1972). He comments: "It might at first seem
surprising that similar factors emerge from two different~ 
species, but there are good reasons for expecting such 
agreement. The first reason is linked with the simple fact 
that monkeys and men (and rats also) have similar anatomico- 
physical structures to subserve emotional/fearful behaviour, 
i.e. an autonomic system and a visceral brain, and arousal 
behaviour, i.e. cortex linked with an ascending reticular 
formation; one would expect individual differences in 
behaviour to be linked with difference in the functioning 
of both these systems, and these behavioural differences 
would be expected to be more similar to those observed in 
humans, the closer the species under measurement was to 
Homo sapiens". (Chamove et al, 1972, p.502).
So the reality of the dimensions may be viewed as being 
at the level of the organization and functioning of the 
nervous system.
Of the three dimensions psychoticism is dealt with 
in least detail, it is also of least importance in the 
present context. Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) have 
reviewed the relevant literature. They conceive of the 
dimension as being orthogonal to both the extraversion and
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nexiroticism dimensions, predisposing persons to pychosis 
in varying degrees, and inherited as a polygenetic 
character; this predisposition would extend into the 
psychopathic and criminal, and anti-social fields, but not 
into that of dysthymic neuroses" (1976., p.22),
3:4 EXTRAVERSION
Of the other two dimensions extraversion-introversion 
has attracted more attention. At the behavioural level he 
has offered the following descriptions of individuals at 
the extremes of this dimension: "The typical extravert is
sociable, likes parties, has many friends, needs to have 
people to talk to, and does not like to read or study by 
himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks 
his neck out, acts on the spur of the moment, and is 
generally an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical 
jokes, always has a ready answer, and generally likes change ; 
he is carefree, easy going, optimistic, and likes to 'laugh 
and be merry*. He prefers to keep moving and do things, 
tends to be aggressive and lose his temper quickly; 
altogether his feelings are not kept under tight control, and 
he is not always a reliable person.
"The typical introvert is a quiet, retiring sort of 
person, introspective, fond of books rather than people, 
he is reserved, distant except to intimate friends. He 
tends to plan ahead, ’looks before he leaps *, and distrusts 
impulses of the moment. He does not like excitement, takes 
matters of everyday life with proper seriousness, and likes 
a well ordered mode of life. He keeps his feelings under 
close control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner, 
and does not lose his temper easily. He is reliable, 
somewhat pessimistic, and places great value on ethical
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standards." (1963 (a), p.52).
Moving beyond simple behavioural description Eysenck 
sees the antecedents of this theory in the work of Pavlov 
and Hull, with the result that the biological basis of 
personality dimensions, the constructs of excitation and 
inhibition, and conditioning all play central roles in the 
theory. He procédés by relating these to the phenotypical 
descriptions of personality types in two postulates. The 
"Postulate of Individual Differences" states; "Human beings 
differ with respect to the speed with which excitation and 
inhibition are produced, the strength of the excitation and 
inhibition processes, and the speed with which inhibition 
is dissipated. These differences are properties of the 
physical structures involved in making stimulus response 
connections".
The "Typological Postulate" states; "Individuals in 
whom excitatoiry potential is generated slowly and in whom 
excitatory potentials so generated are relatively weak, are 
thereby predisposed to. develop extraverted patterns of 
behaviour and to develop hysterical-psychopathic disorders 
in cases of neurotic break-down; individuals in whom 
excitatory potential is generated quickly and in whom 
excitatory potentials so generated are strong, are thereby 
predisposed to develop introverted patterns of behaviour 
and to develop dysthymic disorders in cases of neurotic 
breakdown. Similarly, individuals in \diom reactive 
inhibition is developed quickly, and in whom strong reactive 
inhibitions are generated, and in whom reactive inhibition 
is dissipated slowly are thereby predisposed to develop 
extraverted patterns of behaviour and to develop hysterical- 
psychopathic disorders in cases of neurotic breakdown; 
cOnversly, individuals in whom reactive inhibition is
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developed slowly, in whom weak reactive inhibitions are 
generated, and in whom reactive inhibition is dissipated 
quickly, are thereby predisposed to develop introverted 
patterns of behaviour and to develop dysthymic disorders 
in case of neurotic breakdown," (1957, p. 114).
It is worth pointing out that Eysenck has made a 
number of unsupported assumptions in these postulates:
That the speed of development of both excitatory and 
inhibitory potentials is positively correlated with the 
strength of those processed, i.e. fast development correlates 
with strong potentials; that the speed of development of 
inhibitory potentials is negatively correlated with speed 
of dissipation; that there is a negative correlation between 
both the speed of development and strength of excitatory 
and inhibitory potentials.
These .' . . contentions are of importance in
view of recent suggestions (e.g. Eysenck, 1966, 1967;
Gray, 1965, 1967) that the extraversion-introversion 
dimensions might be similar to certain nervous system 
dimensional properties proposed by Pavlov and his followers. 
Eysenck (1967) has speculated that introverts might correspond 
to Pavlov*s weak nervous system types, while extraverts 
correspond to the strong nervous system types. Gray(1967) 
has suggested that the extravers ion- introvers ion dimension 
might be related to strength of the excitatory processes, or 
possibly to equilibruim of dynamism. Such identifications 
have not always been readily accepted. Nebylitsyn (1966) 
White, Mangan, Morrish and Siddle (1968), and Strelau (1970) 
have all questioned whether or not Eysenck*s concept « 
of inhibition is identical to that of Pavlov and Teplov. 
Strelau comments: "Summarizing the foregoing evidence
leads us to the conclusion that EYSENCK* s concept of
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inhibition, inconsistent in itself, differs basically from 
Pavlov's and his followers* views on the question. It would be 
therefore irrelevant to compare Eysenck's two types with Pavlov's 
weak and strong types from the point of view of convergence of 
views." (1970, p.22). Prior to this comment he discusses 
a number of difficulties in identifying the extraversion- 
introversion dimension with either the dimensions of strength 
of the nervous system or with dynamism of the nervous system.
Nor are the Russians ready to accept Eysenck's 
assumption of the negative relationship between excitatory and 
inhibitory processes. Nebylitsyn (1966) insists thaty "Each 
of the nervous system properties should be separately measured 
for the inhibitory and excitatory processes; when using a 
quantitative approach, this involves the determination of two 
'absolute* values for the given property." (1966, p.21). Thus 
allowing for the properties of strength of the excitatory and 
inhibitory processes to be positively or negatively correlated.
Or for them to be independent of one another.
Strelau (1970), assumming independence of strength of 
the nervous processes according to excitation and inhibition, 
compared scores on the extravers ion-introvers ion dimension with 
scores on various nervous system properties, these were measured 
by means of a questionnaire which is in itself unusual. He 
reports the following correlations:
TABLE 3:1 Correlations between the Properties of the Nervous 
System and Eysenck's Basic Personality Dimension.
Extravers ion Neuroticism 
A* B* A* B*
Strength of excitatory process 0.449 0.476 -0.478 -0,557
Strength of inhibitory process -0.007 0.028 -0.450 -0.526
Mobility of nervous process 0.667 0.652 -0.300 -0.215
(From Strelau, 1970, p.23)
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(*®A* and ®B* refer to correlations obtained in two separate 
experiments. *A* was based on a sample of 78 Ss,*B* on a 
sample of 159 Ss. E and N were measured by a translated 
version of the M.P.I.)
These results suggest that neither extravers ion 
nor neuroticism can be claimed to be identical with any of 
the nervous system properties measured, but perhaps show 
greater correspondence with Marten's (1972) suggestion:'
"it seems reasonable to suppose that such a complex personality 
dimension as extravers ion-introvers ion may be collectively 
determined by several basic properties of the nervous system, 
forming a complex constitutional disposition" (1972, p.223),
3:5 THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF EXTRAVERSION
It might be as well at this stage to indicate \diat 
Eysenck wishes to imply by the terms excitation and inhibition.
In what he calls the "weak" version of the concepts excitation 
is regarded as the facilitation of cortical events underlying 
perception, learning and responding, wherea'B^  inhibition is 
the depression of these processes. Thus both excitation 
and inhibition are conceived of as central states. In the 
'Strong' version of these constructs he attempts to relate 
excitation and inhibition to the activities of particular 
neurological systems and structures.
Behavioural differences between extraverts and introverts, 
Eysenck proposes, are related to differential thresholds of 
particular loci, associated with facilitation or inhibition, 
in the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS), and the 
effect this has on the over all functioning of a cortico- 
reticular-loop. Eysenck suggests that while the ascending 
classical pathways carry detailed sensory and executive 
information to the cortical projection areas, collateral
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fibres from these pathways are elaborated in the reticular 
formation (R.F.). Ascending fibres from the R.F. provide 
a non-specific afferent bombardment of the cortex, and it is 
this state of "functional t onus" which Eysenck refers to 
as 'arousal'. Impulses of both the classical pathways and 
the cortical projections into the R.F. travel more rapidly 
than those of the collaterals, this difference in transmission 
latency being sufficient to allow the cortex to exercise an 
inhibitory influence over the R.F. "Thus", remarks Eysenck,
"the cortex is able to modify its own arousal in response to 
specific information reaching it through the ascending 
afferent pathways; in this way a much more refined adjustment 
to the exigencies of the situation becomes possible and 
learning and conditioning factors can affect the state of the 
cortex in ways which would be difficult to account for if 
such reciprocal action could not be postulated." (1957, p.239).
Differences, then, between introverts and extraverts 
are as summed to be a reflection of the overall functioning of 
the cortico-reticular loop rather than simply of differential 
threshold for elaborating 'arousal' or synchrony (inhibitions) 
of particular loci in the R.F. The theory, then, is one of a 
functional balance between excitatory and inhibitory processes, 
rather than the absolute magnitude of either.
Besides this cortico-reticular loop Eysenck suggests 
there is also evidence for a "centrifugal regulation of 
afferent influx". The implication of this appears to be that 
the afferent impulses, themselves, may be potentiated or 
inhibited as appropriate. He quotes Samuels (1959) as 
saying: (a) "At the level of the sensory receptors, the spinal
cord, and in the specific sensory paths prior to the point 
at which they give off collaterals to the reticular formation, 
both the arousal and the cue effects of stimuli may be
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controlled". (b) "In the reticular formation itself, the 
arousal effects of stimuli may be enhanced or inhibited".
(c) "In the cortex, the cue value of the stimuli may be 
affected." (quoted Eysenck; 1967, p,240). He continues by 
quoting Hernandez-Peon (1961) as saying "the reticular 
mechanisms of sensory filtering are formed by feedback loops, 
with an ascending segment from second-order sensory neurons 
to the reticular formation and a descending limb in the 
opposite direction. Such an arrangement prevents over­
activation of sensory neurons and, therefore, an excessive 
bombardment of the brain by afferent impulses. Their 
exclusion takes place at the entrance gates of the central 
nervous system. The first sensory synapse functions as 
a valve where sensory filtering occurs." (quoted Eysenck, 
1967, p.240-241). The implication for the extraversion- 
introversion dimension is, presumably, that individuals 
differ in their ability or tendency to enhance or inhibit 
incoming stimuli. , Presumably these circuits are in some 
sense more sensitive in the introvert, so that he enhances 
low strength signals to a greater extent, or/and begins 
to inhibit them at an objectively lower signal intensity.
The R.F. is also, some (e.g. Jung and Hass1er 
(1959)) would argue primarily, a motor co-ordinating centre, 
and consequently, given the importance already placed on the 
differences in the R.Fs. of introverts and extraverts, it 
would be hypothesized that there ought to be detectable 
differences in the gross motor movements of introverts and 
extraverts.
The net result of all this is, of course, that 
introverts, as compared to extraverts, are assummed to have 
lower sensory threshold, to show a decrease in efficiency at 
lower levels of arousal, to condition more efficiently given
92
certain appropriate conditions, while extraverts will become 
easily bored, be inefficient on detailed tasks, take more 
rest pauses etc. Eysenck has reviewed a large number of 
studies which compare the performance of introverts and 
extraverts on a wide range of tasks, such as vigilance tasks 
and memory, studies comparing them with respect to involuntary 
rest pauses, sensory and pain thresholds, various perceptual 
phenomena, perceptual defence, flicker fusion, motor movement, 
achievement and aspiration levels, the effects of various 
drugs, autonomic reactivity,conditioning etc. As these 
reviews (e.g. Eysenck 1953, 1957, 1967) are readily available 
as well as several collections of relevant papers (e.g.
Eysenck 1960, 1971, 1976). There seems to be little point 
in duplicating the information especially as only those concerned 
with conditioning are of central relevance here, and these will 
be dealt with below. The results of these studies might be 
summed up by saying that there appears to be some support for 
Eysenck's model, but they have so far failed to provide un­
equivocal support for the various hypotheses derived from 
the theory (c.f. Storms and Sigal. 1958).
3:6 TRAITS OF EXTRAVERSION
There has been some debate as to whether the 
extraversion-introversion dimension is, in fact, unitary 
by nature (e.g. Carrigan, 1960, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1963(b), 
1967(b), 1978, Sparrow and Ross, 1964, Howarth and Brown, 1972, 
Howarth, 1976, Buss and Plomin 1975. , Plomin, 1976). Two 
primary factors, sociability and impulsivity,are usually 
found to constitute the higher-order factor of extraversion.
Of course, given Eysenck's approach, out-lined earlier, which 
assumes that lower order traits should be coalesced to form 
the more important typological factors, which form the basis
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for classification in personality psychology, this is not a 
particularly surprising finding. The problem revolves very 
much around what one means to imply by the use of the term 
unitary. Eysenck and Eysenck (1963(b)) have remarked:'
If by unitary is meant simply 'composed of non-independent 
constituent units ' then our results suggest that E is 
indeed a unitary factor. If what is meant is 'composed of 
units related in such a way that their correlations form a 
matrix of rank one', then clearly E is not a unitary factor." (p.52) 
Eysenck argues that impulsivity and sociability are non- 
independent, correlating about 0.5, and so are more usefully 
construed in terms of the higher order factor extraversion.
At exactly which stage one stops looking for higher 
order factors, seems to be based to a large extent on 
theoretical bias, one's emphasis, and which kind of factors 
one feels are most useful. Eysenck (1967), for example, 
has argued that primary factors, traits, tend to demonstrate 
a substantial instability and in factor analytic studies 
difficult to replicate. The second of these arguements 
seems not to be true for impulsivity and sociability, at 
least, Cattell (1973) has also taken issue with Eysenck over
the replicability of primary traits.While Krug (1978) has
taken issue with him in respect of the reliability of 
primary traits. Although, harking back to Eysenck's 
model once more, it does seem to be true, by definition, that
descriptions will become less 'reliable', i.e. reflect less
coherence or rank order consistency, as one moves from the 
typological level to the specific responding level. As 
Eysenck himself was quoted as saying earlier "the problem 
ceases to be a theoretical one, and becomes instead 
quantitative and empirical". The 'nearer' the trait level 
is to the type level the more reliable we can expect it to be.
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the 'nearer' to the habitual response level the less stable. 
With the additional problem that all primary traits will not 
be equally stable superimposed on the reliability of the 
measurement technique.
Plomin (1976) has suggested that both impulsivity 
and sociability can be further sub-divided; Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1978) added venturesomeness as another primary 
factor worthy of consideration; Eysenck and Eysenck (1969), 
report 11 and 14 interpretable factors, employing different 
types of solutions, Howarth and Brown (1972) report 15. The 
problem seems to be, at least in part, that what you get 
out of factor analysis depends on what you put in, and as 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1978), have observed: "whatever
factors may be, they are surely concepts, and concepts are 
useful in bringing order into the chaos of unselected 
observation, but they do not have any sort of physical 
existence.... Thus concepts can be useful or useless; they 
cannot be true or untrue." (pp. 1252 - 1253). Their 
validity, in this sense, rests largely in their ability to 
permit one to make accurate prediction.
It seems to be pointless to consider different factor 
solutions or indulge in factor naming exercises apart from 
the theories which spawned these factors. The utility of 
Eysenck's theory rests largely on the hypothesized differences 
between individuals at the neurological level. It is these 
differences which allow predictions to be made in relation to 
behaviour. The theory, at least at its present stage, does 
not permit a meaningful distinction, at the biological level, 
between impulsivity and sociability and so there seems to be 
little point in arguing which is more 'real', the primary or 
secondary factors, if the primary factors have no relevance 
at the fount of hypotheses. Although it should be noted in
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passing that it has been speculated that impulsivity may 
give a truer reflection of biological differences than 
sociability (Eysenck & Levey, 1972, p.217). Of course, 
the primary factors still retain their utility at the 
descriptive level.
3:7 NEUROTICISM
To move on then to the final dimension of the 
Eysenckian system, Neuroticism, or emotionality, this is 
again considered to be independent of both extraversion- 
introversion and psychoticism. Neuroticism has been 
largely over-shadowed by extraversion in Eysenckian research. 
There are probably many reasons for this, but two seem likely 
to have been of some importance. Neuroticism as described 
by Eysenck is a close relative of anxiety, and there already 
exists a substantial body of research work on this dimension, 
coming largely from Spence, Taylor, and the so called Iowa 
group. This group viewed anxiety as being a reflection of 
Hu Ilian drive (D), and so of being of primary importance in 
conditioning, while Eysenck has argued that it is the 
extravers ion-introvers ion dimension which is of central 
importance in conditioning, and so it was this, the 
extravers ion-introversion, dimens ion which became the focus of 
research activity.
The other reason for extravers ion-introvers ion becoming 
a focus of research activity is that this is regarded as a 
status dimension, extraverts and introverts are always 
different,while-neuroticism is a process dimension with the 
result that differences between neurotics and stables will 
only be evident in the face of emotion provoking stimuli.
Eysenck (1967) quotes Jones* (1960) description of 
neuroticism: "Neuroticism or vunerability to neurosis
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implies low tolerance for stress, whether it be physical 
as in painful situations, or , psychological as in conflict 
or 'frustration'. In learning theory terms an individual 
scoring high on a factor of neuroticism would be characterised 
by a high level of drive in avoidance situations. High 
appetitive drives are not necessary to the theory and it 
may be that the high drive of neurotics is aroused only in 
situations of threat or ego-involvement", (p.41).
It is often assummed that neurotics, as opposed to 
stables, will display greater autonomic reactivity.
Eysenck (1967) reviewed a large number of studies comparing 
the reactivity of neurotics and stables, such indices as 
EEC, electro-dermal activity, muscle tension, catecholamine 
excretion, pupilary responses, heart rate, cardiovascular 
activity have all been used, and although some studies do 
report that neurotics are more labile the more general 
finding is that the neurotic groups fail to show appropriate 
recovery after the stressful simuli is removed, and often 
maintain elevated values of the index under consideration.
Part of the problem in attempting to investigate lability in 
this way may be, of course, the almost insurmountable 
methodological one that the laboratory testing situation 
in itself is sufficiently anxiety provoking to create 
differences between the groups, differences vhich are reflected 
in a complex manner in the peripheral indices.
Another problem in looking at responsiveness in this 
way is that the peripheral indices do not correlate well 
among themselves, and so to test adequately the responsivity 
hypothesis one would need to record several indices simultaneously. 
As Lacey (1950) has commented, subjects "respond with a 
hierarchy of activation, being relatively over reactive 
in some physiological measures, under reactive in others.
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while exhibiting average reactivity in still other measures. 
These patterns of responses seem to be idiosyncratic; each 
subject's pattern is different. For a single stressor, 
patterns of responses have been shown to be reproducible, both 
upon immediate retest and over a period of nine months.
Moreover the pattern of responses obtained with one stimulus 
condition tends to be reproduced in other quite different 
stimulus conditions." (quoted Eysenck, 1967, pp.68-69).
3:8 THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF NEUROTICISM
Whereas the behavioural differences along the 
extraversion- introversion dimension were as summed to reflect 
differences in the central nervous system, particularly a 
cortico-reticular loop, behavioural differences along the 
neuroticism dimension are assume.L to be reflections of 
differences in the limbic system and the autonomic 
nervous system.
Eysenck has followed Papez (1937) and MacLean 
(1958, 1960) in as summing that the limbic system: the
hippocampus, fomix, cingular gyrus,and especially the 
hypothalamus, in particular the manillary bodies of this 
structure, as being responsible for emotional expression, 
organization and experience. The hypothalamus is seen as 
being of central importance executing a variety of executive 
functions. The limbic system, or as Eysenck terms it the 
'visceral brain", exercises control over the autonomic 
nervous system, but is "perhaps more effective with sympathetic 
than with parasympathetic stimulation;." (Eysenck, 1967, 
p.236). "The sympathetic system is, in general, more diffuse 
in its effects than the parasympathetic, certain parasympathetic 
reflexes may occur without the involvement of other parts of 
the parasympathetic system, whereas the sympathetic system tends
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to discharge as a whole (Morgan, 1965, quoted Eysenck,
1967, p.236). Eysenck regards the extent of this diffuse 
discharge as reflecting the level of activation-greater 
activation leading to a more diffuse discharge.
It should not be imagined, however, that the two 
systems, the cortico-reticular loop and the visceral-brain 
autonomic system, are entirely independent of one another.
Both the cortex and the RF exercise some measure of control 
over the limbic system, while collaterals from the visceral 
brain pass into the RF with the result that in states of high 
emotional arousal the cortex will be 'aroused* or 'excited' 
in much the same way it would when the organism is subjected 
to intense stimulation. This, of course, leads to the 
interesting possibility that although the two dimensions, 
extraversion-introversion and neuroticism, are normally 
independent, at times of increased activation, i.e. visceral 
brain activity, the neurotic will behave in a manner typical 
of the introvert as a result of the increased cortical 
excitation. Thus we would predict that for extreme values of 
neuroticism there will be found a correlation between neuroticism 
and introversion. Eysenck (1959) has reported findings in 
line with this hypothesis.If anxiety is a conditionable 
state we might also expect to find a correlation between these 
two dimensions for extreme values of introversion, as summing 
that conditionability increases with ir^trevarsion.
Apart from the breakdown of the independence of two 
of his dimensions Eysenck suggests that in the situation of 
the breakdown of the distinction of the cortico-reticular 
system and in the cortico-hypothalamic system we have an example 
of the Yerkes-Do^^^ox\law in effect. In normal, non-emotional, 
situations introverts are assumc& to reach optimal levels of 
cortical arousal earlier than extroverts with the result that
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introverts are likely to reach optimum efficiency at lower 
objective levels of stimulus intensity and similarly evidence 
a decline in efficiency earlier. Eysenck quotes Gellhom 
and Loofbourrow (1963) as saying that in those situations 
vhere the hypothalamus "starts firing nearly maximally under 
the combined influence of discharge from the reticular 
formation and the sense organs, the latter impinging on the 
reticular formation and hypothalamus not only directly but also 
via the neo-cortex and limbic cortex. Under these circumstances 
the differentiation in activation pattern and function which 
exists between various cortical areas under strictly 
physiological conditions is lessened. The resulting 'functional' 
decortication is not the result of a 'cortical conflict' ... 
but is due to an excessive excitation of the hypothalamic 
system which is incompatible with the differentiated action 
of the cortex necessary for attention and the higher nervous 
processes" (quoted Eysenck, 1967, pp.237-8).
3:9 CONCLUSION
In summary, then, Eysenck presents us with a model 
which breaks away from the circularity of the dispositional 
statement by suggesting a biological under-pinning for the 
proposed personality types. These neurological differences 
between individuals suggest both that there will be certain 
gross differences in the behaviour of individuals, and also 
a predictable difference in conditionability, which may still 
be regarded as an important determinant of detailed behaviour. 
These biological differences also predispose the individual to 
respond differentially to emotional stimuli, and this pre­
disposition too is thought likely to influence both efficiency 
and, in certain circumstances, conditionability. The theory 
also places some importance on situational variables as
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individuals are hypothesized as having different sensory 
threshold and being differentially sensitive to emotion 
provoking stimuli, suggesting that there will be more or less 
predictable relationships between the person and the situation.
This chapter began with the claim that the nomothetic 
and idiographic approaches to the study of personality 
were not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. In the previous 
chapter the stress was placed on the importance of learning 
and the consequent individuality it produced. The present 
chapter has emphasized the similarity between people located 
at a common point on a dimension. The link between these two 
is that these personality dimensions, in as far as they are 
observable, are assummed to be reflections of neurological 
variations, and these neurological differences betwenn 
individuals are hypothesized as having either facilitating 
or debilitating effect on conditioning. Thus those 
individuals who possess the facilitatory’* nervous system 
will be expected to display "learned behaviours" to a greater 
degree than those who do not possess such a nervous system.
Thus \diat a person will do in any particular situation will 
depend on what he has learned to do, but what he has learned 
to do will depend, to a considerable extent, on his nervous 
system. Generalized statements can, according to Eysenck’a 
model, be made about the individuals ability to le am, 
statements about what he has learned are idiographic.
' The correctness, then, of Eysenck’s hypothesis as to 
the relationship between his introvers ion-extravers ion dimension 
and conditionability is central in determining the utility of 
Eysenck’s theory in linking these two approaches© The present 
chapter has outlined Eysenck’s model from which the prediction, 
that introverts will show superior conditionability to extraverts, 
given appropriate conditions is drawn© The next chapter
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will review the emiprical data relevant to this hypothesis ©
102
CHAPTER IV: PERSONALITY AND CONDITIONING
4,1: INTROVERSION-EXTRAVERSION AND CONDITIONING
Eysenck is not alone in relating a personality 
dimension to differential conditionability. Whereas, as 
pointed out in the previous chapter, Eysenck has related the 
dimension of introversion-extraversion to conditionability, 
Spence (Spence and Taylor, 1951; Spence and Spence, 1964) 
has related conditionability to the dimension of anxiety.
There already exist several reviews of the relationship between 
personality dimensions and conditionability, most notably 
one each by the two main protagonists, Spence (1964) and 
Eysenck (1965), and perhaps the most comprehensive review 
of all by Lovibond (1964) which covers not only empirical 
work, but also a number of theoretical and methodological 
problems. Rather than attempt to duplicate these reviews 
I will draw extensively from them adding some more recent data.
Eysenck began his review by stating "Eysenck (1957) 
has put forward the hypothesis that conditioning would 
correlate with introversion (l). This hypothesis is based 
on two major theoretical assumptions : (a) Extraversion (E)
is a phenotypic set of behaviour patterns which is related to 
genotypic differences in the relative ease of arousal of 
cortical excitation and inhibition, extraverts showing 
greater inhibition, introverts greater excitation.... (b) 
Cortical inhibition depresses conditioning and facilitates 
extinction; this assumption follows directly from Pavlov’s 
theoretical concepts and experimental demonstrations., It 
would also be expected that cortical excitation would facilitate 
conditioning provided that the optimum degree of excitation
103
has not yet been reached." (1965, p.258).
It is worth considering these points a little more 
carefully before dashing off to see whether or not introverts 
are usually found to condition more efficiently. Cortical 
excitation is held to facilitate conditioning, but this will 
only be up to some optimal level, as will be recalled from the 
previous chapter, increasing excitation above this level leads 
to a disruption in learning and performance. The result of 
this is that in under-arousing conditions introverts will be 
expected to condition more efficiently, because their higher 
level of excitation ensures that they will be nearer the 
optimum level of arousal. However, this same state of 
affairs also ensures that they will surpass this optimum level 
earlier than the extravert, with the result that the extravert, 
in over-arousing conditions, will be nearer to the optimum 
level and so it is he \dio is expected to condition more efficiently.
Turning to the other process which Eysenck sees as 
important, inhibition, here it is the extravert who is expected 
to have the lower threshold. Inhibition is as summed to be 
detrimental to the formation of CRs with the result that to 
the extent that the prevailing conditions favour the development 
of inhibition a greater difference will be evident between the 
extravert and the introvert, with the extravert showing the 
greater depression of performance. Thus if the greater 
conditionability of the introvert is to be witnessed there must 
be a careful choice of parameters.
Eysenck has long pointed to four parameters which 
are crucial: (1) partial reinforcement, (2) weak UCS,
(3) small CS-UCS interval and (4) differential learning.
*1*, *3* and *4* all favour the build up of inhibition while 
*2 ^^, obviously, favours the introvert with his higher cortical 
excitation; as the UCS increases in intensity it becomes more
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likely that the situation will become an over arousing one, at 
least for the introvert, and hence precipitate a decline in 
performance.
Eysenck and Levey (1972) have reported a study putting 
these assumptions to the test, 144 subjects were employed 
in an eye-blink conditioning situation. They were classified 
as introvert, ambivert and extravert on the basis of the 
Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI; Eysenck, 1959). 100%
reinforcement was compared with 67%; 400 msecs CS-UCS interval 
with 800. msecs; and 6 Ib/in^ UCS strength with 3 Ib/in^.
Figs 4:1 - 4:3 demonstrate the effect of changing these 
experimental parameters. As can be seen from the comparison 
of figs 4:1(a) and 4:1(b) an increase in the UCS strength 
has the effect of creating a situation in which it is the extravert 
who emerges as conditioning more efficiently. Similarly, 
increasing the CS-UCS interval, or employing 100% reinforcement 
as opposed to 67% reduces any difference in conditionability 
between the groups.
These authors report that extraverts condition well 
under favourable conditions, i.e. strong UCS, 100% reinforcement 
and a long CS-UCS interval, but evidence hardly any conditioning 
at all under unfavourable conditions; whereas the introverts 
ultimately showed almost the same degree of conditioning 
whether or not they experienced favourable conditions, though 
the shapes of the learning curves under these different sets 
of conditions were somewhat different. Though it is difficult 
to know how far this latter finding can be generalized as the 
conditions used in this experiment cannot be regarded as extreme.
In considering studies which purport to test hypotheses 
drawn from Eysenck®s theory, then, it will be necessary not 
only to attend to the reported results, but also to examine 
the design of the study. Eysenck divides his review into
Ill
TABLE 4:1: EYEBLINK CONDITIONING: PARTIAL REINFORCEMENT
'W
AUTHOR Ss CORRELATION 
With E
CRITERION
Franks 1956 60 normals & - 0 48 R
neurotics
Franks (1957) 55 students -.46 E
Brebner (1957) 8Es vs Is students (-.6I)a E
Symons (1958) 8Es vs Is students (-,48)a E
Shagass & Kerenyi
(1958) 30 neurotics -.38 R & S
Franks & Leigh
(1959) 80 neurotics -.26 E
Franks (1963) 21 alcoholics - 0 10 E
Franks (1963) 2 8 normal
volunteers -.01 E
Field &
BrengeImann (1961) 33 criminals -.17 E
Das (1957) 63 students -. 08 E
Willett (1960) 80 Youths -.08 E
Sweetbaum (1963) 56 patients - Rb
a Coefficients are not comparable with the rest of the table
as calculations are based on extreme groups only.
b clinical diagnosis
R = Guilford’s R scale; S = Guilford’s S scale; E =: MPI E Sea
(Taken from Eysenck 1965 p.260).
TABLE 4:2: EYEBLINK CONDITIONING: 100% REINFORCEMENT
AUTHOR Ss CORRELATION 
With E
CRITERION
Barendregt & Ree 
(1961)
41 -.29 Heron’s E
Spence & Spence 
(1964)
160 students -. 08 E
Farber, Spence & 
Brechtoldt (1957)
103 students .007 R
Faber, Spence & 
Brechtoldt (1957)
103 students .37 C
Al-Issa (1961, 1964) 90 apprentices - 0 31 E
(E - MPI E Scale; R - Guilford’s R scale; C - Guilford’s C scale)
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three major sections: (1) studies of eye blink conditioning
using a partial reinforcement schedule; (2) studies of eye 
blink conditioning using a 100% reinforcement schedule, and 
(3) studies of electrodermal response conditioning.
Table 4:1 summarizes the studies in group 1 indicating 
the number and type of subjects used, the criterion for defining 
extraversion and the correlation between extraversion- 
introversion and conditioning. It will be noticed that of 
the first eight studies only the final two by Franks (1963) 
failed to yield a significant negative relationship between 
introversion-extraversion and conditioning. The final four 
studies all failed to disclose such a relationship, however, and 
Eysenck has offered a variety of objections to them.
The Field and BrengeImann (1961) study, Eysenck points 
out, employed prisoners as subjects. He questions whether 
the experimental conditions were adequate, particularly with 
regard to extraneous noise. Perhaps more pertinently, he 
also questions the use of the MPI-E scale. There is some 
doubt as to whether this is an adequate instrument for defining 
extraversion in the prison setting. The questionnaire 
contains a number of questions related to sociability.
"These questions are clearly inappropriate in prison,"
Eysenck says, "and may invalidate the scale as a measure 
of E," (1965, p.262).
The problem in Das* (1957) study, too, is the relevance 
of the MPI to the sample population. This time the subjects 
are drawn from various cultural and racial groups, and 
Eysenck comments that "it does not seem likely that the MPI 
scales can be used indiscriminantly for such divergent groups" 
(1965, p.261). Similarly in the Willett (1960) study he 
suggests that the subjects were too young for the MPI scores 
to be regarded as reliable.
13
Sweetbaum’S (1963) study is placed in a subgroup on . 
its own because although a 100% reinforcement schedule was not 
employed, given the importance of inhibition in distinguishing 
the performance of the two groups, it is questionable whether 
a 90% schedule, as used here, allows sufficient opportunity 
for the growth of inhibition, and the consequent superiority 
of the introvert in forming CRs, to manifest itself. Eysenck 
also suggests that the conditions of this experiment were 
productive of anxiety which condition also militated against 
the appearance of a significant negative correlation between 
conditioning and introversion-extraversion.
If Eysenck’s qualifications on these studies are 
accepted then the bulk of the data do support the hypothesized 
relationship. Eleven of the twelve studies yielded the 
predicted negative correlations, though only six of the twelve 
did so to any significant degree. Eysenck concludes:
"Taking all the studies in the partial reinforcement group 
together, we find a relationship between conditionability and 
E with a p value of less than 1 in 1,000,000, even including 
all the studies on whose adequacy we have thrown doubt,"
(1965, p.265).
Turning to the second group of studies, those using 
continuous reinforcement (CRF), as would be expected from the 
theory and from the Eysenck and Levey (1972) study this 
relationship is no longer evident, (c.f. Table 4:2). CRF, 
of course, favours the conditioning of the êxtravert, but the 
actual magnitude of the relationship observed in any particular 
study will depend on a number of variables besides the 
reinforcement schedule, including the UCS strength, the CS-UCS 
interval and whether or not discrimination learning was employed, 
More recent studies appear to be following the same 
pattern of results as those reported by Eysenck, Besides
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the Levey (1972) study, Jones (1975), and Piers and Kirchner 
(1969) have selected parameters appropriate to the testing 
of hypotheses drawn from Eysenck®s theory, and report results 
supporting Eysenck’s predictions,
McPherson (1965), however, strikes a discordant 
note. Like two of the studies quoted by Eysenck in support 
of his position (Brebner (1957), Symons (1958)), McPherson’s 
data were collected from an Aberdeen Ph.D,. Eysenck (1965), 
remarked of Brebner’s study that: "There was a significant
interaction with sex, male introverts conditioning relatively 
quicker than female introverts and male extraverts less quickly 
than female extraverts," (1965, p.260), McPherson has pointed 
out, however, that the data were less favourable to Eysenck’s 
position than this statement appears to indicate. There was, 
in fact, nn significant difference between the extraverted and 
introverted female groups. Furthermore, while all extraverts 
displayed some degree of conditioning, 3 of 11 introverts 
failed to do so,
McPherson reports that in his own study extraverts 
produced more CRs in both the acquisition and extinction 
phases than did the introverts, though not significantly so.
He continues by stating that when his own data are combined 
with those of Symons no significant difference in condition­
ability is found between the extraverted and introverted 
subjects, "Thus the Aberdeen work appears to show little 
evidence that introverts are more conditionable", (1965, p.484). 
he concludes.
While bearing in mind this note of caution it nevertheless 
appears to be the case both that there is some substance to 
Eysenck®s theory, and that he is correct when he warns of the 
dangers of neglecting the paramaters of relevance.
When attention~is shifted to the third group of studies.
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those employing electrodermal conditioning, the position 
appears to be less favourable to Eysenck’s cause (cf. 
Table 4:3),
TABLE 4:3 ELECTRODERMAL CONDITIONING
AUTHOR Ss RESULTS CRITERION
Franks (1955) 60 normals & 
neurotics -.25 R
Lykken (1957) 59 Sociopaths, 
neurotics & 
normals Sig. MMPI
Vogel (1960) 18 alcoholics Sig. E
Vogel (1961) 40 alcoholics Sig. E
Vogel (1961) 40 normals Sig. E
Becker (1960) 62 students N.S. E
Martin (1960) 23 students N.S. E
Halberstam (1961) 56 dysthymies, 
hysterics & 
norms
Sig. Diagnosis
Becker & 
Matteson (1961) 40 students N.S. R
MMPI
Davidson et al 
(1964) 73 students N.S. E
RECENT STUDIES
Davidson et al 
(1964) 40 neurotics N.S. E
Morgenson & 115 normals N.S. E
Martin (1969)
Wilson (1968) 
Slubicka (1972)
15 High School 
Students o45
Sig.
E
E
Mangan (1974) 25 normals N.S. E
Lovibond (1963) - 100 normals N.S. E
R - Guilfords R scale; E - MPI E scale
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Eysenck (1965) reports that Lykken (1957) found a 
negative relationship between introversion-extraversion and 
conditioning. This study, while it did use discriminant 
conditioning which according to Eysenck (1962) should favour 
the build up of inhibition, also employed 100% reinforcement 
and a UCS (an electric shock) described as "decidedly 
unpleasant, producing in most cases a pronounced startle 
effect." Given this mixture, some parameters favouring 
the superior conditioning of the introverted subjects, others 
favouring the extraverts, and given the absence of data 
indicating either which of these parameters is the most salient, 
or how they interact to produce the conditioning effect in this 
situation, this study cannot really be quoted in favour of, 
nor as evidence against, Eysenck’s theory. Of the studies 
quoted by Eysenck four failed to yield significant negative 
correlations. Of the Becker (1960), Becker and Matteson 
(1961) and Davidson et al (1964) studies Eysenck believes that 
the UCS was of a "very emotion-producing strength" and "it 
comes as no surprise, therefore, that E did not correlate 
with conditioning in these experiments," (Eysenck, 1965, p.265), 
In Martin’s (I960) experiment, too, the UCS appears to have 
been of a suspect strength (a 110 db tone).
To this point Eysenck®s objections to various studies 
appear to have some justification. However, I fail to see 
how he can claim that Lykken’s (1957) study supports his 
position, for the reasons given above, nor how he can list it 
with those studies whose UCSs are classified as "relatively 
weak" (Eysenck, 1965, p.265) when the UCS in this case has 
been described as "decidedly unpleasant," (p,263).
Another cautionary note appears to be in order here; 
though most of Eysenck’s objections appear justified one must 
avoid according them a status that is not properly theirs.
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These objections are suggestions, or hypotheses, which, by 
and large, attempt to throw some light on vhy predictions 
apparently drawn from Eysenck’s theory failed to be confirmed. 
The real reason for these ’failures’ may be quite different 
from those suggested. It is possible that all the parameters 
relevant to the testing of this theory have not been specified, 
the results may possibly be due to chance, the theory itself 
may be incomplete, or completely wrong. Often data are simply 
not available to evaluate an objection in a particular case.
For one of the studies to which Eysenck did object 
the data are, however, available. Becker and Matteson (1961) 
anticipated Eysenck’s objections; after attempting to estimate 
the effect of the UCS intensity they comment: "If shock level
were positively correlated with the criterion conditioning 
score used to test Eysenck’s hypothesis, then this difference 
in shock level could have acted to suppress a relationship 
between CSR conditioning and R (Guilford’s R was used as a 
measure of extraversion). However, the correlation between 
shock level and criterion conditioning score was found to be 
-.11. The correlation between shock level and amplitude 
conditioning score was -.29, The negative relationship, 
though insignificant, may be related to the fact that shock 
level was increased if the GSR to shock decreased appreciably. 
The above findings support the conclusion that the method of 
determining shock level did not produce systematic biasing 
effects which would necessitate modification of the main 
findings," (1961, p,429). The main findings were that while 
conditioning was not related to the introversion-extraversion 
dimension it was related to anxiety.
Here then is one instance in which it appears that 
Eysenck’s ’explanation’ is incorrect. Even this study cannot 
be regarded as providing no support for Eysenck’s theory.
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however. The theory predicts that extraverts will require 
a stimulus of greater intensity than will introverts to produce 
a response of equivalent magnitude; this is what was found in 
this study, though the difference was not significant.
Of the studies in table 4:3 reported by Eysenck both 
Martin (1950) and Davidson et al (1964) used CRF and both 
failed to find a significant relationship between introversion- 
extraversion and conditioning. Of the more recent studies 
only one, Slubicka (1972), has yielded results in the direction 
predicted by Eysenck, while studies by Davidson et al (1966, 
1968), Morgenson and Martin (1969), Wilson (1968), Mangan 
(1974) and Lovibond (1963) have all failed to confirm Eysenck’s 
predictions. Various objections could be leveled against 
most of these experiments as tests of Eysenck’s theory.
For example only in Wilson’s (1968) study was a partial 
reinforcement schedule employed. In this study, however, a 
positive correlation (.45, p^.05) was recorded between 
extraversion and conditioning, although only 15 subjects took 
part in the experiment.
On the basis of the above experimental data it 
certainly cannot be concluded that Eysenck’s position, 
relating personality to conditioning, is well supported in 
electrodermal conditioning. Lovibond (1964) has commented: 
"Possible reasons for the failure to demonstrate a stronger 
relationship, other than the invalidity of the theory, include 
unreliable conditioning measures, and inadequacy of the E 
scale as a measure of extraversion. By and large it is clear 
that the reliability of both eye blink and GSR conditioning 
measures is reasonably satisfactory". (1964, p.120).
Eysenck has expressed his opinion of this view in 
no uncertain terms in replying to a similar comment by Franks 
(1963). "He (Franks) suggests ’that it is perhaps the
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technique used to measure extraversion which is most suspect 
(po306)p This is not a tenable view, in our opinion; 
questionnaire measures of E are reliable and valid (Eysenck 
and Eysenck, 1964) and in the absence of direct evidence 
invalidating the questionnaire used, speculation of this kind 
is not helpful," (Eysenck, 1965, p.262).
In conclusion then it would seem that Eysenck’s 
hypotheses have fared better in eye blink conditioning studies 
than in studies of electrodermal conditioning. It is not 
easy to decide vhy this might be, whether because of a lack 
of generality or because of some peculiarity of electrodermal 
conditioning. However rather than enter into speculation 
it can be pointed out that the majority of studies quoted, 
unfortunately including some of those Eysenck quotes as 
supporting his own hypotheses, have not appropriately controlled 
those parameters which are of theoretical importance in 
influencing the observed relationship between the introversion- 
extraversion dimension and conditioning. It would seem 
rash to offer any firm conclusions at this stage, there 
appears to be data both in support of, and against, the theory. 
It would seem that the case must remain open for the time being.
4:2 ANXIETY AND CONDITIONING
While Eysenck has argued that it is the introversion- 
extraversion dimension which is primarily responsible for 
differential conditionability, Spence has argued that it is 
anxiety in which we should be interested. Spence has used 
Hullian learning theory as the foundation of his approach.
Taylor (1956) indicated those aspects of the theory which 
are relevant to the proposition that conditionability is 
positively related to anxiety when she said: "According
to Hull, all habits (H) activated in a given situation.
20
TABLEt 11 tit IOWA STUDIES OF CONDITIONING PERFORMANCE OF PRESELECTED HA 
AND LA SCALE Ss
Iowa Experiments
•No.
trials
Ready
Signal
UCS
(psi)
No. Percent CR Diff.
(H-L)
HA LA
P
1) TAYLOR (1 9 6 3) 80 Yes 1.6 60 59.6 2 7 . 9 21.7' .001
2) SPENCE-TAYLOR (T951) 100 Yes .6 50 48.2 33.8 14.4 .0 5®
100 Yes 2.0 5 0 55.0 41.7 1 3 . 3 . 0 5
3) SPENCE-FARBER (l953) 6 0 Yes 1.0 64 48.8 3 4 . 1 14.7 . 0 5
»♦) SPENCE-BEECROFT (195^) 50 Yes 1.0 45 5 6 . 5 3 6 . 3 20.2 .02
5) SPENCE-WEYANT (I9 6 0 ) 100 No . 2 5 36 41.8 28.6 . 1 3 . 2 .1^
100 No 2.0 36 6 5 . 4 53.2 12.2 .1
6) SPENCE (UNPUBLISHED) 80 Yes . 2 5 60 3 6 . 5 21.6 14.9 .02°
80 ' Yes 1.5 6 0 48.0 38.8 9.2 .02
a The F Value based bn all groups provided a p value, of .01
b The F value based on all groups provided a p value» of . 0 5
c The F value based on all groups provided a p value‘ of .01
TABLE NON-IOWA STUDIES OF CONDITIONING PERFORMANCE OF HA AND LA
SCALE Ss
'
No.
trials
Ready
Signal
UCS
(psi)
No.
Ss
Percent CR Diff.
(H-L)non—J-ova j^xperiments
HA LA
P
l) HILGARD et al (l95l) 60 Yes 1.6 20 3 2 . 5 3 2 . 4 2.8 -
2) PROKASY-TRUAX (l959) 20 No 3.0 20 3 6 . 0 48.0 -12.0 -
3) BARON-CONNER (igGo) 80 No 1.6 36 44.9 2 7 . 8 1 7 . 1 .01
4) KING et al (1 9 6I) 80 Yes 1.5 32 37.4 5 1 . 6 -14.2 -
5) KING et al (1 9 6 1) 80 No 1.5 32 66.8 64.0 2.8 -
6) KING et al (1 9 6 1) 80 Yes 1.14 40 4 9 . 0 5 1 . 3 -2.3
TABLE i416 STUDIES OF PERFORMANCE OF HA, AND LA SCALE Ss TO POSITIVE CS 
IN DIFFERENTIAL CONDITIONING
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Study
Ready
Signal
No,
Ss
Percent CR 
HA LA
5 % ,
P
1) SPENCE-FARBER (l953) Yes 37 5 0 . 0 39.7 10.3 . 0 5
2) SPENCE-FARBER (1954) • Yes 52 41.1 31.7 9.4 . 0 9
3) PROKASY-WHALEY (1 9 6 2) Yes 60 5 4 . 5 39.5 1 5 . 0 . 0 5
4) PROKASY-WHALEY (I9 6 2 ) No 70 6 0 . 2 5 6 . 7 3.5 —
-
TABLE 4 17 IOWA STUDIES INVOLVING UNPUBLISHED DATA FROM POSTSELECTED Ss
No,
trials
Ready
Signal
UCS
(psi)
No.
Ss
Percent CR Diff.
(H-L)
P
Study
HA LA
1) RUNQUIST & ROSS (l959) 41-80 Yes 1.0 27 7 0 . 0 44.3 2 5 . 7 . 0 5
2 ) RUNQUIST & SPENCE (l959) 41-80 Yes 1.0 34 57.0 38.2 18.8 . 0 5
3 ) INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: 
(UNPUBLISHED)
1-80 Yes 1.0 . 52 41.8 4 5 . 5 -3.7 -
4) EXTINCTION: (u n p u b l i s h e d ) 1 - 3 0 No 2.0 39 64.3 5 3 . 6 10.7 . 0 5
5a) CONDITIONING PROBLEM: 
MALE (u n p u b l i s h e d )
3 1 - 6 0 No .6 67 61.8 4 7 . 6 14.2 . 0 5
5b) CONDITIONING PROBLEM: 
FEMALE (u n p u b l i s h e d )
3 1 - 6 0 No .6 31 7 1 . 0 59.0 12.0
' \
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combine multiplicatively with the total effective drive state 
(D) operating at the moment to form excitatory potential or E 
(E = f(H X D))., Total effective drive in the Hullian system 
is determined by the summation of all extant need states, 
primary and secondary, irrespective of their relevancy to the 
type of reinforcement employed. Since response strength is 
determined in part by E, the implication of varying drive 
level in any situation in which a single habit is evoked is 
clear; the higher the drive, the greater the value of E and 
hence of response strength. Thus in simple, non-competitional 
experimental arrangements involving only a single habit 
tendency, the performance level of high drive Ss should be 
greater than for low drive groups." (Quoted by Lovibond,
1964, p.121)0 Anxiety is considered by Spence to exhibit 
the properties of a drive and, given Hullian theory, high anxiety 
individuals are expected to show superior conditioning "in 
simple, non-competitional" situations.
Tables 4:4 - 4:7 are taken from Spence^ review of 
the available relevant conditioning studies. It can be seen 
from table 4:4 that all the Iowa studies report a significant 
difference in conditioning between the high anxiety (HA) 
and low anxiety (LA) groups. Added to this table should be 
a study by Spence and Spence (1964), using 160 subjects, 100 
males and 60 females. They report a correlation of .242 
(p ^  *05) between conditioning and neuroticism, (the MPI - N 
scale was used) and a correlation of .224 (p ^ .05) between 
conditioning and anxiety, as measured by the Manifest Anxiety 
scale (MAS). These significant correlations held only for 
the male sample, however, the respective correlations for the 
female sample were ,157 (N.S.) and .067 (N.S,). So in this 
study Spence’s predictions received only partial confirmation.
One is curious to know why those studies performed in
12
Spence’s own laboratory, table 4:4, yield consistently 
significant results whereas those experiments performed 
elsewhere are much less encouraging to Spence’s propositions, 
(c.f. Table 4:5). Spence suggests this may be to do with the 
experimental conditions employed, in his own laboratory the 
stress is placed on using naive subjects in anxiety provoking 
situations. He says : " a deliberate attempt was made in
the Iowa studies to provide conditions in the laboratory that 
might elicit some degree of emotionality". (1964, p,135). He 
describes the experimental procedure as follows: "On coming
into the experiment, S at first saw an impressive array of 
electronic recording equipment and was then led to an adjoining 
room in which was located an isolated, screened cubicle. The 
latter contained a dental chair (sic) in which S was seated in 
a reclining position, while a head band was placed on his head 
and a plastic piece was fastened to his upper eyelid. After 
completing the instructions, the illumination in the cubicle 
was reduced to a low level of semi-darkness and S was informed 
that if need arose, he could get in touch with E by means,of 
a microphone placed on a stand within his reach. The door 
to the cubicle and the door to the adjoining room in which E 
worked were then closed and S was left in isolation." (1964, 
p.135).
I think there would be little argument- that these 
conditions are correctly described as anxiety provoking.
That these experimental procedures are of central importance 
receives some support from a study by Kimble (Ominsk and 
Kimble, 1966). Kimble was co-author with King, in the three 
King et al studies listed in table 4:5. These studies not 
only failed to support the anxiety-drive hypothesis but in two 
of the three studies actually report results in the opposite 
direction, LA subjects producing more CRs than HA subjects.
‘3
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though these results were not statistically significant.
According to Kimble these studies were conducted in an 
environment not calculated to be anxiety provoking. The 
Ominsk and Kimble (1966) study, however, made use of a room 
which is described as being like a refrigerator or bank- 
vault in which the subject was left alone. This study, 
contrary to the earlier ones, does report results in line with 
the Spence-Hull hypothesis.
The importance of employing the appropriate parameters 
are further emphasized when we consider studies that, instead 
of manipulating anxiety by selecting HA and LA subjects,
choose individuals in more or less stressful situations. 
Several studies have employed so called ’real life’ stress:
Beam (1955) used students awaiting their doctoral examination 
in an electrodermal conditioning study, Sweetbaum (1963) used 
patients awaiting a surgical operation, and Willett (1963) 
compared youths taking part in a stressful selection procedure 
with those who had already been selected, all report that 
those subjects experiencing the more stressful situation 
displayed the greater degree of conditioning.
Encouraging as these results are,the story is not one 
of unmitigated success as Hobson (1968, 1969) and Beck (1963) 
report superior conditioning from HA groups while minimizing 
generalized anxiety. Franks (1956, 1957) does not report whether 
his experimental procedures may or may not be considered 
anxiety provoking, but he did not find any relationship between 
anxiety and conditioning.
Becker and Matteson (1961) and Piers and Kirchner (1969) 
have both reported studies supporting Spence’s hypothesis.
Though the latter study is not at all straight forward.
Both N (from the EPI) and MAS were found to correlate 
significantly with conditioning, .341 (p .01) and .305 (p-c.Ol)
1 2 5
respectively. When MAS was corrected for extraversion the 
correlation fell to .24 (p -< .05), and as might be expected 
the correlation disappeared ( .06), when the effect of N was 
partialled out. Extraversion (E) was also found to 
correlate with N (.39), and with conditioning -.223 (p<o05). 
Unlike the standard Spence experiment a 50% reinforcement 
schedule was employed and no effort was made to arouse anxiety.
As in the case of Eysenck’s hypothesis it appears 
that not only is it important to adhere to the relevant 
parameters, but different forms of conditioning yield 
different results. Studies by Bitterman and Holtzman (1952) 
Gilbert and Davenport (1960) Lacey, Smith and Green (1955),
Becker (1960), Wilson (1968),Morgenson and Martin (1963)
Lovibond (1963) and Mangan (1974) all employed an 
electrodermal conditioning paradigm, and all failed to 
discover any relationship between conditionability and anxiety.
It should be noted, however, that the last two studies 
are somewhat different from the rest; Lovibond (1963) used 
both an aversive UCS (electric shock) and a non-aversive UCS 
(slides of nude females), while Mangan (1974) used only the 
non-aversive UCS (slides of nude females)o
Bindra, Paterson and .Strzelecki (1955) also employed 
a non-aversive stimulus, a lollipop, in the study of salivary 
conditioning. They failed to find any significant relationship 
between anxiety and conditioning and concluded that a specific 
drive, a defensive reaction, was being utilized in eyeblink 
conditioning and that it would be only under circumstances 
where such a reaction was activated, that a relationship 
between conditioning and anxiety would be apparent. This, 
of course, is the position held by Eysenck, he maintains 
that the Hullian "irrelevant" drive is not a primary determinant 
of conditioning, and that anxiety will be related to conditioning
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only to the extent that it is a measure of a drive relevant 
to the conditioning situation.
Lovibond (1964), has, however, cast doubt on the 
value of the Bindra et al study, commenting that it is open 
to serious methodological criticism (c.f. 1964, p.124), He 
reports that this experiment has been repeated in Adelaide, 
but this time with a control group. The curves for both 
groups, he reports, were identical in form to those obtained 
by Bindra et al (c.f. 1964, p.151), but there was no 
significant difference between the experimental and control 
groups.
It seems then that like Eysenck’s,Spences *s hypothesis 
fares better with eyeblink than with electrodermal conditioning. 
It appears to have no success at all when faced with 
appetitive reinforcement, but perhaps this is not too 
unexpected in view of the stress Spence places on the 
importance of anxiety producing situations. However, this 
finding does appear to place sever limitations on the usefulness 
of the theory.
4:3 EYSENCK AND/OR SPENCE
It might seem that there is an implicit assumption 
that if one of these theories is correct then the other must, 
of necessity, be wrong. Neither theorist, however, claims 
that the two theories are mutually exclusive, Spence, for 
example, has said: "It should be noted, however, that our
interpretation of the MA scale data in terms of the facilitating 
effects of drive on conditioning performance is not 
necessarily incompatible with Eysenck®s hypothesis concerning 
the greater susceptibility of extraverts to I^ «, Our view 
becomes contradictory to Eysenck’s only when he adds the 
assumption that neuroticism is not a factor affecting
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performance." (Spence & Spence, 1964, p.148).
As remarked above the main difference between the two 
theorists is whether or not Hullian "irrelevant" drive, i.e.
"one that is not reduced by performing the behaviour being 
studied"(op. cit, p.148) facilitates conditioning, Spence 
argues that it does, while Eysenck states: "Individuals
higher on N are innately predisposed to react strongly and 
lastingly to certain classes of stimuli with an innervation 
of their sympathetic nervous systems". He continues, "Task­
relevant drive may be created through changes in the experimental 
conditions, that is, through manipulation of attitudes (Spence, 
1964) through the threat of surgery (Sweetbaum, 1963 ) or 
possibly in other ways (Willett, 1964). Under these conditions 
sympathetic innervation will be greater and will last longer 
in Ss high on N, and consequently correlations will be observed 
between N and conditioning." (Eysenck, 1965, p.266).
Eysenck, then, predicts that N will be related to 
conditionability only where certain task relevant drives, 
usually stress,are aroused. This prediction would appear to 
be supported by the Bindra et al (1955), Lovibond (1963) and 
Mangan (1974) studies. Nor does there appear to be any 
clear evidence in support of the contention that "irrelevant" 
drive is a critical determining factor in differential condition­
ability.
Pursuing this line of arguement even further Lovibond 
(1964) has briefly reviewed some of the electro-physiological 
work, and after quoting such authors as Malmo (1958), Wolpe 
(1958) and Anokhin (1961) he suggests that "individuals in a 
state of strong anxiety, whether chronic or acute, will manifest 
a decreased capacity for forming positive reward conditional 
reflexes." (1964, p.128), Quoting his own (1963) study he
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observes that low scorers on the Eysenck N scale performed 
at a higher level, though not significantly so, than high 
scorers in conditions of positive reinforcement. He then 
proceeds in an attempt to marry the two theories in the following 
formulation:
"A reconciliation between the views of Eysenck and 
Spence and the accumulated evidence may be effected by the 
acceptance of the following propositions:
1. The level of cortical excitation, which determines the 
speed of formation of the conditional linkages, is 
dependent on
(a) the degree of subcortical arousal
(b) the general excitability of the cortex, i.e. the 
capacity of the cortex for developing excitation 
from a given level of subcortical arousal.
2. Individuals differ with respect to three dimensions of
nervous activity which are at least partially independent:
(a) general excitability of the cortex,
(b) defensive arousability, and
(c) appetitive arousability.
3. The personality dimension which is related to general
excitability of the cortex, and hence to a general 
factor of conditionability, is introversion-extraversion, 
and the relationship is such that introverts will 
manifest higher levels of general cortical excitability, 
and conditionability than will extraverts.
4. The personality variable of anxiety is related to level
of defensive arousal, and a group factor of aversive 
conditionability,
5o The relationship between different arousal systems is
a mutually inhibitory one so that, e.g., a high level 
of defensive arousal at a particular time will, reduce
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the capacity for appetitive arousal, and hence 
appetitive conditioning performance,
6, The relationship of reciprocal inhibition between
different types of arousal will be to some degree 
asymmetricale Because of the generally greater 
strength of defensive arousal, the inhibitory effects 
of this type of arousal are likely to be more readily 
observed than inhibitory effects of nondefensive 
arousal". (Lovibond, 1964, pp. 126-127).
Lovibond, then, suggests that although there may, indeed, 
be a general factor of conditionability, based perhaps on 
Eysenck®s introversion-extraversion dimension, it will also be 
necessary to consider the type of reinforcement being employed 
and the differential sensitivity of the neurotic to these.
One might be lead to predict that in those situations where 
both appetitive and aversive reinforcers are being employed 
the high N group should be particularly poor in the formation 
of positive conditional links; the low N group, however, having 
a lower potential for defensive arousal and, therefore, 
presuimoiViVy less differentiation between systems Wiich are 
mutually inhibitory, ought to form both appetitive and aversive 
conditional links with difficulty. Thus we might expect the 
high N group to be highly efficient in forming negative 
conditional CRs with little likelihood of positive conditional 
CRs being elicited, as we draw nearer the stable (low N) end of 
the dimension, there ought, in this kind of conflict situation, 
to be little likelihood of any conditioning due to the mutually 
inhibitory effects of the two systems.
A recent study by Kantorowitz (1978) has also added to 
the speculation that the type of reinforcement used might be 
an important determinant of which groups are ultimately 
found to condition, Kantorowitz (1978) used eight male
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subjects in a study "involving conditioning and deconditioning 
of sexual arousal". Using the EPI to classify subjects he 
reports a correlation of ,88 (p < 0.01, 2 tailed) between E 
and tumescence conditioning, and of -,76 (p <  0.05, 2 tailed) 
between E and de tumescence conditioning. N was found to 
correlate -.51 and .25, (both N.S.), to the two forms of 
conditioning respectively. These latter correlations are 
less important as the range of N scores was rather restricted.
With regard to the E dimension the results may be accounted
for on the basis of Eysenck’s theory, if we regard the tumescence 
conditioning as a situation of high arousal, and detumescence 
as a situation of lowered arousal. Kantorowitz, however, has
suggested that we might regard the pre-orgasmic tumescence as
an appetitive situation, vhile detumescence is an instance of 
satiation and, in consequence, non-rewarding. Thus, the 
results of this experiment might be interpreted as indicating 
that the extravert is better at conditioning to appetitive 
rewards while the introvert is better at conditioning to 
aversive reinforcement. Kantorowitz, then, like Lovibond 
casts an element of doubt on Eysenck’s suggested relationship, 
but these two authors themselves propose different solutions.
The importance of distinguishing between different types 
of reinforcers will be dealt with at some length in the next 
chapter when Gray®s theory of personality is discussed. Before 
we turn to that theory, however, I think it ought to be 
acknowledged that not everyone is happy to accept, not only 
that particular personality dimensions are peculiarly related 
to conditionability, but even that it is appropriate 
to talk of humans conditioning at all. Brewer (1974)^  for 
example, has entitled an article "There is no convincing 
evidence for operant or classical conditioning in adult 
humans," This seems to be a typical expression of the
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growing, and fashionable, discontent with behaviourism or 
anything which smacks of behaviourism. As Mackintosh has 
commented a "common attitude today is that conditioning is a 
dull and mechanical form of learning, whose rather trival laws.... 
are fully understood and do not merit further study" (1978, p.43). 
Concordant with some of the views expressed earlier and to be 
proposed later (e.g. the importance of expectation and the 
experiment of Hernstein and Hindline (1969)) Mackintosh 
suggests that we might profitably view conditioning as a process 
of detecting relations between events. No apology needs to 
be made, I think, if this sounds a bit "cognitive", as Mischel 
has indicated;the meaning of the term "behaviour" has been 
steadily expanding over recent years.
The main point of attack of Brewer’s arguement is that 
people are often aware of what they are doing, or of the 
reinforcement contingencies in a conditioning experiment, and, 
therefore whatever is going on is not properly called 
conditioning. Brewer is contributing to the learning with/ 
without awareness issue and one might challenge him on 
several points, but it seems sufficient here to acknowledge 
that awareness obviously does appear to influence the process 
of learning and considerably more could usefully be learned 
about it. This in itself illustrates that the laws of 
conditioning are not in themselves, as yet, fully worked out, 
or more properly, there is as yet no theory which adequately 
describes them or their workings. The scope of all things 
must, however, be limited, and so this problem (reluctantly) 
must be put aside. It will not form the focus of the 
experimental work, although sidelong glances will, occasionally, 
be cast at it. As noted in the first chapter, although 
what goes on within the organism may be a critical determinant 
of behaviour, we still need to observe something before we
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know what might have iiappened.
4:3 CONCLUSION
In summary then, the argument worked through to this 
point is that people may not display an absolute consistency 
in their behaviour and to understand and predict, in detail, 
the behaviour of the individual it might well be necessary to 
study that person’s learning history. However, it was felt 
that if a general factor of conditionability, particularly one 
with the physiological basis made explicit, could be identified 
we might well be able to build up a theory which not only married 
the idiographic and nomothetic approaches, but might also 
tell us when it was proper to make each type of statement and 
what type of statements might be made e.g. nomothetic statements 
of universal validity, or limited to a particular culture.
It was suggested that Eysenck’s theory of personality might 
"fit the bill". In the previous chapter the theory was 
outlined, while in this present chapter the empirical evidence 
of the relationship between the introversion-extraversion 
dimension and conditionability has been examined. The 
empirical evidence relevant to the Spence-Hull hypothesis was 
also examined, partly because anxiety, according to Eysenck, is 
related to both the introversion-extraversion and the 
neuroticism dimensions, and partly because it is the other 
major theory which relates conditionability to a personality 
variable.
Studies of classical eyeblink conditioning seem to 
yield some support for both Eysenck’s and Spence’s position.
At the same time these studies emphasize the importance of 
adherence to theoretically relevant parameters. Studies of 
electrodermal conditioning provided no clear support for 
either theory, though many of these studies are of questionable 
validity as tests of these theories. It appears then that
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no general factor of conditionability has been unequivocally 
demonstrated. While a further complication appears to have 
arisen. It seems that there may be at least two subfactors 
of conditionability, one related to appetitive reinforcement, 
the other to aversive reinforcement. It is the implications 
of this suggestion viiich will be dealt with in the next 
chapter.
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chapter V: DIFFERENTIAL SENSITIVITY TO CUES OF REINFORCEMENT
5:1 INTRODUCTION
Cray (1975a) as a conclusion to his book said "one 
purpose of this book is to serve as a scaffolding for an 
eventual theory of the physiological basis of personality.
The relation between such a theory and a theory of learning 
may be expressed in this way. Learning theory is an attempt 
to describe the general structure of the conceptual nervous 
system which is common to all the members of a given species 
(or even a group of species). A theory of personality is an 
attempt to account for differences in behaviour between 
individual members of the species in terms of systematic 
variation in the properties of the subsystems or components 
which go to make up this general conceptual nervous system.
If one can go one step further and align these subsystems with 
the neural and/or endocrine structure and function in the 
real neuro-endocrine system, one has constructed a theory of 
the physiological basis of personality" (1975a, p.348).
There is sufficient in the above quotation to justify some 
reference to Cray’s theory here, but the theory has two other 
claims to our attention: it is put forward as a modification
of Eysenck’s theory of personality; and expectation, so important 
in the social learning theory, out lined earlier, plays a 
central role in this approach too.
The theory has grown out of a substantial body of work 
on animal learning, particularly work on learned emotions and 
emotional responses which Cray has reviewed extensively (e.g.
1971, 1972, 1975a, b, 1978), Cray has opted for a two process 
theory, coming "down firmly for the view that classical and
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instrumental conditioning involve fundamentally different 
processes" (1975, p.81), He parts company with Hull as to 
the importance of drive reduction as the central principle 
of reinforcement: "The most one can say at present is that 
the drive-reduction hypothesis is almost certainly wrong; the 
drive-induction hypothesis is a tautology, and that the drive- 
increment hypothesis is only a gleam on the horizon". (1975, 
p.199).
A theory which does appear to have been influential 
in the development of Gray’s theory is Amsel®s (1958, 1962,
1967) theory of frustration. Frustration, or the non-delivery 
of an expected reward, is as summed to set up an unconditioned 
internal state with all the properties of an aversive drive.
It differs from fear only in the operations necessary for 
eliciting it - punishment for fear, non-delivery of an expected 
reward for frustration. This leads to a second, symetrical, 
hypothesis that non-delivery of an expected punishment will be 
rewarding.
The importance of expectation to the theory is already 
evident, neither of these situations, non-delivery of a reward 
or of a punishment, could in themselves be rewarding or aversive 
apart from the expectation which is hypothesized as their 
accompaniment,
Because of the importance of expectation to the theory 
Gray sets some store by an experiment of Hernstein and 
Hineline (1969), Rats were placed in a situation in which 
they were offered the choice between two frequencies of shock.
If they pressed the available lever shocks were delivered at 
unpredictable intervals with a mean frequency of M times per 
minute. If they did anything else,shocks, at equally 
unpredictable intervals, with a mean frequency of N time per 
minute (where N>M) were delivered. A lever press obtained
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for the rat a period of time at shock frequency M, this period 
lasting until the next shock was programmed, and then the 
higher frequency was reverted to, unless the lever was pressed 
again. It was found that the rats’ responding was proportional 
to the degree of reduction in shock frequency produced by 
such a response. Gray concludes from this that "the animal 
can:
(a) Measure the average frequency of shocks it receives 
when not responding
(b) Store this frequency
(c) Measure the same quantity during periods of time 
after it responds
(d) Compare this with the stored frequency for shocks vhen 
not responding; and
(e) Choose that behaviour which is associated with the lower 
shock frequency." (1975, p,333).
Thus the ongoing process "enables the organism to 
compute the probability of the UCS following the CS at a number 
of different intervals of time following CS oreet, and to 
compare this with the probability of the UCS occuring without 
the CS preceding it by the interval in question. If the 
probability of the UCS occurring at the specified interval 
after CS onset is greater than it would be without the CS having 
occurred at that time, the CS acquires a positive conditioned 
significance. If the two probabilities are alike, the 
significance of the ’CS’ remains neutral. If the probability 
of the UCS occurring at the specified interval after CS onset 
is actually lower than if the CS had not occurred at that time, 
then the stimulus becomes a negative or inhibitory CS", (1975, 
p,335). Thus rats can form extremely complex expectation.
An alternative strategy in demonstrating the importance 
of expectation is to demonstrate that certain procedures will
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affect expectation, and in consequence related behaviour, 
resulting in differences in behaviour between experimental 
and control groups. Before this can be done it must be 
established whether or not all forms of expectation will be 
influenced by the same procedures, or if there are different 
forms of expectations mediated by different systems and 
consequently affected by different procedures. Gray (1972a) has 
suggested, as noted above, that there is evidence to suppose 
signals of punishment and of non-reward are functionally 
identical, as are signals of reward and non-punishment. Thus 
we have two classes of ’signals] those eliciting approach 
behaviour, in which he includes active avoidance, and those 
promoting behavioural inhibition or passive avoidance.
Although this schema undoubtedly makes for parsimony 
one feels some reluctance in accepting that there is a 
fundamental distinction between active and passive avoidance, 
and even less happy when this assumption is employed as part 
of the foundations of a theory. Gray (1975) has commented on 
the problem, himself, pointing out that in an active avoidance 
situation all responses except one are punished, while in a 
passive avoidance situation only one response is punished.
If we start to expand the class of non-puni shed responses in 
active avoidance situations at vhat point does it become passive 
avoidance? Conversely if the class of punished responses is 
expanded in the passive avoidance situation, at what point 
does it become active avoidance?
Gray® s defence is simply that conditions found to 
adversely affect passive avoidance leave active avoidance 
unaffected.
For the sake of clarity I will deal with the two 
hypotheses separately, firstly with data relating to passive 
avoidance, and the relationship of punishment and non-reward.
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then with active avoidance and the relationship of reward and 
non-punishment, followed by an outline of Gray’s model and his 
proposed modification of Eysenck’s theory.
5:2 PASSIVE AVOIDANCE, PUNISHMENT AND FRUSTRATIVE NON-REWARD
Gray (1975) reports three experiments, two employing 
rats (Adelman and Maatsch, 1956; Daly, 1969) and one employing 
pigeons (Terrance, 1971), These experiments, he maintains, 
demonstrate that a CS of non-delivery of reward (Rew-CS), 
whether it is a discriminative stimulus (S ^ ) or acquires 
this signal value during the extinction phase of a conditioning 
experiment, is aversive and animals will work to escape from it 
or avoid it. In the Adelman and Maatsch experiment animals 
actually learned the task, jumping onto a ledge, more quickly 
to escape from the Rew-CS than to gain a food reward.
Though these experiments appear to demonstrate the 
aversive quality of the Rew-CS, they cannot be claimed to 
demonstrate the functional identity of Rew-CS and Pun-CS,
Data from drug experiments do, however, go some way to establishing 
this identity. Miller (1964) reported that using small doses 
of sodium amytal (15-20 mg/kg interperitonally in rats), 
doses too small to have an anaesthetic effect, the behavioural 
effects of both punishment and passive avoidance was adversely 
influenced. Gray (1975) has commented that the selectivity 
of the drug is "truely remarkable", "It causes the behaviour 
of animals exposed to Rew-CS to resemble the behaviour of 
animals not so exposed, but it does not alter the behaviour 
of animals exposed only to Rew and Rew-CS, This statement 
is true for simple extinction; for the partial reinforcement 
acquisition effect; for the effects of partial reinforcement 
on acquisition even when these take the reverse direction to 
the usual one (PRF animals running slower than CRFones);
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for the partial reinforcement extinction effect; for the Crespi 
depression effect and the depression effect in the Skinner box; 
and for suppression of the response to the negative stimulus 
during discrimination learning; and this list is by no means 
exhaustive". (1975a, p.287),
Gray has followed Amsel in as summing that the partial 
reinforcement effect is, to some degree, due to frustration 
after the non-delivery of an expected reward. This frustration 
eventually becoming the discriminative stimulus (S^) for approach 
Gray, therefore, reasons that if amylobarbitone selectively 
influences the Rew-CS then it ought to abolish the partial 
reinforcement effect, but have no effect on groups trained 
on a continuous reinforcement schedule. There have now been 
a number of studies (e.g. Ison and Pennes (1969), Gray,(1969), 
Gray and Dudderidge (1971), Capaldi and Sparling, (1971)) 
reported using amylobarbitone during partial reinforcement 
training. The results of these studies indicate that the 
partial reinforcement extinction effect is at least considerably 
attenuated by the drug.
Gray (1975b) has suggested that the effects of the 
drug are probably confined to the responses to Pun-CS and 
Rew-CS, rather than to punishment and reward themselves.
The probable site of action for the drug, he suggests, is the 
septo-hippocampal system. This system, according to Gray, 
functions as a behavioural inhibition system, a ’stop® system, 
and as such is involved not only with passive avoidance, but 
also with the orienting reflex; inhibiting behaviour in order 
to facilitate the intake and evaluation of information.
Gray (Gray, Quintao, Araujo - Silva, (1972)) has 
attempted to replicate some of the drug findings with lesions 
of this system in an attempt to verify that this is the 
hypothesized ’stop* system, and site of action for the drugs.
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He reports that septal lesions increase resistance to 
extinction after continuous reinforcement (CRF) but decrease 
resistance after partial reinforcement (PRF). Henke (1974) 
has reported similar resultSo Gray (1978) has reported a 
study by Feldon, Rawlins and Gray in which lesions were 
limited to either the medial or lateral areas of the 
septum. "Our results," he reports” show clearly that at a 
24 hour inter trial interval, the increased resistance to 
extinction seen after CRF training in the septal animals is 
due to medial septal damage, but the decreased resistance to 
extinction after PRF training (and the consequent abolition 
of the FREE (partial reinforcement extinction effect))is due 
to lateral septal damage," (1978, p.426). However, as is 
often the case, the data are somewhat more complex than this 
simple statement would seem to suggest. As can be seen 
from fig. 5:1 there is increased resistance to extinction in 
both groups of lesioned animals as compared to the appropriate 
control group. While it can be seen, from figo 5:2 that, 
as Gray reports, the lesion of the lateral septal area 
produces a decrease in resistance to extinction in the PRF 
group, as compared to the appropriate control group, but it 
also produces an increase in resistance in the CRF group.
Nor is it immediately evident from the model offered by Gray 
why the lateral CRF group should show the greatest acquisition. 
The result becomes still more difficult when it is noticed 
that there appears to be no real difference, on trial 7, 
the final acquisition trial, between the two control groups; 
Gray does not report whether or not this difference is 
significant.
Nevertheless he proposes the following hypothesis.
"We have tried to relate this double dissociation between the
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behavioural effects of medial and lateral septal lesions to 
the organization of the SHS (septo-hippocampal system) by 
way of the hypothesis shown in Fig, 5:3, According to this 
hypothesis the medial septal area is the recipient of 
information, conveyed via an unknown route by secondary 
frustrative stimuli, concerning the imminence of non-reward.
This information is conveyed to the hippocampus by way of the 
theta - producing fibres which travel in the dorsal fornix 
(Myher, 1975, Rawling unpublished observation). The 
hippocampus has the job of inhibiting the non-rewarding 
behaviour (by an unknown route) while determining the best 
behavioural strategy in the changed circumstances, (This 
period of behavioural inhibition and uncertainty is subjectively 
experienced as anxiety,) Under conditions in which the best 
strategy is in fact to continue with the original behaviour 
(as on a PRF schedule), the hippocampus sends a message 
(perhaps via the fimbria) to the lateral septal area which in 
turn via , septal interneurones (De France, 1976), inhibits 
or otherwise alters the medial input to the hippocampus.
The operation of this hippocampo septal. pathway underlies the 
phenomenon of counter-conditioning", (1978, pp,426-428),
The association of frustration and anxiety assummed 
in this model is evident from the above quotation, but it is 
not clear whether orienting also produces anxiety; and what 
of selective attention? It is well known that the hippocampus 
plays an important part in this process , Perhaps the 
answer here is that it would be an error to assume that the 
hippocampus acts in a single indifferentiated manner.
It might be well to put some of Gray’s speculations into 
perspective by noting that they are not uniquely his, and 
he has not always been the first to propose them, Mijner 
(1971) for example summarizing his review of the effects '
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Interpuise interval (msec)
Effects of 20mg/kg amylobarbitone sodium on 
threshold for septal driving of hippocampal theta 
rhythm of driving frequency in two groups (I and II) 
of five rats.
(Taken from Gray, 1972; p.111).
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of various lesions concludes that (l) the septum and hippo­
campus are important for response inhibition; (2) normally- 
activated by cues of non-reward and novelty; (3) that it is 
necessary to distinguish between active and passive avoidance, 
(C.F, Milner, 1971, p.376).
A third research technique Gray has employed is the 
blocking and stimulating of the electrical activity of the 
hippocampus. Following Stumpf (1965) he claims that the 
medial septal nucleus functions as a pace maker cell for 
the hippocampal theta rhythm. Bearing in mind the fact that:
(1) amylobarbitone does not eliminate the theta rhythm
(2) theta is found to accompany behaviours not affected by
amylobarbitone. Gray suggested a 'frequency specific'
hypothesis, after observing the theta activity of free-moving 
rats (Gray and Ball; 1970), He suggested that three distinct 
frequency bands exist: a low amplitude irregular theta band
of 6-7.5Hz accompanying receipt of reward and the performance 
of fixed action patterns; a regular intermediate amplitude 
band of 7,5-8.5 Hz accompanying exploration and frustrative 
non-reward; and a regular, high amplitude band 8.5-lOHz 
accompanying approach behaviour and active avoidance. Since 
the drug affects only behaviour associated with the inter­
mediate band, it should only be this band, 7.5-8.5 Hz,
which is affected by amylobarbitone.
The next step (Gray and Ball; 1970) was to 
investigate the effect of the drug on theta driving. They 
employ free-running rats with bipolar-electrodes implanted in 
the medial septal area and the dorsal hippocampus. "Driving 
was judged as synchrony between the stimulating pulses,
0.5 milliseconds in duration, applied to the septal area and 
the theta waves recorded from the hippocampus" (1972, p.111).
As can be seen from fig. 5:4 in the no-drug conditions
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there is a substantially lower driving threshold at 7.7Hzo 
and this is selectively elevated by the drug, as the hypothesis 
would predict. Other drugs, including alcohol, are found to 
have the same selective effect, (Gray, 1975(b)).
The situation is thrown into some confusion, however 
when it is realized that these data come only from male rats, 
and that female rats have relatively flat "theta driving 
curves", and , at least in novel situations^ are less fearful 
than males. Gray comments: "It seem probable, therefore,
that there is a fundamental difference between the sexes in 
the response of the hippocampus to stimulation of the septal 
area. In the light of the sex differences in fearfulness 
(Gray 1971), it is perhaps no coincidence that this difference 
takes the form that the female theta driving curve in the 
undrugged state (fig. 5:5) is closely similar to the curve 
obtained from the male rat which has received amylobarbitone 
or alcohol: Electrophysiologically as well as-behaviourally, a
female rat resembles a tranquilized male one". (1972(a), p.116). 
One might assume from this that the threshold at the critical 
7,7Hz was actually higher in female ^ rats than in male rats, 
but, as the fig (5:5) shows, the contrary is true. In fact 
there is no over lap of the two curves, the females showing 
lower threshold values for all frequencies. While this 
apparent conflict may be solved by reference to relative values, 
or activity, in different systems rather than absolute values; 
one feels somewhat reluctant to generalize these findings 
across species knowing the limitations of generalizations 
across sexes within one species. Gray, however, summarizes 
the results of a number of studies which provide support for 
his frequency specific hypothesis as follows: "these
experiments offer evidence that: (1) theta driving during 
extinction speeds up extinction; (2) theta driving on a
149
random 50% of rewarded trials creates a "pseudo partial 
reinforcement extinction effect", that is, an increase in 
subsequent resistance to extinction; (3) theta blocking by- 
electrical stimulation of the septal area on the non-rewarded 
trials of a partial reinforcement schedule reduces resistance 
to extinction relative to normal controls trained on partial 
reinforcement; and (4) lesions to the medial septal area 
which disrupts the theta rhyth markedly attenuates the 
partial reinforcement extinction effect. All these results 
are readily understood on the hypothesis that amobarbital 
affects behaviour by antagonizing the normal theta response 
to frustrative non-reward" (1972(b), p.189).
It appears then that the septo-hippocampal system 
may well be involved in passive avoidance, but Gray has 
suggested that impairment of passive avoidance and retardation 
of extinction also follow lesions of the frontal cortex, 
particularly orbital frontal lesions. In consequence he 
concludes that the frontal cortex is likely to be the site 
of the cortical representation of the hippocampal system.
This then is one element of Grays model, of a frontal- 
septa-hippocampal system which mediates behavioural inhibition, 
and passive avoidance, and is activated by cues of punishment 
and frustrative non-reward.
5:3 ACTIVE AVOIDANCE, REWARD AND RELIEVING NON-PUNISHMENT
In contrast to the previous hypothesis, in support of 
which Gray marshals a considerable amount of evidence, Gray's 
second hypothesis that a Pun-CS is functionally equivalent to 
a Rew-CS, and both are mediated by the same system that 
produces active avoidance is far less well supported. As 
Gray himself comments, this hypothesis is "as yet virtually 
innocent of contact, positive or negative, with the harsh
150
FIG; 5:6 Effects of stimuli paired with Reward and 
Non-reward on Sidman Avoidance Responding. 
Performance of a previously learned avoidance 
response over 40 trials by groups of subjects 
for which the test tone had signalled no food, 
S-; had been unrelated to food, RC; had not 
been previously presented, C; or had signalled 
the occurrence of food in either classical 
conditioning, S+(C), or on instrumental 
S+(l) situation,
(Taken from Gray, 1975; p.342)
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world of experimental facto” (1975a, po34l).
He does report a study by Grossen, Kastansek and 
Bolles (1969) in which a tone was used as a CS of reward, for 
some animals, or non-reward for others. "Now, if there is 
a functional equivalence between Pun-CS and Rew-CS, we might 
expect the Rew-CS to produce the same kind of change in the 
rate of avoidance responding (in a Sidman avoidance situation) 
as does the Pun-CS, that is, to decrease it." (1975a, p.341).
Indeed, as can be seen from fig 5:6 (the S+(c) group 
is the relevant one) the Rew-CS group is found to respond at 
a lower rate relative to the two control groups (Labelled 
''C® and "RC”). It is also evident from the figure that the 
Rew-CS increases the rate of responding in relation to the 
control groups. The S+(l) group is included in an attempt 
to demonstrate that the suppression effect is not due to some 
motor artifact. It is unfortunate, however, that no Pun-CS 
was included in the same experiment, this would have made for 
a more convincing demonstration.
If the Pun-CS can be construed as a "warning-signal" 
with aversive qualities to be avoided, then, suggests Gray, 
the Pun-CS may be regarded as a*safety signal* with appetitive 
qualities. Thus he believes that in a Sidman avoidance 
the animal is actually approaching the appetitive * safety 
signals® rather than escaping fromjterminating or avoiding 
aversive stimuli.
In view of the paucity of the evidence in the area, 
the whole hypothesis is too problematical for one to be 
totally confident of Gray * s analysis. For example, he reports 
a study by Kamin et al (1963) in which one group of animals 
was exposed to a CS and unavoidable shock, 3, 9 or 27 times; 
a second group to a CS and avoidable shock, in a shuttle box, 
again 3, 9 or 27 times. The test phase of the experiment was
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the presentation of the CS while the animal was bar-pressing 
for a reward; the more aversive the CS the greater should 
be the suppression of the bar pressing, this is known as a 
conditioned emotional response (CER). "The conditioned 
emotional response (suppression of bar-pressing) increased 
in magnitude during the early stages of training in the 
shuttle box, but as performance (in the“avoidance* group) 
reached successively higher criteria the suppression ratio 
fell again. This finding is, of course unexpected from the 
point of view of the unmodified Mowrer two process theory, 
according to which as fear of _ the warning signals goes down, 
so ought performance of the avoidance response. According 
to the present view, however, this result makes good sense: 
fear of the warning signal extinguishes as it is no longer 
followed by punishment (because the animal is successfully 
avoiding it), but the avoidance response is now maintained 
by the positive reinforcement of the safety signals (those 
produced by shuttling to the currently safe side of the 
apparatus)" (1975, p.325-6).
It is the shuttling, then, which produces the safety 
signals i.e. we have a situation in which the cues to approach 
appear to be indistinguishable from the approach response 
itself. The situation becomes even more complex when it is 
recognized that in a series of experiments Taub and Berman 
(1968) deprived rhesus monkeys of virtually all sensory feed 
back, exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive.
Never-the-less whether the deafferentation was carried out 
before or after training the animal was able to learn and 
maintain the appropriate avoidance response. Thus learning 
took place when any possibility of secondary reinforcement, 
positive or negative, seemed to have been eliminated. Gray 
himself is forced to comment: **the only items which can
FIG; 5:7 Fear elicited by Warning Signals at
different levels of avoidance training. 
Conditioned suppression (0 = no suppression) 
produced by a warning signal paired with 
unavoidable shock 1, 3, 9 or 27 times 
in the "classical" group, or to which the 
animals have made 1, 3, 9 or 27 consecutive 
avoidance responses in the avoidance group, 
(Taken from Gray, 1975; p.326),
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develop secondary aversive and secondary rewarding properties 
are the motor commands themselves. But to push the language 
of classical conditioning and secondary reinforcement this 
far is obviously to take two-process theory beyond the point 
up to which it remains useful." (1975a, p.338), Thus we 
arrive at a position, if we do accept this explanation,where 
the cue to approach is identical to the command to approach. 
Given that the animal can learn with no information other than 
the presence or absence of the UCS and the issuing of the 
motor-command it seems evident why Gray could not simply say 
that the Pun-CS in the shuttle box over trials becomes a 
Pun-CS, Gray's problem here turns to a considerable extent 
on what constitutes the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the formation of secondary reinforcers, and also what 
information will be used, even preferred, when it is available, 
Even this strategy, however, will not really allow Gray to 
suppose that the most obvious CS in the environment, the 
warning signal, becomes a safety signal. If this CS did 
gradually become a safety signal, and assumming that the 
reasoning applied to the data of this and the previous 
experiment is sound, we would expect an increase in the rate 
of bar-pressing for a reward on presentation of this CS as 
it acquired positively reinforcing properties. As can be 
seen from fig, 5:7 even after 27 trials there is still a 
depression in the rate of responding.
It is worth noting in passing that on one hand these 
experiments seem to suggest that a secondary reinforcement 
might not be necessary for the learning of active avoidance, 
and on the other the Pun-CS, if any exist, in the Kamin et al 
experiment appears to be of a fundamentally different kind 
from the Rew-CS employed in the Grossen et al experiment.
There seems little use in labouring this point any longer
157
especially as Gray himself is obviously unhappy with having
to assume that the motor-command is the Pun-CS,
There is, however, another aspect of Gray's analysis 
which is equally unsatisfactory. Gray claims that as the 
Pun-CS is no longer followed by punishment, because of the 
successful avoidance response, it extinguishes and in 
consequence loses its aversive quality, as the Kamin experiment 
is assumed to demonstrate. While the avoidance response 
itself is not assum to extinguish because it is an approach 
response to an appetitive stimulus. What according to Gray 
is the animal expecting as a result of this response?
Nothing; and as this expectation is never disappointed the 
response never extinguishes. Surely this analysis cannot 
be correct, for Pun to have any meaning it cannot simply mean 
'nothing', but must mean the absence of some aversive event 
that is expected. What status can this expectation have, in 
Gray's schema if it is not itself aversive? If the animal 
does not respond to the Pun-CS with the aversive state of 
'expectation of Pun' it is difficult to see how Pun and 
Pun-CS can have any meaning. Yet this is exactly what Gray 
seems to be claiming - that although the animal no longer 
expects a punishment it is relieved when it does not arrive.
It is evident that one of the basic assumptions in 
Grays analysis is that if an aversive UCS is not presented in 
some relationship to the CS the expectation of the UCS 
extinguishes. This is not necessarily the case, however.
Gray (1975a), himself, quotes a study by Soltysik (1960) 
in which after 120 presentations of the CS without the UCS, 
the CR could still be elicited on the 121 trial on presentation 
of the CS, the important difference between Soltysik*s 
situation and a traditional extinction situation is that the 
CS was presented in conjunction with a conditioned inhibitor (Cl)
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for the 120 trials.
It is quite possible, of course, that Gray's analysis 
of the situation or something along the lines he suggest, is 
correct, but it does seem that there are a number of weaknesses, 
and in view of the shortage of data his hypothesis ought to 
be treated with the greatest of caution.
Data in support of a physiological system mediating 
Rew-CS and Pun-CS are similarly weak. It has already been 
pointed out that although lesions of the medial septal area 
and the administration of certain drugs impairs passive 
avoidance no adverse effect is found in active avoidance, in 
fact in conflict situations such as two-way avoidance learning 
in the shuttle box, improved learning and performance is often 
reported. Another piece of evidence used by Gray is that 
stimulation of Old's (1965) reward system has on one hand been 
found to impair the CER (Brody and Conrad; 1960) while on the 
other it actually improved active avoidance.
Again supporting the hypothesis that P.m-CS and Rew-CS 
are mediated by the same system he reports that the administration 
of chloropromizine and cortical depression (c,f. Olds and 
Olds (1965)), both disrupt self stimulation and learned escape 
behaviour. The disruption of spreading cortical depression 
was accompanied by reduced firing of the neurones of Olds 
reward système
This then is the second element of the Grayian 
hypothesis, an approach system, responsive to cues of reward 
and relieving non-punishment, mediated by Olds reward system, 
the septal area, the lateral hypothalamus and the medial 
forebrain bundle. It must also be noted that the evidence 
for this system is much weaker than that for the septo- 
hippocampal stop system.
For the sake of completeness it ought to be noted 
that Gray proposes a third system* Tliis system.
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FIG: 5:8 Inter relationships between three emotional 
systems. The medial hypothalamus appears 
to act as a nodal point in the resolution of 
the influences proceeding down stream from the 
limbic structures. These promote approach 
behaviour (from the septal area via the medial 
forebrain bundle) or fight/flight behaviour 
(from the amygdala via the stria terminalis). 
The medial hypothalamus may inhibit both 
these outcomes via its control of the final 
common pathways in the midbrain, and this 
inhibition is intensified by influences 
proceeding from the septo-hippocampal stop 
system via the fomix and mammillary bodies, 
(Taken from Gray, 1971),
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postulated largely on the basis of Deutsch and Deutsch (1956) 
and the work of de Molina and Hunsperger (1962), he labels 
the fight/flight system. It is activated by unconditioned 
aversive stimuli and mediated by the amygdala and the stria 
terminalis. This system is of less importance, however, 
in the present context,
5:4 GRAY'S MODEL
Figure 5:8 provides a sketch diagram of the three 
physiological systems, and the manner in which they are 
suggested to interact. One feature of the diagram which is 
immediately evident is that while there are three systems 
feeding into the medial hypothalamus there are only two 
outputs from it. This is because the septo-hippocampal 
system exercises only an inhibitory relationship over the 
other two systems.
Gray (1972a, 1975a) suggests that the medial 
hypothalamic nucleus exercises inhibitory control over the 
pathway for fight/flight behaviour. It is the amygdala which, 
upon receipt of appropriate input inhibits the medial 
hypothalamus, producing, in consequence,a disinhibition of 
the fight/flight system. The medial hypothalamus functions 
as a decision mechanism in the sense that input from the septoW 
hippocampal system is thought to potentiate the inhibition of the 
fight/flight, system with the result that the neurological, 
and consequently, behavioural outcome on any particular 
occasions is the result of the balance of activity proceeding 
from these two structures, the amygdalo-hypothalamic-midbrain 
(fight/flight) system and the septo-hippocampal (stop) system. 
Gray proposes a symetrical organization with respect 
to approach behaviour. It is the lateral hypothalamus 
which is this time as summed to be inhibited by the medial
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FIG: 5:9 Block diagram of the arousal-decision model.
and P^: inputs to the reward and punishment 
mechanisms, Rew. and Pun. D.M,: the decision 
mechanism. As the arousal mechanism.
B.Com.: behavioural command to "approach"
(on the reward side) or to "passively avoid" 
or "stop" (on the punishment side), Beh,; the 
observed motor behaviour, B.Cons,: the 
consequences (rewarding or punishing)of the 
behaviour that occurs. Comp,: comparator
mechanisms which compare the actual consequences 
of behaviour with the expected consequences and 
make the appropriate reward and punishment inputs. 
Dashed lines indicate inputs on trial n+1 as a 
result of classical conditioning of exteroceptive, 
introceptive or proprioceptive CSS to the 
consequences of behaviour on trial n.
(Taken from Gray, 1975; p.351)
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hypothalamus, perhaps the ventro medial nucleus, this 
inhibition being enhanced by the septo-hippocampal system, and 
disinhibition resulting from appropriate input via the medial 
forebrain bundle from the septum.
Figure 5;9 proposes a model which attempts to 
incorporate some of the implications of the previous figure and 
also the various hypotheses set out earlier. This figure is 
taken from Gray and Smith (1969) and consistent with the 
hypothesis set out above inputs into the reward side of the 
model, the septal-lateral hypothalamic-medial forebrain system, 
will produce approach behaviour. The behavioural effects of 
this will feed into a comparator, presumably at the level of 
the amygdala, which if the reward is equal to, or exceeds that 
expected will produce an input into the reward system, but 
if the reward is less than that expected will produce an input 
into the punishment side of the model and activating the *stop° 
system. Thus yielding a functional identity between cues 
of punishment and cues of non-reward.
Conversely an input into the punishment mechanism will 
produce ®stop* commands and passive avoidance. Again the 
actual punishment is compared, (again probably at the level of 
the amygdala), with the expected punishment. If the expected 
punishment proved to be greater than the actual punishment 
then there is an input into the reward side of the mechanism. 
Thus providing for a functional identity between cues of 
reward and cues of non-punishment.
The Reward and Banishment mechanisms are considered 
(Gray and Smith, 1969), to be mutually inhibitory partly on 
the basis of data from studies of self stimulation (Olds and 
Olds (1965)), and partly as a way of explaining trial by trial 
changes in the system. This inhibitory activity together 
with the decision mechanism, presumably the midline of the
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hypothalamus, may be viewed as determining the probability 
of a particular response. While the arousal mechanism 
(marked box in the diagram), which presumably involves 
the ARAS, which has an output to (energizing?), the behavioural 
command mechanisms, and inputs from both the reward and 
punishment mechanisms, is included in an attempt to account 
for the phenomenon of * drive summation*. As such it may be 
viewed as determining the intensity of behaviour. The result 
of all this is that observed behaviour may be regarded as a func­
tion of the probability of behaviour, reflecting the 
antagonistic activity of the two sides of the system, and the 
intensity of behaviour, reflecting the level of activity in 
the system as a whole. Gray and Smith (1969) have proposed 
a mathematical model to describe these relations.
Appealing as this model may be on first inspection, 
there do appear to be a number of difficulties. Let us take 
the distinction between active and passive avoidance as a 
starting place. From what has gone before, and from the model 
itself, it is evident that this distinction is central in 
GrayA model building. However, it is equally obvious that 
while active avoidance is defined in terms of some activity 
passive avoidance is defined very much in terms of what it 
is not. If we attempt to define these two types of avoidance 
in common terms it might be said that in active avoidance 
the probability of some response (R) will increase, while in 
passive avoidance the probability of some R will decrease, 
which is equivalent to saying that the probability of one or 
more other Rs will increase, here we would consider * standing 
still'' or ^freezing* an R, Thus the distinction between 
the two types of learning appears to be less to do with what 
the animal does and more to do with what the experimenter 
observes.
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Similarly when we turn to Gray’s model we do not find 
that the two types of avoidance as easily distinguishable 
as Gray seems to suggest. For the organism to expect a 
punishment there must be a prior input into the punishment 
mechanism, with the result that some R is inhibited. If the 
result of this is that the animal avoids punishment then there 
should be an input into the reward side of the model with the 
result that some other R is activated. This seems to be 
identical to Gray’s description ,of active avoidance with the 
exception of the initial stage of inhibition. Is it this 
inhibitory stage then which distinguishes the two forms of 
avoidance? This hardly seems likely as the animal is making 
some R, which must therefore be ’preferred’, which must be 
terminated or inhibited in order to perform the active avoidance 
R, In terms of the model then active and passive avoidance 
appear to be indistinguishable.
There are, of course, two distinct questions tangled 
up here; (1) Is there in reality a distinction between the 
two types of avoidance, e,g, are they mediated by different 
mechanisms; (2) Does Gray’s model adequately reflect this 
distinction. Obviously if '’I® is not true the ’2® is not 
possible.
Another aspect of the model which is not entirely 
satisfactory, is the effect of the activation of the reward 
and punishment mechanisms, and the relation of these to the 
comparators. From the observations of Gray reported earlier, 
and from the fact that the mechanisms were out lined partly 
on the basis of the observation of self stimulation activity 
it would seem that the activity of these mechanisms is 
synonymous with reward and punishment. Indeed he says :
"Now it takes no great leap of imagination to suppose that 
these results indicate the existence in the brain of two
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fundamental motivational systems, a ’reward’ mechanism and a 
’punishment® mechanism. That is to say, the common denominator 
of the heterogeneous class of events which an animal finds 
rewarding (e.g. food, water, copulation) is that they cause 
an increase in the activity of the reward mechanism of the 
brain, while the common denominator of such diverse punishments 
as electric shock, loud noise, sudden loss of support, and 
so on, is that they cause neurones to fire in the brain 
punishment mechanism”, (Gray, 1972a, p,182).
However when talking about the relationship between 
these mechanisms and the comparators it is not immediately 
evident that this activity is itself rewarding, "The reward 
mechanism now sends a signal to the ’comparator for reward® 
informing it of the kind and amount of reward which can be 
shortly expected to occur (on the basis of signals from the 
environment which the reward mechanism is itself receiving).
That is to say, it sends to the comparator for reward a copy 
of the stored memory that, whenever these conditioned stimuli 
(the secondary rewarding stimuli) have occurred in the past, 
they have been followed at such-and-such an interval of time 
by this unconditioned stimulus”, (Gray, 1972a, p,187).
If we assume that the activity of these mechanisms 
is itself rewarding or punishing there appears to be a further 
problem. If we take the punishment side of the model for 
example, a stimulus entering the system via P. must pass through 
the punishment mechanism before any other behaviour is initiated 
or inhibited. In consequence even if the effects of 
behaviour are themselves rewarding, e,g, the termination of 
a shock, it is difficult to see how the model can ever account 
extinction as the punish mechanism will always be activated, 
what is more it will be activated before the rewarding mechanism 
is activated with the result that although the punishment
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mechanism may attenuate the activity of the reward mechanism, 
the converse cannot occur initially.
One solution might be to postulate that Pi itself, 
as well as the activity of behavioural command mechanism, 
becomes a cue for reward. It will be remembered that this 
solution was also suggested earlier, and that Gray appeared to 
reject ito There it took the form of suggesting that the 
warning signals gradually, over a series of successful 
avoidance responses, became safety signals too. However for 
this suggestion to work it seems some modification to the 
model is needed, perhaps (1) a direct link to the reward 
side of the model and (2) some form of communication with 
comparators, other than via the punishment mechanism. An 
alternative approach might be to divide the punishment mechanism 
in two, one part a store which (a) received input from the 
punishment mechanism and (b) was able to inhibit this mechanism 
(c) also receiving an input from Pi, and supply the output to 
the comparator. These suggestions might permit a distinction 
between conditioned inhibition and extinction, with the result 
that the lack of responsiveness of the rat to the discriminative 
stimulus, the warning signal, in the shuttle box might be due 
to conditioned inhibition rather than extinction.
Similar problems arise in respect of the reward side 
of the model. For example, according to the model the non­
presentation of an expected reward causes an input into the 
punishment mechanism with the eventual result that the approach 
response is inhibited, but what effect does this have? Does 
it reduce the frustrative effect of non-Reward, the animal no 
longer being frustrated because it does not attempt to get 
the reward? Is this termination of frustration rewarding, 
we must assume so on Grays schema, thus producing feed back 
into the Reward mechanism? What is the result of this renewed
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feed back? Renewed approach, for the reward mechanism has 
no control over behavioural inhibition?
Another problem is the use of the term inhibition.
Gray (1975a) has dealt at length with the concept of 
inhibition, and yet in as far as the punishment mechanism is 
the stop system we must assume it mediates the orienting 
response, a form of external inhibition, but it also mediates 
behaviour-inhibition in response to a Pun-CS, which is an 
internal or conditioned inhibition. So it seems from Gray’s 
model that both types of inhibition are mediated by the same 
mechanism. But Gray, himself, concludes: "The first
question - the reality of the difference between external 
inhibitory response decrements and internal inhibitory response 
decrements - is most easily dealt with: the conditions which
give rise to each of these and the time course followed by 
each, on which the Pavlovian classification is based, seems 
so diametrically opposed to each other that it is difficult to
•I
see how a single mechanism could be responsible for both,
(Gray 1975a, p,90).
Some, if not all, of these problems might be solved 
if the manner of functioning of the various mechanisms was 
made explicit, or if the model were placed in some more 
obvious relationship to the general functioning of the organism. 
The force of these observations is obviously that the model, 
as it stands at the moment, is not entirely satisfactory, but, 
perhaps more importantly, they are intended to emphasize the 
point that it is not always evident, and seldom unequivocal 
what predictions should be drawn from this model,
5:5 SOME PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF EYSENCK’S THEORY 
Gray has proposed extensive modifications in the 
conceptualization of two of Eysenck’s personality dimensions.
170
0
«ri
H
I
M
0
(!)M
A
0)
•H
•H
cj
(U
0)
0
I
&
0
1W4O
o\iH
eu
rs
c\
r4
r•o c on<u a
p uQ) g «w
> a•H *H p*» *0 0)Q)(lO (U ca
^  Æ Ha 4J
OH
n
O o
x[
CD
J 3
u_
CI
o
u_
O
O u_ O
co
CL CO
i >
â fCL CD
X
"4-
1
>
O
CD
O  < + CO
“D <
(D o ( T
^  o . <
CD
CO
+I t i
"O
CD
_C
co
'c
3
Û _
s»—
o
c
o
3
O
>
o
_ c
CD
CD
13
CD
1 3
v_
O
CD
u_
C
O
0  
( / )
1 -
3
CL
5
171
extraversion and neurotic ism. The two dimensions will be 
dealt with in this order.
As has already been observed Eysenck suggests that 
the central difference between the extravert and the introvert 
is one of excitâtion/inhibition balance; introverts showing 
a relative predominance of excitation, this in turn being 
assummed to underlie their superior conditionability. This 
greater excitation is assummed to reflect greater activity 
in the cortico-reticular loop. Gray (1970, 1972b), has 
suggested that this system is not entirely distinct from the 
septo-hippocampal stop system, and goes on to suggest that the 
pacemaker cells of the medial septal ..nucleus produce the 
the ta rhythm in the hippocampus as a result of neural input 
from the midbrain reticular formation (RE), He also proposes 
that there is a hippocampal-RF link of an inhibitory nature 
(c,fo Adey, Segundo and Livingston (1957), Livingston (1959)) 
causing inhibition of upstream conductance "from the midbrain 
RF to the thalamic parts of the ARAS", The whole of this 
forming a feed back loop with the result that increased activity 
in the ARAS will produce : (1) inhibition of the ARA itself;
(2) activate the septo-hippocampal stop system and consequently 
produce 'act' inhibition (c,f. Fig, 5;10), In addition the
hippocampal and septal areas are assummed to exert an 
inhibitory influence over sensory input, with the result that 
increased activation of the ARAS will also inhibit sensory input. 
This behavioural inhibition and inhibition of sensory input, 
both centrally and perhaps more peripherally, it will be 
recalled, were all suggested to be characteristic of the 
introvert, according to Eysenck's theory. Gray, therefore, 
suggests that it is the level of activity in the septo- 
hippocampal-reticular system which under-lies the dimension 
of introversion-extraversion.
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The inter-relationship between these two systems 
is further emphasized by Gray when he observes that barbiturates, 
(sodium amobarbitone is a barbiturate), and alcohol are known 
to have an extraverting effect (Eysenck, 1967); and secondly 
lesions of the frontal cortex also have an extraverting effect»
Of course, amylobarbitone is the main drug employed by Gray 
to reduce activity fn the septo-hippocampal system, while, 
as pointed out earlier the frontal cortex, particularly the 
orbital section, is seen as the site of the cortical projections 
of the septo-hippocampal system, and lesions of the frontal 
cortex are found to have effects similar to lesions of the 
septal area. Thus, Gray reasons, if the same techniques 
are found to produce increased extraversion in humans and 
decreased activity in the septo-hippocampal system in other 
animals, the introvert must be characterized by a higher level 
of activity in the septo-hippocampal system. On the basis 
of Gray's observations it would also be predicted that the 
introvert ought to condition passive avoidance more efficiently.
Gray, however, draws more extensive comparisons between 
Eysenck'^ s theory and his own than those already noted. He 
argues that a critical element in the development of Eysenck's 
theory was his attempt to answer two related questions,
(1) What are the psychological and/or physiological variables 
which result in the higher suseptibility of individuals with 
higher degrees of neuroticism both to dysthymic disorders and 
to commission of psychopathic offences? (2) What are the 
psychological and/or physiological variables which differentiate 
neurotic individuals along the dimension of introversion- 
extraversion (which is quite independent of the dimension of 
neuroticism) and which causes the introverted neurotic to be 
susceptible to the dysthymic disorders, but the extroverted 
neurotic to display anti-social behaviour of a psychopathic
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kind?'' (Gray, 1970, pp.249-250).
Gray (1970) summarizes Eysenck's solutions to these 
problems in the following manner: (1) dysthymies are over-
socialized, while psychopaths are under-socialized; 
introverts are too conscientious, while extraverts are not 
conscientious enough. The conscience is considered to be 
"a cluster of classically conditioned fear reactions" (Gray,
1970, p,251), (2) Introverts are thought to condition
better than extraverts; while neuroticism functions as a 
drive to facilitate conditioning; and because neuroticism 
is a dimension of susceptibility to emotionality, "it is the 
combination of strong emotions with the neurotic introvert's 
over-socialized conscience which leads him into hospital; 
and correspondingly the combination of strong emotions with 
the lack of a conscience which leads the extraverted neurotic 
into trouble with the law", (Gray, 1970, p,251),
Gray's main objection to these proposed solutions is 
that introverts are not, correctly,held to be more conditionable 
than extraverts, but as has already been discussed, are 
expected to condition more efficiently only under certain 
conditions, which he terms under-arousing, Eysenck talks of 
conditions in which inhibition is most easily developed, 
however^ these two forms of expression amount to the same thing 
if we regard arousal as being synonomous with excitation- 
inhibition balance» Gray goes on to remark that "since there 
is no reason to suppose that parental conditioning techniques 
are more often under-arousing than over-arousing, there is 
equally no reason to predict the over-socialization of the 
introvert which is critical to the whole of Eysenck's 
theoretical super structure." (1970, p.255),
Accepting Eysenck's contention that socialization, or 
a conscience, consists of a cluster of fear reactions. Gray
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LEVEL
1. SOCIO-PSYCHIATRIC Introverts: Dysthymic DisordersExtraverts: Psychopathic Behaviours
2. SOCIALIZATION In Introverts : Good
In Extraverts : Poor
3: CONDITIONING In Introverts : Good
OF FEAR In Extraverts : Poor
4: CONDITIONABILITY In Introverts : Good
In Extraverts : Poor
5: AROUSABILITY In Introverts : High
In Extraverts : Low
6: PHYSIOLOGICAL ARAS In Introverts: High Activity
In Extraverts: Low Activity
FIG: 5:11(a) BASIC STRUCTURE OF EYSENCK'S THEORY INTROVERSION- 
EXTRAVERSION
(Taken from Gray (1972), p.197 )
LEVEL
1. SOCIAL-PSYCHIATRIC Introverts: Dysthymic Disorders 
Extraverts : Psychopathic Behaviours
2o SOCIALIZATION In Introverts : Good
In Extraverts : Poor
3, CONDITIONING In Introverts : Good
OF FEAR In Extraverts : Poor
4. SUSCEPTIBILITY In Introverts : High
to Punishment In Extraverts : Low
5. AROUSABILITY 
6o PHYSIOLOGICAL
In Introverts : High
In Extraverts : Low
Feedback Loop 
comprising ARAS 
Frontal Cortex, 
tSeptal Area and 
Hippocampus
In Introverts: High Activity 
In Extraverts: Low Activity
FIG: 5:ll(b) GRAY'S PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF EYSENCK'S THEORY OF 
INTROVERSION-EXTRAVERSION T 
(Taken from Gray (1972) p.200).
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suggests that we ought not to regard introverts as generally 
more efficient at conditioning, but simply 'better' at 
conditioning fear.
This solution, he feels, also offers an explanation 
of the Spence-Taylor anxiety data which suggest that relatively 
threatening situations are optimal for the conditioning of 
high anxiety (HA) subjects, for these, as has already been 
observed, tend to be introverted neurotics as classified by 
Eysenck's dimensions. Thus introverted neurotics can be 
expected to be more prone to disorders displaying an excess 
of fear, while extraverted neurotics should be more susceptible 
to those characterized by a lack of fear. Gray has offered 
these two schematic representations fig 5:11a of Eysenck's 
model and Fig. 5:11b of his modification of that model.
Turning now to the dimension of neuroticism, one 
of the most evident, and ultimately most important, differences 
between the two theories is the manner in which this dimension 
is construed. For Eysenck neuroticism or emotionality, has 
the properties of a drive, while Gray has defined emotions 
"those(hypothetical) states in the nervous system which are 
produced by reinforcing events or by stimuli which have in 
the subjects previous experience been followed by reinforcing 
events." (1972a, pp.81-82). Now the events usually 
associated with emotionality are stressful. In the 
description of neuroticism offered earlier Jones, (1960) 
indicated that the more neurotic person could be expected to 
have a lower tolerance both for physical pain and for 
frustration, and he want on to conclude that "the high drive 
of neurotics is aroused only in situations of threat", and not 
necessarily in appetitive situations. If this were the case 
then for Gray, neuroticism and introversion would at least be 
indistinguishable, if not identical. Thus another
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FIG: 5:12 Proposed relationship of (a) susceptibility 
to signals of reward and susceptibility 
to signals of punishment of (b) the dimensions 
of introversion-extraversion and neuroticism. 
The dimensions of anxiety and impusivity 
(diagonals) represent the steepest rates 
of increase in susceptibility to signals of 
punishment and reward respectively,
(Taken from Gray, 1972; p,102).
î 77
Neurotic
Stable z f
Introverted Extroverted
[ È
Susceptibility to reward
• " punishment
178
modification of Eysenck's theory is necessitated. Gray 
accepts Eysenck's description of the neurotic as being 
generally more emotional, but, in line with his own definition 
of emotionality, interprets this as meaning that the neurotic 
is more sensitive to cues of reinforcement, both classes 
of reinforcement. It is worth noting in passing that this 
view has other implications, for example neuroticism will 
be less closely linked to activity in the ANS, but will 
reflect the level of activity in the reward and punishment 
systems, and the thresholds of these systems.
The net result of these proposals is the proposal 
that Eysenck's two dimensions should be rotated by 45°, as shown 
in Figure 5:12. The anxiety dimension running from Eysenck's 
stable-extravert to neurotic introvert quadrant is a dimension 
of increasing relative, (and absolute), sensitivity to cues 
of punishment, the impulsivity dimension, running from Eysenck's 
stable-introvert to neurotic-extravert quadrant is a dimension 
of increasing relative, (and absolute), sensitivity to cues of 
reward. This dimension is, of course, quite distinct from, 
although presumably expected to correlate with, Eysenck's 
trait of impulsivity which is independent of neuroticism.
Thus the neurotic is sensitive to cues of both classes 
of reinforcer, while "the extraversion score reflects the 
relative balance of sensitivity to signals of punishment and 
reward, respectively: an. individual relatively more
sensitive to signals of punishment (or non-reward) than to 
signals of reward (or non-punishment) is introverted; one 
relatively more sensitive to signals of reward than to signals 
of punishment is extraverted" (Gray, 1972, p.102).
It is evident that Gray is assumming (1) that for 
the introvert there is greater activity in the 'stop' system 
than in the 'approach' system: (2) that this balance is
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reversed for the extravert. However, if we re-examine the 
arguments presented earlier we find that conditions which 
reduce activity in the 'stop* system increase extraversion, 
from which it was concluded that the introvert has a relatively 
higher level activity in the 'stop' system than does the 
extravert. No evidence is presented to demonstrate that the 
extravert has a relatively higher level of activity in the 
'approach' system either than he has in the 'stop' system or 
than the introvert has in the approach system.
Even allowing for the fact of mutual : inhibition of 
the two systems there is no necessity to postulate the complete 
cross over Gray presents us with. Indeed there is virtually 
an infinite number of relationships between the two dimensions 
which could be postulated without having to propose this 
complete cross over. Indeed it would not be too difficult 
to make out a, speculative, case for it to be advantageous 
to always have lower threshold and greater activity on the 
punishment side.
I think it would be fair to say that the jump from the 
experimental animal data to the original model is somewhat 
conjectural, but the jump from what human data there is 
available to the application of the model to human personality' 
is highly speculative.
5:6 SOME OBSERVATIONS
One would like at this stage to review the experimental 
data collected both specifically to test Gray's hypotheses 
and from human subjects, but there is, as yet, little such 
data available. Two experiments have been reported however, 
(Nicholson and Gray, 1971, 1972,) both dealing with the peak 
shift and behavioural contrast phenomena, which Gray considers 
to be frustration effects. In the first of these experiments 
data from only four children are reported, three of the seven
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children tested failing to leam the initial discrimination. 
While it was found that the children did display the behavioural 
contrast effect, the evidence for peak shift was unclear, 
with the children showing the most efficient discrimination 
showing no evidence of it. No measures of personality are 
reported in this first study. However in the second report 
(1972) the Junior EPI was used. The authors express some 
dissatisfaction with the neuroticism scale of this instrument 
with the result that they base their conclusions, with respect 
to neuroticism on teachers® ratings. In support of Gray®s 
contention that both behavioural contrast and peak shift 
reflect sensitivity to frustration and hence are relevant to 
Gray® s theory they report a correlation between measures of 
the two phenomena of .6 6, but this is based on scores of 
only 10 of the available 14 subjects. The first order- 
correlations between the measures of personality and measures 
of behaviour did not yield any significant relationships:
Behavioural Contrast “ Peak Shift
Teachers* Rating N 0.36 0.37
J.E.P.I. N 0.31 -0.29
J.E.P.I. E -0.31 -0.35
TABLE 5:1 Correlations between measures of personality 
and Behavioural Contrast + Peak Shift.
Some significant relationships were discovered, 
however, when a series of partial correlations was calculated. 
These relationships appear to be stronger for the 
neuroticism dimension than for the extraversion dimension. 
However, the authors interpret the results as supporting their 
hypotheses. In view of the relatively large number of 
variables collected, the variety of partial correlations 
performed, the fact that peak shift was calculated in an
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original manner, that the data were transformed, that only a 
small number of subjects was employed (of 17 subjects tested 
some analyses included data from 14, some .from 10 subjects,
3 subjects were dropped from all the main analyses), and also 
bearing in mind the rather complex nature of the data obtained, 
a firm conclusion that these data really do support Gray's 
hypothesis must attend on either a replication of the 
experiment or further experimentation.
If there are few studies, on the one hand, which have 
attempted to test hypotheses drawn from Gray's theory then 
there is, on the other hand, also a paucity of literature 
attempting a critical evaluation. Passingham (1970) has 
offered some criticisms of the theory which are worthy of 
note. He complains that Gray does not offer sufficient 
anatomical or physiological evidence in form of the various 
feedback loops he proposes. As to the effect of frontal 
lesions, which is so important in linking the animal work with 
human personality dimensions for Gray, Pass ingham has objected 
these lesions were obviously not planned to provide data on 
the effects of such treatments on the extraversion-introversion 
dimension with the result that the work is unsystematic, 
methods of lesioning differ widely from study to study and 
the behavioural tests employedjon the basis of which it is 
concluded extraversion increases after such lesions, often 
bear a questionable relationship with Eysenck's extraversion 
dimension. Similarly, he points out, widely different types 
of lesions have been studied with the result that it is not 
clear that whatever behavioural changes do occur after such 
lesions are due to lesions of the orbital frontal cortex, 
indeed there is some evidence that dorso and ventro-lateral 
lesions are more likely to produce perseveration.
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He also questions whether, given our present state of 
ignorance, it is safe to assume that the septo-hippocampal 
system performs the same function in man as it does in rats.
He concludes: "It can only be concluded that, even where the
evidence reviewed in this paper provides partial or suggestive 
support for the theory of Gray (1970), it is by no means 
conclusive. This review suggests that Gray's (1970) theory 
as to the neurological basis of introversion-extraversion has 
not yet been adequately tested or verified". (1970, p.364).
Besides highlighting the problematic nature of the 
neurological data, at least with reference to humans.
Passingham also made another point, closely allied to one made 
above and that is that despite the fact that according to 
Gray's theory neurotics ought to be more sensitive to all cues 
of reinforcement, there does not appear to be any evidence 
that neurotics are more sensitive to cues of reward. Indeed 
one might add that this is hardly a trait one would associate 
with the typical characture of the neurotic.
One would be reluctant to contest Passingham's 
conclusion; what Gray has done is to assemble a substantial 
amount of data and to relate these in an original and 
interesting way. Looked at closely no one area of data 
presented seems to lead to one unequivocal solution. He relies 
much more on the weight of evidence. The later parts of the 
theory, those referring to man, and particularly the proposed 
modification of Eysenck's theory are of most interest in the 
present context, but are the most speculative, having the least 
supportive evidence.
The theory places a strong emphasis on conditioning, 
both instrumental and classical, and Gray obviously regards 
it as also providing nomothetic descriptions, hence his 
explicit comparison of this theory with Eysenck's. For example^
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one might be tempted to characterize Gray's introvert as the 
type of person who is sensitive to social cues, he knows when 
to say "thank you" and how to dress appropriately, but is 
normally somewhat retiring and certainly does not search out 
the limelight. He is afraid of failing. His extravert 
is poorly socialized, but outgoing and friendly, likes to be 
the centre of attraction and to succeed. Though these are 
easily recognizable 'types* are they correctly drawn from 
Gray's theory? The most obvious prediction drawn from the 
theory is that the introvert should condition passive avoidance 
relatively more easily than approach or active avoidance.
The bulk of the data, however, on which the model is built 
is between - group data, while this is a within-individual 
comparison. This aside, it is evident that much of socialized 
behaviour, like two 'innocent' examples in the characterization 
of the introvert, is not passive, but active avoidance, and 
according to the model it is the extravert \dio is supposed 
to display the superiority in this department. Classical 
conditioning, it is hypothesized, is carried out at the level 
of the amygdala, a level at which no difference is hypothesized 
between the introvert and the extravert. The relating of these 
CSs to instrumental reponses is assummed to be carried out at 
the level of the reward and punishment mechanisms. Thus 
introverts and extraverts might be expected to form the 
CS-UCS(aversive) connection equally well but their talents lie 
in being able to formulate different types of instrumental 
responses to cope with the situation, with differential ease.
This does not match our original descriptions of the 
'typical' introvert and extravert, it now seems that these 
must be modified to describing the introvert as a recluse 
and the extravert as friendly and well socialized. This 
change does not necessarily cause any great difficulty, indeed
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it could be taken as yet another example of looking for 
patterns of behaviour which do not, in fact, exist in nature.
However if the above analysis is correct and introverts 
are passive avoiders and extraverts active avoiders what are 
we to make of Gray’s claim that most individuals displaying 
obsessive-compulsive disorders will be neurotic introverts? 
Surely these are active avoidance activities. It appears Gray 
would agree, talking of obsessional hand washing he says; 
"Should we look for any more recondite explanation of this 
behaviour than that the patient has acquired, through the 
vagaries of conditioning and learning an active avoidance 
response not different in principle from the kind that carries 
a rat over a hurdle to avoid a potential electric shock?
(1971, p.237).
What is to be concluded from this? Part of the 
problem is that Gray does not adequately distinguish between 
the classical and instrumental aspects of these situations 
in relation to his model of personality functioning. He does 
in his book "Elements of a Two-Process Theory of Learning" 
(1975a) spend a considerable amount of time discussing the 
distinction between these two types of conditioning and how 
they might both be present in avoidance learning, but he does 
not relate these problems to his model of personality.
The answer may well be that when extraverts do condition fear 
they will learn an active avoidance response relatively more 
efficiently. The extravert, however, is less likely to 
condition fear, perhaps because the introvert being relatively 
more aroused will find more stimuli reaching aversive levels, 
with the result that he will attempt to escape more often 
than the extravert employing both active and passive avoidance 
responses. After all^the difference between the two 
systems is supposed to be a relative and not an absolute one.
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Various other criticisms could be leveled against the theory, 
but once more the central point of the observations made is 
that in some situations two apparently contradictory hypotheses 
may be drawn from the theory. Alternatively results may be 
explained post hoc as having confirmed, or as being interpretable 
in terms of some particular aspect of the theory. This is 
obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs. In the 
experiments which follow it will be a s s u m e t h a t  as 
mildly aversive stimuli will be employed, and as summing that 
the higher arousal of the introvert will facilitate the 
conditioning of fear it will be the introvert who will leam 
the avoidance response, both active and passive, more efficiently. 
On the other hand if a stronger aversive stimulus were used 
one might predict,as was done earlier that the extravert 
would condition active while the introvert would condition 
passive avoidance more efficiently.
The various observations and criticisms of the theory 
which have been made while outlining it are intended to be 
cautionary and not the basis for out right rejection. The 
theory is virtually untested and in consequence it is hardly 
surprising that it exhibits a certain ’vagueness' and lack 
of precision in places. On the other hand there is a certain 
plausibility about it; it is easy to picture some people as 
interested primarily in rewards and others primarily in 
avoiding punishment. However, as Mischel remarked with 
respect to trait theories in general they have a certain 
plausibility about them, but in practice they have not proved 
to be useful, so any final evaluation of Gray’s theory must 
wait until hypotheses drawn from it have been tested and the 
theory as a whole is not so "innocent of contact..... with 
the harsh world of experimental fact".
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CHAPTER VI: EYSENCK, GRAY AND MISCHEL
It was suggested earlier that if Eysenck's theery is 
to prove itself useful in linking the nomothetic and 
idiographic approaches in a single theoretical structure, then 
his introversion-extraversion dimension must be demonstrated 
to be a general factor of conditionability. This, it was 
concluded, in Chapter IV, has not yet been done; hypotheses 
drawn from the theory being subject both to confirmation and 
frequent disconfirmation. Some of these "disconfirmations" 
may be challenged on the grounds that they used inappropriate 
parameters. Gray, however, has gone a step further than 
reporting disconfirmating data and suggested that Eysenck's 
I - E dimension cannot be the factor of conditionability, 
because there are, according to data reviewed by him, two 
conditionability dimensions; one related to positive 
reinforcement, the other to negative reinforcement. 
Unfortunately there is little evidence from studies of 
conditioning with humans which permits a realistic evaluation 
of Gray's claims, though there are aspects of the theory he 
puts forward as an alternative to Eysenck's which are not 
entirely satisfactory. However, if Gray is correct, in 
general, if not in detail, it would mean that Eysenck's theory 
would be unsuitable for the task required of it here. Gray's
model may, of course, itself, prove to be an adequate 
substitute.
There is a certain attraction in bringing together 
the approach to behavioural organization outlined by Mischel 
and Bandura with Gray's model of personality. While the two 
former authors plead for a learning theory approach to
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personality, Gray attempts to deduce a model of personality 
functioning from work on animal learning, Eysenck, by 
contrasts, starts with a model of personality from which he 
deduces differences in learning ability. It is true that 
whereas Mischel and Bandura stop at the stage of describing 
how learning a behavioural repertoire might take place, and 
suggesting factors which might influence this learning. Gray 
couches his model in nomothetic generalizations and suggests 
that whole groups of people will be expected to behave in 
certain ways. Nevertheless, the addition of some of Gray's 
suggestions to Mischel's approach to behavioural organization 
may be seen as adding both variety and strength.
Mischel has argued that consistency may be explained 
without recourse to unobservable traits, but simply on the 
basis of generalization, Gray might provide a clue to what 
is generalized. If people are differentially sensitive, as 
he suggests, we might expect individuals to notice certain cues 
more readily- than others and in consequence produce certain 
classes of responses more often than others. There is no 
need either to claim individuals are absolutely consistent, 
or deny that learning constitutes an important determinant 
of behaviour. Nor does all individuality need to be explained 
in terms of differential learning history, for two people 
to behave in exactly the same way they would need to have not 
only identical learning histories, but also identical nervous 
systems, or at least functionally identical interactions of 
these two. To take an example from Mischel (1968), he 
argues that it is not surprising that a child does not show 
consistent behaviour if, for example, he is rewarded at school 
for "being near" and "showing affection" while at home the 
same behaviours are discouraged. It seems probable that 
some children will behave "appropriately" and respond differently
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at home and at school. However, many children may not, infact, 
display this differentiation. Often one child may ignore the 
punishment and persist in demonstrations of affection at 
home, while another, more sensitive to cues of punishment 
according to Gray's model, will shy away from demonstrations 
of affection even though rewarded for them at school.
One might even view Gray as attempting to put forward 
a model of Bandura's reciprocal determinism. According 
to Gray's model behaviour produces an effect on the 
environment and also sets us an expectation in the individual; 
changes in the environment are seen as modifying expectations 
and influencing the individual's experiencial state, both 
of which, of course, will affect his future behaviour - and 
the situation. One might equally well start from the 
situation which provides cues, which set up expectations 
and initiate behaviour. Nor is this approach at odds with 
Mischel's speculations about strong and weak situations, 
for the hypothesized differences between individuals is one 
of relative differential sensitivity, not absolute 
insensitivity on one side. Thus if, as Mischel claims, as 
a situation becomes "stronger" more individuals will behave 
in a similar way. Gray would predict the same but indicate 
that if the cue is a cue of punishment then those individuals 
more sensitive to cues of punishment will show the behaviour 
earlier than those relatively more sensitive to reward. In 
fact one might extend the point and suggest that one might 
begin to suspect abnormality if, amongst other things, the
level of punishment required to di^ade an individual from
persuing a particular course of action has to be uncommonly y
high, or rewards have to be at an extreme level before he is 
induced to behave in a particular manner. Gray would predict 
that these two abnormalities would be most likely to occur
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in different individuals
It would seem necessary, however, to turn from 
speculation for no matter how persuasively these approaches 
may be fitted together before one can go any further one 
must have some empirical data on the basis of which these 
suggestions may be evaluated. One would like to know 
whether or not introverts do always condition better than 
extraverts, given the appropriate parameters, or whether 
the type of reinforcement does determine which group shows 
superior conditionability; whether individuals show different 
patterns of behaviour in response to cues of reward and 
punishment when they are all presented with the same 
information, or only when they have to leam these relationships 
themselves. In general one is interested in knowing which of 
these two theories is correct, when yielding different 
predictions especially with respect to conditioning, or 
whether they are both incorrect. It was to provide 
information relevant to these and related questions that the 
experiments to be reported here were performed.
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CHAPTER VII; EXPERIMENT 1
7:1 ABSTRACT
The purpose of this experiment was to compare the 
predictive value of Gray's and Eysenck's theory of personality. 
Predictions were also drawn from Spence's theory. A 
modified Taffel-type verbal conditioning paradigm was employed. 
As no clear conditioning effect was evident it is 
impossible to draw any firm conclusions with respect to the 
three theories. The results do, however, provide some 
support for the predictions drawn from Eysenck's theory.
Some of the predictions from Gray's theory with respect to 
the interaction of extraversion and the type of reinforcement 
employed also received weak support, but there was no consistent 
support for hypotheses drawn from this theory.
The LN and HN groups were found to differ significantly 
in their initial level of responding, this introduced a 
further complication in attempting to interpret the data. 
However, contrary to the predictions of both Spence and 
Gray it was the LN group who appealed to show some increase 
in the use of the CR with reinforcement. It was suggested 
that this might be interpreted as supporting Roess1er's 
view of Ego-strength, and that any future replication of 
the experiment might usefully control for Ego-strength 
in order that Roessler's predictions might be properly put 
to the test.
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7:2 INTRODUCTION
It has already been pointed out in some detail that 
the theories of Gray and Eysenck offer different predictions 
with regard to the relationship between personality and 
conditionability. It has also been remarked that while on 
the one hand hypotheses drawn from Eysenck's theory have not 
received overwhelming confirmation, on the other hand many 
of the studies purporting to test Eysenck's theory are of 
questionable methodological validity. The present 
experiment attempts not only to put Eysenck's predictions, 
with regard to the relationship between the introversion- 
extraversion dimension and conditionability to the test once 
more, but also to compare these predictions with some drawn 
from Gray's theory.
Verbal Conditioning 
(a ) Extraver s ion-Introversion
Eysenck (1959) suggested the possibility of using 
verbal conditioning as a test of his theory, and went on to 
report that, as predicted by the theory, the more introverted 
subjects displayed superior conditionability. He indicated, 
however, that the results of this experiment need to be 
treated with some caution as there appeared to be an initial, 
significant, difference in the preference of the two groups 
to use the designated CR, verbs of muscular activity, even 
before reinforcement was introduced.
In two subsequent studies, Johns and Quay (1962) 
and Quay and Hunt (1965), results were reported \diich were 
interpreted as supporting Eysenck's hypothesis. Quay and 
Hunt (1965) report a correlations of -.25 between conditionability 
and extraversion as measured by the MPI. Once more, however, 
the results of the experiment proved difficult to interpret 
because of a differential rate of emission of the designated
: 4 92
CR prior to reinforcement. Indeed Person and Person (1965) 
have argued that the results of the Johns and Quay's 
experiment should be interpreted in the direction opposite 
to that indicated by those authors. Weight was added to 
Person and Person's criticism when Bryan and Kapche (1967) 
failed to replicate Johns and Quay's findings. McDonell 
and Inglis (1962), employing the MPI, whereas both Johns 
and Quay, and Bryan had used the Quay-Peterson Inventory 
(1965), also failed to find any relationship between the 
introversion-extraversion dimension and conditionability.
Gelfand and Winder (1961) further added to the 
confusion when they reported that dysthymies displayed 
superior verbal conditioning to hysterics, which is as Eysenck 
would predict, but that Guilford's R, used as a measure of 
extraversion, failed to distinguish between the two clinical 
groups. In consequence of this latter finding they went on 
to conclude that:"The findings do not support the relationship 
between extraversion and resistance to conditionability 
postulated by Franks (1956) and Eysenck (1955)". (1961, p.689).
Goodstein (1967) also employed Guilford's R and failed 
to find any relationship between introversion-extraversion 
and verbal conditioning, as did Das and Mitra (1967) using 
the MPI, and Languani (1968) using the EPI,
Costello (1967) moved from the usual Taffel type 
paradigm where the subject is supplied with a verb and series 
of pronouns and required to respond with a sentence containing 
the verb and one of the pronouns, and reinforced, usually 
by the experimenter saying "good", if he uses the designated 
pronoun(s) usually "I" and "We". Instead Costello attempted 
to condition the "connotive meaning of words" and reported 
that introverts did display superior conditionability.
Knowles (1963), however, reported conflicting results.
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in one experiment suceeding in conditioning the pronouns "I" - 
"we", but not "he" - "they", while in the second experiment 
failing to find any evidence of conditioning of either pair 
of pronouns. There was no evidence of a relationship between 
personality and conditioning in either experiment. Beech 
and Adler's (1963) results are little more comforting for 
Eysenck. These authors used schizophrenic, neurotic and 
depressive patients and "normals". All subjects completed 
the MPI. They report a correlation between introversion- 
extraversion and verbal conditioning of -.64, but this was 
true only for the depressive gpoup. Similarly they report 
a correlation of -.54 between neuroticism and conditioning, 
but in this case it was true only for the "normal" group.
Eysenck does receive some limited support from 
Gidwani (1971) who used children as subjects and "smarties" 
as reinforcers. In the extinction phase of the experiment, 
for those subjects classified as being unaware of the rein­
forcement contingencies, the differences in emission of 
the CR was as predicted by Eysenck's theory, the extraverted 
group showing the more rapid decline in its use. Eysenck 
(1967) reported a study by Jawanda (1966) which he describes 
as the most extensive and best controlled study to that time. 
Jawanda employed subjects belonging to three age groups:
21-25, 36-40, 56-60 years, and four personality groups : 
Neurotic extraverts (HNHE), stable extraverts (LNHE), 
neurotic introverts (HNLE) and stable introverts (LNLE). 
Subjects were assigned to personality groups on the basis 
of their MPI scores. He employed the usual Taffel procedure.
For all age groups the LNLE groups were found to produce the 
largest number of CRs, the HNHE group the least and the other 
two groups falling midway between those two.
While this study does appear to support Eysenck's
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predictions, given the variability of results relating verbal 
conditioning to the introversion-extraversion dimension it would 
be fool hardy to place too much importance on this one study 
alone. However, it must also be remarked that not all of 
these studies are easy to interpret, in some studies there 
appeared to be a differential tendency for groups to use the 
CR before reinforcement began, in others either clinical 
groups were employed or else psychometric tests other than 
Eysenck's own were used. Almost all these studies used 
100% reinforcement and as pointed out earlier, if parameters 
appropriate to the theory are not employed it becomes 
impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions.
If Eysenck's predictions have fared badly, Gray's 
have fared even less well, for not one study reports superior 
conditioning by the extravert group although all use positive 
reinforcement in an operant reinforcement situation.
(B) Anxiety
Turning now to the second personality dimension 
hypothesized as being of importance in determining 
conditioning, anxiety, this is of less importance for 
Eysenck's theory, but, of course, of some importance to both 
Spence and Gray. Spence, it has often been assummed, would 
predict that anxiety ought to correlate positively with 
verbal conditioning. However, it will be recalled from 
Chapter 4 that he lays some stress on the importance of 
employing an anxiety provoking situation, and the usual 
verbal conditioning procedure can hardly be regarded as that.
The result of this is that it is not immediately evident 
whether one ought to predict no systematic relationship 
between anxiety and verbal conditioning. There is similar 
confusion over Gray's position, while he would predict that
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neurotics, given their greater sensitivity to cues of 
reinforcement, ought to condition better than stables, 
it has been reported that anxiety correlates both 
positively with neuroticism and negatively with extraversion. 
Thus where a negative reinforcement is employed we can 
confidently conclude that Gray would predict that the more 
highly anxious (HA) subject would condition more efficiently 
than the less anxious (LA) subjects. However most verbal 
conditioning studies employ a positive reinforcer and so it 
will depend on the precise composition of the LA group in any 
particular experiment whether or not the HA group is seen 
to condition more efficiently. Put another way to test 
Grays predictions adequately independent measures of both 
extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N) are necessary.
Returning to Jawanda *s study we find him concluding, 
contrary to Gray's prediction that "subjects scoring low on 
neuroticism develop verbal conditioning better than their 
counterparts scoring high on neuroticism" (quoted by 
Eysenck, 1967, p.125), As already noted the group one 
would expect to find producing the most CRs, according to 
Gray's theory the HNHE group, in fact produced the fewest; 
the LNLE group producing the most.
Few studies, however, have enployed measures of 
both E and N, and ever since Taffel's (1955) original study 
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale (MAS) has been the favoured 
instrument. Taffel, himself, reported a positive
relationship between MAs and verbal conditioning, as did 
Cambell (1960) and Rosenblum (1960), Buss and Geruoy 
(1958), however, failed to replicate Taffel's findings and 
reported results in the opposite direction, with LA subjects 
showing better conditioning than HA subjects. Jantz (1960) 
Vidulich (1963) have also reported a negative relationship
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between anxiety and verbal conditioning.
Patterson, Helper and Willcott (1960) have complicated 
the issue somewhat by on the one hand reporting superior 
conditioning by the LA group but interpreting this as being 
in line with the Spence-Hull hypothesis. They argue that 
on the basis of Hull's theory in a simple learning situation, 
such as the Taffel type verbal conditioning procedure, a 
higher level of anxiety facilitates conditioning. However, 
as the response to become conditioned becomes more complex, as 
in the Kent-Rosanoff word association test which they used, 
higher levels of anxiety become detrimental with the result 
that LA subjects should condition more efficiently than 
HA subjects.
The difficulty in achieving replicable results is 
underlined by the fact that not only do some studies report 
a positive relationship while others report a negative 
relationship between anxiety and verbal condition, but a number 
of studies have failed to find any relationship at all between 
these two variables (e.g. Daily, 1953; Zadek, 1959;
Maltarazzo et al, 1960; Ebner, 1961; Oakes, 1963).
After reviewing studies which had employed anxiety as 
a variable Sarason (1960) concluded that it is difficult to 
achieve any replicable results where anxiety is concerned, 
and in this respect at least the relationship between anxiety 
and verbal conditioning appears to be running true to form.
(C) Reinforcement
(i) Type: One of the major distinguishing features
of Gray's theory is the importance he places on the type of 
reinforcement employed and the manner in which this is expected 
to interact with personality groupings. There do not appear 
to be any studies in the verbal conditioning literature which
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report data which can be used as evidence either for or against 
this proposition. Several studies have employed either 
aversive, or compared aversive with appetitive reinforcement 
(e.g. Buss, Weiner and Buss, 1954; Rotberg, 1959; Das and 
Mitra, 1962). Das and Mitra (1962) even recorded the subject‘s 
E, N, intelligence and rigidity scores; they report that no 
personality variable was found to relate significantly to 
conditionability, though they do not report whether there was 
any tendency towards an interaction between reinforcement type 
and personality type.
(ii) Schedule: As with the effects of different types 
of reinforcement there do not appear to be any studies relating 
personality, verbal conditioning and reinforcement schedule.
There are some studies, however, relating the second and 
third of these variables. Kanfer (1954) using the autokinetic 
effect compared 100%, 67% and 50% reinforcement schedules
of reinforcement; both reinforcement and responses were verbal. 
He reports that in the acquisition phase partial reinforcement 
groups required more trials, but fewer reinforcements to 
reach a criterion level of responding. In the extinction 
phase those subjects who had been given continuous 
reinforcement showed greater initial resistance but later 
showed a more rapid decline in use of the CR than those who 
had received partial reinforcement
(iii) CS-UCS Interval: Again investigation of this
parameter appears to have been neglected with reference to 
verbal conditioning. Beech and Adler (1963) did have their 
subjects pause after the first word of the sentence, which had 
to be a pronoun, and administered reinforcement where 
appropriate. Though this procedure is more in line with
the requirements of Eysenck's theory than the usual method 
of reinforcing at the end of the sentence, as already reported.
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their results were not strongly in Eysenck's favour.
(D) The Pronoun
Though not of immediate theoretical interest to any 
of the theories under consideration here, the work of 
Gidwani (1971) strongly suggests that one other variable, the 
pronoun to be reinforced, must be given some consideration. 
Gidwani (1971) reports that when she employed the normal 
method of reinforcing both "I" and "we" only the former was 
found to increase in frequency. In a subsequent experiment 
she discovered that even in a non-reinforced control group 
the frequency of the use of "l" increased across trials.
This increase was significant, though the increase in 
frequency was not as great for this group as for the experimental 
group. In a further experiment she failed to find any 
evidence of conditioning of the pronouns "we", "she", "he", 
"they".
Gidwani is not alone in experiencing this problem.
Gelder (1968) reports that when reinforcing both "I" and "we" 
only the former was found to increase significnalty. Knowles 
(1963) reported success in conditioning "l/we" but not "he/they", 
although he failed to replicate these results, failing, in 
the second experiment, to obtain any evidence of conditioning 
of either pair of pronouns.
Beech and Adler (1963), on the other hand, do report some 
success in conditioning the pronoun "we". In this experiment, 
however, when subjects were unaware of the reinforcement 
contingencies only the schizophrenic group displayed any 
evidence of conditioning. Leftwich and Nawas (1969) also 
report some success, this time in conditioning the pronouns 
"he/we"o Conditioning was only evident, however, for 
those subjects aware of the reinforcement contingencies.
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In view of the strong possibility of obtaining a 
pseudo-conditioning effect, especially if the pronoun "I" 
were employed as the CR, it was decided to use three 
pronouns, randomly across subjects, as the CR in the 
present experiment. On the basis of data taken from Gidwani 
(1971) the pronouns "he", "she" and "they" were chosen as 
these appeard to have approximately equal probability of 
occurence in a non-reinforced situation.
TABLE 7:1
I They She He We You
4.93 3.83 3.74 3.28 2.81 1.11
5.25 3.85 3.77 3.52 3.05 o75
Experiment 1
Mean number of times pronoun is used over a block of 
20 unreinforced trials (data taken from Gidwani 1971).
It was hoped that by randomly allocating subjects to 
three groups, each group to have a different pronoun 
reinforced, it might be possible to avaid spurious effects 
due to the preference of particular personality groups for 
particular pronouns.
7:3 HYPOTHESES
The aim of the present experiment is, of course, to 
compare predictions drawn from several theories as to the 
differential conditionability of individuals located at different 
points on generalized personality dimensions thought to be of 
relevance. According to Eysenck's theory the higher cortical 
excitation and lower cortical inhibition of the introvert
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ought to favour superior conditioning of this group, while 
the faster development of cortical inhibition in the extravert 
ought to favour a more rapid extinction effect, given that the 
appropriate parameters are employed. This then is the 
first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:1 The introverted group will show superior 
conditioning, while the extraverted group will show a more 
rapid extinction.
Gray, on the other hand, would not predict a significant 
extraversion effect, the superior conditioning of the introverts 
when faced with negative reinforcement and the superior 
conditioning of the extravert when offered positive reinforcement 
cancelling each other out. One might predict, instead, on 
the basis of Gray’s theory, that extraversion would interact 
with type of reinforcement. This then is the second 
hypothesis :
Hypothesis 1:2 There will be an interaction between 
extraversion and type of reinforcement due to the superior 
conditioning of the extraverted group in the reward condition 
and the introverted group in the punishment condition.
Gray also envisages the neuroticism dimension as a 
dimension of general sensitivity to cues of reinforcement, 
which leads to two further predictions:
Hypothesis 1:3 The neurotic group will demonstrate a 
superior conditionability as compared with the stable group 
(i.e. low N scorers).
Hypothesis 1:4 There will be an extraversion x neuroticism x 
type of reinforcement interaction, with the HNHE group 
employing the CR most in the reward condition and the HNLE 
group using the non-punished pronoun most in the punishment 
condition.
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It is often assummed that Spence would predict that 
anxiety ought to be positively related to verbal conditioning, 
but as already noted, this is not necessarily so, because of 
the importance he places on anxiety provoking conditions.
As the verbal conditioning task cannot be classified as a 
complex one there does not appear to be any justification for 
the contention that negative relationship between verbal 
conditioning and anxiety ought to be regarded as supporting 
Spence’s position. In the present experiment, then, 
confirmation of hypothesis 3 may be regarded as supporting 
Spencers theory, though if no significant difference is 
found between these two groups it cannot be regarded as a 
’’strong” dis confirmation of the theory as no effort will be 
made to provoke anxiety in the subject.
All these hypotheses rest upon one assumption, that 
conditioning does indeed take place. As all the theories 
from which hypotheses have been drawn predict differential 
conditioning, rather than that one group will condition 
while another will not, one further hypothesis may be added;
Hypothesis 1:5 There will be a significant trials effect 
and a significant linear trend over trials. It is to be 
expected this effect will be evident for each of the other 
main effects and interactions which have been indicated as 
being of theoretical significance.
7:4 METHOD
Design
The independent variables in this experiment were: 
Introversion-extraversion, neuroticism-stability, reward- 
puni shment and seven blocks of twenty trials, yielding a 
2 X  2 X  2 X  7 design with repeated measures in one variable 
Reinforcement: In the ’’positive”, or reward, condition the
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experimenter said : ”mmmh” (a noise of approval), accompanied
by a slight nod of the head after each response which was to 
be rewarded. In the "negative”, or punishment, condition 
reinforcement consisted of the experimenter saying; ”tut”
(a noise of disapproval), accompanied by a slight shake of 
the head.
Schedule: A fixed ratio 50% reinforcement schedule was
employed, that is, every other time the CR was used it was 
reinforced as was appropriate to the condition.
Trials: Each subject was presented with 140 cards sequentially,
He/she was required to compose a phrase in response to each 
card. Trials were divided into blocks of twenty, with the 
first block serving to establish the operant level of 
responding, and so going unreinforced. The next four blocks 
(blocks 2 - 5 )  were reinforced, while the final two blocks 
(blocks 6 & 7) were again unreinforced and served as an 
extinction phase. There was no pause between blocks of trials 
and so the subject was unaware of this division.
The CR: The response to be reinforced was a pronoun. Three
pronouns, ”he”, ”she” and "they” were used randomly across 
subjects, of course any one subject had only one pronoun 
reinforced.
Task: The subject was presented with a card and required to
respond with a two word phrase in the form pronoun-verb.
Each card had printed on it the verb to be used in the 
response, and three personal pronouns, of which either the 
first or third had to be used as part of the response, i.e. 
the second, or middle pronoun was not to be used as part of 
the response.
Materials: Six sets of 6” x 4” white cards, 140 cards to a
set were prepared. Each card had a verb in the centre and 
three pronouns underneath the verb. The verbs were neutrally
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toned past tense verbs taken from Dixon and Dixon (1964) and 
Binder, McConnell and Sjoholm (195f). Responses were recorded 
on a prepared score sheet.
Personality measurement: Extraversion and neuroticism were
defined by Eysenck and Eysenck’s (1964) Eysenck Personality 
Inventory (EPI). Subjects scoring 11 or over on the E scale 
were classified as extraverts and those scoring 10 or less as 
introverts. Similarly, subjects scoring 11 or over on the N 
scale were classified as neurotics for the purposes of this 
experiment and those scoring 10 or less as stables.
Procedure
60 subjects were tested as part of this experiment, but 
13 were subsequently discarded when it was discovered that 
either they had scored 5 or more on the EPI lie scale, or that 
English was not their first language. Two further subjects 
were dropped as they knew of the Taffel experiment and so were 
not naive as to the purpose of the experiment. It was then 
decided to drop a further five records in order to create 
equal cell frequencies. Records to be dropped were chosen 
in a random manner, with the constraint that equal cell 
frequencies ensued.
Subjects were volunteers, university students, 16 males 
and 24 females, all with English as their first language.
They were randomly assigned to either the reward or punishment 
conditions. For each subject one of the six available sets 
of cards was chosen,again at random, and finally one pronoun 
was chosen to be reinforced.
Each subject completed the EPI and immediately on 
finishing this was instructed as follows :
"There are 141 cards here. Each card is of this 
format (a sample card was shown on which there appeared the 
verb "thanked", plus the pronouns to be used in the experiment).
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There will be a verb in block capitals at the top and three 
personal pronouns underneath. What I want you to do is to 
make a phrase using only the verb and either the pronoun in 
the first or third position (these were indicated while 
speaking). So it will be a two word phrase in the form pronoun- 
verb. For example if you were given this card you could 
say either...... (the two possible phrases were given). Do
you understand?"
Each card contained a different verb (cf. appendix 
for list of verbs used). The pack of cards was placed in 
front of the subject and one card was handed to him/her at 
approximately four second intervals. The whole task took 
approximately 10 minutes. Each response was recorded on a 
prepared scoring sheet before the next card was handed to the 
subject.
The experimenter sat facing the subject, but the subject 
was unable to see the scoring sheet. The experimenter kept 
his eyes fixed on the scoring sheet or the cards in order to 
restrict communication to that required by the experiment i.e. 
the appropriate noises and gestures. After the last card had 
been presented to the subject the experimenter said: "I
would like to ask you some questions now." He then proceeded 
to ask a series of questions taken from Gidwani (1971) 
designed to assess the subject’s awareness of the experimental 
contingencies. (Cf. appendix for questions).
Six packs of cards were available to the experimenter. 
Each pack contained all 140 verbs, but there are six possible 
combinations of the three pronouns. These were organized so 
as to give three choice situations: "he" vs "they," "he vs
"she," "she" vs "they". For each of these situations there 
were two packs available, each pack made up of 50% of the 
cards with e.g. "he" in the first position and "they" in the
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third position and the converse for the other 50% of cards.
The second pack was the complement of this. Within a pack 
cards were shuffled so as to yield equal probability of 
either pronoun occuring in the first position on any card.
Thus for each subject the experimenter chose first one of the 
six packs and then one of the two pronouns at random.
Though the subject completed the EPI before the 
conditioning phase of the experiment began, these were not 
scored until sometime later, and so the experimenter was 
unaware during conditioning of the personality group to which 
the subject would be assigned.
7:4 Results
The mean scores on the E and N scales of the present 
sample are comparable to those reported by Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1964); here the mean E score was 11.1, and N 10.6, 
as compared to values of 11.095 and 10.006 reported by 
Eysenck.
In order that data from the reward and punishment 
conditions might be statistically comparable a subject’s 
score in the reward condition was simply a count of the 
number of times he/she used the reinforced pronoun in a block 
of 20 consecutive trials. In the punishment condition the 
subject’s (S) score was a count of the number of times the 
unreinforced pronoun was used. That is, in both conditions 
it was the number of times the pronoun, which was expected 
to increase in frequency, was used which provided the data for 
the analysis. It was in order to be able to analyse the 
data in this way that the subject was given the choice of 
only two pronouns, rather than three or more as is usual.
Conditioning
As the experiment was designed to investigate the
TABLE 7:2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE USING RAW DATA
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Source SS DF MS F Sig.
Between
Type of Reinforcement (R) 70.805 1 70.805 3.583 N.S,
Extraversion (E) 61,605 1 61.605 3.118 It
Neuroticism (N) 117.045 1 117.045 5.923 p < .05
R X  E 0.605 1 0.605 < 1 N.S.
R X  N 4.805 1 4.805 -< 1 It
E x N 0.245 1 0.245 -< 1 It
R X  E X  N 0.125 1 0.125 1 It
Residual 632.32 32 22.758
Within
Trials (T) 9.28 4 2.32 1.184 It
Linear trend 2.89 1 2.89 1.474 It
T X  R 1.92 4 0.48 c  1 It
T X  E 0.12 4 0.03 ^  1 It
T X  N 15.68 4 3.92 2.0 It
T X  R X  E 8.92 4 2.23 1.138
T X  R X  N 8.92 4 2.23 1.138 It
T X  E X  N 4.08 4 1.02 ^  1 It
T X  R X  E X  N 15.8 4 2.015 2.015 It
Residual 250.88 128 1.96
Total 1203.155 199
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relationship between personality and conditioning it is of 
more than passing interest to know whether or not conditioning 
did take place over the sample as a whole. Hypothesis 1:5 
predicted that there would be a trials effect, and a significant 
linear trend across trials, but as can be seen from Table 7:2, 
which presents the results of the analysis of variance of 
data drawn from the operant and reinforcement phases of the 
experiment, this hypothesis has not been confirmed. Though 
this result constitutes something of a set back it need not be 
totally damning. The various theoristsconsidered have 
predicted differential conditionability of various personality 
groups and so it is possible that a conditioning effect will 
be evident in at least one of these.
Anxiety
Hypothesis 1:3 stated that HN subjects would show 
superior conditioning as compared to LN Ss. It can be seen 
from Table 7:2 that there is a significant difference between 
these two groups. However Fig. 7:1 suggests that even here 
all is not well. The HN group uses the CR more than the LN 
group in each block of trials, but there is no evidence of the 
increase in the frequency of the CR across trials one might 
expect if conditioning were taking place. We appear to 
have come across the same problem as that reported by both 
Eysenck (1959) and Johns and Quay (1962) with one group using 
the CR significantly more than the other even before reinforcement 
is introduced.
With respect to the Johns and Quay’s experiment Person 
and Person (1965) have suggested that a ceiling effect might 
be obscuring the conditioning effect. Unfortunately they do 
not suggest a suitable method of correcting for this when 
faced with this type of data. In an attempt, therefore, to 
reduce the influence of any ceiling effects, scores deviating
TABLE 7:3: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE USING CORRECTED DATA
2 0 9
Source SS DF MS F Sig.
Between
Type of reinforcement (R) 0.00146 1 0.00146 < 1  N.S.
Extraversion (E) 0.00925 1 0.00925 < 1  "
Neuroticism (N) 0.14258 1 0.14258 2.049 "
R X  E 0.00106 1 0.00106 C l  *»
R X  N 0.00205 1 0.00205 < 1  "
E X  N 0.02205 1 0.02205 cl "
R X  E X  N 0.03809 1 0.03809 < 1  "
Residual 2.22668 32 0.06958
Within
Trials (T) 0.07282 4 0.01821 1.073 N.S.
Linear trend 0.01221 1 0.01221 < 1  "
T X  R 0.01403 4 0.00351 < 1  "
T X  E 0.00332 4 0.00085 < 1  "
T X  N 0.08858 4 0.02214 1.305 "
T X  R X  E 0.05518 4 0.01379 < 1
T X  R X  N 0.07992 4 0.01998 1.177 "
T X  E X  N 0.04551 4 0.01138 <-1
T X  R X  E X.  TSf 0.14577 4 0.03644 2.147 "
Residual 2.17244 128 0.01697
Total 5.12077 199
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from the operant level of responding in a positive direction 
were transformed according to the following formula:
Xr - Xo 
Xmax - Xo
Scores deviating from the operant level in a negative 
direction were transformed according to the formula:
Xr - Xo 
Xo
(Where Xo * operant level of responding; Xr = the number 
of times the CR is employed in a subsequent block of trials;
Xmax = the maximum number of times the CR could be used in 
a block of trials (here 20)).
Scores corrected in this way provided the data for 
another analysis of variance, the results of which are 
summarized in Table 7:3, It can be seen that the neuroticism 
effect is no longer significant, nor is the neuroticism by 
trials interaction. In fact, when the graphs for the stable 
and neurotic groups are compared (cf Fig, 7:2) it seems to be 
the LN group who show some improvement, rather than the HN 
group. The HN group initially showing a slight decrease in 
the use of the CR. This negative relationship between 
frequency of using the CR and N cannot be held to support the 
models of either Spence or Gray, though it does conform to 
the pattern of results reported by Jawanda (1956).
Eysenck - Extraversion
Hypothesis 1:1 predicted that it would be the 
introverted group vho would show superior conditioning, however, 
as can be seen from Table 7:3 neither the extraversion main 
effect, nor the extraversion x trials interaction is found to 
be significant. Figure 7:3 indicates that at least the 
results are in the direction predicted by Eysenck, with the
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introverted group employing the CR more than the extraverted 
group on each block of reinforced trails. It is also the 
introverted group who show the greater initial increase viien 
reinforcement is introduced, but this increase is not 
significant.
Eysenck's theory also predicts that the extraverted 
group ought to show a more rapid extinction, again the results 
are in the direction predicted. Too much cannot be made of 
this finding, however, because, as can be seen from figure 7:3 
the extraverted group actually shows an increase in the use of 
the CR in the first extinction block of trials; the effect 
does not reach the arbitroy level of statistical significance. 
Most importantly, however, one cannot speak of an extinction 
effect with any conviction where no conditioning effect has been 
clearly demonstrated.
Gray - Extraversion, Nueroticism and Reinforcement
It has already been remarked that Gray's predictions 
with regard to the neuroticism dimension have not been 
supported, once the data have been corrected for initial 
difference between the groups in responding, and as can be 
seen from table 7:3 his predictions with regard to the inter­
actions between extraversion, neuroticism and the type of 
reinforcement employed have fared no better. In line with 
the predictions of the theory the extraverted group do show 
the greatest increase in using the CR in reward condition, while 
it is the introverted group who show the greatest increase 
during reinforcement in the punishment (cf. Figs, 7:4, 7:5).
Even here, however, as though pouring salt into the wound, 
the results are not unequivocally in the direction predicted 
by Gray.
It is the LN groups which show the improvement and
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TABLE 7:4 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE INCLUDING DATA FROM BOTH
ACQUISITION AND EXTINCTION PHASES,(Uncorrected data)
Source SS DF MS F Sig.
Between
Type of Reinforcement (R) 100.800 1 100.800 4.043 P <  .1
Extraversion (E) 84.700 1 84.700 3.397 P <ol
Neuroticism (N) 142,857 1 142.857 5.730 P .05
R X  E 2.057 1 2.057 < 1 N.S.
R X  N 0.014 1 0.014 < 1 N.S.
E X  N 0.229 1 0.229 < 1 It
R X  E X  N 0.014 1 0.014 < 1 tt
Residual 797.771 32 24.930
Within
Trials (T) 15.936 6 2.656 1.216 N.S.
Linear trend 0.700 1 0.700 < 1 •t
T X  R 1.95 6 0.325 < 1 tt
T X  E 12.150 6 2.025 < 1 tt
T X  N 20.293 6 3.382 1.548 tt
T X  R X  E 9.563 6 1.599 <  1 tt
T X  R X  N 28.336 6 4.723 2.162 P <.05
T X  E X  N 39.421 6 6.570 3.008 p <.01
T X  R X  E X  N 22.036 6 3.673 1.681 N.S.
Residual 419.429 192 2.185
Total 1697.586 279
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table 7:5: ANALYSIS OF VARIAHCE INCLUDING DATA FROM BOTH
ACOUISTION AND EXTINCTION PHASES. (Corrected data)
Source SS DF MS F Sig,
Between
Type of Reinforcement (R) 0.00054 1 0.00054 < 1 N.S.
Extraversion (E) 0.01170 1 0.01170 ^ 1 tt
Neuroticism (N) 0.26476 1 0.26476 2.863 u
R X  E 0.00903 1 0.00903 < 1 N.S.
R X  N 0.03960 1 0.03960 < 1 tt
E X  N 0,00506 1 0.00506 < 1 tt
R X  E X  N 0.02942 1 0.02942 < 1 tt
Residual 2.95901 32 0.09247
Within
Trials (T) 0.12724 6 0.02121 1.106 N.S.
Linear trend 0.00255 1 0.00255 < 1 tt
T X  R 0.01861 6 0.00310 < 1 tt
T X  E 0.10011 6 0.01668 < 1 tt
T X  N 0.11809 6 0.01968 1.027 tt '
T X  R X  E 0.06409 6 0.01068 < 1 tt
T X  R X  N 0.25219 6 0.04203 2.192 p c  .05
T X  E X  N 0.34433 6 0.05739 2.993 p .01
T X  R X  E X  N 0.20844 6 0.03474 1.583 N.S.
Residual 3.68115 192 0.01917
Total 8.23337 279
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and not the HN groups as might be expected from the theory. 
Indeed the HNHE group shows no evidence of conditioning in 
either condition.
The same situation exists in the extinction phase 
with some trends interpretable as being in the direction 
predicted by Gray, e.g. the dramatic switch, by the In HE 
group, to the previously punished pronoun (non punishment 
being equal to reward), but the results lack an over-all 
consistency which might persuade one that the predictions of 
the theory had been, to some degree, supported.
When the data from both the acquisition and extinction 
blocks are included in the same analysis two interactions do 
emerge as being significant (cf Tables 7:4 and 7:5), the 
neuroticism x type of reinforcement x trials interaction and 
the extraversion x neuroticism x trials interaction. As 
neither of these is significant when the acquisition data 
alone is analysed these results must be due either to a contrast 
between the acquisition and extinction phases, or because of 
differential behaviour of the groups in the extinction phase.
The T X  E X  N interaction seems to be largely due to the 
dramatic change in behaviour of the LNHE group in the 
extinction phase, this group showing a marked decrease in the 
use of the CR while the LNLE group displayed an increase in 
use of the CR over the two extinction blocks (cf. Fig 7:6). 
However, even this finding can be "explained away" when it is 
noted that the dramatic change of the LNHE group is due to a 
substantial increase in the use of the CR in the first 
extinction period in the reward condition, and a decrease in 
the second extinction period of the punishment condition.
(cf Figs 7:4 and 7:5)
The T X  R X  N interaction appears to be due to 
differential behaviour of the groups in the acquisition and
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extinction phases. As can be seen from Figure 7:7 the LN 
group in the reward condition actually increases its output 
of the CR in the first extinction block and then decreases it 
in the second. It is almost as though they were searching 
for the withdrawn reinforcement when it is first withdrawn, 
and then, on realizing it is being withheld returning to 
something like their operant level of responding.
It the punishment condition they behave quite differently, 
after showing a steady improvement throughout the acquisition 
trials they display a tentative decrease in the first 
extinction block and then on discovering that the punishment 
has ceased they slump back to their operant level.
The LN group show a substantial increase in both 
conditions while the HN group display no evidence of 
conditioning in either condition. In the punishment extinction 
period they show a slight increase, while in the reward
ondition they show a slight decrease.
2
Several X (Chi squares) were calculated. There 
appears to be no significant difference in the frequency with 
which any of the three pronouns was designated as the CR 
for either the HN - LN groups (X^ = .72) or the HE - LE 
groups (X = 1.3). Nor can the differences in performance 
of the HN - LN groups be attributed to the fact that one group 
was more "aware" than the other, at least as indicated by 
Gidwani*s technique. Only five subjects were able to state 
that a particular pronoun was being reinforced. 17 Ss 
remarked that the experimenter was doing anything at all 
other than handing over cards and ticking the record sheet.
There was no significant difference even in this limited 
"awareness" between the HN and LN groups.
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7:6 DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present experiment was to compare 
the differential conditionability of various personality groups. 
In view of the fact that there was no clear conditioning 
effect the relevance of the present results to the various 
theories under consideration is questionable. Why no 
conditioning effect is evident is not immediately obvious 
considering that such a well tried technique was employed.
One possibility, however, which does suggest itself is that 
the pronouns "he", "she" and "they" were employed as opposed 
to the more usual "I" and "we". As reported in the 
introduction Gidwani (1971), Gelder (1968), Knowles (1963),
Beech and Adler (1963) and Nawas (1969) have all experienced 
difficulties in conditioning pronouns other than "I". These 
findings, together with the results of the present experiment 
and Gidwani*s finding that the frequency of use of the 
pronoun "I" increases over blocks of trials whether or not 
it is reinforced, induce a sense of disquiet. Why should 
only one pronoun be conditionable? Are verbal conditioning 
studies really demonstrating conditioning?
Another finding which advises caution in attempting 
to interpret the results of the present experiment is that 
the two neuroticism groups were found to differ significantly 
in the use of the pronoun designated as the CR even before 
reinforcement was introduced. If the results are accepted 
at face value then it must be reported that the HN group 
used the CR more than the LN group in each block of 
reinforced trials. This finding is consistant with the 
predictions drawn from the theories of Spence and Gray.
The data represented in Fig. 7:1 do not suggest, however, 
that there is any increase in the frequency of the CR over 
trials, for the HN group, as one would expect if conditioning
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really were taking place. On the other hand if it is 
argued that the conditioning effect cannot be deciphered because 
of a ceiling effect and the data are "corrected" to take 
account of this then it appears to be the LN group who 
display the superior performance. This is contrary to 
the predictions of Spence and Gray, but, one might argue, 
support the contentions of Roessler (1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 
1970, 1973).
Roessler regards adjustment as a process of "reality 
testing", or "the ability to accurately appraise the nature 
and intensity of stimuli", combined with appropriate 
responding. HN, or more accurately, as Roessler prefers 
to use Ego-Strength (Es), low Es, individuals are less likely 
than high Es individuals to display this accuracy of 
perception and appropriate responding. Roessler (1972) 
reports a correlation between Es and the EPI N scale of -.72 
(p .001), and of -.76 (p<.001) between Es and the MAS 
and so it might be suggested that the differential performance 
of the N groups in the present experiment reflects the more 
appropriate responding of the high Es individuals reported by 
Roessler. One might even interpret the significant 
T X  R X  N interaction as supporting Roessler's thesis.
This interaction is due largely to the differential behaviour 
of the LN group in the reward and punishment conditions which 
might be regarded as reflecting a more accurate perception 
of reality by this group.
These suggestions are, of course, post hoc, and given 
the ambiguous state of the data, the dearth of significant 
results, and the fact that N and not Es was recorded, must be 
treated with a healthy caution, but at least they do suggest 
that hypotheses drawn from Roessler*s theory might, fruitfully, 
be taken into account in future experiments.
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Returning from speculation about theories which might 
fit the data to ones, consideration of which, generated the 
data, it is difficult to provide a convincing case claiming 
that any support has been found for the theories of Gray 
and Spence. Although the behaviour of some groups 
occasionally shows the trends predicted by Gray, an over­
all consistency in the results which might persuade one that 
there was some substance to the theory, despite the non­
significant results, is missing. For example, the prediction 
of differential behaviour is more clear cut with respect 
to the reward than the punishment condition, and in accord with 
the theory it is the extraverted group who display the 
greater improvement, but this is true only for the LN group, 
the HNHE group, who should display the greatest improvement, 
shows an initial decrease in use of the CR and never on any 
block of trials surpasses its operant level of responding.
Nor does the theory explain why when positive 
reinforcement is withheld (extinction), a procedure which 
according to the theory is equivalent to punishment, the 
LNLE group, a group hypothesized as being differentially more 
sensitive to cues of punishment, should show an increase 
in use of the CR. (cf. Fig. 7:4).
Eysenck's theory on the other hand emerges from the 
experiment in a much more favourable light, despite the fact 
that the differences between the E and I groups is never 
significant it can be seen from Fig, 7:3 that the results are 
in the direction predicted by Eysenck, the Is always using 
the CR more during reinforcement, and the Es showing a 
steeper extinction.
Since this experiment was completed two other 
experiments have been reported, Gupta (1976) and Gupta and 
Nagpal (1978), both using the Taffel procedure to test
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hypotheses drawn from Gray's theory. In both experiments 
they predict that extraverts, or Ss designated as impulsive 
or social, would display superior conditioning in the reward 
condition and introverts, or the less impulsive and less 
social Ss, would show superior conditioning in the punishment 
conditioning. In the first experiment four reinforcers were 
used; the word "good" and a buzzer, both designated as 
positive reinforcers, and the word "bad" and an electric 
shock, both designated as negative reinforcers. In the 
second experiment only three reinforcers were used: "good",
buzzer and the electric shock.
In the first experiment all Ss were male while in the 
second all were female. Five pronouns : "he", "you", "they", 
"I" and "we" were used. "I" and "we" were reinforced..
A 100% reinforcement schedule was used and reinforcement was 
adminstered at the end of the sentence, so the CS - UCS 
interval was long as compared to the present experiment.
In both experiments the results are interpreted as supporting 
Gray's theory. There are, however, some features of the 
experiments which suggest that one ought to be cautious, in 
interpreting the results. From the descriptions of the 
methodology in both experiments it appears that data have been 
used in the analyses which are not, strictly speaking, 
statistically comparable. When a positive reinforcer was 
used the frequency of the CR increased, while when a negative 
reinforcer was employed this frequency decreased. If one 
were interested in demonstrating this one might include all 
scores in the analysis with the appropriate sign. However, 
when one is interested in the degree of conditioning, how 
much behaviour changes due to reinforcement, the magnitude of 
change is of primary importance, not the direction. With 
this in mind it is unclear whether or not the E x type of
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reinforcement interaction would have been significant if only 
the magnitude of change in the frequency of the CR had been 
considered in the analyses of data from these experiments. 
Although it must be noted that the type of reinforcement 
main effect was not significant. When one considers the 
reported results it is found that the extraverted group 
displays the greatest change in behaviour in both conditions, 
and that an extraverted group with a male experimenter displays 
the least change in behaviour in the reward condition, and 
an introverted group with a male experimenter the least 
conditioning in the punishment condition i.e. these results 
are in the direction opposite to those predicted. With 
the female experimenter the results reported are in the 
predicted direction with extraverts conditioning more 
efficiently than introverts in the reward condition, and 
introverts more efficient conditioning than extraverts in 
the punishment condition. Gupta suggests that the differential 
effect produced by the sex of the experimenter might be due 
to the fact that approval from a young woman is more 
reinforcing for a young man than is approval from another 
man. While this may. be true^ it does not explain why introverts 
display superior conditioning to extraverts in the reward 
condition when the experimenter is a male, and why the 
extravert displays superior conditionability in the punishment 
condition.
In the second experiment, though the same objection 
may be put with regard to the method of statistical analysis 
adopted, the results do appear to be in the direction predicted 
by Gray. In this experiment the sex of the Ss is reported, 
female, but not of the experimenter. One might point to the 
fact that the parameters specified by Eysenck as being 
relevant were not employed here, or to the fact that the
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pronouns "I" and "we" were used as the CR, data were produced 
only for the two pronouns jointly, not for each separately, 
and some reservation has already been expressed with regard 
to the use of the pronoun "I" in this context, but it seems 
unlikely that either of these factors is totally responsible 
on its own for the results that have emerged. While on one 
hand it must be acknowledged that some support for the Gray 
model does emerge from the Gupta studies^ even there the 
results are inconsistent, results sometimes being reported 
in the direction opposite to those predicted by the theory.
It does not bode well for the theory when such variable 
results are reported.
With respect to the present experiment one might 
complain that with only two pronouns available, and being 
restricted to two word phrases, the S found the task boring 
and so rather than constantly repeating one pronoun he/she 
changed from time to time, these fluctuations obscuring any 
conditioning effect which may have been present.
An alternative explanation of the results, it might be 
argued, is that they support the contention that no conditioning 
can take place in humans unless the S is aware of the 
reinforcement contingencies obtaining at the time. In the 
present experiment it appears that Ss were not aware of the 
reinforcement contingencies.
These, however, are untested hypotheses and further data 
would be needed before they could be accepted or rejected.
In a similar vein, one might consider whether or not the 
reinforcements necessarily belong to the categories to which 
they were allotted, or whether there was any consistency across 
subjects in this respect. One S when asked if she had 
noticed the experimenter doing aiything during the experiment 
replied that he had been making "doctor—like noises", which she
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found quite the opposite of rewarding. This Ss belonged to 
the HNLE group, the group Gray assumes to be differentially 
most sensitive to cues of punishment. One might speculate 
that this group found any observation of their behaviour 
unpleasant. If this were true one would expect them to 
condition especially well in the punishment condition. They 
did not.
Handler and Kaplan (1956) concluded from their study 
that: **in human verbal learning, the subject's subjective
evaluation of the reinforcing stimulus may provide an 
independent measure of the reinforcing value of a verbal 
reinforcer, ** Ss vdio evaluated the "mmmh” of the experimenter 
positively conditioned, where as those who evaluated it 
negatively did not. Here again, however, without additional 
information it is impossible to evaluate to what extent this 
effect influenced the results of the present study.
In summary then, as no significant conditioning effect 
was evident one cannot argue that the results of this 
experiment strongly support, or disconfirm any of the 
predictions drawn from the theories of Eysenck, Gray or 
Spence, The situation is made even more complex by the 
fact that the HN group used the pronoun designated as the CR 
significantly more often than the LN group during the operant 
period, even before reinforcement was introduced. Despite 
this, however, the experiment might be regarded as offering 
weak support for Eysenck, as the introverted group showed 
the more pronounced improvement during reinforcement, while 
the extraverted group displayed the more pronounced 
extinction effect.
In favour of Gray's theory it was observed that the 
LNHE group displayed greater improvement than the LNLE 
during positive reinforcement, and the LNLE out did the
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LNHE during negative reinforcement, but the HN groups did 
not display the behaviour expected of them on the basis 
of the theory, in either reinforcement condition. No 
evidence of conditioning was found for the HN group, 
overall, but the LN group showed a clear improvement, a 
finding contrary to the predictions of both Gray and Spence,
2 2 7
CHAPTER VIII; EXPERIMENT II
8:1 ABSTRACT
The present experiment was a modification of one by 
Ehlers (1963) which concluded that recognition reaction times 
could be altered by a conditioning procedure. Introverts 
were found to be the better conditioners.
In the present experiment an appetitive condition 
as well as an aversive condition was employed. A significant 
conditioning effect was found, but despite some results being 
in the direction predicted by the theories of Eysenck, Gray 
and Spence, none of these theories received any clear support.
Introverts were found both to show the more rapid 
extinction of both the "sensitization" and "perceptual 
defence" effects, and to be more likely to become aware 
of the reinforcement contingencies.
With respect to self-rated consistency it seems 
more likely that this is a trait specific, rather than 
a generalized, factor.
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8:2 INTRODUCTION
Given the failure of experiment 1 to produce any clear- 
cut results with respect to the hypotheses that different 
personality groups will be found to show differential 
conditionability it was decided to put these hypotheses to 
the test once more, but this time using a different paradigm.
Eysenck (1967) reports a study by Ehlers (1963) in which 
four groups of nonsense syllables, each characterized by 
containing a specific letter, were associated with different 
types of stimuli; painful electric shock, a visual stimulus, 
an auditory stimulus, with a fourth group serving as a control 
group and not being associated with any stimulus. After 
this association phase the syllables were presented once more 
but this time unaccompanied, while "tachistoscopic reaction 
times measured to correct recognition of the stimuli"
(Eysenck, 1967, p.150) were recorded.
As predicted those syllables associated with the painful 
shock were found to have the highest recognition thresholds. 
Subjects had been classified into personality groups on the 
basis of their EPI scores and Eysenck reports that although 
the HN group had higher recognition thresholds than the LN 
group for all four groups of syllables when one considers 
the difference between recognition times for the shock and 
non-shock associated syllables there was no significant 
difference between the LN and HN groups. However, "introverts, 
as compared to Extraverts, showed a significant increase in 
recognition time for shock over non-shock stimuli; the 
extraverts, in fact, showed no increase for the shock 
stimuli." (Eysenck, 1967, p.150).
Eysenck interprets these results as demonstrating on 
one hand the superior conditionability of the introverted 
group, and on the other the relative mildness of the stress
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produced in the conditioning situation. These findings 
may be seen as supporting the hypotheses of Brown (1961) 
and Inglis (1960). Inglis (1960) while reviewing work on 
perceptual defence (PD) had noted that an interaction was to 
be expected between "situations of differential stress and 
differential individual susceptibility to stress." (p.264).
Brown(1961), on the basis of his extensive review of 
the PD literature, offered the following hypothesis:
"That recognition thresholds at first rise with increases in 
stimulus emotionality; and that the amount of stimulus 
emotionality required to bring recognition thresholds to 
their peak is directly related to the degree of extraversion 
of the subject."
Both these authors postulate an inverted U - shaped 
function in an attempt to account for the apparently 
conflicting results reported by different authors. Many 
experiments on perceptual defence (PD) had reported an 
increase in recognition thresholds e.g. Bootzin and Natsoulas 
(1965), De Lucia and Stangner (1953), Ehlers (1963), Eriksen
(1952), Eriksen and Brown (1956), Kates and Klein (1954),
Kissin et al (1957), Kogan (1956), McGinnies (1949),
McGinnies and Sherman (1952), Matthews and Wertheimer (1958), 
Ruiz & Krauss (1968), Sauber (1971), Zajonc (1962), others
have reported lowered thresholds e.g. Greenbaum (1956), Hatfield 
(1959), Osier & Lewinsohn (1954), Postman, Bronson, & Gropper
(1953), Spence (1956). Still other experiments have reported 
both a rise and fall in thresholds e.g. Adcock and Mangan 
(1970), Brown (1961), Bruner & Postman (1947), Dodwell (1964), 
Lazarus, Eriksen and Fonda (1951), Lysak (1954), Reece (1954) 
Rosen (1954), Spence (1957).
Indeed, even in the first study to use the term 
"percêptual defence" (Bruner and Postman, 1947) the authors 
postulated that two processes were necessary to account for
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the PD phenomenon:
(i) Perceptual defence - "With increase in emotionality of 
stimuli, recognition may lead to an anxiety and is to be 
avoided as long as possible. For some of our subjects, 
this type of perceptual defence became increasingly evident 
over the total range of emotionality." (p.74).
(ii) Sensitization - "in situations which are highly 
threatening and highly exacting, the most adaptive perceptual 
response is frequently the one which takes most vigilant 
account of 'reality'." (p.76).
Both Brown and Inglis regard the dimension of 
extraversion-introversion as well as the neurotioism dimension 
as of some importance to the PD phenomenon. Brown (1961), 
when attempting to test his , hypothesis did find the predicted 
curvilinear relationship between the threshold of recognition 
and stimulus emotionality, but this relationship held for 
female subjects only, male subjects showing the ascending phase 
of the curve only. Only LN subjects displayed the inverted U - 
shaped relationship, though, in line with the hypothesis, in 
the group which did show the relationship the LE subjects 
reached peak recognition threshold earlier than HE subjects.
Dodwell (1964) used the EPI to classify his subjects, 
and he reports that at low levels of stress the introverted 
group displays "defence" and the extraverted group "vigilance". 
At higher levels of stress these roles were reversed.
Anxiety has, of course, also been related to PD.
Greenbaum (1956), for example, reported that high MAS scorers 
had lowered thresholds for hostile faces. Osier and 
Lewinsohn (1954) found that high MAS scorers had lowered 
thresholds for "unacceptable words". Spence (1956) reported 
a significant correlation between the lowering of thresholds 
and state anxiety.
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Other personality dimensions have also been considered: 
Matthews and Wertheimer (1958) found that hysterics (high 
scorers on the MMPI Hy scale) showed PD while psychasthenics 
(high scorers on the MMPI Pt scale) did not; Bootzin and 
Natsoulas (1965) report that hysterics showed a generalized 
PD effect while other groups showed it only to anxiety 
producing words, Eriksen and Brown (1956) found that low Pt 
scorers showed the more marked PD effect.
Kates and Klein (1954) employed the California F scale 
and found that high scorers were significantly slower to 
recognize "charged" words. Similarly Kogan (1956), again 
using the California F scale, found his results, "clearly 
indicated the presence of an inverse relationship between 
authoritarian attitudes and the capacity to identify highly 
emotional stimuli". Sauber (1971) looked at Locus of Control 
and found externals to be more defensive.
However the PD phenomenon has not gone unchallenged 
Howes and Solomon (1950), criticizing an experiment by 
McGinnies (1949) offered two alternative explanations of the 
results of that experiment, (i) that the findings reflected 
differential familiarity with the words employed in the 
different conditions, that is, the PD phenomenon might simply 
be explained by claiming that less familiar words are harder 
to recognise; (ii) that what was being observed was not 
perceptual defence but simply response suppression, the 
subject is more cautious, perhaps due to embarrassment, 
about responding with emotional or taboo words.
Many ingenious experiments were devised to obviate 
these problems, but one attempted solution, in particular, 
is of interest here. A number of authors have used nonsense 
syllables or neutral words and associated these with emotional 
stimuli, usually electric shock. Hatfield (1959), for
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example used five letter disyllables and shock, and found a 
lowering of recognition threshold, Lysak (1954) again using 
syllables and shock found some evidence for both defence and 
for sensitization. Rosen (1954) entrained shock to nonsense 
syllables and concluded that when correct identification of 
a stimulus ended an associated punishment then sensitization 
increased. If, however, punishment could not be avoided 
by a correct response then perception was disturbed.
Along similar lines Reece (1954) used a paired associate 
learning task and five groups: (i) predictable shock (the
same nonsense syllables were associated with shock on each 
trial, and shock was escapable by reporting the syllable 
correctly), (ii) unpredictable but escapable shock (random 
pairings of syllables and shock), (iii) predictable inescapable 
shock, (iv) unpredictable-inescapable shock, (v) a no-shock 
control group. The escape groups were found to have the 
lowest thresholds. Reece also found that subjects in the 
non-escape groups were significantly more inclined to view 
shock as a punishment. He goes on to suggest that perceptual 
defence will be more evident when the subject has no learned 
escape response available, that is, escape from the noxious 
: stimulus will be viewed as a reward and one can 
expect low thresholds with reward, as found in his experiment.
As already mentioned Ehlers (1963) also successfully 
conditioned the perceptual defence phenomenon and in 
addition also demonstrated the importance of the personality 
variable, extraversion.
8:3: HYPOTHESES
The present experiment may be considered as a follow 
up of Ehler's study with some modification to permit the 
comparison of predictions drawn from the theories of Gray
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and Eysenck. Previous studies appear to have demonstrated 
that the perceptual defence phenomenon may be conditioned, 
even if it is not legitimate to regard it as always being a 
conditioned phenomenon. In addition to the raised thresholds 
associated with mildly aversive situations it appears that 
thresholds may also be lowered either in the face of strongly 
aversive stimuli or of rewarding stimuli, that iSjthere 
appears to be a process which enables one to ignore that which 
is annoying, but vhich makes one aware of that which is 
either dangerous or rewarding.
The present experiment employs both a positive and a 
negative reinforcer, and we would expect on the basis of 
previous experimental results that lowered thresholds will be 
associated with the positive reinforcer and raised thresholds 
with the negative reinforcer. This then is the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:1 There will be a significant difference between 
the recognition thresholds of those syllables associated with 
positive reinforcement and those associated with negative 
reinforcement, reaction times of the syllables associated 
with the positive reinforcer being the faster.
Of course, turning to the personality variables, on 
the basis of Eysenck's theory it is to be expected that the 
introverted group will show the superior conditioning as 
compared with the extraverted group. This then gives us the 
second hypothesis :
Hypothesis 2:2 There will be a significant extraversion x 
type of reinforcement interaction when reaction time scores 
are compared, the introverts showing superior conditioning in 
both the positive and negative reinforcement conditions.
When the difference between the reaction times in the positive 
and negative conditions are used as scores for analysis it 
is predicted that the introverted group will show a greater
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difference between these two conditions than will the 
extraverted group.
Gray, with his model of differential sensitivity to 
cues of reinforcement, would predict a rather different 
pattern of results:
Hypothesis 2:3 The introverted group will be expected to 
show the slowest reaction times in the negative reinforcement 
condition, while the extraverts will be expected to show the 
fastest reaction times in the reward condition.
Gray also considers the neuroticism dimension to be of 
importance as a dimension of general sensitivity to cues of 
reinforcement, with this in mind it is predicted:
Hypothesis 2:4 The HN group will show faster reaction times 
than the LN group in the reward condition and slower reaction 
times than the LN group in the negative reinforcement condition.
For the reasons given in Experiment 1 if hypothesis 
2:4 is confirmed this will be taken as supporting Spence's 
position.
On the basis of Gray's theory it is also predicted: 
Hypothesis 2:5 There will be an extraversion x neuroticism 
X  type of reinforcement interaction, with the HNHE group 
showing the fastest reaction times in the reward condition 
and the HNLE group showing the slowest reaction times in the 
negative reinforcement condition.
With respect to the recognition stage of the 
experiment as no reinforcement is available during this phase 
it may be regarded as an extinction phase. On this basis
it may be predicted that if Eysenck's theory is correct: 
Hypothesis 2:6 The extraverted group will display the 
steeper extinction trends in both "reward" and "punishment" 
conditions.
However, on the basis of Gray's theory it is predicted:
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Hypothesis 2:7 The extraverted group will show the steeper 
extinction trend in the punishment condition, (CS -Pun =
CS-Rew), while the introverted group will show the more rapid 
extinction in the reward condition (CS-Rew = CS-Pun)
8:4 METHOD
Design
The independent variables used in this experiment were: 
two levels of extraversion, and two levels of neuroticism, 
the between subject variables, and three types of reinforcement, 
positive, neutral and negative, providing a within subject 
variable, A 2 x 2 x 3 design was employed. The dependent 
variable was the tachistoscopic reaction time to correct 
recognition of a three letter syllable.
The experiment was performed in two stages: a
conditioning stage and a recognition stage.
Stage 1: In the first phase of the experiment a classical
conditioning procedure was employed. Reinforcement was 
associated with three letter syllables on a variable ratio 
schedule, the CS overlapping in presentation with the UCS.
The reinforcement was not contingent on any response from 
the subject.
Three sets of nonsense syllables were used, all taken 
from either Archer (1960) or Noble (1960). Each set was 
characterized by its central letter, which was a vowel.
Three vowels were used. I, U, E, hence three sets of 
syllables. These vowels were associated with either a 
positive reinforcer, a 2p coin, a negative reinforcer, white 
noise at 75dbs for 500 msec.s, or a neutral "reinforcer", 
the noise of the feedback between two speakers, again at 
75dbs for 500 msec.s. A random 75% reinforcement schedule 
was employed. Each subject performed under all three
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conditions though the relationship between vowels and 
reinforcers was randomized across subjects.
It will be seen that an effort has been made to 
employ those parameters Eysenck regards as being of importance 
if one is to demonstrate the superior conditionability of the 
introvert: partial reinforcement, a weak UCS, a short CS -
UCS interval, here there was 350 msec.s interval between the 
on-set of the CS and the on-set of the UCS, and they 
overlapped for 500 msec.s. Discriminant learning was also 
used.
Stage II: Nonsense syllables were again presented
tachistoscopically, but this time the S was required to press 
a switch as quickly as possible, (this both stopped a timer, 
thereby yielding a reaction time (RT) score, and changed the 
tachistiscope field, thereby preventing the S from reading 
the syllable after an RT was recorded). The S was required 
to call out the nonsense syllable at the same time as pressing 
the switch. It was these RT's v^ich provided the data for 
analysis.
Personality Measurement
Ss were classified as extraverted or introverted, and 
of high or low neuroticism on the basis of their EPI 
(form A) scores. They also completed a self rating 
questionnaire in which they rated themselves on a nine point 
scale for each of the three traits: Extraversion
(sociability), impulsivity, and neuroticism. Preceding each 
scale was a brief description of the trait and following 
each rating scale was another nine point scale with the 
word "sometimes" printed at one end and "always" at the other. 
The direction of this scale was varied.
Ss were asked to use this consistency scale to rate 
how typical they felt the rating they had given of themselves
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on the trait scale was of their behaviour. The idea of 
using these self rating scales was that on the one hand the 
consistency ratings might throw some light on the issue of 
whether consistency is trait specific or more generalized.
On the other hand one might perform an analysis of data 
drawn only from those subjects who rated themselves as 
highly consistent, hypothesizing that even if the statements 
of trait theorists are not generally applicable they might 
never-the-less be true of this subgroup. It was for this 
reason that a description of the trait, as conceived of in 
Eysenck's theory, was given before each rating scale, rather 
than follow the suggestion that people will be found to be 
consistent with respect to dimensions, and clusters 
of situations, of relevance to them. Though in some ways 
this method of global self-rating must be nearer to this ideal 
than the traditional questionnaire.
As events turned out, however, there were too few 
observations in some cells for this latter analysis to be 
performed meaningfully, (cf. appendix for copy of Questionnaire)
APPARATUS
Syllables were presented tachistoscopically. The 
length of exposure was controlled by a digit timer. This 
also controlled the timing of the on-set and off-set of two 
cassette recorders which provided the noise stimuli.
Additional circuitry permitted the experimenter to select, 
on each trial, which, if either, of the two noises would be 
heard by the S. Subjects wore headphones throughout the 
experiment, and it was through these that the noise stimuli 
were delivered. As mentioned above still further circuitry 
Caused a digit timer to stop and the tachistiscope field to 
change whenever the S pressed the switch positioned in front 
of him/her.
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Pilot Studies
Two pilot studies were conducted in preparation for the 
present experiment. The design of the first of these was 
substantially the same as that of the present experiment, 
it brought two potential problems to light, however.
(i) It was found that with 12 presentations of the CS on a 
75% reinforcement schedule, yielding 9 reinforced trials, 
the conditioning trend was not clear. It was, therefore, 
decided to increase the number of presentations to 20 i.e.
15 CS - UCS pairings.
(ii) It was also found that the noise used as the aversive 
stimulus, the sound of a whining drill, was not found to be 
particularly unpleasant by the subjects. In an attempt to 
find a noise stimulus which could serve as an unpleasant 
stimulus 7 different sounds were recorded and played, in 
random order, twice each to 40 subjects. Noises were 
presented at 75 dbs for 500 msec.s over headphones i.e. 
exactly as they would be heard in the experiment proper.
Subjects were then asked to rate each noise. They were 
presented with a line marked "very pleasant" at one end,
and "very unpleasant" at the other, with the mid-point of 
the line marked "neutral". The line was 15 cm.s long.
Subjects were asked to put a mark somewhere on the line 
indicating how pleasant or unpleasant they found the noise.
The distance of these points from the end of the scale was 
measured to one decimal place. These measures consititued 
the data for the analysis. Each noise was rated on a 
separate scale. Two noises were then selected, (a) the 
noise most consistently and significantly rated as unpleasant - 
white noise; (b) the noise which had a mean rating nearest 
to the mid-point of the scale - this was the noise of the 
feed back between two speakers.
These two noises plus the original "aversive" noise
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were then played to a further 19 subjects. The procedure 
was the same as before. White noise was found to be rated 
as significantly more unpleasant than the other two noises, 
which were not found to be significantly different from each 
other. There were no interactions between ratings for the 
noises and the personality dimensions measured by the EPI. 
Procedure
55 subjects were originally used in this experiment; 
two of these had to be disgarded from the analysis because of 
errors which occured during the conditioning phase of the 
experiment. One further subject was excluded from the 
analysis. She made 18 errors in the recognition phase of 
the experiment, whereas most subjects made none at all, and 
her mean RT was substantially slower than that of the other 
subjects. She was also the oldest subject used by some years.
Both male and female volunteer, university students took 
part in the experiment. Each subject completed an EPI (form A)
and a self rating scale. One of these was completed before
the experiment and the other after. The order was randomized 
across subjects.
In the first phase of the experiment the subject was 
seated in front of a tachistoscope, wearing headphones and 
with his/her right hand lying open on the table, alongside 
the tachistoscope. Nonsense syllables of all three types 
were presented to the S in random order, and the appropriate 
stimulus paired with it. In this phase of the experiment 
the subject was presented with 60 nonsense syllables, 20 of 
each type, 75% of each type being reinforced as was appropriate. 
The type of reinforcement paired with each type of syllable 
was randomized across subjects.
350 msec.s after the syllable appeared in the 
tachistoscope the noise appropriate to that condition commenced.
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this noise continued for 500 msec.s. At the end of this 500 
msec.s the tachistoscope field changed to a visual noise 
field and the noise ceased. Thus the syllable was visible 
for 850 msec.s, and the noise and syllable overlapped by 
500 msec.s.
On the positive reinforcement trials the experimenter 
dropped a 2p coin into the hand of the S approximately 350 
msec.s after the syllable became visible. Naturally this 
procedure was not nearly so accurate as the electronically 
timed onset of the noise in the negative reinforcement 
condition, but it is unlikely that the CS-UCS onset interval 
was ever greater than 500 msec.s. As in the negative 
reinforcement condition the syllable remained visible for 
850 msec.s in all.
On non-reinforced trials no noise was played nor coin 
given, only the syllable was seen for 850 msec.s. Instructions 
to the S were as follows: "I'd like you to look into the
tachistoscope where you will see a number of cards flashed up. 
These cards will have three letters on them, always in the 
order consonant-vowel-consonant.
These letters will sometimes be accompanied by a noise 
which other people have rated as unpleasant, sometimes by a 
noise that other people have rated as neutral, neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant. And from time to time I will drop a 2p coin 
into your hand - you can keep all the "coins you get. Any 
questions?"
Most subjects asked what they had to do and were 
assured that at this stage they were required to do nothing.
Some subjects asked if they would be expected to remember the 
letters, but were only told, as were all subjects, that there 
would be a second part to the experiment and this would be 
explained to them when they got to it.
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In the second phase of the experiment 10 cards of 
each type were presented. In two of the groups, those 
characterized by the letters "I" and "0", none of these 
syllables had been seen by the S. before. By accident, 
however, one card in the "E" group appeared in both stages 
one and two. However, as the relationship between type 
of syllable and type of reinforcement was randomized 
across subjects it seems unlikely that this could have 
influenced the results of the experiment.
Ss were required to make a reaction time response to 
the syllables by pressing a switch positioned in front of 
them. This switch both stopped the timer and changed the 
tachistoscope field. This prevented the S from reading the 
card after he/she had stopped the timer. Ss also had to 
call out the three letters of the syllable.
In order to make the two phases as similar as possible 
the S was not told that there would be no more reinforcement 
and was required to continue wearing the headphones during 
the second part of the experiment.
Ss were given a 2 - 3 min. rest between the two phases 
of the experiment, during which time the experimenter prepared 
the second set of cards, the scoring sheet etc.
The instructions for the second part of the experiment 
were as follows :
"I'm going to present you with another series of cards. 
Like the first set of cards each card will have three letters 
on it. As soon as you can tell me what these three letters 
are I want you to press this switch and say them aloud. I 
want you to make your response as quickly as possible, but 
be sure that you get the letters right. Are there any 
questions?
I will say 'ready' just before each syllable is
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presented so you will know when to expect each card."
The RT to each syllable was recorded. In those cases 
where the syllable was incorrectly reported it was presented 
again at the end of the series. However there were only 
14 of these out of 1560 responses.
After all the cards had been shown the subject was 
asked the following series of questions:
1. What did you think was happening?
2. Did you notice any consistent relationships?
3. Did you notice anything consistent happening when
certain types of cards were shown?
4. Did you notice anything particular in the relationship
between the letters, noises and coins?
Ss were classified as "aware" or"unaware" on the basis 
of these questions. Most subjects who were aware of what 
was "going on" correctly reported the reinforcement 
contingencies in response to question one.
Ss were also asked which of the two noises they found 
less pleasant. Most Ss found the white noise less pleasant 
but several found the feedback noise less pleasant and so for 
these Ss this was regarded as the negative reinforcement 
condition.
8:5 RESULTS
For the purposes of the present experiment Ss 
scoring 11 or more on the E or N scale of the EPI were 
classified as extraverted or neurotic, respectively.
Those scoring 10 or less were classified as introverted 
or stable. The means and standard deviations for the 
groups were as follows:
tu
table 8:1
Mean S.D,
Extraverts Scores 13,71 2.55
on -------------------
Introverts E 6,04 2,44
Neurotics Scores 15.15 3.13
on -------------------
Stables N 6.46 2.94
5 were also classified as extraverted or introverted, neurotic 
or stable, impulsive or non-impulsive on the basis of their own 
self-ratings. Those scoring 10 or over were regarded as 
extraverted (mean = 9,65). Those scoring 6 or over on the 
impulsivity scale as implusive (mean = 4.58), and those scoring
6 or over on the neuroticism scale as neurotic (mean = 4,77),
Because syllables were presented in a random order in the 
second phase of the experiment it was possible that while the 
first occurrence of a syllable associated with e.g. the positive 
reinforcer might be on the first RT trial, while the first 
occurrence of a syllable associated with a non-appetitive 
reinforcer might have been on the third RT trial, or even later. 
In an attempt to reduce any effect position might have had on 
the results of the experiment the mean of two consecutive trials) 
in a condition was used as the S's score. This had the effect
of reducing each Ss scores from 10 to 5 per condition.
Before turning to the testing of the hypotheses set 
out earlier one other effect was looked at. Several studies 
(e.g. Morgan 1967; Morgan and Farmer, 1967; Zharov and 
Yemolayer-Tomina, 1972) have reported significantly faster 
reaction times for extraverts as compared to introverts.
As can be seen the same difference in RTs between these two
TABLE 8 :2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF REACTION TIMES
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Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES.
Source D,F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 1 42639490.294 12.237 0.001
Neuroticism (N) 1 4970276.594 1.426 0.236
E X  N . 1 11562890.798 3.318 0.071
Residual 48 3484379.734
Total 51 4129337.535
TABLE 8:3 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF REACTION TIMES, Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS,
Source D.F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 1 21520455.955 5.473 0.022
Neuroticism (N) 1 1702637,928 0.433 N.S.
E X  N 1 7469367.285 1.900 0.171
Residual 48 3932060.378
Total 51 4129337.535
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TABLE 8:4 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF REACTION TIMES. Ss ALLOCATED
ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF
EPI SCORES. ("Aware" Ss only)
Source D.F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 1 15546692.001 4.362 0.044
Neuroticism (N) 1 4908864.282 1.377 0.250
E x N 1 4195820.419 1.177 0.288
Residual 26 3563757.380
Total 29 3771772.279
TABLE 8:5 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF REACTION TIMES. Ss ALLOCATED
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS.
("Aware" Ss only)
Source D.F. M.S. F P
Extravers ion (E) 1 14680568.955 4.210 0.048
Neuroticism (N) 1 825270.022 0.237 N.S.
E X N 1 1275572.508 0.366 N.S.
Residual 26 3486910.631
Total 29 3771772.279
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table 8:6 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA. Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES.
Source S.S. D.F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 133.852 1 133,852 2.579 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 8.925 1 8.925 0.172 N.S.
E X N 31.926 1 31.926 0.615 N.S.
Residual 2490.951 48 51.895
Total 2630.244 51
TABLE 8:7 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA, Ss ALLOCATED 
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS,
Source S.S. D.F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 229.169 1 229.169 4.59 0.035
Neuroticism (N) 11.728 1 11.728 0.235 N.S.
E X N 75.209 1 75.209 1.507 0.224
Residual 2396.297 48 49.923
Total 2632.902 51
!
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table 8:8 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA. Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EPI SCORES.
("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.S. D.F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 151.607 1 151.607 2.405 .130
Neuroticism (N) 39.509 1 39.509 .627 N.S.
E X N 82.782 1 82.782 1.313 .261
Residual 1638.862 26 63.033
Total 1795.043 29 61.898
TABLE 8:9 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA, Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS.
("Awarei" Ss only)
Source S.S. D.F. M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 383.305 1 383.305 7.134 .012
Neuroticism (N) 52.372 1 52.372 .975 N.S.
E X N 118.342 1 118.342 2.203 .146
Residual 1396.897 26 53.727
Total 1795.334 29 61.908
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groups has been found here (Tables 8:2 - 8:5), The data 
for these analyses are the sum of the five scores in each 
of the three conditions (i.e. the sum of 15 scores) for each 
S; that is, it is the same as the main effect for extraversion 
in a 4 way analysis of variance (extraversion x neuroticism x 
type of reinforcement x trials) which could have been performed 
on this data.
Because of this significant difference between the 
two groups it was felt that a "floor effect" might well be 
affecting the results and, if it were not corrected for, 
might well yield spuriously significant results especially 
when the differences between the RTs to syllables associated 
with appetitive and aversive stimuli were compared (difference 
scores). For this reason the scores were transformed in 
the following manner: The fastest RT response of each
subject was subtracted from each of his other scores. As 
each score was the mean of two consecutive RT responses this 
procedure did not yield any zero scores. It was the natural 
log,of these differences which was then used in subsequent 
analyses. The transformation may be described by the 
following formula:
log (X - X min)
(Where X = the mean of two consecutive RTs belonging to the 
same reinforcement condition; X min ='the fastest RT for the S.)
The success of this transformation can be judged, at 
least in part, by the fact that when the analyses summarized in 
Tables 8:2 and 8:4 were performed using data transformed in 
the manner described above, the significant extraversion effect 
is no longer evident at least when Ss were allocated to cells 
on the basis of their EPI scores (Tables 8:6 and 8 :8).
There is still a significant difference between the RTs of the 
introverted and extraverted Ss when they are allocated to cells
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TABLE 8:10 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA, FIRST SCORES
PER CONDITION. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON
THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 51
Extraversion (E) 1.1686 1 1.1686 1.01784 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 0.4443 1 0.4443 < 1 N.S.
E X  N 0.5005 1 0.5005 <  1 N.S.
Ss within groups 55.1096 48 1.14812
Within
Type of Reinforcement (R) 2.357 1 2.357 6.2457 p<.05
E X  R 0.0576 1 0.0576 < 1 N.S.
N X  R 0.3581 1 0.3581 < 1 N.S.
E X  N X  R 0.03042 1 0.03042 < 1 N.S.
R X  Ss within groups 18.11407 48 0.37738
Total 77.530701
TABLE 8:11ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 'FRANSFORMED DATA, FIRST- SCORES
PER CONDITION0 Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON
THE BASIS OF' SELF-RATINGS.
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 51
Extraversion (E) 0.384 1 0.384 <ri N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 2.1342 1 2.1342 1.888 N.S.
E X  N 0.322 1 0.322 < 1 N.S.
Ss within groups 54.2563 48 1.13034
Within 52
Type of Reinforcement (R) 2.4681 1 2.4681 6.7176 p ^ . 0 5
E X  R 0.0989 1 0.0989 < 1 N.S.
N X  R 0.0853 1 0.0853 < 1 N.S.
E X  N X  R 0.7391 1 0.7391 2.0117 N.S.
R X  Ss within groups 17.6355 48 0.36741
Total 77,53291 103
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TABLE 8:12 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA. FI&ST SCORES
PER CONDITION. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY'GROUPS ON
BASIS OF EPI SCORES. ("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 29
Extraversion (E) 0.3122 1 0.3122 <  1 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 0.8886 1 0.8886 <  1 N.S.
E X  N 0.025 1 0.025 < 1 N.S.
Ss within groups 39.14 26 1.5054
Within 30
Type of Reinforcement (R) 0.7631 1 0.7631 3.06 p <.05
E X  R 0.1595 1 0.1595 <  1 N.S.
N X  R 0.0784 1 0.0784 < 1 N.S.
E X  N X  R 0.0416 1 0.0416 < 1 N.S.
R X Ss within groups 6.48567 26 0.2494
Total 47,8765 59
TABLE 8 5 13 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TRANSFORMED DATA, FIRST SCORES PEE
CONDITION. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE
BASIS OF SELF--RATINGS. ("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 29 '
Extraversion (E) 0.0872 1 0.0872 <  1 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 1.5376 1 1.5376 1.032 N.S.
E X N 0.1322 1 0.1322 -<1 N.S.
Ss within groups 38.745 26 1.4902
Within 30
Type of Reinforcement (R) 1.0413 1 1.0413 4.642 p <o05
E X  R 0.2546 1 0.2546 -c 1 N.S.
N X  R 0.0035 1 0.0035 -cl N.S.
E X  N X  R 0.5047 1 0.5047 2.25 N.S.
R X  SS within groups 5.8311 26 0.2243
TOTAL 47.8766 59
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on the basis of their self-ratings (Tables 8:7 and 8:9), however. 
Conditioning
Hypothesis 2:1 predicted that there would be a 
significant diffemnce between the RTs of syllables associated 
with the positive reinforcer, and those associated with the 
negative reinforcer. This really amounts to the statement 
that conditioning will take place, and as such the 
confirmation of this hypothesis is of central importance to 
the interpretation of the results of this experiment. As 
can be seen (Tables 8:10 - 8:13), a significant difference has 
been found between these two sets of RTs as predicted, and 
so it can be concluded that conditioning has taken place.
The data used in these analyses are the transformed scores 
for the first recognition trials. It was decided only to 
use these first scores rather than all five scores per 
condition, as these should reflect the conditioning effect 
most clearly, the sum of all five scores would reflect the 
extinction trends as well.
Eysenck - Extraversion
The second hypothesis for this experiment was drawn 
from Eysenck*s theory of personality and predicted that there 
would be a significant introversion-extraversion x type of 
reinforcement interaction. There is no evidence of this, 
however, in Tables 8:10 - 8:13.
When Fig 8:1 is considered, however, it is obvious /
\
that the introverted group has slower mean log. RTs than the 
extraverted, which suggests, in its turn,that "difference" 
scores, (log. RTs to syllables associated with negative 
reinforcement minus log. RTs to syllables associated with 
positive reinforcers), might throw some light on the differential 
conditionability of the various personality groups, by 
yielding scores relatively uncontaminated by the differences 
in RTs between groups.
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TABLE 8:14 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 'DIFFERENCE* SCORES, Ss
ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 0.267 1 0,267 0.351 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 0.732 1 0.732 0.965 N.S.
E X  N 0.077 I 0.077 0.102 N.S.
Residual 36.448 48 0.759
Total 37.525 51
TABLE 8:15 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF •difference • SCORES. Ss
ALLOCATED TO' PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF
SELF-RATINGS #
Source s.s. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 1.553 1 1.553 2.105 0.150
Neuroticism (N) 1.396 1 1.396 1.893 0.172
E X  N 1.507 1 1.507 2.043 0.156
Residual 35.400 48 0.738
Total 37.525 51
TABLE 8:16ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 'DIFFERENCE* SCORES. Ss
ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI
SCORES, ("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 0.130 1 0.130 0.261 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 0.194 1 0.194 0.389 N.S.
E X N 0.081 1 0.081 0.161 N.S.
Residual 12.988 26 0.500
Total 13.240 29
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table 8:17 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF ’DIFFERENCE* SCORES. Ss
ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF
SELF-RATINGS. ("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.So DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 0.046 1 0.046 0.103 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 0.333 1 0.333 0.742 N.S.
E X  N 1.012 1 1.012 2.253 0.142
Residual 11.675 26 0.449
Total 13.240 29
TABLE 8:18 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE CONTRASTING LINEAR TRENDS
FOR REWARD AND PUNISHMENT CONDITIONS. Ss ALLOCATED TO 
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
Source S.S. DF M.S. F p
Extraversion (E) 23.280 1 23.280 3.872 0.052
Neuroticism (N) 14.593 1 14.593 2.427 0.122
E X N 6.177 1 6.177 1.027 0.317
Residual 288.585 48 6.012
Total 320.270 51
TABLE 8:19 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE CONSTRASTING LINEAR TRENDS
FOR REWARD AND PUNISHMENT CONDITIONS. Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES.
("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 2.534 1 2.534 0.459 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 0.380 1 0.380 0.069 N.S.
E X N 0.000 1 0.000 oMooo N.S.
Residual 143.523 26 5.520
Total 148.623 29
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Using this data one would expect a significant 
introversion-extraversion difference if Eysenck's theory was 
to receive any support. Tables 8:14 - 8:17 suggest that this 
is not to be,
Neuroticism
On the basis of the theories of both Gray and Spence 
it was predicted that there ought to be an N x type of 
reinforcement effect, but, as with Eysenck's predictions, 
none of the analyses (Tables 8:10 - 8:17) suggest that 
there is any support at all for this prediction in the present 
experiment.
Gray - E, N and type of Reinforcement
It has already been observed that no signifcant 
introversion-extraversion effects, or extraversion x type 
of reinforcements interactions have emerged from the analyses. 
This together with the lack of significant results associated 
with the neuroticism dimension suggests that little support 
can be derived from the present experiment in favour of 
Gray*s hypothesis. Turning to the 3 way interaction, and 
Fig, 8:1, it can be seen that as predicted it is the HNLE 
group who show the longest RTs in the punishment condition, 
and the HNHE group who have the shortest RTs in the reward 
condition. There is no suggestion in Tables 8:10, 8:12, 8:14, 
or 8:16 that this arrangement of groups might not be 
entirely due to chance factors.
The relevant interactions in Tables 8:11, 8:13, 8:15 and 
8:17 do, however, approach a more acceptable level of 
significance, but, as Fig. 8:2 indicates, the groups no longer 
organize themselves into a pattern nearly so favourable to 
Gray's speculation. The difference between these two figures
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and their complement airy analyses is that in the former subjects 
are allocated to personality groups on the basis of their EPI 
scores, while in the latter they are allocated on the basis of 
their own self-ratings. It is the former, therefore, which must 
be regarded as the more sensitive test of the hypotheses drawn 
from the theories of both Gray and Eysenck and though it can be 
pointed out that the HN groups display steeper slopes than the 
LN groups (cf. Fig. 8:1) indicating a greater differentiation 
between the two types of syllables as benefits the group 
hypothesized as being generally more sensitive to cues of 
reinforcement, and as already pointed out there is some 
indication that the groups organize themselves as would be 
predicted on the basis of Grays theory, nevertheless it would be 
foolish to stress this very tentative support for Gray in face of 
the non-significance of the results.
When subjects are allocated to personality groups on the
basis of their self-ratings the results do appear to be approaching
a more "respectable" level of probability, but the pattern of
results no longer favours Gray. It is the HNHE group which now
displays the slowest RT in the punishment condition, and the LNLE
group which displays the fastest RTs in the reward condition. It
can be seen from Fig. 8:2 that the tendency towards a significant
three way interaction is due almost entirely to the lack of
differentiation between the two conditions by the LNHE group.
Indeed if only the stable (LN) groups are considered the 
differences between the introverted and extraverted groups are 
exactly as one would predict on the basis of Eysenck's theory.
Footnote Apart from those analyses looking at the overall 
differences in RTs between groups data from the control condition 
has not been used in any analysis. The reason for this can be 
seen from Fig. 8:3. The graph described by the control condition 
follows the same path as that followed by the punishment condition. 
This may be because there was no aversive conditioning taking 
place, but the general trend of the graph does not suggest that this 
is so. This similarity may have been due either to (a) generaliz­
ation, both were noises, or (b) because, as Gray suggests those 
stimuli associated with not receiving an expected reward may 
well themselves function as aversive stimuli.
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Extinction 2 □ 8
As no reinforcement, either positive or negative, was 
available during the 30 recognition trials this second stage 
of the experiment can be regarded as an extinction phaseo 
Again different predictions can be drawn from the theories of 
Eysenck and Grayo Hypothesis 2:6 suggests that in both the 
positive and negative reinforcement conditions the extraverted 
group will show the faster extinction, and this pattern of 
results will be seen as supporting Eysenck’s theory.
Hypothesis 2:7, on the other hand, drawn from Gray’s theory, 
predicts a more rapid extinction by the extraverted group only 
in the punishment condition, while the introverted group will 
be expected to show the faster extinction in the reward 
condition.
Table 8:18 summarizes the results of the contrasts 
between the linear trends of RTs to "rewarded" and "punished" 
syllables over the extinction trials. As can be seen the 
expected significant extraversion effect is, indeed, evident. 
For the introverted group there is a general trend for the 
RTs to get slower across trials in the reward condition, 
while the trend is in the opposite direction for the punishment 
condition (cf. Fig. 8:3), clear extinction effects.
Eventually the RTs for the two types of syllables should 
settle down to the same level, but here they appear to have 
over shot that level. This might well be a rebound effect; 
or, on the other hand, it might be regarded as an example of 
Gray’s equivalences of reinforcers, non punishment being the 
same as reward, and the absence of an expected reward being 
equivalent to a punishment.
These extinction trends are much flatter for the 
extraverted group, than they are for the introverted group.
The effect, then, though it reaches an acceptable level of
2 59
table 8:19a ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE CONTRASTING LINEAR TRENDS 
FOR REWARD AND PUNISHMENT CONDITIONS, Ss ALLOCATED TO
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES 0
(Extreme scores only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 8.484 1 8.484 1.222 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 9.123 1 9.123 1.314 N.S.
E X  N 3.059 1 3.059 0.44 N.S.
Residual 159.719 23 6.944
Total 180.385
TABLE 8:20 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE CONTRASTING LINEAR TRENDS 
FOR REWARD AND PUNISHMENT CONDITIONS. Ss ALLOCATED TO
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS.
("Aware" Ss only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 10.805 1 10.805 2.210 0.146
Neuroticism (N) 0.023 1 0.023 0.005 N.S.
E X N 0.018 1 0.018 0.004 N.S.
Residual 127.140 26 4.890
Total 148.624 29
TABLE 8:21 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE CONTRASTING LINEAR TRENDS 
FOR REWARD AND PUNISHMENT CONDITIONS. Ss ALLOCATED TO 
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF? RATINGS,
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 2.534 1 2.534 0.387 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 5.588 1 5.588 0.854 N.S.
E X N 4.869 1 4.869 0.744 N.S.
Residual 313.991 48 6.541
Total 320.269 51
2 5 0
significance is not as was predicted by either theory. One 
might of course attempt to argue either that the results may 
be construed as supporting Eysenck, the extinction trends 
reflecting the fact that the introverted group reached a level 
of conditioning beyond that attained by the extraverted group. 
This seems unlikely, however, in view of the fact that there 
was no evidence of differential conditioning in the earlier 
analyses. On the other hand one might simply argue that, 
contrary to Eysenck’s hypothesis, introverts show a more rapid 
extinction of CR than do extraverts.
This effect is not found to be significant, however, 
in Tables 8:19 - 8:21, where Ss are allocated to groups on 
the basis of their self-ratings, or the analysis is limited to 
the data from either Ss aware of the reinforcement contingencies, 
or are more. than half a standard deviation above or below the 
mean on the E and N scales.
Awareness
It was suggested in the first experiment that the lack 
of any evidence of conditioning might be construed as being 
related to the fact that few Ss became aware of the 
reinforcement contingencies. It was, therefore, thought worth­
while here to look at the effect of awareness on conditioning, 
and the distribution of "aware" Ss across the personality 
groups. A series of Chi square analyses were calculated.
No significant difference was found in the proportion of HN 
and LN Ss who were classified as "aware". Nor was any 
significant difference found when the LNHE and HNLE groups 
were combined and compared with the HNHE and LNLE groups, 
(reflecting the E x N interaction). A significantly 
larger proportion of the introverted, than of the extraverted 
group^ irrespective of whether the EPI scores on self-ratings 
were used as the basis of classification, were found to be
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aware of the existing reinforcement contingencies. There was
no evidence of any difference in performance, however, between
the "aware" and "unaware" Ss, (cf. summary Table 8:22).
Correlations
To this point all the results which have been reported have 
been looking for significant differences between groups, but 
questions about differential conditionability and personality 
dimensions may also be asked the other way round - to what 
extent are measures of personality related to indices of 
conditioning2
Two sets of correlations may be seen as of importance 
(i) correlations between personality variables and indices of 
conditioning; (ii) the inter-correlations of conditioning 
indices. The second of these is, in many ways, the more 
important. If indices of conditioning do not correlate with 
each other significantly then any theory which postulates a 
single general factor of conditionability must be wrong.
The present, experiment, however, although it uses three 
indices of conditioning, cannot really shed any light on the 
question of whether there is, or is not, a general factor of 
conditionability because, on one hand, the correlations 
between the indices reflect mainly the common source of the 
data, RTs, from which they are drawn, and on the other the 
"difference" index is obviously not entirely independent of 
the other two indices, RTs to reward syllables and RTs to 
punished syllables. Table 8:23 may be summarized by saying 
that Ss who have fast RTs in one condition also tend to have 
fast RTs in the other, and Ss who show the largest differences 
tend to have fast RTs in the reward condition, and slow 
RTs in the punishment condition.
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TABLE 8:23 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICES OF CONDITIONING
1. Difference Scores 1.00
2. RTs to "reward” -.5188 1.00
syllables (p .001)
3. RTs for "punished" .3982 .5096 1.00
syllables (p=.004) (p<.001)
As can be seen from Table 8:24 none of the correlations 
between the personality dimension and either the RTs or the 
"difference" score turned out to be significant. Significant 
correlations were found between some of the consistency 
measures and the condition indices, however.
TABLE 8:25 RATED CONSISTENCY OF IMPULSIVITY
"Difference" Score .3064 (p=.028)
RT to "Reward" CS -.3071 (p=.027)
RT to "Punishment"
CS .0118 (N.S.)
(Correlations between rated consistency of Impulsivity and 
indices of conditioning).
The correlations reported in Table 8:25 suggest that 
individuals who rate themselves as consistent with respect to 
their level of impulsivity also tend to be good conditioners, 
particularly with respect to appetitive reinforcement 
TABLE 8:26
Rated Consistency of N
"Difference" Scores -.3036 (p=.029)
RT to "Reward" CS -.0368 (N.S.)
RT to "Punishment"
CS -.3642 (p=r.008)
(Correlations between rated consistency of Neuroticism and
indices of conditioning)
2 6 5
These results (TABLE 8:26), in their turn, suggest that 
those individuals who rate themselves as inconsistent with 
respect to their level of neuroticism tend to be the better 
conditioners, particularly with respect to aversive 
re inf orcement.
Rated consistency on the extraversion (sociability) 
scale was found to correlate significantly and negatively 
(-.395, p=.004) with rated neuroticism and with the EPI 
N scale (-.2756, p=.048). Similarly self-rated consistency 
for neuroticism was found also to correlate significantly 
and negatively (-.3792, p=.006) with self-rated neuroticism, 
though not with the EPI N scale (-.1998, p=.156).
Correlations, of course, do not imply any direction of 
causality and so it is unclear whether these relationships 
indicate whether inconsistency is seen as an aspect of 
neuroticism, when people are rating themselves on this 
dimension, or whether people who see themselves as neurotic 
also see themselves as inconsistent.
It is interesting to note, too, the high, though 
far from perfect, correlations between the questionnaire 
measures and the self-ratings. For extraversion there was a 
correlation of .724 (p<.001) between the EPI measure and 
self-rated extraversion (sociability) and a correlation of 
.448 (p < .001) between EPI E and self-rated impulsivity.
For the neuroticism dimension the correlation between the 
EPI measure and the self-rating was .744 (p <  .001).
With respect to the three consistency measures 
no evidence of a general factor emerged, none of these 
self-ratings correlating significantly with any of the 
others, as can be seen from Table 8:27.
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TABLE 8:27
1. Rated Consistency of
Extraversion 1.00
2. Rated Consistency of .1578 1.00
Impulsivity (N.S.)
3. Rated Consistency of .0891 .03321 1.00
Neuroticism (N.S.) (N.S.)
8:6 DISCUSSION
The first, and in many ways the most important, point 
to be made about this experiment is that in as far as it 
set out to elicit longer RTs to one set of syllables than 
another on the basis of the reinforcements associated with 
them, it succeeded. It was found that those syllables 
characterized by having the same central vowel as the 
syllables associated with the unpleasant noise yielded 
significantly slower RTs to recognition than did the 
syllables characterized by the vowel associated with 2p coins. 
Apart from this reinforcement history there appears to be 
no obvious reason to expect these syllables to give rise to 
different RTs, especially as all three vowels were randomly 
assigned to all reinforcement conditions across Ss. Given 
that the experiment was successful in its attempt to condition 
differential perception, or at least responding, there was 
every reason to expect the differential conditionability of 
the personality groups predicted by the trait theorists.
It was predicted on the basis of Eysenck’s theory, 
of course, that the introverted group would display the 
superior conditionability. No significant differences were 
found, however, between the introverted and extraverted groups 
in conditioning. Nor were any of the correlations between
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the extraversion dimension, whether measures were taken from 
the EPI or self-ratings, and the indices of conditioning 
significant. This finding must he regarded as a serious 
set back for the Eysenckian theory when it is considered 
that there is both clear evidence of conditioning, and that 
parameters, thought to favour the superior conditionability 
of the introverted group, were employed.
In Eysenck’s favour one might point to the fact that 
it is an extravected group, the INH.E group, which shows the 
least differentiation between conditions (cf. Fig. 8:1 and 
8:2), and when Ss are allocated to personality groups on 
the basis of their self-ratings, for the stable groups at 
least, it appears that the introverted groups do display the 
superior conditioning (cf. Fig. 8:2). In fact there appears 
to be very little evidence of any conditioning at all on the 
part of the extraverted group.
When Ss are allocated to personality groups on the 
basis of their EPI scores (Fig. 8:1) both introverted groups 
display slower RTs in the aversive condition than the 
extraverted groups do. This arrangement of groups is, of 
course, as Eysenck would predict. This is of some interest.
It has already been remarked that most experiments purporting 
to put Eysenck’s theory to the test have employed an aversive 
stimulus, puffs of air and electric shocks being the favourite. 
Here again when an aversive stimulus is used as reinforcement 
the results, even thoiigh non-significant statistically, are 
in the direction predicted by Eysenck. The theory does not 
receive such favourable support when an appetitive reinforcer 
is employed, however. One might speculate as to the meaning 
of such findings. Is it that Eysenck’s theory is true only 
with respect to aversive reinforcement? Ought these results to 
be interpreted as supporting Gray who does predict that
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introverts will display superior conditioning only to 
aversive reinforcement? To this last point one might also 
add the observation that the evidence Gray assembles vdien 
presenting his theory is more convincing with respect to the 
relationship between introversion and passive avoidance than 
it is with respect to the relationship between extraversion 
and the conditioning of appetitive behaviour.
Looking at the problem from an altogether different 
angle one might argue that the mean RT of the introverted 
group is slower in both conditions than the mean RT of the 
extraverted group. The slower RTs of the introverted groups 
in the punishment condition, may, therefore, be regarded as a 
manifestation of the more generalized situation, that introverts 
have slower RTs than extraverts, and nothing at all to do with 
differential conditionability.
Two things, however, argue against this last point 
being the whole explanation, on one hand the transformation 
of the data does appear to have had some success, (compare 
Tables 8:2 and 8 :6); on the other hand the introverted group 
in the extinction phase showsa substantial increase in the 
speed of their RTs.
Turning to the extinction phase, here Eysenck’s theory 
is quite explicit and predicts that it is the extraverted 
groups who ought to show the more rapid extinction. A 
significant extinction effect did emerge, but Fig. 8:3 shows 
clearly that it is the introverted and not the extraverted 
groups who display the more rapid extinction. A finding 
quite contrary to the prediction made. One might have 
argued that no differential conditioning effect was observed 
because all groups reached an asymtotic level, but if this 
were true the differential extinction effects ought to have 
been even more pronounced.
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Another finding might be introduced at this point 
which might help explain the more rapid extinction of the 
introverted group, even if Eysenck’s theory is correct.
A larger proportion of the introverted group than of the 
extraverted group was found to be aware of the reinforcement 
contingencies. The effect of this ’awareness’, it might 
be argued, was that the two groups of Ss were not, in fact, 
in exactly the same situation. The ’aware’ Ss were not 
responding to the CS alone, but also to the ’correct’ 
construction of the situation. The result of this might 
well have been that when reinforcements were withdrawn the 
’aware’ Ss would be able, with the aid of the information 
available to them to return, rapidly, to their normal, pre­
conditioning, level of responding. ■ No doubt the ’unaware’
Ss also had some personal construction of the situation, but 
as it was not the ’correct’ one it would not necessarily 
facilitate a rapid return to a normal level of responding.
One might even wish to construe the fact that 
proportionally more introverts became aware of the reinforcement 
contingencies as support for Eysenck’s theory. To do this 
one would have to argue that it is only after the CR has 
been established that an individual becomes aware of the 
reinforcement contingencies.
On the other hand it might be argued that the reverse 
is true and behaviour changes only after some degree of 
’awareness’ is attained.
These view points belong, of course, to the learning 
with/without awareness controversy, and as the present 
experiment provides no data on the basis of which one might 
decide between these two alternatives extended speculation 
here would be fruitless.
These speculations must be tempered, however, by the
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knowledge that no significant differences were found in the 
comparisons of Ss classified as ’aware’and ’unaware*.
(cf. Table 8:21).
With respect to Eysenck’s theory then, despite the 
fact that appropriate parameters were employed and the fact 
that certain previous findings were confirmed, the faster 
RTs of the HE groups, suggesting that this sample was not 
yielding ’abnormal’ results, none of the hypotheses drawn 
from the theory were confirmed to a significant degree.
However, certain features of the data are in the direction 
predicted by Eysenck, while others may be, arguable, interpreted 
as supporting his position, though they were not predicted 
before hand. It might, therefore, be wiser to claim rather 
that Eysenck’s theory receives no strong support from the 
present experiment, rather than that it has been disconfirmed.
There was little which could be interpreted as 
supporting Gray in the first experiment, and the situation 
seems to be much the same in this second experiment. Despite 
the fact that this experiment might be viewed as a more 
appropriate test of Gray’s theory, employing as it does a 
passive avoidance situation, none of the hypotheses drawn from 
Gray’s theory were confirmed to a significant degree. In 
favour of Gray’s theory, however, it must be pointed out that 
the neurotic groups did show the greatest differentiation 
between conditions (Fig. 8:1) as one would expect from the 
group hypothesized as being generally more sensitive to cues 
of reinforcement.
The HNLE group was found to have the slowest RT in 
the punishment condition and the HNHE the fastest RT in the 
reward condition, which is again as the Grayian model predicts, 
but these differences failed to reach significance. On the 
other hand when we look at the trends over extinction it is
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difficult to find any evidence which might be called in 
support of Gray’s theory. Given both the non-significance 
of the results and this lack of consistency one cannot 
argue too strongly that the results are not due simply to 
chance factors. No evidence, then, has been found which 
clearly supports Gray’s position.
As with Gray’s theory no real support can be claimed 
to have been found, in the present experiment, in favour 
of Spence’s theory. Similarly, although Ego Strength was 
not measured in the present experiment, it is not obvious 
how these results might be used to support the theory of 
Roessler.
At this point it seems worth suggesting that it might 
be rather too simplistic to relate one or more personality 
variables to "conditioning in general". This harks back 
to a suggestion made earlier when discussing Gray’s theory. 
There it was pointed out that the theory appeared to claim 
that classical conditioning takes place at the level of the 
amygdala, at a level where no difference was hypothesized 
between the introvert and extravert. Instrumental 
conditioning, however, seemed to be thought to take place 
at the level of the reward and punishment mechanisms. In 
an attempt to fit in these features of the theory with 
certain observations made by Gray it was suggested that 
extraverts are less likely to condition fear than introverts, 
perhaps because being less highly aroused fewer stimuli would 
reach an aversive level for them. The point of this 
speculation was that differences might emerge in operant 
conditioning because, at least for aversive stimuli, 
differences might also be present in the classical conditioning 
which preceded it. In view of the fact that no differences 
have emerged between the introverted and extraverted groups
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in the present classical conditioning situation it might 
be fruitful to see if the differences hypothesized by 
Gray do in fact emerge in an operant conditioning 
situation. It might then be speculated, if Gray's 
hypotheses are confirmed, that Gray's theory is limited to 
operant learning situations. Whereas Eysenck's theory, 
which fared somewhat better in the present experiment and 
has most often been tested in classical conditioning 
situations, makes statements relevant, primarily, to classical 
situations.
Along similar lines it may be suggested that classical 
conditioning is relatively less stress inducing than operant 
conditioning, or perhaps induces a different kind of stress, 
as the S does not have to leam and perform a task and is not 
in a position of such obvious evaluation. Thus is might be 
predicted that Eysenck's theory is more relevant to low stress 
classical conditioning, Spence's to high stress classical 
conditioning and Roessler's to operant conditioning situations. 
In this scheme of things all the theories might be correct, but 
only in a limited number of situations. If this were true it
would necessitate a change in research strategy from simply 
comparing predictions drawn from different theories to looking 
at predictions drawn from a theory in a number of situations.
Turning now to the consistency issue one might expect 
the less consistent individuals to be more easily conditioned 
and this is the way things appear to be at least with respect 
to the neuroticism dimension. Individuals who rate themselves 
as inconsistent with respect to their level of neuroticism 
are also found to show superior conditionability, especially 
with respect to aversive reinforcement, which appears to make 
some sense. However, the situation is just the reverse with 
respect to impulsivity. Individuals who rate themselves as
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consistent with respect to their level of impulsivity were 
found to be more easily conditioned, especially with relation 
to appetitive reinforcement. Rated consistency of 
extraversion (sociability) was not found to correlate with any 
of the indices of conditioning. Before speculating about 
what a pattern of results such as these might mean it might 
be useful to wait and see if they are replicated. What 
does appear to be true of the consistency ratings in the 
present experiment is that they show a considerable independence 
of each other and would appear to support the suggestion that, 
in as far as consistency might be regarded as a factor in its 
own right, it must be viewed as trait specific, rather than 
one generalized factor.
Of course, rated consistency was looked at here rather 
than the consistency of actual behaviour and this appears 
to be closely linked, at least for the present sample, to the 
construct of neuroticism. Rated consistency of neuroticism 
and rated consistency of extraversion (sociability), though 
not rated consistency of impulsivity, were both found to 
correlate with self rated neuroticism. Being a correlation 
it is not clear, however, whether Ss tended to rate themselves 
as being more neurotic because they saw themselves as 
inconsistent, or as inconsistent because they were neurotic. 
Though these results seem to accurately reflect the commonly 
held view of the neurotic, inconsistency does not form part 
of Eysenck’s construct of neuroticism.
Similarly though Eysenck was at pains to remove any 
correlation between the E and N scales of the EPI, the 
correlation for the present sample was -.19(N.S.). When 
subjects rated themselves a correlation of -.316(p ^  .025) 
between self rated extraversion and self rated neuroticism 
emerged, suggesting that at least in the "common view" an
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individual who is introverted is also likely to be somewhat 
neurotic.
In summary, then, despite the fact that a clear and 
significant difference emerged in RTs to recognition of 
nonsense syllables due to differential reinforcement none 
of the predictions drawn from Eysenck’s, Gray's or Spence's 
theory were confirmed to a significant degree. Some 
results were found to be in the direction predicted by the 
theories of Gray and Eysenck, but, particularly with respect 
to Gray's theory, these results lacked the consistency to 
suggest that they might be due to other than chance factors.
It was suggested that predictions drawn from these 
theories might have a more limited usefulness than is at 
present implied by the theories themselves.
There were some significant differences, however, 
between the personality groups. The introverted groups, as 
compared to the extraverted group was found to show a more 
rapid extinction and to be generally more aware of the 
reinforcement contingencies.
The results also suggest that inconsistency might 
generally be viewed as an aspect of neuroticism, but despite 
this there is no evidence, as least when people are asked 
to rate their consistency, that the consistency is a single 
generalized factor.
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CHAPTER IX: EXPERIMENT 3
9:1 ABSTRACT
Predictions were drawn from the theories of Eysenck,
Spence,Roess1er and Gray and tested in an operant conditioning 
situation in the present experiment. This type of conditioning 
was used in order to permit the suggestion made in the previous 
experiment, that different personality dimensions might be 
relevant to different conditioning situations, to be put to 
the test.
As the predictions drawn from Eysenck's theory, that 
introverts condition more efficiently than extraverts, were 
confirmed it was concluded that the above suggestions had not 
been supported.
The theories of Gray, Spence and Roessler received no 
support. The low ego-strength, and the high neuroticism groups 
were found to use the response key to a greater extent than the 
other groups. It was suggested that this might well reflect a 
difficulty on the part of these individuals in inhibiting responses 
Two findings reported in the previous experiment failed 
to be replicated here: rated consistency was not found to
correlate with rated neuroticism; consistency ratings were found 
to correlate moderately well with each other.
Extraversion was found to correlate with the indices of 
conditioning, these indices correlated only poorly with each 
other, it w^s therefore questioned whether it was reasonable 
to assume that there is a general factor of conditionability.
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9:2 INTRODUCTION
It W4S proposed in experiment 2 that perhaps those 
theories which relate a personality dimension to conditionability 
might be wrong not so much in kind as in degree. That is, 
certain personality traits might favour conditioning in certain 
situations. Now this is a somewhat disappointing conclusion 
to come to in the present context, where it has been suggested 
that if a personality trait could be identified which was related 
to a general factor of conditionability then it might be possible 
to weld the idiographic and nomothetic approaches to personality 
study into a single, and ultimately more useful approach.
The present speculations should not be taken as a 
counsel of despair, however. While on one hand there may be 
several factors of conditionability, all of approximately equal 
importance, on the other there may be a single, major, general 
factor of conditionability with several minor factors, each with 
some relationship to a personality trait, contributing relatively 
minor amounts of observed variance.
The other point worth considering, before speculation 
runs riot, is that as yet these suggestions are untested 
hypotheses. In the first experiment there appeared to be 
some evidence that the stable (LN) Ss displayed superior 
conditionability, but it was felt that the results of this 
experiment must be treated with extreme caution, particularly 
in view of the fact that the LN and HN groups were found to 
be behaving significantly differently before reinforcement was 
introduced.
In the second experiment it was Eysenck's theory which 
fared best, or.,, more accurately, least badly. Thought none of 
the predictions drawn from this theory received significant support, 
some results were in the direction predicted by the theory, 
while those results which were statistically significant were
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interpretable, though not unequivocally so, as supporting the 
theory.
The purpose of this third experiment is to put the earlier 
speculation to the test by employing an experimental design 
which is, sufficently similar to experiment 2 to permit 
comparison of the two sets of results but which employs an operant 
conditioning technique as opposed to the classical conditioning 
paradigm used in experiment 2 .
In view of the suggestions being made here it is note 
worthy that Spence and Spence (1966) presented the following 
Table (Table 9:1) comparing high and low anxiety Ss in 
conditioning studies in which a masking task had been employed.
TABLE 9:1 STUDIES OF PERFORMANCE OF LA AND HA SCALES S 
WHEN A MASKING TASK HAS BEEN USED.
Study N Difference in % CRs (H - L)
1. Spence & Rutledge (1964) 17 - 2.2
2. Homzie (1964) 48 -1.5
3. Spence (1966) 48 2.8
4. Spence (Unpublished) 48 4.3
5. Spence (Unpublished) 28 11.3
6. Spence (Unpublished) 37 -9.8
None of these studies produced significant results, and 
the fact that in three out of the six studies the LA group 
displayed better conditioning than the HA groups puts things 
pretty much at chance level. What is noteworthy about these 
studies is simply that the inclusion of a masking task in the 
experimental design results in the disapperance of the 
impressive superiority, in conditioning, of the HA groups, so 
often reported by Spence.
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A study by Elias (1965) might also be regarded as 
relevant here. Elias, using the MAS as a basis for categorizing 
Ss, compared a classical with an operant conditioning 
situations. He compared three levels of anxiety, HA, MA, LA, with 
two intensities of electric shock, 30 - 70 A versus 75 - 125 A. 
For half the Ss shock always followed the CS, a buzzer, (classical 
conditioning); for the rest of the Ss the CR resulted in 
avoiding the shock (avoidance conditioning). In both the 
experiments reported avoidance conditioning proved to be 
superior to classical conditioning. In the first experiment 
HA Ss showed the highest level of conditioning and LA Ss the 
lowest under low intensity shock conditions. The position 
was reversed for the high intensity shock condition. This 
result was not replicated in the second experiment, however.
In the second experiment an interesting finding was 
reported. It may be recalled that in Chapter One there was some 
discussion of the fact that individuals may appear inconsistent 
because they are focusing on different aspects of the situation 
to those considered by the observer. In Chapter Two it was 
commented that the actors and the observers constructs might 
not overlap and "to the extent that they do not the individual 
will appear, from the observer's point of view, inconsistent, 
or to have failed to leam a particular response".
In his second experiment Elias recorded not only CRs, 
as is customary, but also the number of irrelevant responses 
emitted by the S. The interesting point is that in the 
classical conditioning situation it is the LA group which produces 
both most CRs and fewest irrelevant responses. In the 
operant conditioning situation the irrelevant responses are 
quickly extinguished for the LA group, but go on increasing 
in frequency for the HA group, (cf. Fig. 9:1), despite this 
the HA group also produce more CRs, though not significantly
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more, than the LA group.
Elias comments on his results as follows: "These data
suggest that the function of drive is to energize general 
defence responses, while UCS avoidance acts to selectively 
reinforce a particular response. In classical conditioning, 
where shock could not be avoided, finger withdrawal and 
irrelevant responses were acquired at about the same rate and 
reached the same level. In avoidance conditioning, where 
shock was avoided by a finger withdrawal, the finger- 
withdrawal response showed a progressive acquisition throughout 
conditioning as irrelevant responding extinguished.
Interference of irrelevant responses with the 
conditioning of finger withdrawal may explain the relatively 
poor performance of the classical conditioning group". (Elias, 
1965, p.115),
It seems then that the situation may be still more 
complex than initially suggested; not only may personality 
factors contribute some variance, even if not all, to 
conditioning, but if the response acquired is not the one 
designated as the CR then good conditioners may well be classified 
as poor conditioners, especially if the "irrelevant CR" 
interferes in some way with the performance of the CR.
On the basis of Elias' results, however, it seems 
that such interference is less likely to take place in 
operant than in classical conditioning, perhaps because the CR 
in operant conditioning has a functional value and so all 
operant conditioning situations involve discrimination learning.
There seems little point in further speculation here 
until data are available which might be called in support of, 
or against, any hypotheses made. The present experiment, 
then, is similar to experiment two in that it employs nonsense 
syllables paired with two types of reinforcement, appetitive
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and aversive. It is different from the previous experiment 
in that reinforcement is contingent on certain responses being 
made or withheld. The CR to avoid punishment was to press a 
response key; the CS was a three letter nonsense syllable 
characterized by the letter "I" ("U" for half the Ss).
The CR to gain the positive reinforcement was to 
avoid pressing the key; the CS was a three letter nonsense 
syllable characterized by the letter "U" ("I" for half the Ss) 
Positive reinforcement was gaining 2p, negative 
reinforcement losing 2p,
9:3 HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses here were substantially the same as 
those in experiment two:
Hypothesis 3:1 There will be a significant conditioning 
effect, reflected in there being significantly more successful 
presses of the réponse key to the aversive CS.
Hypothesis 3:2 On the basis of Eysenck's theory it is 
predicted that there will be an introversion-extraversion x 
type of reinforcement interaction.
It is predicted that the results will indicate that 
the introverts will show superior conditioning.
Hypothesis 3:3 On the basis of Gray's theory it is 
predicted that
(i) there will be a significant introversion-extraversion x 
type of reinforcement interaction; introverts showing the 
superior conditioning in the punishment condition, 
extraverts in the reward condition.
(ii) There will be a neuroticism x type of reinforcement 
interaction, the HN group displaying the superior conditioning,
(iii) there will be an introversion - extraversion x neuroticism 
X  type of reinforcement interaction.
)
Hypothesis 3:4 On the basis of Roessler*s theory it 
is predicted that there will be a significant Es x type of 
reinforcement effect, with high Es scorers displaying the 
superior conditioning.
9:4 . METHOD
Design
Subjects completed the EPI (form A), giving measures 
of extraversion and neuroticism, a self-rating scale, giving 
ratings of extraversion (sociability), impulsivity, neuroticism 
and consistency for each of these traits, and the Barron's Ego- 
Strength (Es) scale from the MMPI. These, together with two 
types of reinforcement) appetitive and aversive, were employed 
as the independent variables in the various analyses performed 
in the present experiment.
An operant conditioning paradigm was employed. The 
experimental situation was so designed that 500 msecs after 
a nonsense syllable was projected on to a screen, clearly 
visible to the S, the number shown on one of two counters, 
situated immediately in front of the S, increased by one.
The S was told that he/she would receive 2p for each point on 
the left hand counter (appetitive reinforce), but lose 2p for 
each point on the right hand counter (aversive reinforcer).
60 nonsense syllables were presented* Partial 
reinforcement was used, 23 syllables out of 30 per condition 
being reinforced (76.67%). Reinforcement was random, and 
syllables were presented in random order*
Two sets of syllables were used, one characterized by the 
central vowel I, the other by the vowel U* These syllables 
had been used in experiment 2. The association between these 
vowels and reinforcement was random across Ss.
The S was able to prevent the number on the counters
*1. An outline of Roessler*s theory is provided in Appendix I
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increasing by pressing a key within 500 msec.s of the 
syllable appearing. The syllable was visible to the S for 
one second, both counters were permanently visible.
A number of scores were obtained from each S:
(i) The number on the positive counter at the end of the
experiment i.e. the amount the S gained. ("Positive** or 
"Reward" score).
(ii) The number on the negative counter at the end of the 
experiment i.e. the amount the S lost. ("Negative" 
or **Punishment**score;.
(iii) The Ss "score" - the number on the positive counter minus 
the number on the negative counter. ("Difference" score)
(iv) The number of times the S pressed the key.
Apparatus
As mentioned above introversion - extraversion and 
neuroticism were measured by the EPI (form A), and Es by 
Barron's (1956) scale from the MMPI. The self rating scale 
was the same as that described in experiment 2.
Syllables were projected on to a screen by a carousel 
projector. The image of a letter on the screen measured11.5 cms
X 2.5 cms. The screen was 127 cms from the S, the digital counters
52 cms from the S.
The experimenter controlled vhich, if either, of the two 
counters would show an increase on any particular trial. He 
also had control of the interval between syllables. Additional 
circuitry made it possible for the S to prevent the number on 
the counters from increasing, by pressing a key within the 
first 500 msec.s that the syllable was visible. Pressing the 
key after this had no effect.
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Procedure
53 volunteer Ss took part in the experiment. All Ss 
were students or academic staff of the university. No S who 
had taken part in experiment 2 was used as a subject in this 
experiment. It was decided to exclude these potential Ss 
because it was felt that the designs of the two experiments 
were similar enough to facilitate awareness of the reinforcement 
contingencies. This might have distorted any results obtained, 
it would certainly limit their generality.
As in the previous experiment Ss scoring 11 or more 
on the EPI E or N scales were classified as extraverted (HE) 
or neurotic (HN), as appropriate, for the purpose of analysis. 
Those scoring 10 or less were classified as introverted (LE) 
or stable (LN), as appropriate.
Three Es groups were used, high Es (HEs) Ss scoring 
54 or more on the Barron Es scale, medium Es (MEs) Ss scoring 
40 - 53, and low Es Ss scoring less than 40.
Again as in the previous experiment Ss scoring 10 or more
on the relevant rating scales were classified as extraverted, 
those giving a rating of 6 or more on the impulsivity scale 
were classified as impulsive, and those giving a rating of 
6 or more on the neuroticism scale as neurotic.
Three S were omitted from the analyses because they
had scores of over 5 on the EPI lie scale. Four further 
S had also to be omitted from the analyses due to an error in 
reinforcement, such that on some trials the wrong reinforcer 
was paired with the syllable.
Ss completed an EPI and an Es scale, one before and 
one after the experiment, (the order was randomized across Ss), 
and a self rating scale, again completed either before or 
after the experiment with the order randomized across Ss.
These were not scored until sometime later and so.
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during the experiment, the experimenter had no idea to which 
personality category the S would be allocated.
After completing the personality questionnaire the S 
was given a typed sheet containing the following instructions. 
"Instructions
What you will be doing in this experiment is playing 
a game, and the object of the game will be to earn as much 
money as possible.
This is what will happen: a 3 letter syllable will be
projected on to the screen; half a second later, while the 
3 letters are still visible, the number on one or other of 
the two counters will increase by 1 ^unless you press the key.
If you press the key ne ifher counter will increase. There will 
also be times when even though you do not press the key neither 
counter will increase.
You will receive 2p for each point on the LEFT hand 
counter, but, (the catch), you will LOSE 2p for each point on 
the RIGHT hand counter. That is you will get 2p for each point 
remaining when the number on the RIGHT hand counter is taken 
from the number on the LEFT hand counter
E.Gs
LEFT RIGHT
00025 00012
in this case you would get 25 - 12 = 13 x 2p, that is 26p.
Any questions?"
The key and counters were pointed out to the S so as 
to avoid any confusion. The S was allowed to place the key 
wherever he found it most comfortable. By looking straight 
ahead both screen and counters were clearly visible to the S,
Three syllables not used in the experiment proper,
TAD, XXX, HOT, were used to demonstrate the procedure. Each 
S was allowed to practice until he felt confident enough to
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start the experiment. A minimum of 10 practice trials were 
given.
The pattern on which the counters increased or failed to 
increase during the practice trials was random and bore no 
relationship to the reinforcement contingencies of the 
experiment proper. The S was informed of this.
Immediately before the first syllable of the 
experiment proper was shown the experimenter said to the S,
"Are you sure you understand what you have to do? You have 
to devise a strategy, or discern a pattern which will allow 
you to predict which counter will increase, and decide whether 
or not to press the Key and stop the counters from increasing."
60 syllables were then presented in random order.
The inter trial interval was random in length with a mean value 
of approximately 3.5 secs.
The experimenter recorded on each trial whether or not the 
S had pressed the key, but, because the counters were not 
visible to him, he was unable to record whether or not the 
response had been "successful" i.e. \diether it had been made 
within the initial 500 msec.s and so prevent the counter from 
increasing. At the conclusion of the experiment he recorded 
the numbers on the two counters and paid the S his/her ’’winnings**. 
On several occasions he had to refuse to take money from Ss
who had so entered into the spirit of things that they wanted
to pay the experimenter because they had "lost".
At the end of the experiment the S was asked a series
of questions similar to those asked in the two previous 
experiments, and again used to classify Ss as "aware" or 
"unaware".
1. "What did you think was going on during the experiment?"
This question elicited a correct description of the 
reinforcement contingencies from almost all Ss who were
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table 9:2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE
BASIS OF EPI SCORES
Source S.So DF M.S. F P
Between 45
Extraversion (E) Ool98 1 0.198 1 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 5.847 1 5.847 -=:l ti
E X N 0.595 1 0.595 tt
Ss within groups 448.81 42 10.686
Within 46
Type of reinforcement (R) 408.49 1 408.49 16.352 .001
E X  R 39.768 1 39.768 1.592 N.S.
N X  R 10.521 1 10.521 < 1 II
E X  N X  R 3.153 1 3.153 -<1 II
R X  Ss within groups 1049.19 42 ■ 24.981
Total 91
TABLE 9:3 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE
BASIS OF EPI SCORES. ("]EXTREME" scores only)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 23
Extraversion (E) 5.361 1 5.361 <  1 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 15.73 1 15.73 2.337 II
E X  N 0.037 1 0.037 <  1 II
Ss within groups 135.207 20 6.76
Within 24
Type of reinforcement (R) 313.618 1 313.618 11.767 .005
E X  R 74.792 1 74.792 2.806 N.S.
N  X  R 26.313 1 26.313 < 1 II
E X  N X  R 44.292 1 44.292 1.662 II
E  X  Ss within groups 533.068 20 26.653
Total 47
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table 9:4 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE
BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 45
Extraversion (E) 0.36 1 0,36 1
Neuroticism (N) 9.64 1 9.64 -cl
E X N 36.54 1 36.54 3.78
Ss within Groups 405.63 42 9.66
Within
Type of Reinforcement (R) 367.78 1 367.78 13.48 <  .005
E X R 0 1 0 -Cl
N X R 30.82 1 30.82 1.13
E X N X R 2.18 1 2.18 < 1
R X Ss within groups 1145.63 42 27.28
Total 91
TABLE 9:5 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE
BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS ON IMPULSIVITY AND NEUROTICISM
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 45
Impulsivity (l) 1.09 1 1.09 < 1
Neuroticism (N) 7.91 1 7.91 < 1
I X N 38.36 1 38.36 4.1 -C .05
Ss within groups 404.47 42 9.63
Within 46
Type of Reinforcement (R) 368.6 1 368.6 13.6 <  . 005
I X R 0.45 1 0.45 < 1
N X R 32.27 1 32.27 1.19
I X N X R 8.00 1 8.00 -Cl
E X Ss within groups 1138.7 42 27.11
Total 91
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TABLE 9:6 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS 
OF SELF-RATINGS, WITH THOSE USING THE MID POINT OF THE 
SCALE (5) OMITTED
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 28
Impulsivity 6.35 1 6.35 <  1
Neuroticism 1.38 1 1.38 < 1
I X  N 13.32 1 13.32 1.63
Ss within groups 204.51 25 8.18
Within 29
Type of Reinforcement (R) 263.37 1 263.37 8.94 <.005
I X  R 3.2 1 3.2 < 1
N X  R 2.42 1 2.42 < 1
I X  N X  R 6.35 1 6.35 < 1
R X  Ss within groups 736.83 25 29.47
Total 57
TABLE 9; 7 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS
OF EGO-STRENGTH SCORES
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between 45
Ego-strength 9.55 2 4.78 < 1
Ss within groups 440.17 43 10.24
Within 46
Type of Reinforcement (R) 443.62 1 443.62 17.79 <.005
Es X  C 78.44 2 39.22 1.57
R X  Ss within groups 1071.97 43 24.93
Total 91
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eventually classified as "aware**. However, if it did not 
elicit a correct description the following questions were 
asked.
2. "Were you aware of any pattern in what was happening in 
the experiment?.
3. "Did you notice any relationship between what was on the 
screen and what was on the counters?"
Most Ss had formed some kind of hypothesis, or tested 
out some strategy. If it had not been the "right" one Ss 
were aware of it and would add something like: "But it
didn't work", or "It worked for a while and then started to 
go wrong", to their descriptions.
Results
The mean scores on the EPI scales for the present sample 
were comparable with those of the previous experiments: E 11.7
(S.D. 4o55), N 9.65 (S.D. 5.6). The mean for the Es scale was 
45.09 (S.D. 8.77).
Conditioning
It seems appropriate that the first result to be reported 
should be that dealing with conditioning. The interpretatiop 
of the other results rests, to a considerable extent, on this 
one. If no conditioning had taken place there would be no 
reason to expect the "positive" and "negative" scores to 
reflect anything other than chance variations. On the other 
hand "positive" scores ought to be significantly larger than 
"negative" scores if conditioning had taken place. "Positive" 
scores were found to be significantly larger than "negative" 
scores, (cf. Tables 9:2 - 9:7).
In experiment two the subject”s awareness of the 
prevailing reinforcement contingencies appeared to have no
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TABLE 9:8 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING 'AWARE* WITH"UNAWARE"
Ss USING 'DIFFERENCE' SCORES (REWARD SCORE MINUS
PUNISHMENT SCORE).
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Awareness 1774.801 1 1774.801 133.167 -^.001
Residual 586.417 44 13.328
Total 2361.217 45
TABLE 9: 9 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COFIPARING 'AWARE*AND 'UNAWARE*
Ss IN THEIR TRENDS OF USING THE KEY IN FACE OF CUES OF
REWARD
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Awareness 55.00 1 55.00 8.711 <  .005
Residual 277.804 44 6.314
Total 332.804 45
TABLE 9.10 ANALYSIS OF■ VARIANCE COMPARING 'AWARE*AND 'UNAWARE*
Ss IN TRENDS OF RESPONDING TO CUES OF PUNISHMENT
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Awareness 108.528 1 108.528 25.543 ^ .001
Residual 186.95 44 4.249
Total 295.478 45 6.566
TABLE 9:11 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING REWARD J^SfD :PUNISHMENT
SCORES IN THE 'UNAWARE' GROUP
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Between Ss 330.6 29 11.4 2.724 N.S.
Within Ss 128.0 30 4.267 1.02 N.S.
Type of Reinforcement 6.67 1 6.67 1.59 N.S.
Residual 121.33 29 4.184
Total 458.6 59
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significant effect on the degree to which an individual 
conditioned. Here, however, a significant difference was 
found between Ss classified as "aware" and those classified as 
"unaware". Table 9:8 summarizes the results of an analysis of 
variance where the S's score, ("positive" score minus "negative" 
score), was used as the dependent variable. The "aware" Ss 
display the superior conditioning.
This measure, of course, reflects both appetitive 
and aversive conditioning. The same story emerges, however, 
if we look, instead, at the trend of responding in the reward 
(Table 9:9) and punishment (Table 9:10) conditions separately.
The "aware" Ss still appear to show superior conditioning.
In fact, when these subjects were excluded from the analysis, 
leaving only the "unaware" Ss, the significant conditioning 
effect disappeared. (Table 9:11).
At this juncture one might debate whether or not it 
might be desirable to exclude the "unaware" Ss from any further 
analyses, particularly those purporting to test hypotheses 
drawn from the personality theories. Whatever arguements might 
be offered either in favour of, or against, such an exclusion 
such a step proved to be, in practical terms, impossible.
16 Ss (34.78%) were classified as "aware", too few to permit , 
the calculation of any meaningful analyses after Ss were 
allocated to the various personality groups.
Eysenck
As can be seen (Tables 9:2 - 9:6) the interaction 
between introversion - extraversion and type of reinforcement 
(E X R) was not found to be significant. It was this interaction 
one would expect to be significant if Eysenck's theory of 
personality were correct. The analyses summarized in Tables 
9:2 to 9 :6 , as has already been remarked, compare "positive" 
with "negative" scores, thus reflecting both appetitive and
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TABLE 9:12 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF "DIFFERENCE* SCORES, Ss
ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI
SCORES ("EXTREME" SCORES ONLY)
Source SpSo DF M.S. F P
Extravers ion (E) 2020500 1 202.500 3.617 <.035*
Neuroticism (N) 147.556 1 147.556 2.635
E X N 87,774 1 87.774 1.568
Residual 1119.808 20 55.99
Total 1377.833 23
* 1 tailed
TABLE 9:13 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF "DIFFERENCE® SCORES. Ss
ALLOCATED TO PERSONAL GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 63.626 1 63.626 1.231 N.S.
Neuroticism (N) 29.034 1 29.034 0.562
E X N 4.355 1 4.355 0.084
Residual 2171.238 42 51.696
Total 2286.978 45
TABLE 9:14 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTRAST IN REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
TRENDS IN THE USE OF THE RESPONSE KEY, Ss ALLOCATED TO
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF jEPI SCORES
(EXTREME SCORES ONLY)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 52.900 1 52.900 3.457 <.05*
Neuroticism (N) 15.577 1 15.577 1.018
E X N 17.88 1 17.88 1.168
Residual 306.033 20 15.320
Total 363.958 23
* 1 tailed
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aversive conditioning. When the difference between these two 
scores, rather than the magnitude of the scores, was used as 
the dependent variable then the tendency towards significance, 
apparent in Table 9:3, was found to be fully significant,
(p <  .035, 1 tailed). (Table 9:12). These two analyses, 
(summarised in Tables 9:3 & 9:12), include data only from Ss 
scoring half a standard deviation or more from the mean, "extreme" 
scorers, on the EPI scales. This had the effect of reducing 
the sample size from 46 to 24.
The results of these analyses were in the direction 
predicted by Eysenck. The greater the degree of differential 
responding by the S the larger this "score" will be. The 
means indicate that it was the introverted group which showed 
the greater differentiation between the two sets of cues. The 
group means were as follows: Introverts - 7.727
Extraverts - 3.46 
When all Ss were included, though the mean scores were 
in the same direction the difference between the introverted 
and extraverted groups was no longer significant. The means 
were as follows: Introverts - 5.93
Extraverts - 2.871 
Fig. 9:1 illustrates the differential responding of the 
two groups. After 10 trials both introverts and extraverts were 
using the response key less in the face of reward cues than in 
the face of punishment cues, suggesting that some conditioning 
had already taken place. At this stage there was little 
difference between the two groups in their level of responding, 
however. By the end of the 30 trials per condition the 
introverted group was responding more appropriately to both cues, 
least often in the reward condition and most often in the 
punishment condition. The fact that the introverted group 
displayed steeper slopes in both reward and punishment conditions
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TABLE 9:15 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTRAST IN REWMD .^ND PUNISHMENT
TRENDS IN THE USE OF THE RESPONSE KEY. Ss ALLOCATED TO
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 17.371 1 17.311 0.912
Neuroticism (N) 28.396 1 28.396 1.588
E X  N 3.763 1 3.762 0 . 2 1 1
Residual 750.82 42 17.877
Total 799.304 45
TABLE 9:16 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTRAST IN THE LINEAR TRENDS
OF USING THE RESPONSE KEY. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY
GROUPS Otsf THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES (PUNISHMENT CONDITION)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 25.737 1 25.737 3.811 <.03*
Neuroticism (N) 8.843 1 8.843 1.309
E X  N 12.617 1 12.617 1.868
Residual 283.654 42 6.754
Total 311.413 43
* 1 tailed
TABLE 9:17 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTRAST IN THE LINEAR TRENDS
OF USING THE RESPONSE KEY. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY
GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES (EXTREME SCORES ONLY)
PUNISHMENT CONDITION
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 36.1 1 36.1 4.318 .024*
Neuroticism (N) 7.633 1 7.633 0.913
E X  N 21.337 1 21.337 2.552
Residual 167.208 20 8.36
Total 204.00 23
* 1 tailed
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TABLE: 9:18 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTRAST IN THE LINEAR TRENDS 
IN THE USE OF THE RESPONSE KEY. Ss ALLOCATED TO 
PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES 
REWARD CONDITION
Source S. S. DF M.S.
Extraversion (E) 
Neuroticism (N)
E X N 
Residual
0.82 1 
13.772 1
0.681 1 
290.778 42
0.82
13.772
0.681
6.923
0.118
1.989
0.098
Total 317.935 45
TABLE 9:19 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTRAST IN THE LINEAR TRENDS IN 
THE USE OF THE RESPONSE KEY. Ss ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY
GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES (EXTREME SCORES ONLY)
REWARD CONDITION
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 1.6 1 1.6 0.338
Neuroticism (N) 1.969 1 1.969 0.415
E X N 0.058 1 0.058 0.012
Residual 94.8 20 4.74
Total 103.833 23
TABLE 9:20 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PUNISHMENT SCORES. Ss 
ALLOCATED TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF 
EPI SCORES (EXTREME SCORES ONLY)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 60.143 1 60.143 4.016 <.05
Neuroticism (N) 41.377 1 41.377 2.3
E X N 22.562 1 22.562 1.28
Residual 359.5 20 17.975
Total 23
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TABLE 9:21 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE REWARD SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
(EXTREME SCORES ONLY)
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 20.06 1 20.06 1.19
Neuroticism (N) 0.66 1 0.66 < 1
E X  N 21.72 1 21.72 1.29
Residual 336.105 20 16.805
Total 7899 23
TABLE 9:23 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF "TOTAL® SCORES. Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 48.188 1 48.188 2.492
Neuroticism (N) 8.832 1 8.832 0.457
E X  N 71.651 1 71.651 3.705 0.058
Residual 812.135 42 19.337
Total 906.804 45 20.151
TABLE 9:24 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF "TOTAL® SCORES Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF SELF-RATINGS OF
IMPULSIVITY AND NEUROTICISM
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Impulsivity (I) 56.467 1 56.467 2.588
Neuroticism (N) 11.929 1 11.929 0.547
I X  N 118.823 1 118,823 5.446 0.023
Residual 916.362 42 21.818
Total 1068.609 45 23.747
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was reflected in the significant difference found between the 
introverted and extraverted groups when the two trends are 
constrasted, at least when the analysis is limited to "extreme" 
extraverts and introverts. (Table 9:14).
When the two reinforcement conditions were considered 
independently of each other it was found that the introverts 
conditioned significantly more quickly in the punishment 
condition, (Tables 9:16 & 9:17), but not in the reward condition, 
(Tables 9:18 & 9:19), though the results were in the same 
direction in this condition.
These analyses employing the amount of, or trends of, 
responding as the dependent variable reflect all responses 
both those which were effective, i.e. within the 500 msec, 
time limit, and those vdiich were not. Effective responding is 
reflected in the "positive" and "negative" scores. When these 
two were analysed separately and data from only Ss classified 
as extremely introverted and extraverted were included in 
the analysis then we find, once more, that there is a significant 
difference between the introverted and extraverted groups for 
the punishment condition, but not for the reward condition. 
(Tables 9:20 & 9:21)
A similar result was reported in the previous experiment 
and one is tempted to suggest that Eysenck"s contention, that 
introverts display superior conditioning, is limited to 
situations of aversive conditioning. However, if we consider 
the pattern of results, rather than what is found to be 
significant and what is not, we find that Fig. 9:1 seems clearly 
to suggest that the introverted group were displaying superior 
conditioning in both reward and punishment condition. The 
reason for the lack of significance in the reward condition 
seem less likely to be due to a limitation on the part of 
Eysenck’s theory and more likely to be due to a "floor" effect.
00
As can be seen from the figure the mean level of responding 
for the introverted group has dropped to lo8 per ten trials by 
the second epoch (trials 11 to 20) and remain at this level 
for the final epoch*
Alternatively the difference between the two conditions 
might be due to the subjective intensity of the two stimuli.
Though the reward and punishment stimuli were objectively 
equivalent, the gain and loss of 2p, this does not guarantee 
subjective équivalence.
Taking the overall pattern of the results in to 
consideration it must be concluded that Eysenck's theory emerges 
from this experiment with considerable support. Introverts do 
appear to show superior conditionability as compared with extraverts 
It was earlier reported that "aware” Ss were found to 
condition while "unaware" Ss were not, at least not to a 
significant degree. Having now concluded that introverts 
condition more efficiently than extraverts, and bearing in mind 
that in experiment two it was found that there was a greater 
tendency for introverted Ss, than for extraverted Ss, to become 
aware of the prevailing reinforcement contingencies, it seemed 
probable that here, too, we would find this same tendency. This 
was not found to be the case, however. A Chi squared test 
was calculated but no significant difference was found in the 
proportion of introverts and extraverts classified as "aware".
The differences were, however, substantially in the direction 
one might have expected (cf. TABLE 9:22)
TABLE 9:22 "AWARENESS" AS A FUNCTION OF INTROVERSION- 
EXTRAVERSION
Introverts Extraverts
Aware 7 9
Unaware 8 22
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GRAY
Turning from the success of the predictions drawn from 
Eysenck's theory to Gray's theory the story seems to be quite 
different. There is little in the data from this experiment 
which might be construed as supporting Gray's theory. The 
E X R interaction, it has already been remarked, appears to 
support Eysenck rather than Gray. It would be flying in the 
face of the general trend of the results to insist that the 
introverted group displays significantly superior conditioning 
in the aversive condition, and this is as Gray would predict.
The sum of the scores on the two counters reflects the 
number of "successful" responses, i,e. responses made within 
500 msec.s. The more often the response key was used within 
this time limit the smaller this "total" score. On the basis of 
Gray's theory it might be expected that the neurotic introvert, 
the HNLE, group, as it is the group hypothesized as being most 
sensitive to cues of punishment, would use the response key 
most often, and the neurotic extravert, or the stable extravert, 
the HNHE and the LNHE groups, use it the least.
When Ss were allocated to personality groups on the basis 
of their EPI scores, no significant E x N interaction was evident. 
This interaction was, however, found to be significant when S's 
were allocated to personality groups on the basis of their 
own ratings (Tables 9:23 & 9:24). Despite the significance of 
this interaction little support can be gleaned from this result 
in favour of Gray's theory. As predicted the HNLE group, (and 
the HNLImp,) group provided the lowest score, but contrary to 
the predictions of the theory the highest score was provided by 
the LNLE, (and LNLImp.), group, (cf Tables 9:25a & b).
TABLE 25a MEAN "TOTAL SCORES FOR FOUR PERSONALITY GROUPS, Ss
ALLOCATED TO GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR SELF RATINGS,
Introversion Extraversion
LN 32 29.45
HN 27.71 30.8
02
TABLE 25b MEAN "TOTAL” SCORES FOUR HIGH AND LOW, SELF RATED 
IMPULSIVITY AND NEUROTICISM GROUPS
Cantions Impu1s ive
LN 31.55 29.13
HN 27.33 30.7
One might challenge the interpretation of this result 
pointing out that Gray argues, not that the introverted group 
is more sensitive to punishment, but that this group is relatively 
more sensitive to cues of punishment. Ss in this group will, 
therefore, be expected to leam these cues relatively more 
quickly and, in consequence, respond more often in face of such 
cues, rather than, as suggested above, generally using the 
response key more often.
As the E X  N X  R interaction (Tables 9:2 - 9:6) was 
not found to be significant, however, there appears to be no 
support for the hypothesis that the introverted group do : 
leam the cues of punishment more quickly than the cues of 
reward. They do, of course, leam to respnnd to the cues of 
punishment more quickly than the extraverted group.
Nevertheless the point of the analysis of "total" scores 
was that if Gray's theory is correct one might expect different 
pattems of errors from those who are differentially more sensitive 
to cues of reward and those differentially more sensitive to 
cues of punishment. The latter group might be expected to 
make more errors of commission, resulting in a lower "total" 
score; the former group more errors of omission, resulting in a 
larger "total" score. However, as already reported despite the 
fact that a significant E x N interaction was found when these 
scores were analysed, the pattem of results does not provide 
any support for the hypotheses drawn from Gray^s theory.
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table 9:26 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE No. OF TIMES DIFFERENT
PERSONALITY GROUPS PRSSS THE RESPONSE KEY.Ss ALLOCATED
TO PERSONALITY GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF EPI SCORES
(EXTREME SCORES ONLY).
Source S.S. DF M.S. F P
Extraversion (E) 4.9 1 4.9 0.225
Neuroticism (N) 142.277 1 142.277 6.544 0.018
E X N 2.199 1 2.199 0.101
Residual 434.833 20 21.742
Total 662 23
TABLE 9:n  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF NUMBER OF TIMES THE THREE
EGO-STRENGTH GROUPS USE THE RESPONSE KEY
Source S.S. DF M.S.
Ego-strength 206.464 2 103.232 2.604 .05*
High Es Vs. Low Es 127.864 1 127.864 3.225 <  .05*
Residual 1704.688 43 39.644
Total 1911.152 45
1 tailed
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NEUROTICISM
In none of the analyses reported has any difference been 
found between LN and HN, or LEs and HEs, groups. Thus the 
theories of Gray, Spence and Roessler all failed to find 
confirriiation of their hypotheses in the present experiment.
When all responses are included in the analyses, rather 
than only those made within the 500 msec, time limit, a 
significant difference was found between high and low : - 
neuroticism, and high and low Es groups. (Tables 9s26 & 27). 
When the analysis was limited to Ss at the extremes of the 
personality dimension it was.found that HN Ss, and LEs Ss, used 
the response key significantly more often than the LN and
HEs groups. The means for these groups were as follows:
HN - 28.07, LEs - 28.36
LN - 21.9 HEs - 23.57
These differences may of course, be due to any one of a 
number of factors e.g. slower RTs on the part of the HN and LEs 
groups, maladaptive responding, slow decision making, the 
inability to inhibit a response. The data are not available, 
here, which would allow one to choose between the alternatives 
with any confidence. It is, however, worth noting that these 
results may be seen as being in line with those reported by 
Elias (1965) and briefly outlined in the introduction to this 
experiment.
CORRELATIONS
Despite the significant differences found between the 
introverted and extraverted groups EPI E scores were not found 
to correlate significantly with either the "positive" score,
(r = -.166), or the"negative" score (r = .0809). These 
correlations are, however, in the direction predicted by Eysenck, 
rather than that predicted by Gray's theory.
3 0 5
If there were a general factor of conditionability one 
would expect these two indices, the "positive" and "negative" 
scores, to correlate substantially with each other. The 
correlation observed, however, was -.251 (p <  .05, 1 tailed), 
which though significant can hardly be regarded as impressive.
It was found in the previous experiment that Ss \dio 
rated themselves as high on neuroticism also tended to rate 
themselves as inconsistent. This finding was not replicated 
here, as can be' seen from Table 9:28
TABLE 9:28 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EPI AND SELF RATED N AND 
SELF RATED CONSISTENCY
EPI N SELF RATED N
Rated consistency of
extraversion -.069 -.076
Rated consistency of
impulsivity -.124 -.022
Rated consistency of
nuuroticism -.207 -.251
The consistency scores were not found to intercorrelate in the 
previous experiment and it was then suggested that, at least 
for self rated consistency, consistency might be regarded as 
being trait specific. This result was not replicated here.' 
Self rated consistency scores were found to correlate moderately 
well with each other in the present experiment (cf. Table 9:29).
TABLE 9:29 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RATINGS OF CONSISTENCY
1. Rated consistency for extraversion
2. Rated consistency for impulsivity
3. Rated consistency for neuroticism
1.00
.467
.45
1.00
.404 1.00
(p ^.006 for all correlations)
(TABLE 9:30 provides a full correlation matrix)
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9DISCUSSION
. 0 8
One might regard the present experiment as testing 
hypotheses at three distinct levels* At the most fundamental 
level the aim was to produce a predictability in behaviour 
by systematically associating certain outcomes with specified 
cues - to condition a response. At the next level interest 
was focused on the differential success of conditioning with 
relation to certain personality dimensions. At the third 
level the pattern of this differential conditionability as 
compared to the pattern in the previous experiment was the 
focus of interest.
At the first level a clear and significant effect 
was observed, Ss used the response key more often within 500 msec.s 
of the onset of the stimulus when it was a cue of punishment than 
when it was a cue of reward. In other words Ss learned to 
gain rewards by inhibiting a response and to avoid punishments 
by responding. Most Ss who applied this strategy successfully 
were aware of the reinforcement contingencies obtaining in 
the present situation and as a result a significant 
difference was found in the behaviour of Ss classified as 
"aware" and those classified as "unaware". No such difference 
was found between Ss classified in this way in the previous 
experiment, it may be recalled. This difference is not so 
surprising, however, as in the present experiment a voluntary 
response was conditioned, while the perceptual defense and 
sensitization of the last experiment are, presumably, 
involuntary responses. In the present experiment the S had 
to make a decision on each trial whether or not to use the 
response key to prevent the counters increasing. If he chose 
not to use the key feedback was immediately available as to 
the appropriateness of the choice. It seems certain that if 
a S hit upon the correct strategy, in this situation, he
3 0 9
would immediately become aware of it.
It seemed, watching the Ss, that, for most of those 
who became aware of the reinforcement contingencies, the 
"correct" response was made on several trials and then, 
suddenly, he/she became aware of what was happening, after 
which no more errors were made.
This was not the universal rule, however. One S 
simply watched the counters and syllables for several trials, 
making no attempt to respond. After he had "solved the problem" 
he responded on every trial "correctly". This, of course, 
is the most appropriate way to behave, for only by refraining 
from responding is new information available. It is 
appropriate, however, only if one wishes to gain the reward, 
if avoiding punishment is upper most in ones mind using the 
key on every trial would be the most "appropriate" behaviour.
It is possible that this S should have been excluded 
from the analyses, but he was not. Such an exclusion would 
have been equivalent to accepting the proposition that 
conditioning is a mechanical process and occurs without 
awareness. It was not desired to espouse any position on 
the learning with/without awareness controversy. Though 
this S may have contributed some artifactual error in a 
"pure" study of conditioning. It was felt that no such 
artifact was present . in this situation where one 
wants to generalize the results to the type of learning 
described by Bandura (1977), and Mischel (1973) and outlined 
in Chapter 2. If different personality groups "learn" in 
different ways then it seems appropriate to include all such 
variance, rather than to exclude it and be left with a 
relatively pure measure which reflects the learning strategy 
or processes of only a small proportion of individuals.
Turning to the next level, the differential
10
conditioning of various personality groups, it is Eysenck's 
theory which emerges with the honours. This theory predicts 
that, given that certain parameters are employed introverts 
will show superior conditionability as compared with 
extraverts. Significant differences were found between the 
introverted and extraverted groups, at least the more extreme 
scoring introverts and extraverts, when the difference between 
the "positive" and "negative" scores were compared for these 
two groups. These two groups also displayed significantly 
different trends across the 30 trials per condition in the 
use of the response key in the face of the two sets of 
syllables, cues of punishment and of reward. The differences 
were always in the direction predicted by the Eysenckian model. 
Similarly "extreme" introverts were found to have significantly 
lower "punishment" scores than "extreme" extraverts.
Whereas the introverts had the higher score in the reward 
condition, though not, this time, to a significant degree.
As pointed out in the results section, once again 
there is a suggestion that the introverted group do condition 
better when an aversive stimulus is employed. It seems 
possible, on the basis of the present data at least, however, 
to distinguish between the two possibilities (a) the 
introverted group are more sensitive to cues of punishment 
than they are to cues of reward, or (b) the aversive stimulus 
used here is more aversive than the appetitive was rewarding. 
The problem was given some thought when the experiment was 
designed, and it was for this reason that the reward and 
punishment stimuli were made objectively equivalent, either 
the gain or loss of 2p. Yet somehow it seems that losses 
are more salient than gains. Perhaps the subjective 
experiences of gaining and losing objectively equal amounts 
are never equal, merely that they are "less unequal" for some
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groups than for others.
I might, at this stage, be accused of being an apologist 
for the Eysenckian model, and attempting to obscure the 
fact that the results, at least partially, confirm the 
predictions of Gray. On the one hand we have the introverts 
conditioning significantly better than the extraverts in the 
aversive conditioning situation, as Gray's model predicts, 
while in the reward condition no significant difference
between the groups is found, suggesting that either the 
extravert group is showing better conditioning, in this 
situation, or the introverted group worse. Whichever of these 
suggestions is true it may be interpreted as supporting Gray's 
model.
While these observations are true, in as far as they 
go, they do not really go far enough. It has already been 
noted that the real reason there is no significant differences 
between the introvert and extraverted groups in the reward 
condition might be that there is a "floor" effect distorting 
the results, to some degree, in this condition, (cf. Fig 9:1)
From Fig. 9:2 it can be seen that the results are not
at all as Gray would predict. It is the HNHE group vhich 
uses the response key most often in face of the punishment ' 
and the LNLE group who use it least in face of the reward 
cue. In as far as these data can be regarded as reflecting 
conditioning, as they employ responses both within and out 
side the 500 msec.s time limit, it appears that the LNHE group 
show no real evidence of conditioning in either condition, 
while the HNHE group conditions more effectively in the 
punishment, than in the reward condition. None of this is 
predictable on the basis of Gray's theory.
The same story appears to be told if the group scores
for - . "reward" and "punishment" . are compared:
o13
TABLE 9:32. GROUPS MEANS FOR "REWARD" AND "PUNISHMENT" SCORES
INTROVERTS EXTRAVERTS
Reward Punishment Reward Punishment 
LN 19.4 11.2 15.6 16.4
HN 17.8 10.5 17.9 11.8
If individuals are responding at a chance level we 
would expect the score to be not significantly different 
from 15. If conditioning were taking place we would expect 
a score lower than 15 in the punishment condition, and 
greater than 15 in the reward condition. As can be seen in 
both conditions the LNHE group give mean scores of 
approximately 15. In the punishment condition the rank 
order is HNLE LNLE HNHE LNHE. In the reward condition 
the rank order is LNLE HNHE HNLE LNHE. These results 
really cannot be viewed as supporting Gray's model.
At first sight it might appear that this experiment 
is not quite a fair test of Gray's theory. In the aversive 
condition an active avoidance response is required and it was 
earlier pointed out that the theory clearly predicts that 
introverts show superior conditioning of passive avoidance. 
Nevertheless the introverts here show the superior 
conditioning, and it was argued that where mildly aversive 
stimuli are employed it might be justifiable to expect the 
introverted group to condition better than the extraverted 
group in both active and passive avoidance conditions.
It is the reward condition which highlights another 
potential weakness of the theory. From the model presented 
by Gray we expect the extraverted group to condition more 
efficiently to all cues of reward. The model assumes, however, 
that these rewards are obtained as the result of some activity.
14
The reward side of the model does not have access to the 
inhibitory mechanism, this is controlled by the punishment 
side of the model. In the present experiment, however, reward 
is obtained only by inhibiting a response. What is to be 
predicted? Is it the Ss with the differentially more 
sensitive reward mechanisms or those who are better at 
passive avoidance who display the superior conditioning in 
this type of situation? The data here suggests that it is the 
latter, in which case Grays model needs to be modified. If
it is the former then the hypothesis is not confirmed. In
either case Gray's model emerges from this experiment both 
needing modification and being more limited in its predictions 
than was at first thought.
In the effort to relate the findings of the present 
experiment to some theoretical model we must not miss a 
point which is emerging as a rather consistent effect that 
the LNHE group, the stable extraverts, seems to demonstrate 
especially poor conditionability. It is also note worthy 
that if both the theories of Eysenck and Spence were correct 
it would be this group with its low cortical excitation 
and its low drive which would be expected to show the 
poorest conditionability.
There is, however, no other support evident in 
these data which might be construed as confirming Spence's 
position. Indeed the only significant difference found 
between LN and HN groups, or between high and low Es groups, 
was found in the number of times the response key was used.
As there were no differences between high and low neuroticism 
or Es, groups in respect of the "Total" score this significant 
result must indicate that the HN Ss used the response key 
more often than the LN Ss after the 500 msec, time limit had 
expired.
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One might regard this as an example of maladaptive 
responding, at least to the degree that until one knows the 
reinforcement contingencies, by using the response key one 
loses information. One knows before hand that neither counter 
will increase after the response key has been used. On the 
other hand, as already remarked, if avoiding punishment is 
uppermost in ones mind then pressing the response key may 
not be at all maladaptive. One might be willing to interpret 
this result as being in line with Roessler*s hypothesis that 
low Es individuals behave in a generally more defensive manner, 
if this group had used the response key more often than the 
high Es group both during and after the 500 msec, time limit, 
rather than only after the 500 msec, time limit had expired, 
the suggestion that neurotic Ss have slower RTs might be more 
tenable if they had used the response key less often than the 
LN Ss within the time limit, but they did not.
One solution to the problem might be that the HN, 
and LEs, Ss are generally more responsive but have slower RTs, 
on average. This solution is not likely to be true, however, 
for although 500 msec.s cannot be called a long time it is 
much longer than most RTs. The problem might be, of course, 
that the S not only had to make a simple response, but pripr 
to that had to make a decision about whether or not to make 
the response at all. Perhaps the HN and LEs groups were 
slower in making this decision, but are also inclined to be 
more responsive.
This explanation is not really satisfactory.
One would expect slow decision makers to be less successful, 
and there is no evidence here, or in the previous experiments, 
that this is the case. An alternative is that the HN and 
LEs individuals simply have difficulty in inhibiting responses. 
In the present experimental situation this "difficulty" may be
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obviated by simply delaying the response, rather than 
inhibiting it totally. Though the data are not available 
here to chose between these alternative suggestions this last 
one does at least have the advantage that it corresponds with 
the commonly held view of the "nervous" person as being 
"jumpy" and "full of nervous energy." It also fits the 
pattern of results reported in the introduction from 
Elias (1965). In Elias' experiment while "irrelevant" 
responses were found to extinguish from low anxiety Ss, 
they were found to increase over trials for the high anxiety 
Ss.
Turning now to the general pattern of results, it was 
suggested at the end of the previous experiment that theories 
may not have the generalized predictive ability they are 
often assummed to have, but are limited, in their predictive 
ability, to particular types of situation. This type of 
arguement in turn led to the question of whether or not there 
was a single generalized factor of conditionability.
Theories such as Eysenck's suggest that there is such 
a factor. At least to the degree that the results of the 
previous experiment were explicable in terms of his theory 
and the predictions drawn from his theory were confirmed in 
the present experiment, it seems that his contention is 
supported. However, if there is such a factor, and, as 
Eysenck maintains, the introversion - extraversion factor is 
related to it, why have predictions drawn from the theory 
fared so poorly in the present series of experiments \dien 
the experiments were designed specifically to demonstrate the 
superior conditioning of the introverted group?
Even in the present experiment the two conditioning 
indices, the "reward" and "punishment" scores were not found 
to correlate significantly with the introversion-extraversion
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dimension. Indeed, the correlation between these two indices, 
though significant (-.251, p <.05, 1 tailed), is hardly of 
the magnitude to persuade one they reflected the same general 
factor.
Several authors have commented on this problem.
Morgenson and Martin (1969), for example, reported a factor 
analytic study by Prescott (1964) in \diich it was found that 
(a) there was no relationship between the conditioning of 
electrodermal activity(EDA) and introversion-extraversion, 
and (b) that the various methods of measuring EDA conditioning 
were independent.
Davidson et al (1964) reported that conditioned EDA 
and conditioned finger withdrawal did not correlate in 
normal Ss.
In a study by Mangan (1974) which looked at EDA 
conditioning to slides of nude females, and also at the 
orienting response (OR), the initial amplitude of the response, 
sensitivity and habituation rate in the tactile, visual and 
auditory modalities, spiral after effect, sex drive and 
imagery in a factor analytic study, he concluded: "Under
the present experimental conditions, it is clear that the 
psychophysiological variables are the most important sources 
of individual differences in the acquisition and extinction of 
sexual CRs, and that cognitive and personality variables 
are largely irrelevant", (p.134)
Eysenck, himself, has considered the problem and 
observes that "the results (of correlational studies) between 
different types of conditioning are relatively low and may 
even be near zero." (1965, p.267). He even quotes Moore 
and Marcuse (1945) as arguing that "the concept of good and 
bad conditioners must always be with reference to a 
particular response".
However, Eysenck argues that peripheral factors must 
also be taken into account and their influence partialled out. 
Parameters of theoretical relevance must also be adequately 
controlled, of course.
Following the same line of reasoning Lovibond (1964) 
has listed four factors which may attenuate the observed 
correlations:
(i) variability in peripheral response mechanism sensitivity;
(ii) non — associative contamination of conditioning measures.
"To the extent that non'-associative factors not highly 
correlated with conditionability enter differentially 
into various types of conditioning measures, the observed 
relationships between the measures will be spuriously 
low", (p.142)
(iii) Central set influences in conditioning measures.
(iv) Procedural variations in conditioning; this is particularly 
important where the parameters, suggested by the theory
to be of some relevance, are not adhered to.
Davidson et al (1964), using university students as Ss 
found no relationship between EDA conditioning and finger 
withdrawal, as has already been reported. However, in a 
later study (1966) which used hospitalized female neurotics ^ 
as Ss the same two measures were found to be significantly 
related. Following up these findings (1968) they concluded 
that the rate of conditioning was specific to the response 
studied for "normal" Ss. However, in the neurotic group 
conditionability is found to be rather more generalized.
These results are strangely reminiscent of those reported by 
Raush and Moos vhen looking at personal consistency. There 
it was found that the person was often a more important 
source of variance than the situation for the clinical groups. 
Davidson et al concluded: "In view of the disparate
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nature of the eyeblink conditionability in normals, the 
positive results relating eyeblink conditioning to personality 
measures become rather trivial and isolated findings and the 
theories predicting these relationships lose much of their 
heuristic importance."
Mangan (1974) makes a similar point. The Eysenck 
and Levey (1972) paper confirms the predictions of the theory, 
he concedes. Does it, he questions, necessarily support 
Eysenck's position on the relationship between the assume I. 
neurological differences and observed behaviour, "since there are 
no grounds for assumming that 'under-arousing' conditions 
favouring introverts are more likely to be encountered during 
the course of development than 'over-arousing' conditions." (p.126) 
He goes on to point out that personality accounts for only a 
small percentage of the reliable variance observed in his 
experiment, despite the fact that extremes of the personality 
dimension were used. "On this evidence," he says, "the 
infered neurological processes hardly qualify as critical 
determinants of personality organization." (p.126)
Franks (1964), seems no more hopeful that a general 
factor will be demonstrated, despite the fact that data from 
.his earlier experiments are often quoted in support of Eysenck's 
position. Commenting on a paper by Livingston (1964) he said 
"In the absense of a general factor of conditionability over 
and above specific factors pertaining to variables such as 
those listed above, the need for precision in replication 
becomes paramount. Even if a general factor (or factors) 
could be demonstrated, the need for precise replication would 
assume importance inversely to the amount of variance 
accounted for by the general factor in the specific 
conditioning situation under examination. Unfortunately, there 
is no evidence of a general factor, precise replication of
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circumstances known to be pertinent is difficult, many factors 
are little understood and some unknown." (1964. p.550)
The present experiment employed a paradigm quite 
different from that normally employed when testing hypotheses 
drawn from Eysenck's theory, yet the theory still received 
substantial support. It would be wrong, however, to attempt 
to argue from this that, contrary to the views of the various 
authors cited above, these results indicate that a general factor 
of conditionability exists. Taking the results of this 
experiment together with those of experiments one and two, 
Eysenck's theory has received little convincing support.
The difficulty in reliably eliciting superior conditioning from 
the introverted group suggests rather that, as Managan pointed 
out, there may be some truth in the theory, one might even 
claim that it has some generality, but the proportion of 
variance in conditioning contributed by the introversion- 
extraversion dimension is usually small, even trivial, and as 
a consequence of this the theory loses its heuristic value.
If this conclusion is correct then Eysenck's theory loses its 
value as a framework which might be used to unite the 
idiographic and nomothetic approaches. One might even go 
further and suggest that as the indices of appetitive and 
aversive conditioning showed such a poor correlation no theory 
which assumes a single general factor of conditionability will, 
ultimately, be found to be useful. Gray's theory, of course, 
does not assume such a single factor, but no evidence has been 
found, as yet, which may be regarded as supporting this theory.
In summary then the prediction drawn from Eysenck's 
theory that, given appropriate conditions, introverts will 
display better conditioning than extraverts has been confirmed, 
though rather more strongly in aversive than in appetitive 
conditioning. Despite this confirmation, however, the
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correlations between the measure of introvers ion-extravers ion 
and the conditioning indices were non-significant suggesting 
that this dimension contributes but a small amount of the 
variance observed in conditioning. Indeed, considering the 
size of the correlation between the "reward” and "punishment" 
scores it was questioned vdiether one could assume there was 
any general factor of conditionability.
If the support for Eysenck's theory was equivocal then 
the other theories considered, those of Gray, Spence and 
Roessler, fared even worse for they received no support at all. 
Though as in the previous experiment the stable extravert group 
(LNHE) were found not to display any evidence of conditioning.
Ss high in neuroticism, or low in Ego-strength were 
found to use the response key more often than stable, or 
high Es, Ss but only after the 500 msec, time limit had 
expired. It was suggested that this might be because these 
Ss have difficulty in inhibiting a response. It was also 
suggested that this result might be seen as consonant with 
that reported by Elias (1965).
The finding reported in the previous experiment that 
rated consistency was related to rated neuroticism was not 
replicated in the present experiment. In the last experiment 
it was suggested that the consistency ratings indicated that, 
at least for rated consistency, the trait specific rather than 
the generalized factor approach might be correct. In the 
present experiment these results were reversed, the three 
consistency ratings correlating moderately well with each other.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The general bias of the speculation put forward so far 
is that individuals do not display an absolute consistency in 
their behaviour, and in consequence an adequate appreciation of
the individual must wait upon an idiographic description, 
particularly one which gives pride of place to the individual's 
learning history.
At the same time traits are seen as useful general 
descriptive terms. It was suggested that some traits might be 
substantially more important than others. If a trait could be 
identified which was more, or less, closely identifiable with a 
general factor of conditionability, then, it was argued, such a 
trait might be used as the basis of a theory which integrated 
both the idiographic and nomothetic approaches to personality 
study. The final form, and ultimate utility, of the theory would 
depend on the characteristics, particularly physiological 
characteristics, associated with the conditionability factor.
Two theories were seen as particularly promising 
because, besides relating a personality trait to conditionability, 
they also provided a physiological underpinning to explain the 
differential conditionability. These two theories were
expounded by Eysenck and Gray. The first experiment reported
here asked, simple mindedly, as these two theories predicted 
that different groups of individuals will condition more 
efficiently, which is correct? The answer was not simple.
The data were not clear cut, but if any group was to be singled 
out as "the good conditioners" it appeared to be the low 
neuroticism group. Not the group either theory predicted.
This first experiment had employed an operant paradigm 
and a social reinforcer. The same question was asked again in 
experiment 2 , but this time using a classical conditioning 
paradigm and physical reinforcement. This time the effect of 
conditioning was clear, but the low neuroticism group was no 
longer found to be identified with efficient conditioning. 
Eysenck's theory received only the most tentative support and 
Gray's none at all. The data suggested that rated consistency 
might, on one hand, be trait specific and, on the other hand be
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related to neuroticism.
The original simple question was fading. Perhaps, it was 
speculated, as individuals condition efficiently enough, the 
trait dimensions are limited in their importance to specific 
situations. Experiment 3 used the operant paradigm again, 
but this time with physical reinforcement. Again there 
was a clear conditioning effect. Eysenck's theory received 
considerable support and Gray's none at all. The question 
posed in experiment 1 was, then, eventually answered in 
experiment 3, but the two intervening "failures" pre-empted 
any enthusiastic theory-building.
Behaviour seemed more complex, the results relating 
neuroticism and rated consistency, and the suggestion that 
consistency was trait specific were not replicated. Wlien it 
was asked how important the int r over s ion-extravers ion dimension 
was in determining conditioning, the answer was, "not very".
The results of these experiments seemed to confirm those 
summarized by Lovibond in 1964. He remarked: "Willet (1960)
used the Fisher Z transformation to obtain an estimate of the 
true correlation between eye-blink acquisition score and the E 
scale. The estimate, which was based on the studies of 
Franks (1957), Das (1957), 0'Connor (1959) and Willet (I960)* 
was -.188". (p.119).
In experiment 3 a surprisingly similar correlation was 
found between E and conditioning ("difference" score) of -.1807 
(p = .23). The other correlations were lower; positive 
conditioning and E -.1663 (N.S.); negative conditioning and E 
.08l(N.S.).
The introversion-extraversion dimension, then, seems 
unlikely to be explaining much more than about 4% of the 
variance in conditioning. Even Eysenck does not appear to
324
wish to claim that it contributes substantially more.
Commenting on a paper by Franks (1963) he says, "neither do 
they (the results of the study) disprove the hypothesis under 
investigation, that is, that E and conditioning correlate -.3 
approximately". (1965, p.262).
If extraversion explains such a small percentage of the 
variance in conditioning, and its effect is so easily swamped 
by other variables, then it seems hardly likely that it will 
be found useful as a basis for integrating the idiographic and 
nomothetic approaches. Indeed one might agree with the opinions 
expressed by Davidson et al (1964) and Mangan (1974) when they 
observe that if one needs to establish such precise conditions 
before predictions from Eysenck's theory can be confirmed, 
and if even then the extraversion dimension accounts for only 
a small proportion of the observed variance, then the theory 
loses much of its heuristic value, and hardly qualifies as a 
critical determinant of personality organization.
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CHAPTER X: EXPERIMENT 4
10:1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The present study is concerned with the question of 
whether or not it is possible to predict that certain 
groups of people will commit certain mistakes. The study 
is divided into three quite distinct parts.
The first part, experiment 4a, follows up the 
suggestion made in discussing the results of the last 
experiment, that perhaps high N scoring individuals have 
difficulty in inhibiting responses.
The second section, experiment 4b, looks at the 
possibility of identifying Ss who have a tendency to make 
errors of commission. It is speculated that the nervous 
system property of mobility and/or perseveration may be 
related to such a tendency.
The third section of the study used data drawn from 
the two early sections to question an assumption inherent 
in them both, and which was challenged in earlier chapters: 
that individuals are relatively consistent in their behaviour.
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10:2: EXPERIMENT 4A
Introduction
It was found in the previous experiment, experiment 3, 
that the HN group tended to respond after the time limit 
for effective responding had expired. As this group was no 
more, or less, successful than the LN group at the task in 
hand it was suggested that one possible explanation for this 
phenomenon might be that the HN individual experiences 
difficulty in inhibiting a response. The present experiment 
was designed to put this hypothesis to the test.
On the basis of the results reported by Elias (1965) 
one might suggest that in the normal course of events the 
HN individual is especially prone to develop more than one 
response to any given stimulus, with the result that he never 
finds himself in the position of having to inhibit, completely, 
all tendency to respond; one response - though in an 
experimental situation, not necessarily the one recorded by 
the experimenter - will always be available and permissible.
This being the case the HN S, in experiment 3, may well have 
found it "easier" to delay a response for around 200 msec.s 
than to inhibit it altogether.
One might extend this hypothesis and suggest that the 
HN individual represents one end of a dimension. Individuals 
at this, HN, end of the dimension while being ill suited for 
situations which require the ability to readily inhibit responses, 
are ideally suited for certain other situations. Individuals 
at the opposite end of the dimension are similarly well 
suited to some, but poorly suited to other situations.
Perhaps rather than talking about situations one ought to 
refer to strategies of coping in, or dealing with, situations. 
Thus the two extreme groups would be ideally suited to employ 
certain strategies of coping, but rather poorly suited to
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others, while individuals situated at the mid-point of such 
a dimension might be able to utilize all coping strategies 
with moderate success.
One might argue that such a dimension made more 
"biological sense" than the more traditional view which 
places the neurotic or anxious individual at one end of the 
dimension, with his "typical" behaviour having a distinctly 
maladaptive flavour, with the stable individual at the other 
end of the dimension being eminently well adjusted - a 
state of affairs which leads one to question why natural 
selection does not work against such a maladapted group.
If these suggestions are to any degree correct, in 
the present experiment where the S is required to respond to 
a simple visual stimuli either the more quickly he is 
required to respond, or the more alike the "respond" and 
"do not respond" stimuli are, the more errors of commission 
the HN individuals will make.
HYPOTHESES
It is predicted then^ that as the task becomes more 
difficult errors will be found to increase
Hypothesis 4a:1 There will be a significant location of , 
stimulus effect, with a greater number of
(i) commission errors
(ii) omission errors
being associated with the central position.
Hypothesis 4a:2 There will be a significant rate of
presentation effect with the greater number of
(i) Commission errors
(ii) omission errors
(iii) anticipations
being associated with the faster rate of presentation.
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It is also predicted that errors of commission will 
be associated with the neuroticism dimension.
Hypothesis 4a;3(i)There will be a significant neuroticism 
effect, the LN group making fewer commission errors than the 
HN group.
(ii) N may be found to interact with location of the stimulus, 
little difference between the LN and HN groups at the more 
extreme positions, significant differences at the central position
(iii) N may be found to interact with rate of presentation, 
the more pronounced differences between the LN and HN groups 
being evident at the faster rate of presentation.
(iv) N may be found to interact with both rate of presentation (s) 
and location of stimulus (p) i.e. N x S x P. The most 
pronounced differences between the LN and HN groups occuring at 
the faster rate of presentation in the central position.
10:3 METHOD 
Design
The stimulus used in this experiment was a single point 
of light. This could appear, on each trial, in any one of 
6 positions along the horizontal mid-line of an osciloscope 
screen. These positions were as follows: 1.637 cms to the
left (central left) or right (central right), 4.91 cms to the 
left (middle left)or to the right (middle right), or 8.185 cms 
to the left (extreme left) or to the right (extreme right) of 
the vertical mid-line of the osciloscope screen.
Neither horizontal nor vertical mid-line was marked on the 
screen. Dots appeared one at a time and randomly with respect 
to position, with the restriction that dots appeared 20 times 
in each of the 6 available locations. Thus there were 120 
trials per run.
Each S completed two runs, each one of 120 trials.
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In one of these stimuli were presented at a rate of 1 per 
500 msecoS, this was the "Fast" condition. In the "slow" 
condition stimuli were presented at a rate of 1 per second.
These two conditions were presented in random order across Ss.
The S*s task was to respond whenever the dot was to 
the left, (to the right for 50% of Ss), of centre, and to 
refrain from responding when ever it was to the right (left for 
50% of Ss)o
Ss responded to the same side in both conditions, "Fast" 
and "Slow".
The following data were collected for each location 
on each trial:
(i) The response latency
(ii) If a response was made, whether or not it was correct
or an error of commission.
(iii) if no response had been made, whether or not this was
correct, or an error of omission
(iv) responses of less than 100 msec.s were classified as 
anticipatory responses.
Ss were allocated to personality groups on the basis 
of their EPl scores. The same criterion being used as in
earlier experiments. This gave a 4 way factorial design for
both commission and omission errors: two levels of E, two
levels of N, two rates of presentation and three locations.
Procedure
60 Ss took part in this experiment, but two of these 
were excluded from the analyses. The data of one of these
Ss was lost due to a computer failure, the other S failed to
complete the personality questionnaires.
All Ss were either students or academic staff of the 
university, all were volunteers. Ss of both sexes were
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included in the experiment.
The presentation of stimuli was controlled by, and 
data were recorded by, computer. Ss were seated in front 
of a teletype approximately 4ft from an osciloscope screen.
This screen was 4ft 8 ins from the floor and measured 21.6 x 
17 cms.
The subject was instructed as follows:
"Points of light, dots, will appear one at a time along 
this (the horizontal) midline. What I’d like you to do is to < 
press this bar, (the space bar), as quickly as you can whenever the 
dot is to the left (right) of centre»! The centre will not be 
marked you’ll have to judge where it is yourself".
The two conditions, "fast" and"slow", were presented 
in random order across Ss. On the second run the S was 
warned, as appropriate, that the rate of presentation would be 
faster, or slower than in the previous run.
A tone sounded 7 sec.s before the first stimulus 
appeared on the screen.
All Ss also completed the EPl (Form A), the Es scale 
and the self-rating scale which had been used in experiments 2 
and 3.
10:4 RESULTS
As can be seen from Table 10:1 no differences were found 
between the HN and LN groups, nor was there an interaction 
between neuroticism and the speed of presentation, nor 
neuroticism and the location of the stimulus; nor was the 
three way interaction found to be significait. It seems,
therefore, that the proposed hypothesis has received no support.
It was suspected at one stage that no significant 
difference would be found simply because few commission errors
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TABLE 10:1 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING
COMMISSION ERROR DATA
Source SS D.F. M.S. F P
Between
Extraversion (E) 0.196 1 0.196 <  1
Neuroticism (N) 0.48 1 0.48 <  1
E X  N 4.294 1 4.294 2.836 <.l
Subject within cells 83.265 55 1.514
Within
Location of Stimulus (P) 42.706 2 21.353 20.996 <  .001
E X  P 0.828 2 0.414 <  1
N X  P 0.423 2 0.211 •<1
E X  N X  P 6.549 2 3.275 3.22 <.05
P X  Subject within cells 111.85 110 1.017
Rate of Presentation (S) 13.29 1 13.29 7.831 < . 0 1
E X S 0.196 1 0.196 < 1
N X  S 1.833 1 1.833 < 1
E X  N X  S 0 1 0 ^ 1
S X  Subject within cells 93.33 55 1.697
S X  P 1.775 2 0.888 <  1
E X  S X  P 2.02 2 1.01 ^ 1
N X  S X  P 2.98 2 1.49 < 1
E X  N X  S X  P 7.608 2 3.804
S X  P X  Subject within
cells 249.25 110 2.266
TOTAL 353
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were being made, but as can be seen from Table 10:1 this can 
be or cannot be the explanation for this lack of significance, 
as both the speed of presentation (p<.01) and location 
of the stimulus (p<.001) were found to have a significant 
effect on the number of errors of commission made.
Both these results were found to be in the predicted 
direction. As can be seen from Fig. 10:1 the nearer the 
stimulus was to the centre of the screen, i.e. the more like 
the "respond" signal the "non-respond" signal was, the more 
likely it was that an error of commission would be made.
These two variables were not found to interact, 
however, the increase in speed affected performance at all 
locations to about the same extent.
Despite the fact that neither the introversion- 
extraversion nor the neuroticism dimensions were found to be 
significant, the E x N interaction did approach significance.
(p <..1, 2 tailed)
TABLE 10:2 COMMISSION ERRORS AS A FUNCTION OF EXTRAVERSION 
AND NEUROTICISM
LN 0.73 0.95
HN 1.1 0.9
As can be seen from the means presented in Table 10:2 
the most substantial difference appears to be between the LN 
and HN groups, but only for introverted Ss. This result is, 
for the introverted group, in the direction predicted.
The E X  N X  P interaction was found to reach significance
TABLE 10:3 COMMISSION ERRORS AS A FUNCTION OF EXTRAVERSION. 
NEUROTICISM AND LOCATION OF THE STIMULUS
POSITION OF STIMULUS
EXTREME MIDDLE CENTRAL
HEHN 0.5 1 1.58
HELN 0.44 0.78 1.71
LEHN 0.5 0.93 2.0
LELN 0.45 0.57 1.13
It is clear from Table 10:3 that there is no difference 
between groups when the stimulus is at the extreme of the 
screen, i.e. when the "non-respond" and "respond" stimuli are 
maximally dissimilar. However, when the stimulus is 
presented close to the centre of the screen i.e. most 
like the "respond" stimulus, we find the LEHN Ss making 
the largest number of commission errors, and the LELN Ss 
making the fewest. It seems, then, that the original hypothesis 
that the HN group will be found to make more commission errors 
has found some confirmation, but it also appears to require some 
limitation, for it appears to be true only for Ss classified as 
in troverted.
TABLE 10:4 COMMISSION ERRORS AS A FUNCTION OF EXTRAVERSION, 
NEUROTICISM, LOCATION OF STIMULI AND SPEED OF 
PRESENTATION
HEHN
HELN
LEHN
LELN
0.33
0.87
1
0. 8
"FAST" "SLOW"
Extreme Middle Central Extreme Middle Central
1.17
1.032
1.143
.73
1.33
1.97
1.57
1.6
0.667
0.01
0
0.2
0.83
0.39
0.429
0.4
1.83
1.45
2.429
0.66
3 3 3
TABLE 10:5 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING
OMISSION ERROR DATA
SOURCE Ss D.F. M.S. F P
Between
Extraversion (E) 13.353 1 13.353 < 1
Neuroticism (N) 0.078 1 0.078 < 1
E X  N 0.002 1 0.002 < 1
Subject within cells 1455.756 55 26.468
Within
Location of Stimulus (P) 964.321 2 482.161 54.04 <.001
E X  P 36.196 2 18.098 2.075
N X  P 17.843 2 8.922 < 1
E X  N X  P 0.387 2 0.194 < 1
P X  Subject within cells 959.229 110 8.72
Rate of Presentation (S) 672.358 1 672.358 69.6 <.001
E X  S 11.745 1 11.745 1.216
N X  S 5.863 1 5.863 < 1
E X  N X  S 13.167 1 13.167 1.363
S X  Subject within cells 531.308 55 9.66
S X  P 50.422 2 25.211 1.467
E X  S X  P 0.118 2 0.059 < 1
N X  S X  P 3.196 2 1.598 < 1
E X  N X  S X  P 1.02 2 0.51 <•1
S X  P X  Subject within
cells 1890.212 110 17.184
TOTAL 353
2 3 3
TABLE 10:6 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING
ANTICIPATING RESPONSE DATA
Source SS D.F. M.F. F
Between
Extraversion (E) 4.598 1 4.598 1.27
Neuroticism (N) 2.186 1 2.186 <  1
E X  N 0.941 1 0.941 < 1
Subject within cells 119.076 55 3.63
Within
Rate of Presentation (S) 280.876 1 280.876 77.1 <^001
E X  S 4.735 1 4.735 1.359
N X  S 3.824 1 3.824 1.097
E X  N X  S 10.588 1 10.588 3.039
S X  Subject within 
Cells 200.37 55 3.643
TOTAL 117
'
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Table 10:4 summarizes the group means for the 4 way 
E X  N X  S X  P interaction. Although this was not found to 
be significant it is interesting to note that both the 
neurotic groups, LEHN and HEHN, make more errors of 
commission, when the stimulus is in the central position, 
at the slower rate of presentation than at the faster, 
whereas the converse is true for the stable groups LELN 
and HELN.
Turning to the analysis of the omission errors 
(Table 10:5) and the anticipation data (Table 10:6), once 
again the physical manipulations effect substantial changes 
in behaviour, while the personality variables fail to reach 
significance.
TABLE 10:7 OMISSION ERRORS AS A FUNCTION OF EXTRAVERSION,
OF PRESENTATION
"FAST" "Slow"
Extreme Middle Central Extreme Middle Central
HEHN 3.33 3'ol7 7.17 1.17 1.17 3
HELN 2.97 3.13 8 0.58 0.55 3.71
LEHN 4.14 3.71 9.86 0.29 0.14 3.43
LELN 2.93 3.27 9.4 0.47 0.47 5.53
TABLE 10:8 ANTICIPATION AS A FUNCTION OF EXTRAVERSION
AND NEUROTICISM
Fast Slow
1 E 1 E
LN 3.867 3.677 0.6 0.258
HN 5.429 3.667 0.143 0.5
3 3 8
One feature of both Tables 10:7 and 10:8 which 
immediately strikes one is the fact that the groups means for 
both omissions and anticipations are substantially larger 
than those for the commission errors, indicating that as 
compared with either an anticipaory or an omission error, 
commission errors were relatively rare events.
Apart from this the results are as predicted with more 
errors being associated with the faster rates of presentation 
and, for omission errors, with stimuli nearer the centre 
of the screen, (cf Tables 10:5 and 10:6)
10:5 DISCUSSION
Despite the fact that the specific hypotheses presented 
in the introduction failed to reach significance, it does 
appear that some support can be found in this experiment for 
the hypothesis that neurotic individuals are more inclined 
than non-neurotic individuals to make errors of commission.
With the confirmation, however, comes a limitation, this 
difference between high and low neuroticism groups appears 
to hold only for individuals who are classified as introverted 
(cf. Tables 10:1, 10:2, 10:3).
One might be willing to interpret the pattern of results 
described in Tables 10:2 and 10:3 as predictable on the basis 
of Gray’s theory. To do this one might argue that according 
to this theory it is the neurotic introverted (LEHN) group 
who are most sensitive to cues of punishment and so individuals 
belonging to this group might be most highly motivated to avoid 
failure, resulting in a large number of errors of commission. 
Both stable and neurotic extraverted might be motivated by 
the desire to succeed, to be seen to do well, resulting 
in a tendency to over respond, and a relatively large number 
of commission errors. In contrast the stable introverted
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group, affected by neither an unusually high sensitivity 
to cues of punishment nor reward, would be predicted to be 
the group least likely to make erroneous commission errors.
Table 10:4 does not introduce any information which 
appears to contradict this interpretation, it does, however, 
suggest that the relationship between the physical variables 
and the trait variables is more complex than may have been 
suspected. For example the neurotic introverted group are 
found to have both the highest and lowest mean number of 
responses, and both of these occur in the slow condition.
This may well suggest that this group reaches its "optimum" 
level for this task at some point in this condition and the 
extra stress produced by the more rapid rate of presentation 
simply "pushed them over the edge", on to the descending limb 
of the ubiquitous inverted U shaped curve. If this were, 
in fact, what was happening one would expect a generalized 
disruption of performance in the "fast" condition, with an 
increased number of both omission errors and anticipatory 
responses. This is, of course, the situation described in 
Tables 10:7 and 10:8.
These suggestions are, however, post hoc, both in 
terms of interpreting the results as supporting Gray’s theory, 
and of the patterns of behaviour being describable by an 
inverted U shaped curve. Neither suggestion fully explains 
the results obtained, and replication is needed before more 
speculation can be justified.
Two other features of the present data are note­
worthy. The first of these is that while manipulations of 
the physical aspects of the situation, the location of the 
stimulus and rate of presentation, produce substantial 
changes in behaviour the differences between different 
personality groups is small and often fails to reach
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significance. This is a repetition of the pattern found in 
experiments 2 and 3. Any simplistic "situationalist" 
interpretation of these data, however, seems to be incorrect 
for reasons offered in earlier chapters. To state that 
trait dimensions do not reliably distinguish the behaviour 
of different individuals is not equivalent to stating that 
there are no reliable differences in the behaviour of 
individuals.
The second feature of the data may not be entirely 
independent of this first one, and that is that there were 
relatively few commission errors made as compared to the 
number of omission errors made. This may, on one hand be 
the reason why the differences between the LN and HN groups 
were not more pronounced. It seems almost certainly to 
reflect a strategy employed in this situation indicating 
that "person variables" may be of substantial importance 
in determining behaviour. It may be recalled that it was 
with situations such as this in mind that Mischel (1973)  ^
entitled his description of the learning of behaviour a 
Cognitive Social Learning Theory. In summary, then, both 
the location of the stimulus and the rate of presentation of 
the stimulus, significantly effected the number of errors- 
made, both omission and commission, and the speed of 
presentation also had a significant influence on the number 
of anticipated responses made; neuroticism was found to 
affect the number of commission errors made for the 
introverted Ss when the location of the stimulus was 
taken into account.
10:6 EXPERIMENT 4B
Introduction
Three conditioning experiments have been reported thus
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far and as yet no evidence has been found which convincingly 
supports the model of personality functioning put forward by 
Gray. Given the conclusion arrived at in experiment 3, that 
there seemed little likelihood that Eysenck’s theory would 
provide a useful basis for intergrating different approaches 
to the study of personality, one might expect Gray’s theory 
to be cast aside. Eysenck’s theory, at least found some 
support. Gray’s has found none at all. Nevertheless it 
was felt that it might be premature to abandon the theory 
at this stage.
Two considerations militated against the abandonment 
of Gray’s theory. Gray proposed firstly that individuals would 
be found to be differentially sensitive to cues of reward and 
punishment, and only secondly that this differential sensitivity 
would be related to the Eysenckian dimensions of introversion- 
extraversion and neuroticism. It was remarked when outlining the 
theory that this proposed relationship was highly speculative, 
nevertheless it is this latter speculation which has largely 
been put to the test. The suggestion that differential 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement may be related to the 
dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism may well be wrong, 
as indeed it appears to be, without seriously damaging the 
more fundamental aspects of the theory.
The second consideration was the niggling suspicion 
which kept appearing -iji the data that appetitive and 
aversive conditioning might, indeed, be independent of each other;
On the basis of Gray’s theory it might be predicted that 
individuals relatively more sensitive to cues of punishment 
might err on the side of over inclusiveness and be found to 
respond not only to cues of punishment but also to cues of 
substantial similarity to punishment cues. That is, they 
might be expected to make relatively few omission errors but a
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substantial number of commission errors. A complementary 
pattern of responding might be expected from those individuals 
relatively more sensitive to cues of reward - few failures 
to respond in the face of cues of reward but also a tendency 
to try to obtain rewards when they were not, in fact, . 
available.
Viewed in this light it seems probable that the differences 
between individuals differentially more sensitive to cues of 
reward and those differentially more sensitive to cues of 
punishment might be more readily evident in a sample of Ss 
pre-selected for their tendency to make errors of commission.
The previous experiment reported that individuals classified as 
neurotic might well display such a tendency. However, this 
tendency was not found to be strong, nor was there any evidence 
found in Experiment 3, where the pattern of commission errors 
was examined, that even in the neurotic group Gray’s theory 
was strongly supported.
For this reason it was decided to turn to two other 
dimensions which might provide a basis for selecting Ss for 
the next experiment in which it is proposed to put hypotheses 
drawn from Gray’s theory to the test once more. The two 
dimensions which looked most promising were the dimension'
Cattell refers to as dispositional rigidity and the property 
of the nervous system known as mobility.
Pavlov (1951 - 1952, vol. 3, book 2, p.268) has defined 
mobility as: "the speed with vhich the organism, on external
demand, yields, gives preference to one stimulation over 
another, substitutes stimulation for inhibition and vice 
versa."
Thus the indices of mobility are:
(i) substituting one excitatory process for another,
(ii) replacement of an excitatory by an inhibitory process.
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(iii) replacement of an inhibitory by an excitatory process.
Mobility brings with it its own set.of problems, 
however, as Nebylitsyn (1956) has noted; "The mobility of 
the nervous processes, is even to-day the least defined 
parameter in terms of its physiological basis. " (p.241)
The result of this is that there is no one, unequivocal, 
generally accepted index of mobility. Reviewing the most 
commonly employed indices Nebylitsyn concludes that none of 
these are, beyond doubt, unidimensional, reflecting one, 
and only one, property of the nervous system.
With this difficulty in mind Cattell’s dispositional 
rigidity may be a better candidate. This is a difficulty 
or slowness in turning from an old to a new response in 
situations where the new response is clear to the individual 
and he has the intelligence and will to make it. Cattell 
and Winder define dispositional rigidity as: "a
failure to ’adapt’, by the use of a shorter behavioural 
route than the usual one to a given goal, when circumstances 
make it possible." (p.23).
Dispositional rigidity at first sight appears to share a 
remarkable similarity with mobility of the nervous system, 
but, it may be argued, some features included in the concept of 
dispositional rigidity would, when translated into the Russian 
system, be more happily housed under the concepts of 
dynamism and strength of the nervous system, dimensions which 
are theoretically independent of mobility.
Perhaps the strongest argu'^eTct against proposing that 
mobility and dispositional rigidity are identical is the fact 
that Teplov notes that "by mobility, in the widest sense of 
the term, one means all the temporal characteristics of the 
nervous system functioning of which the description speed 
may be applied" (1956, p.61-62).
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While Cattell states that the process he terms 
"structural rigidity", which is distinct from dispositional 
rigidity, "would be expected to reveal itself by the relative 
slowness of an operation requiring rapid oscillation between 
processes A and B, when compared with the steady repetition 
of A or B separately" , p.28).
Thus the "inertia of the mental processes", as 
Cattell calls it, is best shown by alternation tests. Speed 
and alternation, two of the characteristics of mobility of 
the nervous system, are, then, considered to be related to 
process rigidity. Of this latter Cattell said; "on the 
evidence now available it is possible to say that perseveration 
as "mental inertia" shown by after effects and immediately 
successive mental processes simply does not exist" ( ,237).
Given the very different starting places for their 
analyses it would be foolhardy to assume a simple corespondence 
between the dimensions of mobility and structural rigidity.
The work on critical flicker fusion (CFF), for example, provides 
yet another example that the too eager mapping of these two 
analyses on to one another will produce errors and over 
simplifications. CFF has been used as an index of mobility 
of the nervous system by Russian workers, while Cattell has 
noted "the interesting finding in regard to the classical 
factor of p (perseveration) is that it does include rigidity of 
perception (and slow speed of flicker fusion) as well as the 
longer attested motor rigidity." (\ASZ, p.29). Nebylitsyn, 
however, has suggested that CFF might be an index not of 
mobility, but a newer property of the nervous system, lability. 
"Clearly lability must be viewed as an independent property 
of the nervous system distinct from the traditional property 
of ’mobility*." (1965, p.259). This confusion helps illustrate 
the complexity of the situation.
The reason mobility of the nervous system and
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dispositional rigidity have been discussed here is that the 
property we wish to tap is, or seems to be, akin to both of them. 
If one could be sure either (a) that these two dimensions were 
identical, or (b) that one of them would identify individuals 
prone to make errors of commission, then it would be possible, 
indeed preferable, to employ indices previously used 
and found to be satisfactory, as a basis for the pre-selection of 
Ss.
As there is no ready made index available it was 
decided to follow up some suggestions made by Nebylitsyn (1966) in 
attempting to devise one. Nebylitsyn, discussing the results 
of some studies employing RTs to stimuli presented at various 
points in the visual field, and the possible importance 
of information processing and choice RTs, although unable to 
offer a definite conclusion as to whether these are measuring 
mobility states: "we assume, however, that this index has
greater intrinsic worth than others in advancing our 
understanding of the physiological basis of the mobility of 
the nervous processes" (p.261).
Given that the method of measuring mobility used 
here was bound to be crude in this its first outing, and given 
the possibility that one is looking for Cattell*s dispositionally 
rigid individuals, it was decided that the perseveration (p) - 
tests should also be employed here.
Chown (1962) has reported that Cattell’s p - factor 
fractures into two independent rigidity factors. This being 
the case it was felt that a new index of mobility should be 
devised, which was as similar as possible to the situation 
to be used in the next experiment, thus permiting any results 
to be more convincingly generalized to that situation, and 
which might also measure mobility of the nervous system. At 
the same time the four measures of rigidity were also to be used.
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The justification for proceeding in this way was that 
if the new test was found to correlate substantially with one 
or more of the p-tests, Ss might be classified, economically, 
on the basis of these, the p-tests in future experiments.
On the other hand if the p-test are not found to correlate 
with the mobility measure, the behavioural data will still be 
available on the basis of which S can be classified for the 
next experiment in which it is intended to put Gray’s theory 
to the test once more.
HYPOTHESES
As more than one index was derived from the data 
provided by the "mobility task" it was predicted that;
Hypothesis 4b;1 The indices of mobility would be found to 
correlate significantly with each other.
As the value of the signals to respond, and not to 
respond, were to change more than once during the mobility 
test, it was predicted that
Hypothesis 4b;2 The mobility indices would correlate significantly 
and negatively on the first and second reversals of signal 
value.
Hypothesis 4b;3 The four tests of perseveration would bé 
found to correlate significantly with each other.
Hypothesis 4b;4 The indices of mobility and of perseveration 
would be found to correlate significantly, and follow from 
this when these correlations are factor analysed a single factor 
would emerge loaded on by both mobility and perseveration 
indices.
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10:7 METHOD
DESIGN
Partly in an attempt to follow up Nebylitsyn*s suggestions, 
but substantially in order to (a) keep the test situation 
as simple as possible, while (b) make the task here as similar 
as possible to the tasks in experiment 4a and in the next 
experiment, it was decided that the stimulus should be a 
simple visual one, a single point of light. The S was required 
to respond to this.
Points of light were presented, one at a time, on an 
oscilloscope screen. These stimuli were presented at a rate
of 1 per 500 msec.s. They were brief, but clearly visible,
flashes of light.
These dots were presented approximately 1.5 cms either 
side of the centre of the screen, along the horizontal mid-line. 
The S*s task was simply to make an RT response whenever the 
dot was to the right, (for 50% of S to the left), of centre.
There were no markings on the screen, and so the decision 
demanded of the S was a rather difficult one.
After 40 trials, 20 presentations of the stimulus in 
each position in a random order, the S was required to reverse 
the pattern of responding, i.e. if the dot appeared on the, 
left (right for 50% of Ss) a response was required but not when 
it was on the right (left for 50% of Ss).
As speed is hypothesized as being an important 
characteristic of mobility there was only 1 second between 
the signal to change the direction of responding and the next 
presentation of a stimulus.
There were four blocks of trials, 160 trials in all, and 
consequently S was required to change the stimulus to which 
he was responding on three occasions.
The following data were recorded on each trial: . .
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(i) whether or not the S had correctly responded or 
refrained from responding, .
(ii) whether a commission error had been made,
(iii) whether an omission error had been made,
(iv) the latency of any responses made.
From these the following scores were derived
(i) the ratio of the mean RT on the last 10 response trials 
before reversal to the first 10 after it. If this task were 
really tapping the nervous system property of mobility then 
the less mobile the individual the smaller would be this ratio.
(ii) The difference in the number of commission errors between 
the same two groups of 10 trials. Difference was prefered to
a ratio index here because of the relatively large number of
error free blocks of trials. Again, if we are tapping mobility 
we can expect the less mobile individual to have the larger 
difference score.
(iii) The difference in omission scores to the same two 
groups of 10 trials.
(iv) RTs of less than 100 msec.s were regarded as anticipatory
responses, and recorded separately.
The four perseveration tests (p-tests) used were those 
used by Cattell et al (1954) and Chown (1962).
(i) The ratio of the number of letters written when the
word "Ready" was written forwards and reversed, each for 
one minute.
(ii) The same ratio, but this time for the number 237
(iii) The ratio of the number of letters written when the 
sentence "The sky is a deep blue" was written normally and 
with each letter doubled, (written twice), each task for one 
minute.
(iv) The ratio of the number of letters written \dien the
sentence: "The sky is a deep blue" was written in upper
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and in lower cases to the number of letters written when 
the case was alternated letter by letter. Again each task 
for one minute.
Procedure
The same 60 Ss were employed in this emperiment as in 
experiment 4a. This experiment and experiment 4a were conducted 
in a single session lasting approximately 35 minutes.
The four perseveration tasks were performed in random 
order, but always as a single block. The order of the 
"mobility" task and the block of perseveration tasks was 
randomized across Ss.
The "mobility" task was controlled by computer. S 
was seated in front of a teletype approximately 4ft from 
an osciloscope screen. This screen was 4ft 8ins from the 
floor, and measures 21.6 x 17 cms.
The S was instructed as follows:
"Spots of light will appear on the screen, one at a time, 
either just to the left or just to the right of the centre of 
the screen. What 1 would like you to do is to press this 
bar, (the space bar), as quickly as you can anytime the dot is 
to the left (or right) of centre. Don't press if the dot, 
is to the right (or left). The centre will not be marked, 
you will have to judge where it is yourself.
After a number of trials, 40 in fact, a tone will 
sound and the computer will print out 'Press for right', (or left), 
that is just what 1 want you to do - press \dien the dot is 
on the right, (or left), but not when it is on the left, (or 
right).
The tone will sound on three occasions, and so you’ll 
have to make this change three times. Each time the 
computer will print out which side you should be pressing for.
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in case you get confused.
Do you understand what you have to do?
A tone sounded to start the run and one second later 
the first dot appeared, subsequent dots appeared at the rate 
of one per 500 msec.s. At the end of 40 trials the tone 
sounded again and there was a "pause" of one second before 
the next dot appeared, this was the case for all three 
reversals. Data were stored on paper tape.
For the perseveration tests the S was seated at a 
table and provided with a sheet of lined foolscap paper 
and a freshly sharpened pencil. Each section of the tasks 
lasted one minute and the S was told to write the word, 
number or sentence, as applicable, "as many times as possible 
in a minute".
The writing backwards task i.e. forming each letter 
in reverse, was demonstrated to the Ss to avoid any 
possibility of confusion.
10:8 RESULTS 
Mobility
The first question to be answered is whether or not the 
three types of score derived from the "mobility" test show 
any substantial relationship with one another.
TABLE 10:9 CORRELATIONS OF "MOBILITY" SCORES
(1) RTs 1.00
(2) Commission errors -.78** 1.00
(3) Omission errors -.017 .412** 1.00
(*^ vp ^ .005)
Table 10:9 reports the correlations between the RT , 
ratio score, the omission and commission difference scores for
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the first reversal. It was felt that, at this stage at 
least, it would be better to limit the correlations to this 
first reversal, because this was least likely to yield 
spurious results e.g. an S with very poor mobility might 
appear to display a marked improvement after the second 
reversal, but in fact still be responding in the manner he 
had for the first 40 trials, having failed during the second 
block of trials to establish a new pattern of responding.
As can be seen from this table while the "commission 
index" correlates significantly with the other two indices, 
these two indices do not correlate significantly with each 
other. The two explanations of this which spring to mind 
most quickly are that (i) the commission index reflects a 
quality which both the other indices also reflect, but these 
indices reflect that quality less adequately, or (ii) 
the negative correlation between the RT ratio and the 
commission difference index is due to the fact that individuals 
who have slow RTs during the first block of trials do not 
show any great decrease in their RTs after the reversal, 
because they are already responding so slowly, and slow 
responders are simply less likely to make error of commission* 
These Ss then will have relatively large ratio, scores and 
small commission difference scores^ whereas the correlation 
between the omission and commission differences reflects a 
common underlying cause, perhaps mobility.
When we turn to the correlations between the same index 
on the three reversals (cf. Tables 10:10 (a) (b) and (c))*
TABLE 10:10a CORRELATIONS OF RT RATIO SCORE ON THREE
OCCASIONS
First 1.00
Second -.116 1.00 .
Third -0.031 -0.103 . 1.00
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TABLE 10:10b CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMISSION INDEX
SCORES ON THREE OCCASIONS
First
Second
Third
1.00 
-.676** 
.224*
1.00
.199 1.00
(**p <.005; *p <  .05)
TABLE 10:10c CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE OMISSION INDEX
SCORES ON THREE OCCASIONS
First
Second
Third
1.00
-.04
.012
1.00
.023 1.00
it is found that only the commission index shows any 
significant correlations (Table 10:10b)* The correlation 
between the first and the second reversal is both 
substantial and negative (-.676), suggesting that perhaps 
this index is tapping a genuine difficulty in the ability 
to reverse ones responses, and in consequence that this 
measure might be more promising than the other two.
Perseveration
Table 10:11 presents the correlations between the 
four p-tests.
TABLE 10:11 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERSEVERATION TESTS
(1) Reversed Number
(2) Reversed Word
(3) Alternated Cases
(4) Doubling letters
1.00
.275*
.489**
.408**
1.00
.367*
*192
1.00 
. 55** 1*00
(*p <  .025; **p <  .005)
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There seems little to say about this set of correlations. 
As one might expect from a set of tests which have been used for 
some time they all seem to show moderate and significant 
correlations with each other. The only test about which 
there might be some question on this pattern of correlations 
is the reversal of the word "Ready", this produced the 
poorest set of correlations, and the only correlation which 
was not significatn, with the doubling of the letters task.
It seems then that on one hand the commission index may 
turn out to be the best index of mobility, while all the 
p-test show good intercorrelations suggesting that they are 
all tapping the same general factor. The question of interest 
now is: do the p-test and suggested indicies of mobility,
particularly the commission index correlate significantly 
with one another?
TABLE 10:12 INTER CORRELATIONS OF P-TESTS .AND MOBILITY
INDICES
RT Commission Omission
Ratio Difference Difference
Reversed Number -.002 -.029 -.285*
Reversed Word -.021 -.68 + -.316**
Alternated Cases -.083 .118 -.277*
Doubled letters .001 .023 -.318*
(*p <• .025; **p < . 0 1 +p <  .005)
This Table( 10:12) suggests that wiiile the omission index 
shows a substantial relationship with the p-test, both the 
commission and RT indices show a considerable independence 
of perseveration. However, before claiming that either 
there is one factor of which mobility and perseveration are 
different constructions, and of which the omission index is a
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good measure and the commission index a bad one; or that 
there are two factors, mobility and perseveration, the 
p-tests and the omission index reflecting the latter, and 
the commission index the former, some of the results of a 
factor analysis should be reported. This factor analysis 
cannot, of course, be regarded as "strong" evidence, computed 
as it is on only 58 sets of observations. It was felt, 
however, that the factor analysis might provide a useful 
check on any interpretation of the pattern of correlations. 
Orthogonal factors were extracted using the varimax procedure.
TABLE 10:13 LOADINGS OF "MOBILITY" INDICES AND P-TESTS 
ON TWO FACTORS
RT Ratio
Commission Difference .678
Omission Difference .722
Reversal Number «656
Reversal Word *419
Alternated Cases .666
Doubled letters .811
* (a fuller version of the factor loadings provided in 
Table 10:19)
This analysis (cf Table 10:13) then seems to suggest
quite clearly that there are two factors, independent of 
one another, one on which the perseveration tests load 
and another on which both the commission and omission indices 
load.
10:9 DISCUSSION
There appears to be little to say about the results 
of this present experiment, it would . . seem to be fairly clear
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that mobility, if that is the quality being tapped by the 
indices derived from the behavioural data of the present 
experiment, is a dimension substantially independent, if not 
totally independent of the quality tapped by the p-tests.
In as far as one would wish indices of these two dimensions 
to be "pure", i.e. not reflecting to any other quality, the 
commission index appears to be more promising. Not only is 
it found not to correlate significantly with the p-indices 
but the index at the first reversal correlates significantly, 
and negatively, with the index at the second reversal as it 
was predicted an index of mobility should.
The p-tests do correlate significantly with each other, 
and they are all found to load on the same factor, but as 
they do not predict who will, and who will not, make a 
commission error, e.g. the total number of commission errors 
was found to correlate .0699(N.S.) with the reversed number 
index, -.0817 (N.S.) with the reversed word index, .105(N.S.) 
with the doubling of the letter index, and -.0181 (N.S.) with 
the alternating of case index, these indices appear to be 
of little further interest here.
The commission index, however, whatever its promise 
might appear to be needs to be treated with the greatest ,of 
caution. Very few errors of commission were made, infact, in 
the block of trials before the first reversal which provided 
the opportunity to make up to 20 commission errors, 80% of Ss 
made only one or none at all.
Of course, even if the findings relating to the 
commission index had been based on a much larger range of 
data one would not be justified in using this index as a 
basis for selecting Ss, one needs to know if this index is 
indeed reliable. This would be true in any situation, it 
must be especially true in the present context where the .
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absolute consistency of behaviour bas been questioned, and 
the importance of the inter-relationship between person variables 
and situation variables in determining behaviour has been 
stressed. These comments lead us to the third section 
of the present study.
10:10 SECTION 4C
INTRODUCTION
If, as was suggested in the previous section, one 
wishes to select people on the basis of some particular
behaviour then one must make the assumption that if people do
a thing in one situation, then they will do the same thing 
in another situation, that is, one must assume that people 
are consistent in their behaviour. . On the basis of the , 
literature reviewed in Chapter One this appears to be a 
rather dangerous assumption to make.
What one must do, therefore, is demonstrate some 
consistency in behaviour. In the previous sections the 
predictibility of behaviour, and hence its consistency, was 
related to traits, neuroticism, mobility and perseveration, 
but as Wallach and Leggett (1972) have argued this need not be
the case. To quote them at length:
"With constructs thus turning out to be as difficult 
to validate within moderator-defined subgroups as they 
were in samples as a whole, it seems time to emphasize that 
the search for consistency does not stand or fall with the 
finding of evidence for traits or dispositions. Tiie 
demonstrated elusiveness of such evidence tells us not that 
constructs of the kind considered don't seem to be useful 
conceptual entities. Whether people manifest consistency 
remains to be seen - by focusing not on the test responses
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which are of interest only if they function as signs of some 
hypothetical trait or other, but rather on behaviours and 
effects of behaviours that are of interest in their own 
right. In the case of such behaviours and behavioural 
effects we can ask, quite straight forwardly, whether 
persons exhibit relative consistency in producing them across 
varying occasions. This is not the mere study of test-retest 
reliability, because test responses do not carry inherent meaning- 
their meaning depends on whether they serve as a clue to some­
thing else. We are talking, by contrast, about performances 
and products that do not call for a justification beyond 
themselves in order to qualify as objects of study", (p.602).
As the same Ss took part in experiments 4a and 4b 
we are able to ask "quite straight forwardly, whether 
persons exhibit relative consistency" with respect to the 
behaviours recorded on these two occasions.
It might also be recalled that it was remarked, when 
discussing Mischel (1968), that: "the distinction between
the concepts of reliability and validity is, at least in 
part, a reference to the degree of generality of responding 
to which one wishes to refer",. Experiments 4a and 4b were 
contrived partly with this statement in mind, and so it is 
possible to compare the consistency in behaviour to more 
and less similar stimuli within the same situation and . 
between situations.
HYPOTHESES
If Wallach and Leggett are correct it may be 
predicted that:
Hypothesis 4c:l The eight commission error scores available 
from experiments 4a and 4b will be found to correlate with , 
each other to a significant degree.
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Assumming that the similarity between stimuli is 
important in determining consistent behaviour, it is predicted 
that
Hypothesis 4c:2(1) the correlation between the commission 
errors made to the stimuli in the central position and that in 
the middle position will be greater than the correlation between 
the errors made to this central stimuli and the stimuli 
farthest from the centre of the screen. This will be true in
both the fast and slow conditions.
(ii) The commission error scores from experiment 4b (the 
"mobility" task) will correlate most highly with those made 
in response to the stimuli in the central position in the 
"fast" condition in experiment 4a.
These hypotheses may also be repeated with respect to 
omission errors.
Hypothesis 4c:3 All omission error scores will be expected 
to intercorrelate
Hypothesis 4c:4(i) The correlation between "central" and 
"middle" omissions will be greater than that between "central" 
and "extreme" omissions.
(ii) "Mobility" omissions will correlate most highly with 
"central" omissions in the "fast" condition.
Hypothesis 4c:5 Anticipation scores will be expected to 
inter-correlate to a significant degree.
Owing to the conflicting results obtained in 
experiments 2 and 3 no prediction is made with respect to the 
relationship between the three self-rated consistency scores.
Hypothesis 4c:6 It is predicted, however, that self-rated V
neuroticism will be found to correlate to a significant degree 
with self rated consistency for neuroticism.
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10:11 METHOD
DESIGN
The intention in this study was to use the data 
already collected in experiments 4a and 4b in order to look 
at the consistency question once more. Three sets of 
behavioural data were used: (1) commission errors, there
were eight commission scores available : for the task in
experiment 4a, in the "fast" condition (i) the number of 
commission errors made when the stimulus was in the central,
(ii) middle, and (iii) extreme positions, in the slow 
conditions commission errors associated with the same 
three locations, (vii) the number of commission errors 
made during the first block of trials in the "mobility" task, 
(viii) the total number of commission errors made during the 
mobility task.
(2) The same eight scores were available for omission errors.
(3) Three anticipation scores were available (i) the number 
of anticipations made in the "fast" condition of task 4a,
(ii) the number of anticipations made in the "slow" condition 
of task 4a, (iii) the total number of anticipations made 
during the "mobility" task. An anticipatory "response"
was defined as any response with a latency of 100 msec.s' 
or faster.
It was intended to inter correlate the scores 
within each set of data.
Ss also completed the same self-rating scale as in 
experiments 2 and 3, and so it was proposed to look once 
more at the relationship between self-rated consistency and 
neuroticism, and at the inter-relationships between the ratings 
of consistency for various traits.
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PROCEDURE
The tasks and how they were performed, the equipment 
used and the Ss have all been described in experiments 4a and 
4b. It only remains to point out here that experiments 4a 
and 4b were conducted during a single testing session lasting 
approximately 35 minutes. The S performed either the 
"mobility" task or task 4a first, with the order randomized 
across Ss. The perseveration task always came next.
Finally came which ever of the two tasks, "mobility" or 4a, 
which had not been performed already. This procedure was 
adopted to allow S some respite from having to respond 
quickly to brief visual stimuli rapidly presented.
10:12 RESULTS
The first hypothesis (4c:1) predicted that all the 
commission error scores would show substantial and significant 
inter-correlations. As can be seen from Table 10:14 this 
prediction has not been confirmed.
TABLE 10:14 INTER-CORRELATION OF COMMISSION ERROR SCORES
1 Total, Mobility
task /
2 1st block Mobility
task
3 Fast condition.
central «019 .151
4 Fast condition.
middle .086 .017 .203
5 Fast condition.
extreme .167 .114 -.024 .092
6 Slow condition
central .104 .041 .112 -.112 -.034
7 Slow condition.
middle «032 .38** .016 -.018 .186 .052
8 Slow condition.
extreme «0999 -.018 .168 -.022 .274* .67 .383**
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(*P <  .025; **p -C.005)
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Only three of the 27 correlations reached a significant 
level, a result which does not indicate that people are 
consistent with respect to their tendency to make commission 
errors, not even when, as here, one looks at relative consistency, 
Nor does there appear to be any evidence that the more similar 
stimuli are, either within or between situation, the more 
consistently people will behave. The situation appears to be 
somewhat different, however, when one turns to omission errors, 
(cf. Table 10:15)
TABLE 10:15 INTER CORRELATION OF OMISSION ERROR SCORES
1. Total Mobility
task
2. 1st block mobility
task
3. Fast condition
central •3§? .138
4. Fast condition ** * **
middle .471 «259 .482
5. Fast condition ^
extreme .329 .217 .462 .646
6. Slow condition *
central .285 -.015 .038 .029 -.039
7. Slow condition ** * **
middle .422 -.07 .238 .193 «168 «673
8 . Slow condition ** >v ** ** **
extreme «537 .058 .259 «529 .549 .419 .519
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
('ïp <  .05; *>’?p< .005)
18 of the 27 correlations in Table 10:15 were found to 
be significant, suggesting that with respect to omission errors 
there is considerable consistency in behaviour. There also 
appears to be a considerable consistency across situations as 
the total number of omission errors in the "mobility" task 
was found to correlate with all six omission error scores 
from experiment 4a. Though the number of errors before the
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first reversal in the "mobility" task was found to correlate
with only two of these six scores, perhaps reflecting the
unreliability of this smaller sample* The results with
respect to the hypothesis that the more similar the stimuli
are the more similar behaviour will be,is equivocal. It
seems to find some support within a situation, the number
of errors made in central position correlating more highly with the
number in the middle position, (.482, "fast" condition; .673, "slow’
condition), than in the extreme position, («462, "fast"
condition; .419 "slow" condition). The hypothesis does not
appear to find any support across situations.
Turning to the anticipation data (cf. Table 10:16) 
there it was found that only one of the three correlations 
computed was significant.
TABLE 10:16 INTER CORRELATION OF ANTICIPATORY "RESPONSE"
ERRORS
1. Total number, "mobility" task
*
2. Total number, "Fast" condition .447
3. Total number, "Slow" condition .089 -«014
(*p <  .005)
Turning now from whether people behave consistently to 
whether they rate themselves as behaving consistently, as can 
be seen from Table 10:17 the results of the present sample 
fall midway between those of experiments 2 and 3.
TABLE 10:17 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RATINGS OF CONSISTENCY
1. Rated consistency for extraversion
2. Rated consistency for impulsivity -.083
*
3. Rated consistency for neuroticism .175 .367
Î 2
(*p < .005)
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Rated consistency for impulsivity and for neuroticism 
were found to correlate significantly, but the other two 
correlations were not found to be significant.
The relationship between the consistency ratings and 
neuroticism is reported in Table 10:18
TABLE 10:18 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EPI AND SELF-RATED N
AND SELF RATED CONSISTENCY
EPI Self-rated 
N N
1. Rated consistency of extraversion -.161 -.222*
2. Rated consistency of impulsivity .069 -.133
3. Rated consistency of neuroticism -.33 -.436
*
(*p <  .05; **p <  .005)
The relationship between self-rated consistency for 
neuroticism and self rated neuroticism was found to be 
significant,once more.
Table 10:19 reports the loadings of the variables on - 
factors extracted from the correlation matrix (only loadings 
greater than .4 have been recorded). It seems pointless 
indulging in a factor naming exercise here, especially as the 
correlations are based on such a relatively small sample, but 
there are some features of this factor analysis that are note­
worthy. None of the trait measures are found to load on the 
same factors as any of the behavioural measures, and with the 
exception of the anticipation scores the behavioural data 
derived from experiments 4a and 4b are described by quite 
independent factors, suggesting that one ought not to 
concentrate simply on behaviour, but on a variety of 
situational variables, most important of which might be the 
individuals construction of the situation.
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TABLE 10 ;19 SUMMARY OF FACTOR LOADINGS
"Mobility" Task F^ F Fg F^ F^
RT Ratio
Commission index .678
Omission index .722
Total Anticipations .779
p-Tests
Reversed Number « 656
Reversed Word .419
Alternated Cases .666
Doubling letters .811
"Fast” condition
RT - central 
RT - middle
RT - extreme .46 .461
Commissions - central 
Commissions - middle 
Commissions - extreme 
Omissions - central .535
Omissions - middle .777
Omissions - extreme .867
Anticipations .67
"Slow” condition 
RT - central
RT - middle .47
RT - extreme .724
Commissions - central .582
Commissions - middle 
Commissions - extreme 
Omissions - central .778
Omissions - middle .77
Omissions - extreme .669 .44
Anticipations .752
Extraversion «68
Neuroticism -.813
Ego-Strength .714
% of variance 25.8 13.3 8.2 7.5 5.6 11.2 6.7
Only loadings greater than .4 have been recorded
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10:13 DISCUSSION
Wallach and Leggett (1972) advised asking"straight 
forwardly” whether or not people were consistent. Of course, 
they meant to limit this question to behaviuurs which are of 
interest in their own right. Such behaviours were chosen 
in the present study and Wallach and Leggett®s question was 
asked, but it appears that nature has a wry sense of humour.
The answer was, "sometimes”. Obviously nature does not feel 
compelled to conform to our simple schemas, with the result 
that while there appears to be some, moderate, degree of 
consistency with respect to the making of omission errors, 
there is less evidence of consistency with respect to anticipatory 
errors and no real evidence at all of any consistency with 
respect to commission errors. One might speculate that some 
behaviours simply show more consistency than others. It 
seems more probable however, that to some extent the results 
obtained here reflect the fact that there were substantially 
more errors of omission than of commission and in consequence 
the correlations between the various omissions scores are more 
reliable. For example in the "fast” condition the mean 
number of commission errors was 1.741, while the mean for 
omission errors was 8.517. The same two means in the slow 
condition were .19 and .5 respectively.
Part of the explanation for this state of affairs is, 
no doubt, that especially in the "fast” condition it is more 
likely that one will miss making a response than that one will 
make an extra response, Suggesting that situational variables 
are the paramount determinants of behaviour. This can not 
be the whole story, however. It has already been reported 
that more commission errors were made if the task was 
made more difficult, either by increasing the rate of 
presentation, or by making the discrimination more difficult 
by placing the stimuli near the centre of the screen.
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Besides this, one could point out that there was as much time 
available in which to make a commission error as to make a 
correct response, and these predominated*
Talking to Ss informally after the experiment^ most of 
them were surprised to find how well they had done, for, 
it emerged, almost all S had adapted a strategy of caution - 
an "if in doubt don't respond" strategy. Thus the relatively 
large number of omissions, and in consequence the more 
reliable correlations, were the result not only of the physical 
parameters of the situation, but also of a conscious decision 
on the part of the individuals. It seems that we have here 
a good example of the complex relationship between the 
individual and the situation.
It is possible that it is because of the way in which 
this strategy was employed that there appears to be more 
support for the hypothesis : the more similar the stimuli
are the more similar the response behaviour will be, within 
the experimental task (4b) than between experimental tasks 
(4a and 4b).
It seems, then, that things may be considerably more 
complex than Wallach and Leggett have argued, and more likely 
to be in line with the proposals of Mischel (1973) and Bandura 
(1977). It seems that the degree of consistency observed 
will depend on the strategy adopted by the individual observed, 
the behaviours recorded, and other critical variables such as 
the instructions given to the S, the range of situations 
sampled and, perhaps most importantly, how S views the 
situations i.e. whether he sees them as sufficiently similar 
to justify using the same strategy.
These solutions are, of course, in line with those 
proposed in earlier chapters. One of a different persuasion 
might argue that given the problematic nature of the data.
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the moderate correlations obtained, especially with relation 
to the omission data, may well indicate a substantial degree 
of consistency. Each point of view might find some support 
in the present data. What is beyond doubt is that any 
simplistic model of the determinants of human behaviour 
is wrong.
If the behavioural data relevant to the consistency 
issue is somewhat confused, the self rating data is even more 
so. It appears that even non-significant results are not 
reliably replicable. In experiment 2 the three self ratings 
of consistency were found to be independent of one another, 
it was, therefore, suggested that consistency might be trait 
specific. In experiment 3 these same three ratings were found 
to correlate. In the present experiment one of the three 
correlations, that between rated consistency for neuroticism 
and for impulsivity, was found to be significant the other 
two were not.
On the other hand, however, one finding does appear
to be reliable and that is the correlation between rated
consistency for neuroticism and rated neuroticism, in 
experiment 2 a correlation of -.379 (p = .006) was reported, 
in experiment 3 a correlation of -.251 (p .05 ), and in the 
present study a correlation of -.436 (p<.005).
It seems then that the common conception of 
neuroticism includes the concept of inconsistency.
10:14 SUMMARY
On the basis of the first experiment it was concluded
that there was some limited support for the hypothesis that
individuals classified as neurotic tend to fail to inhibit 
responses, but this statement is true only for introverted 
subjects. The second experiment indicated that mobility
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and rigidity were likely to be independent factors, and that 
the tendency to make commission errors, was, in this situation, 
the most promising index as a measure of mobility of the 
nervous system. It was felt that caution was necessary, 
however, as few errors of commission had been made, and in 
consequence the correlations on which this evaluation was 
made, lacked reliability. Any possibility of selecting Ss 
on the basis of their commission error score was quashed when 
it was found in the third section of the study that there was 
little evidence of consistency with respect to this type of 
error. This apparent inconsistency may have been a function 
of the fact that there were relatively few commission errors, 
for there appeared to be a moderate degree of consistency 
with respect to omission errors, and there were considerably 
more omission errors made.
It was also found that, as in previous experiments, 
while the physical - situational variables had a substantial 
effect on behaviour the trait variables were rarely found to 
have a significant effect. However, it was argued that this 
should not be interpreted as indicating that situational 
variables are all important. In the third section of the 
study it was argued, indeed, that a personal variable in the 
shape of the strategy adapted by the S, was having a critical 
influence on behaviour, and it was for this reason that the 
hypothesis suggesting that similar stimuli will elicit similar 
behaviour, was only partly confirmed.
It was suggested that the data might best be 
interpreted as reflecting the complex reciprocal relationship 
between physical, personal and behavioural variables.
One finding which was replicated was that individuals 
who rate themselves as inconsistent with respect to the 
dimension of neuroticism tend to rate themselves as neurotic.
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CHAPTER XI EXPERIMENT 5
11.1 ABSTRACT
Subjects were required to respond to appetitive 
stimuli, stimuli for active avoidance and neutral stimuli 
At the behavioural level it appeared that individuals were 
differentially sensitive to these cues of reinforcement.
Only the weakest evidence was available to link this 
dimension of differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement 
to extraversion. A self rating of differential sensitivity 
was found to distinguish between individuals displaying 
differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcements more 
successfully. This dimension was also found to be 
substantially independent of need achievement and locus of 
control.
Locus of control was found to contain two sub factors 
related to positive and negative outcomes, though these 
were not independent of each other.
No real evidence was found for behavioural consistency, 
nor even for self-rated consistency being consistent.
Self rated consistency appeared to be trait specific.
Self ratings on the dimensions of extraversion, neuroticism 
and impulsivity were, however, found to be consistent.
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11:2 INTRODUCTION
As already pointed out experiments 1 - 3  assumed 
that there was some substance to Gray's claim that the 
dimension of differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement 
is closely related to the Eysenckian dimension of introversion- 
extraversion, with the result that emperimental situations 
were so contrived as to derive different predictions from 
the two theories, Gray's and Eysenck's. While Eysenck's theory 
has received some support Gray's has received none at all.
This assumption is laid aside in the present experiment, 
and whether or not people are found to be differentially 
sensitive to cues of reinforcement serves, instead, as the 
focus of attention.
The present experiment is an elaboration of an earlier 
experiment. In experiment 3 Ss were able to use a response 
key to avoid reinforcement, it was expected that they would 
leam to use the key to avoid negative reinforcement, but 
to avoid using it when positive reinforcement was available.
This they did. It was suggested in that experiment that the 
difference between the Eysenckian and Grayian models might be 
evident at the stage of learning an operant response. The 
results favoured Eysenck's contention that introverted Ss 
display superior conditionability. The present experiment 
dispenses even with the learning stage and questions whether 
or not individuals are able to respond to cues of appetitive 
and aversive reinforcement with differential efficiency, when 
they are informed of the value of these cues.
In this experiment, then, Ss were instructed that 
responding with one key in the face of one stimulus (CS - Rew) 
would gain them a point; responding with a second key 
to another stimulus (CS - Pun) would allow them to avoid losing 
a point. There was also a third stimulus available but this
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was associated with neither positive or negative reinforcement, 
though the S was instructed to press a third key in response 
to it.
This situation provided information about the manner 
in which Ss responded in face of various cues of reinforcement. 
It also necessitated some thought about what might constitute 
the data for analysis.
Scores
As one ultimately wishes to draw some conclusions from 
the data obtained, it seems worth while to give some thought 
to what the various scores, which might be derived from this 
data, might "mean".
(1) Ss, during the course of the experiment, both gained and 
lost points according to the accuracy of their responding.
It might seem appropriate, therefore, to use the Ss final total 
net score as the raw data for the analyses. However, an S 
responding correctly on every avoidance trial but incorrectly 
on every gain trial would achieve a net score of zero; an S 
responding correctly on every gain but incorrectly on every 
avoid trial would also achieve a total net score of zero.
Thus two Ss responding in very different fashions would achieve 
identical scores, and obviously this measure is not sensitive 
enough to differential sensitivity for our needs. It also 
appears to a greater or lesser degree to reflect speed of 
responding, motivation, fatigue and other such variables.
This measure will be refered to as the "net score" and may be 
defined as the number of points gained minus the number of 
points lost.
(2) One might improve on the net score by looking instead 
at the total number of times the two keys "gain" and "avoid", 
were pressed, whether or not the responses were correct.
Though this measure preserves some information lost in the net 
score, it too has its short comings. This measure clearly
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reflects two, quite distinct, components;
(i) Ss sensitivity to the cues of reinforcement
(ii) Ss tendency to respond to, or the strength of his need, 
or his desire to gain or avoid reinforcement.
It is only the first of these which is 6f.interest with respect 
to Gray's theory. So this measure does not appear to be 
entirely satisfactory. This measure will be referred to as 
the "Total" press score, and is derived as follows:
The total number of times the gain key (TG) was used minus 
the total number times the avoid key (TA) was used, divided 
by the total number of responses (TR) made.
(TG - TA)
TR
(3) The magnitude of the net score will be limited by two 
types of error which are confounded: the number of failures to 
respond correctly with the gain key, and the number of failures 
to respond correctly with the avoid key. It would be desirable 
to attempt to differentiate between correct and erroneous 
responses. To this end one might derive a measure from the 
correct responses only, arguing that with respect to Gray's 
theory what one is interested in is> on one hand, the number of 
correct responses to cues of reward and punishment, reflecting 
sensitivity while on the other the difference between the 
number of correct responses to each of these cues reflecting 
the degree of differential sensitivity. Thus if Gray is 
correct one would predict that the individual relatively 
more sensitive to cues of punishment will make more correct 
avoidance than gain responses, while the situation will be 
reversed for the individual relatively more sensitive to cues 
of reward. This measure though an improvement on the Net 
score will not be absolutely pure, still reflecting to some 
degree Ss desire for reinforcement.
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This measure will be called the "correct" score and 
may be defined as follows; The number of correct gain 
responses (CG) minus the number of correct avoid (CA) 
responses divided by the total number of correct responses (TC),
(CG - CA)
TC
(4) One might look at the general desire for or need for one 
or the other type of reinforcement by looking at the 
difference in the number of erroneous "gain" and "avoid" responses 
made. This measure, though, will suffer from the same 
limitations as the "Total" press score, reflecting both 
sensitivity and need.
This measure will be called the "error" score and may 
be defined as follows: The number of erroneous "gain"
responses (EG) minus the number of erroneous "avoid" responses 
(EA) divided by the total number of error responses (TE)
(EG - EA)
TE
(5) Three keys were available to the S one related to cues 
of reward, one to cues of punishment and the third to neutral 
stimuli. One might obtain a better measure of the differential 
need for, or tendency to respond with the key of reward by 
looking at the difference in the number of times the gain key 
and avoid key were used when the neutral key ought to have 
been used. This measure will be free of sensitivity to cues 
of reward and punishment. As the term "error score" has 
already been used it is proposed to call this measure the 
"need" score, as it is assummed to reflect the differential 
need for one type of reinforcement over the other and the 
tendency to respond with the key associated with that 
reinforcement, even when the reinforcement is not available.
The "need" score then may be defined as follows:
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The number of times the "gain" responses are made to the 
neutral stimulus (NG) minus the number of times the "avoid" 
response is made to the neutral stimulus (NA) divided by 
their sum
(NG - NA)
(NG + NA)
Having indicated the main indices of performance and 
what they are thought to reflect this seems to be an 
appropriate place to state the first set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5:1 (i) The "net" score will not be found to
correlate with any of the other measures of performance, 
(ii) There will be little overlap between the "correct"
and "need" measure of performance as they are reflecting 
essentially different things. Thus the correlation 
between them although positive, will be small^
With relation to the relationship of differential 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement and the Eysenckian dimensions 
one might offer the following hypotheses :
Hypothesis 5:2 (i) On the "correct" measure extraverts will
obtain a significantly larger score than the introverts; 
there will also be an E x N interaction.
(ii) These differences will not be evident on the "net"
score measure, nor on the "need" score.
Hypothesis 5:3 (i) There will be a positive correlation between
the EPI E score and the "correct" score.
(ii) EPI N will be found to correlate significantly with the
total number of correct responses made, regardless of 
whether they are responses to cues of positive or 
negative reinforcement.
As no evidence has been forth coming to support the 
hypothesis that Eysenck's introversion-extraversion is related 
to the dimension of differential sensitivity to cues of
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reinforcement it was decided to obtain from Ss a rating 
indicating to which they felt more sensitive, cues of reward 
or punishment. The self-rating, of course, presents a 
special problem, for although Ss were asked about sensitivity 
to the likelihood of pleasant or unpleasant ov^ Ajcomes - 
"Are you more motivated by, or sensitive to the likelihood of 
a pleasant outcome or the likelihood of an unpleasant outcome?"
- they may well have been rating their sensitivity to rewards 
and punishments rather than to the cues of reinforcement.
This results in two possible hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5:4 (i) If Ss are rating sensitivity to cues then
thostwho rate themselves more towards the reward end of 
the scale should obtain a higher "correct" score
(ii) If Ss are rating sensitivity to reward and punishment 
itself the difference between Ss rating themselves as 
more sensitive to rewards and punishment should be 
evident on the "need" score.
Need - Achievement
There are certain, at least superficial, similarities 
between Gray's concept of differential sensitivity and the 
older ones of need-achievement (n-ach) and fear of failure, 
those individuals relatively more sensitive to cues of reward 
resembling the high need-achievers. It can be maintained, however, 
that the two concepts are quite distinct, one being a 
sensitivity, the other a need and willingness to engage in 
activity to obtain a goal. It is possible, indeed likely, 
that, at times, the two qualities will be evident in the same 
individual, but it is not necessary that they are.
Given the superficial similarities it was felt worthwhile 
including a measure of n-ach in the present study. It is 
hypothesized that:
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Hypothesis 5:5 (i) High n-ach scorers will obtain higher
"need" scores than low n-ach scorers.
(ii) The high n-ach scores may also obtain higher "net" 
scores
(iii) No significant difference will be found between high 
and low n-ach scorers on the "correct" score measure
(iv) n-ach will not be found to correlate with any supposed 
measure of sensitivity i.e. "correct" score, 
extraversion, rated sensitivity to cues of reward, to 
cues of punishment, or differential sensitivity to cues 
of reinforcement.
LOCUS OF CONTROL 
AWARENESS
In experiment 2 a significantly greater proportion of 
introverted, than of extraverted, Ss became aware of the 
prevailing reinforcement contingencies. The pattern was the 
same, though the differences were not significant in 
experiment 3. On the basis of this finding it might be 
speculated that introverts, as a result of their superior 
awareness, might feel that they have some degree of control 
over the environment - they can relate their behaviour / directly 
to changes in the environment. Extraverts, in contrast, 
not noticing the relationship between responses and 
reinforcement might well not experience this sense of control 
and instead feel they were simply responding to the situation. 
This sense of controling or being controlled is, of course, 
similar to Rotter's (1966) concept of Locus of Control, (LoC). 
Having remarked on this similarity one might predict that 
individuals characterized by internal beliefs might well be 
cue sensitive. Indeed if LoC were divided into internal- 
external beliefs for negative and for positive beliefs, then
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one might suggest that those individuals classified as internals 
for positive beliefs (In+) are the same individuals Gray 
classifies as relatively more sensitive to cues of reward.
While internals for negative events (In-) may be regarded 
as identical with those people Gray classifies as relatively 
more sensitive to cues of punishment.
Before continuing with this line of speculation, 
however, it seems appropriate to say something of Rotters 
concept of LoC and refer to some recent research 
relevant to it.
LoC belongs to the same tradition as the social 
learning theories of Mischel (1973) and Bandura (1977) outlined 
earlier and so it should be regarded as what Mischel calls 
a "person variable" rather than a personality trait.
Rotter (1965) describes it as follows: "The effect of
reinforcement following some behaviour on the part of a 
human subject...... is not a stamping in process but depends
on whether or not the person perceives a causal relationship 
between his own behaviour and the reward..... when reinforcement
is perceived by the subject as following some action of his 
own but not being entirely contingent upon his action, then, 
in our culture, it is typically perceived as the result of 
luck, chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, 
or as unpredictable because of the great complexity of the 
forces surrounding him. When the event is interpreted in 
this way by an individual, we have labelled this a belief 
in external control. If the person perceives that the 
event is contingent upon his own behaviour or his own 
relatively permanent characteristics, we have termed this a 
belief in internal control." ( p.l)
Thus internals (Ins) are aware of, or perceived, 
the relationship between their behaviour and its consequences
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whereas externals (Exs) do not. This is much as we found 
introverted and extraverted Ss, respectively, to behave.
It seems, then, that it may be reasonable to look at the 
relationship between these two - LoC and introversion- 
extraversion.
Eysenck, of course, contends that the introversion- 
extraversion dimension is closely related to a factor of 
conditionability, though this has received only limited 
support in experiments 1 - 3 .  As for LoC there appears to 
be little evidence that Ins condition more efficiently than 
Ex.s. The situation is somewhat complex, however, as there 
is some suggestion that In.s strenuously resist any attempts 
at subtly influencing their behaviour.
Getter (1966) found that though Ex.s conditioned more 
efficiently than In.s in a verbal conditioning situation, the 
In.s showed an increase in the conditioned response once 
reinforcement was withdrawn. This he interpreted as 
latent conditioning. Similarly Strickland (1970) found 
that though In.s quickly became aware of the prevailing 
reinforcement contingencies,they did not display the CR.
Ude and Vogler (1969) also reported that In.s were more likely 
to become aware of reinforcement contingencies. Lichtenstein 
and Graine (1969) failed to support the results of Getter and 
Strickland.
Jolly and Spielberger (1973) reported that 
in their study only Ss aware of the reinforcement contingencies 
were found to condition. LoC and anxiety were found to be 
unrelated to performance among Ss classified as unaware.
Amongst the "aware" Ss high anxiety - Ex. s were more responsive 
to social reinforcement than high anxiety - In.s, but low 
anxiety - In.s were more responsive than low anxiety - Ex.s.
Doctor (1971) found that only aware Ex.s conditioned.
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and Gore (1962) found that In.s were resistant to subtle 
influences. Biondo and MacDonald (1971), have called these 
findings into question, however.
Studies by Ritchie and Phares (1969), Hjelle and Clauser 
(1970), Rychman, Martens, Rodda and Sherman (1972) and Snyder 
and Larson (1972) suggest the Ex.s are more interested in the 
source than the content of a message. While Hamsher, Galler 
and Rotter (1968) found that it was Ex.s who tended to 
disbelieve the Warren Commission Report.
Approaching the problem from a different angle 
Lefcourt (1972) found that Ex.s performed a task according to 
the instructions they were given, while In.s did not.
Lefcourt, Lewis and Silverman (1968) found that In.s were 
yore reluctant to accept instructions which emphasized the role 
of chance, i.e. instructions which were at variance with 
their own beliefs.
Similarly Crowne and Liverant (1963) using an Asch - type 
conformity situation found that in some conditions In.s displayed 
less conformity than Ex.s, and Tolor (1971) reported that Ex.s 
were more susceptible than In.s to the auto-kinetic effect.
Phares (1976) has concluded "one might assert that 
externals appear readily persuadable, conforming to what they 
believe is expected of them, and accepting of information or 
other sources of influence. This is not to say that internals 
never conform or never move their attitudes in the direction 
of the applied persuasion. But when they do, it appears to be
on the basis of a considered analysis of the merits of the 
message. Majorities, peer influence, prestige of 
communicators, or the social reinforcements available in the 
situation all affect internals to a much lesser extent than 
they do externals. Indeed, the evidence suggests that there 
may be active resistance to influence, particularly subtle
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influence, on the part of internals." (p.92)
Whether or not this conclusion is entirely justified on 
the basis of the available data is debatable, but what does 
seem to emerge with some consistency is that In.s become aware 
of what is "going on" more quickly than do Ex.s and respond 
in a manner they feel is most appropriate. On the basis of 
this, then, *it seems reasonable to postulate that there will 
be at least a moderate relationship between LoC and the 
intro vers ion-extravers ion dimension. This, then, may be
taken as another hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5:6 There will be a positive correlation between 
Rotter's (1966) LoC scale (scored in the direction of 
externality) and the EPI E scale.
Anxiety and Ego-Strength
Another aspect of LoC vdiich promotes interest in the 
present situation is that In.s, at least those who are 
moderately internal, might be viewed as looking at the world 
in a realistic manner and responding appropriately to it.
This is,of course, how Roessler views Es.
Rotter (1966), himself, has commented on the relationship. 
"Perhaps less clear is the relationship of internal versus 
external control of reinforcement to the notion of 'ego- 
control'. Although the concept of ego-control is not always 
defined similarly, it seems to contain the idea of confidence 
and ability to deal with reality. While it seems likely that
individuals at both extremes of the internal versus external 
control of reinforcement dimension are essentially unrealistic, 
it is not unlikely that the people towards the middle of the 
distribution are less confident. We do have indications, 
however, that people at either extreme of the reinforcement 
dimension are likely to be maladjusted by most definitions, and.
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to the extent that ego-control is another type of definition 
of maladjustment, it will bear some curvilinear relationship 
to the variable we are concerned with here." (p.4 ).
Es is, of course, clodely related to neuroticism, 
and a number of studies have reported significant relationships 
between LoC and anxiety, if not neuroticism (cf Phares;
1976, p.121). It is, therefore, hypothesized
Hypothesis 5:7 (i) In view of Rotter's suggestion that the
relationship between LoC and Es is likely to be 
curvilinear it is predicted that any relationship 
between these two variables will be moderate in size 
and negative
(ii) Similarly EPI N is expected to show a moderate and 
positive relationship with LoC.
Competence
One would expect competence to be allied to an 
accurate perception of reality, and perhaps the greatest 
distinction that has been made between In.s and Ex.s has been 
in terms of their differential efficiency and success.
Much of the early experimental work in this area was 
directed towards demonstrating that people behave differently 
when they believe they have or have not control of reward 
contingencies (eg. Phares, 1957; James, 1957; James and 
Rotter, 1958; Bennion, 1961, Rotter, Liverant and Crowne 
1961; Blackman, 1962; Fazio and Hendricks, 1970; Walls and 
Cox, 1971). Differences were found in the success with 
vdiich tasks were performed, learning and extinction rates, in 
behaviour related to changes in the portability of an outcome. 
"Whether (people) are confronted with chance instructions, 
a task they have learned in the past is chance - controlled, 
or a highly variable or unpatterned performance, the results
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are the same: They learn a great deal less, and this
decrement in learning seems directly attributable to the 
effects on expectancy of a belief that, in a given 
situation, they do not control the relationship between 
behaviour and reinforcement". (Phares, 1976, p.30).
Given that predictable differences in behaviour 
could be expected from people who held different beliefs about 
the control of reinforcement, on the basis of experimental 
manipulations. Rotter, Phares and others, from the early 
1960*s, have set out to demonstrate that similar differences 
might be elicited from people who would be characterized 
as internals or externals. The differences in behaviour 
being attributed to the different beliefs held by internals 
and externals.
It has been claimed that In.s seek out and use 
information more efficiently than Ex.s (e.g. Seeman and Evans, 
1962; Seeman, 1963; Davis and Phares, 1967; Willis and 
Stock, 1972). Lefcourt and Wine (1967) reported that In.s 
attempted to engage in more eye contact, and made more 
observations of the situation when it was ambiguous than Ex.s 
did. Lefcourt (1967) suggested that Ex.s did not categorize 
the situation in a way that facilitated awareness of the, 
contingencies of reinforcement, although they were able to use 
reinforcement cues if they were made explicit.
DuCette and WoIk (1973) found that internals 
remembered successes better than externals did, and used 
experience both to improve their own performance and to 
decipher rules. In.s have also been found to display more 
incidental learning (WoIk and DuCette, 1974).
As might be expected given the superiority of the
In.s in the acquisition and use of information LoC has been
associated with differential success. Indeed LoC has been
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associated with all kinds of behaviours, from birth control 
practices (Lundy, 1972; MacDonald, 1970; Phares and Wilson, 
1972) to giving up smoking (Straits and Sechrest, 1963; James, 
Woodruff and Wemer, 1965) with In.s generally exhibiting the 
greater degree of control. Although Lichtenstein and \
Keutzer (1967) failed to replicate the findings of earlier 
studies relating smoking to LoC.
Several studies have looked at the relationship 
between LoC and risk taking, (e.g. Liverant and Scodel 1960; 
Lefcourt, 1965; Strickland, Lewicki and Katz, 1966; Baron, 
1968; Julian, Lichtman and Ryckman, 1968). It would be 
misleading to say that all these studies yield consonant 
results, for, at least at first sight, they appear to 
contradict each other. However, it does appear that there 
is a general trend with the In.s behaving in a manner which 
might be described as "appropriate".
In.s have been found to be the more successful in an 
auctioning situation (Elkins and Cochran, 1978); they are 
more often office holders, (Brown and Strickland, 1972); 
they are more willing to take steps to correct personal 
short comings (Phares, Ritchie and Davis, 1968). In.s 
have been found to be more "efficient" in eliciting the 
desired experimental results (Felton, 1971); and they have 
even been found to induce a greater degree of attitude 
change than externals, when reading from the same prepared 
script. (Phares, 1965).
Several studies (e.g. Bailer, 1961; Strickland,
1972; 1973; Walls and Smith, 1970) have reported a 
relationship between LoC and the ability to delay 
gratification. Other studies, however, (e.g. Walls and 
Miller, 1970; Zytkoskee, Strickland and Watson, 1971) have 
failed to confirm that such a relationship exists.
3S4
Many studies (e.g. Cellura, 1963; Crandall,
Katkovsky and Crandall, 1965; Chance, 1965; McGhee and 
Crandall, 1968; Gurin, Gurin, Lao and Beattie, 1969;
Buck and Austrin 1970; Lao, 1970; Solomon, Houlihan,
Busse and Pardius 1971; Brown and Strickland, 1972;
Clifford and Cleary, 1972; Messer, 1972) have reported a 
relationship between internality and school achievement. ^
Not all studies have managed to find such a relationship, 
however, (e.g. Eisenman. and Platt, 1968; Katz, 1967;
Warehime, 1972).
"The most basic characteristic of internal individuals 
appears to be their greater efforts at coping with or attaining 
mastery over their environments. This is the most elemental 
deduction that could be made from the nature of the I - E 
(internal ity - externality) variable. Fortunately, this 
deduction has received wide spread support from experiments 
with many different populations in a variety of situations." 
(Phares, 1976, p.78).
This description of In.s as exerting greater efforts 
at coping and being generally more successful leads to the 
suggestion that LoC may well be related to n-ach. Rotter 
(1966) has remarked on the similarity: "Perhaps one of the
major conceptions which bears some relationship to the belief 
in internal versus external control of reinforcement is that 
of need for achievement. The work of McClelland, Atkinson,
Clark and Lowell (1953) and of Atkinson (1958) and their 
colleagues working primarily with adults, and Crandall (1963) 
with children, suggests that people who are high on the 
need for achievement, in all probability, have some belief 
in their own ability or skill to determine the outcome of 
their efforts. The relationship is probably not linear, however, 
since a person high on motivation for achievement might not
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be equally high on a belief in internal control of 
reinforcement, and there may be many with a low need for 
achievement who still believe that their own behaviour 
determines the kinds of reinforcements they obtain", (p.3 ).
Empirically the two dimensions have not been found 
to be closely related. Lichtman and Julian (1964), and 
Gold (1968), and Wolk and DuCette (1971) found no relationship 
between the two variables. Odell (1959) and Pedhazur and 
Wheeler (1971) reported small correlations; Mehrabian 
(1968, 1969) reported a correlation of .64 for males and 
.41 for females, between LoC and n-ach. Chance, on the other 
hand reported a negative correlation between internality and 
n-ach.
Durand and Shea (1974), looking at the entrepreneurial 
activity of black small business men attempted to distinguish 
between LoC as a belief in control of reinforcement, on 
n-ach - a "know(ing) what to do", or a "typically thinking of 
instrumental activities that lead to an achievement goal" 
(po59)o They reported a correlation of -.19 between 
locus of control and n-ach.
Given, then, that In.s are generally more successful 
than Ex.s it might be predicted that in the present experiment:
Hypothesis 5:8 (i) Those Ss classified as internal will be
found to have a larger Net score than those Ss 
classified as external,
(ii) The correlation between LoC (scored in the direction 
of externality) and n-ach will be small and negative.
Unitariness
To this point LoC has been spoken of as if it were 
unitary, but this, of course, is not necessarily so. There 
appears to be no a priori reason for maintaining that those
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who believe they are responsible for their success must also 
believe that they are responsible for their failures, or 
even that those who feel they are in control of their fate 
to a substantial degree must feel that luck and chance 
are unimportant. This is not the first time the 
unitariness of LoC has been questioned. Phares (1976) noted 
that Liverant, Rotter, Seeman and Crowne (Rotter, 1966) looked 
for sub-scales to the general intemality-externality one.
Mirels* (1970) factor analysis yielded two subscales : 
(1) personal mastery in life, (2) the extent to which an 
individual can influence society. Abrahamson, Schulderman 
and Schulderman (1973) found similar factors. Gurin, Gurin, 
Lao and Beattie (1969) constructed a questionnaire with two 
sub-scales: (1) personal, (2) ideological. Schne\d.er and 
Parson’s (1970) identified five sub-dimensions (1) general 
luck (2) respect, (3) politics (4) academic and leadership,
(5) success. Levenson (1973a, b, c), constructed scales 
related to internality, powerful others, and chance.
Similar to the distinction made earlier between 
internality-externality for success and failure is that made 
by Crandall, Katkovsky and Crandall (1965) in their 
Intellectual Achievement Responsibility questionnaire (lAR). 
This has two sub-scales, one measuring internal ity for 
achievement (In+), the other internality for failure (In-). 
These two sub-scales have been found to relate differentially 
to academic success.
A recent study, reported after the present study was 
completed, by Gregory (1978) seems worth considering in some 
detail here. Gregory claimed that "No studies have been 
designed expressly to test whether the Rotter (1966) scale 
can distinguish between Internals and Externals in both 
positive and negative outcomes." (p.841).
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His prediction was, however, that the LoC scale would 
distinguish between the more and less successful individuals 
only in aversive conditions i.e. In.s are only superior 
to Ex.s with respect to avoiding punishments.
59 Females and 48 males took part in the experiment 
and they were required to match various angles with a stimulus 
angle. The task was the same as that used by James (1957) 
and Rotter and Mulry (1965). All the test angles were 
within 2° of the stimulus angle but presented in a different 
rotation. There were no correct choices available^
Course credits were used as both positive and negative 
reinforcers. Ss were classified both V on the basis of Rotter's 
(1966) LoC scale and the Malevolent- Benevolent Questionnaire 
(MBQ) (Gregory et al, 1978). On the basis of this Ss were 
allocated to categories: (l) In+ In- (2) In+ Ex-
(3) Ex+ In (4) Ex+ Ex-
As can be seen from Fig. 11:1 it is only in the 
punishment condition that a substantial difference is found 
between groups, as Gregory had predicted. It would seem 
then that there is some basis for Gregory's claim that 
Rotter's (1966) scale is really measuring locus of control 
for avoiding unpleasant outcomes.
One would predict that in those situations where 
the S feels he has more control he will take more time in 
order to be sure of making the correct decision.
Table 11:1 indicates that when individuals feel they have more 
control in positive than in negative situations (In+Ex-) or 
vice versa then they do, indeed, take more time over the 
task in the appropriate condition. While if they see no 
difference in their control whether the situation is 
positive or negative (In+In-, and Ex+Ex- groups), then as •; 
might be expected they do not display any difference in decision
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time in the two situations.
TABLE 11:1 TIME SPENT ON A MATCHING TASK AS A FUNCTION 
OF INSTRUCTIONAL SET AND MBQ CATEGORIZATION
Positive
Outcome
LoC
Negative
Outcome
Reward Punishment P
ln+
In- 18 17.5 N.S.
Ex- 27.6 14.5 P < .01
Ex+
In- 11.7 19.0 P < .08
Ex- 15.5 18.3 N.S.
These results, however, raise some problems of their
own. Onjy one of the four comparisons reached the p = .05
level of significance, though admittedly one other was 
substantially in the predicted direction. If the hypothesis 
put forward to explain these results was correct then one 
would expect the In+ In- group to take longer in making 
their decision in both reward and punishment conditions 
than the Ex+ Ex- group, but as can be seen this does not 
appear to be the case. Similarly though the In+ groups 
take longer in the reward condition than the Ex+ groups, the 
situation is not equally reassuring with respect to the In­
groups, in the punishment condition,
Ss were allocated to groups on the basis of their
MBQ scores for this analysis, and so it appears we have 
confounded the problem. (1) Are there two LoC dimensions 
one referring to positive - rewarding events, the other to 
negative - punishing events? (2) Does the MBQ measure them 
both adequately?
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From the results reported in Fig. 11:1, where Ss were 
allocated to groups on the basis of their scores on the 
Rotter LoC scale, it does appear that there are two 
substantially independent variables, with the Rotter scale 
relevant only to the punishment one. One might wish to 
argue that the results are as they are because reward has 
some over-riding effect which obscures any effect due to 
belief in LoC. This, though possible, seems unlikely given 
the fact that internals and externals diverge from this 
moderate level obtained in the reward condition in different 
and predictable directions in the punishment condition.
One might argue that externals are simply more 
motivated in the face of reward, but this does not explain 
why the internal group takes less time in this condition 
than in the punishment condition.
It seems likely that the problems with the MBQ 
results lie, at least in part, with the instrument itself. 
Gregory, himself, has remarked that the MBQ was "not designed 
to serve as a locus of control measure", (p.842).
It is also worth noting in the present context 
that Mischel (Mischel, Zeiss and Zeiss, 1974) has also 
devised a locus of control scale, for use with pre-school 
children. This scale also employs the In+, In- distinction.
The locus of control dimension, of course, grew out 
of Rotter's (1954) social learning theory and though at times 
it has been used as if it were a personality trait Rotter 
has stressed that it is not. Mischel (1974) in his turn 
has said: "The present study has been guided not by the 
search for the global correlates of pervasive generalized 
dispositions but by an interest in the particular relations 
between differences in expectancies and theoretically 
relevant behaviour in specific situations. The overall
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results suggest that individual differences about their 
ability to control outcomes are partial determinants of their 
goal directed behaviour, but the relationships hinge on 
extremely specific moderating conditions with regard to 
both types of behaviour and type of belief" (p.278).
On the basis of the distinction between belief in control 
of outcomes for positive and negative events, and particularly 
with Gregory's (1978) experiment in mind the following 
hypotheses may be put forward.
Hypothesis 5:9 (i) If Ss are asked to rate their belief in
their control of positive and negative outcomes 
separately then: Rotter's scale (scored in the
direction of externality) should (i) correlate 
negatively with rated internality for negative outcomes, 
(ii) but not with positive outcomes.
Hypothesis 5:10 (i) We might also expect rated In+ to
correlate with rated sensitivity to cues of reward
(ii) Similarly rated In- should be found to correlate
with rated sensitivity to cues of punishment.
Hypothesis 5:11 On the basis of the results of Gregory's 
experiment it might be predicted that those Ss classified as 
internal on the Rotter scale will have a low "Correct" score 
(reflecting the fact that they make proportionally more 
correct avoidance than gain responses).
Hypothesis 5:12 There ought to be a significant In- x In+ 
interaction, and In+Ex- Ss obtaining the highest "Correct" score 
and the Ex+In- group the lowest "Correct" score.
Hypothesis 5:13 A similar interaction might also be 
predicted between LoC and differential sensitivity to cues of 
reward and punishment, with the Internal-punishment
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sensitive Ss obtaining the lowest correct score 
Consistency
Several subjects took part in both the present 
experiment and the previous one, and this gave the 
opportunity to look at the consistency of both (i) self 
report data and (ii) behavioural data.
With respect to the self report data, as the same 
questionnaires were used and there seemed to be little in 
the two situations which might persuade people to respond in 
a markedly different way, and the time interval between the 
two testings was 3 - 4  months, it might be expected that 
substantial correlations would be obtained.
For the behavioural data no significant correlations 
are predicted. In experiment 4 some consistency was found 
for errors of omission. In the present situation, however, 
to employ a strategy which resulted in a large number of 
omissions would prove costly. Thus, because, of the 
different strategies suggested by the two experimental 
situations, different patterns of behaviour are expected, and 
no evidence of rank order consistency in behaviour.
With regard to the commission errors, while there 
may well be many in the present experiment, as there were 
so few in the previous experiment, and the various commission 
error scores were not found to correlate, it seems highly 
unlikely that significant correlations will be found in the 
present instance.
Hypothesis 5;14 There will be significant correlations 
between the self ratings obtained in this present experiment 
and the ratings obtained in experiment 4 for the same 
dimension.
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Hypothesis 5;15 No significant correlations will be found between 
the commission errors or the omission errors made in the two 
experiments
As Ss were being asked to complete several 
questionnaires it was decided to administer these same 
questionnaires to a larger group of individuals. This was 
to make a factor analysis of the results possible. The main 
point of interest here was whether or not sensitivity to cues 
of reinforcement would emerge as a meaningful self report 
factor, or whether it would be subsummed under some other
factor. A second point of interest was whether or not locus
of control would be found to split into two factors.
Hypothesis 5;16 Several factors ought to emerge from the 
factor analysis:
(1) Extraversion loaded on by EPI -E, rated Extraversion
(sociability), and rated Impulsivity
(2) Neuroticism loaded on by EPI -N, Es and rated neuroticism
(3) Differential sensitivity to cues of Reinforcement
(4) Sensitivity to cues of reward
(5) Sensitivity to cues of punishment
(6) Locus of control for positive events
(7) Locus of control for negative events, loaded on by the
Rotter scale, and the self rating for In-.
No one factor of consistency is predicted.
With both questionnaire and behavioural data available 
it is possible to turn a question round and ask not only if 
people who rate themselves differently behave differently, 
but also if people who behave differently rate themselves 
differently.
Hypothesis 5:17 If S are divided into high, medium and low 
"Correct" scorers, they ought to be found to rate themselves 
differently on the EPI -E scale, on sensitivity to cues of
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reward and punishment, on the Rotter scale, and on the In+
and In- questions.
Hypothesis 5;18 Ss divided into groups on the basis of their
"Need" scores ought to be found to rate themselves differently
with respect to n-ach.
11:2 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
5:1 Measures derived in different ways will be found to
reflect different qualities:
(i) The "Net" score will not correlate with any of the 
other measures of performance.
(ii) The correlation between the "Correct" and "Need" 
scores will be small but positive.
5:2 (i) When the "Correct" score is used as the dependent
variable the extraversion main effect and the
E X  N interaction will be found to be significant,
(ii) No significant differences will be found between 
extraversion groups when the "Net" score or "Need" 
score is used as the dependent variable.
5:3 (i) There will be a positive correlation between EPI E
and the "Correct" score.
(ii) There will be a positive correlation between EPI N 
and the number of correct responses made.
5:4 (i) There will be a significant difference between those
rating themselves as relatively more sensitive to 
reward and those rating themselves as relatively more 
sensitive to punishment on the "Correct" measure.
(ii) There will be a significant difference between Ss
rating themselves as more sensitive to cues of reward 
and those rating themselves as more sensitive to 
punishment on the "Need" score.
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5:5 (i) High n-ach Ss will obtain higher "Need" scores than
low n-ach Ss
(ii) High n-ach scorers will obtain higher "Net" scores 
than low n-ach scorers
(iii) No significant difference will be found between 
high and low n-ach scorers on the "Correct" 
score measure.
(iv) N-ach will not be found to correlate with EPI E, 
rated extraversion,rated sensitivity to cues of 
reward or punishment, or rated differential 
sensitivity to cues of reward.
5:6 There will be a correlation between externality and EPI E
5:7 (i) There will be a small, negative correlation between
Es and externality 
(ii) There will be a positive correlation between EPI N 
and externality.
5:8 (i) Internals will obtain larger "Net" scores than
externals.
(ii) There will be a small, negative correlation between 
externality and n-ach.
5:9 (i) Rotter's scale will correlate negatively with self
rated intemality for negative out-comes. '
(ii) Rotter's scale will not correlate with rated 
internality for positive out-comes.
5:10 (i) Rated intemality for positive out-comes will
correlate with rated sensitivity for cues of reward,
(ii) Rated intemality for negative out-comes will be
found to correlate with rated sensitivity to cues of 
punishment.
5:11 Intemals will be found to have a lower "Correct" score
than externals
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5:12 There will be an In+ x In- interaction when the
"Correct" score is used as the independent variable.
5:13 There will be a locus of control x differential
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement interaction when 
the "Correct" score is used as the independent variable.
5:14 There will be a significant correlation between self
ratings obtained in the present experiment and ratings 
obtained for the same dimensions in the previous experiment,
5:15 No significant correlations will be found between
commission errors or omission errors made in the present 
experiment and those made in the previous experiment.
5:16 A factor analysis will yield factors of: extraversion,
neuroticism, sensitivity to cues of reward and punishment, 
differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement locus 
of control, locus of control for positive and negative 
out-comes, and possibly several factors of consistency.
5:17 Ss differentiated on the basis of their "Correct" scores 
will be found to rate themselves differently on the 
EPI E scale, on sensitivity to cues of reward and 
punishment, on Rotter's Locus of Control scale and on 
rated intemality to positive and negative out-comes.
5:18 Ss differentiated on the basis of their "Need" scores
will be found to rate themselves differently on the 
n-ach scale.
11:3 METHOD
DESIGN
Subjects were required to make differential responses
to each of three classes of stimuli.
1. When a syllable of the form vowel - consonant - vowel
(VCV), (for 50% of Ss CVC), appeared on the screen Ss were
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required to press the right hand most key (left for 50% of 
Ss) in order to gain a point. This response had to be made
within 700 msec.s of the on-set of the stimulus. If the
S failed to respond with the correct key, or responded after 
the time limit had expired he did not lose a point - this 
was purely a reward condition.
2. When a CVC appeared on the screen (for 50% of Ss
a VCV) S was required to respond with the left-hand most 
(right for 50% of Ss) of the three keys within 700 msec.s
of the on-set of the stimulus in order to avoid losing a point. 
This was the punishment condition, correct responding did not 
gain a point for the S.
The relationship between key, stimulus and reinforcement 
was randomized across Ss.
3. When a syllable made up of either three vowels (VW) or 
three consonants (CCC) was presented the S was required to 
press the second (middle one) of the three keys. This was
the neutral condition and S received neither reward nor 
punishment in connection with these stimuli.
Ss were given feed back on their performance after 
each trial in the form of a running score (Net score). On 
each trial the type of stimulus presented, the response made 
and the latency of the response were recorded. This 
information was used to compute a series of behavioural scores 
which served as the dependent variables in the analyses of 
the present experiment.
Ss also completed a number of questionnaires: EPI
(Form A), Intemality-External ity scale (Rotter, 1966), Es 
scale, the Quike Measure of Achievement Motivation (Smith,
1973), and a series of 9 point rating scales (cf Appendix).
Self-rating scores, commission error and omission error 
scores were available from the previous experiment (4a and 4b)
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Procedure
65 Subjects took part in this experiment, 28 of whom 
had taken part in the previous experiment. 162 Sscompleted 
the questionnaires. Of the 65 experimental Ss 55 provided 
questionnaire data (37 Female, 18 Male). Subjects were 
volunteer university students, with a mean age of approximately 
22 years
Each S was tested alone. The S was seated 3ft from 
an osciloscope screen which was 4ft 8ins from the floor. On 
a table in front of the S were three keys, attached by means 
of a magnet to a large metal plate. The S was told that he 
would be allowed to use only his preferred hand, and was 
asked to place the keys in a position which was most 
comfortable for him, and which allowed him to respond as quickly 
as possible.
The S was given the following instructions. They were 
typed, and the S was allowed to read them at his own pace 
Instructions
This experiment takes the form of a game; your task 
is to gain as many points as possible and lose as few as 
possible.
Three types of syllables will appear on the screen:
(1) consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC)
(2) vowel-consonant-vowel (VCV)
(3) Three vowels (VW) or three consonants (CCC).
If a CVC* appears and you press Key 1*, the right 
hand key* within half a second you gain a point. If you 
fail to press this key you do not lose a point 
PRESS TO GAIN
If a VCV* appears on the screen you must press Key 3*^  
the left hand key^ v to avoid losing a point. Again you have 
half a second, you do not gain any points for pressing this key. 
PRESS OR LOSE
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If a CCC or V W  appears on the screen then you are to 
press Key 2, the centre key. You will not gain or lose 
anything when these syllables are presented.
Your score will be displayed on the screen after each 
response.
You will have twenty practice trials, at a slow speed 
to get used to the task."
* These were randomized across Ss yielding four combinations.
(1) CVC - 1 = gain, VCV - 3 = Avoid
(2) CVC - 3 = gain, VCV - 1 = Avoid
(3) CVC - 1 = Avoid, VCV - 3 = gain
(4) CVC - 3 = Avoid, VCV - 1 = gain
The S was given 20 practice trials, and more if he 
still did not feel confident about what was required of him. 
Syllables were presented for 1500 msec.s during these practice 
trials, and S could respond at anytime in this period. There 
was 500 msec.s between trials during which the running score 
was displayed.
For the test trials S was alone in a room, the computer 
controling the presentation of stimuli and recording response 
data. Stimuli were presented for 700 msec.s with a 500 msec 
inter-trial interval during which the running score was displayed. 
Syllables were presented in random order.
There were 180 trials, 60 per condition.
The oscilloscope screen on which the syllables were presented 
measured 21.6 x 17 cms. Syllables were displayed in the 
middle of the screen, slightly above centre; scores were presented 
in the middle of the screen slightly below centre.
The main behavioural measures were described in the 
introduction, but for the sake of completeness they will be 
described here once more.
"Net" score: The number of points gained minus the number of
points lost.
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"Total** score: The total number of times the gain key (TG)
was pressed minus the total number of times the avoid key (TA) 
was pressed, divided by the total number of responses (TR) 
made.
(TG - TA)
TR
**Correct** score: The number of correct gain responses (CG) made
minus the number of correct avoidance responses (CA) made
divided by the total number of correct responses made (TC)
(CG - CA)
TC
**Error** score: The number of erroneous **gain** responses (EG)
minus the number of erroneous **Avoidance** responses (EA) made
divided by the total number of erroneous responses (TE)
(EG - EA)
TE
**Need** score: The number of **gain** responses made in response
to neutral stimuli (NG) minus the number of **avoid** responses
made to neutral stimuli (NA) divided by their sum
(NG - NA)
(NG + NA)
Ratio scores were preferred as these take into account 
the number of responses made, and so eliminate any effects 
due simply to the number of responses made. Other scores 
were computed however 
Ratio scores:
(1) TC/TA
(2) CG/CA
(3) EG/EA
(4) NG/NA 
Difference scores:
(1) TC-TA
(2) CG-CA
(3) EG-EA
(4) NG-NA
Mean RT scores
(1) (RT of TC)/(RT of TA)
(2) (RT of CG)/(RT of CA)
(3) (RT of EG)/(RT of EA)
(4) (RT of NG)/(RT of NA)
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11:4 RESULTS
In such a long series of trials, 180 without pauses^ 
it seems likely that practice and fatigue effects may well 
influence the S*s behaviour. It also seems likely that an 
S will employ different strategies at different points in the 
task. In order to minimize the risH of arriving at spurious 
conclusions, therefore, vdiere appropriate four separate scores 
will be reported: those relevant to the first, second and
third thirds of the experiment, and results derived from all 
180 trials.
The Behavioural Measures
The first hypothesis dealt with the behavioural 
measures, the arguwic-rd: being quite simply that if there was 
any substance to Gray' s theory then some measures ought to be 
tapping differential sensitivity while others should not
TABLE 11:2 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE "NET" SCORE AND THE 
FOUR OTHER MEASURES OF BEHAVIOUR
Behavioural
Measures
Trials 
1 -  20 
per 
condition
Trials 
21 - 40 
per 
condition
Trials 
41 - 60 
per 
condition
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
condition
"Total" Score -.0168 .0235
^'Correct" Score .0585 .0434
"Error** Score .0009 .0597
"Need" Score .0317 -.1058
.0134
.0277
-.0043
.0034
-.0118
.09
.06
-.143
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As can be seen none of these correlations is 
significant.
A more important prediction, because the interpretation 
of later results depends on it, is that the "Correct" measure 
reflects differential sensitivity, while the "Need** measure 
reflects, substantially, the desire to gain or avoid certain 
types of reinforcement. These two measures, therefore, ought 
to be substantially independent.
TABLE 11:3 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE **CORRECT** AND **NEED** SCORES
Trials Trials Trials Trials
1 - 2 0  2 1 - 4 0 41 - 60 1 - 6 0
per condition per condition per condition per condition
.227* .11 .259* .287*
(*p < .05)
The correlations between these two measures, as can be 
seen from Table 11:3, are significant, probably reflecting the 
motivational element in the "Correct" measure, but they also are 
small suggesting, as was predicted, a substantial independence 
of the two measures.
Gray* s Model and the Eysenckian Dimensions
No support has been found so far for Gray * s suggestion 
that differential sensitivity is related to the introversion- 
extraversion dimension, or general sensitivity to cues of 
reinforcement to the neuroticism dimension. As the "Correct" 
measure is assummed to best reflect differential sensitivity 
it should be on this measure that the predicted differences 
are most evident.
TABLE 11:4
1U3
SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING E AND N 
AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Trials
1 - 2 0
per
condition
Trials 
21 - 40 
per 
condition
Trials 
41- 60 
per 
condition
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
condition
"Net'* score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Total** score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Correct" score 
**Error" score
E
p = .038 
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S. '
N.S.
N.S.
**Need** score N.S. E N.S. N.S.
p = .051
As can be seen in Table 11:4 only one result is found 
to be significant on the **Correct" measure, where, if Gray 
were correct, one would expect a significant extraversion effect 
and extraversion x neuroticism interaction in each of the 
four analyses. However, in this one significant result the 
groups do arrange themselves as predicted (cf Table 11:5)
TABLE 11:5
LN
GROUP MEANS ON THE **CORRECT** MEASURE, FOR THE 
FIRST EPOCH OF TRIALS (1 - 20)
Introverts Extraverts
-.045 104
HN -.168 .227
The only other result to reach significance in this set 
of analyses was again a significant difference between the 
introverted and extraverted Ss this time when the "Need" 
score was used as the dependent variable (cf Table 11:4)
4 0 4
LN
HN
:6 GROUP MEANS FOR THE "NEED" SCORE, FOR TRIALS 21-40
Introverts Extraverts
.201 -.241
.036 -.11
The means reported in Table 11:6 indicate that it is the 
introverted subjects who respond with the "gain" key more often 
in face of the neutral stimuli.
It was hypothesized (hypothesis 5:3(i)) that the EPI - E 
score would correlate with the "correct" score, but as can be 
seen from Table 11:7, except for the first third of the 
experiment this is not the case.
TABLE 11:7 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EPI - E AND THE FOUR 
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Behavioural
Measures
Trials
1 - 2 0
per
condition
Trials 
21 - 40 ' 
per 
condition
Trials 
41 - 60 
per 
condition
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
condition
"Total" score .166 .029 -.003 .09
"Correct" score .254* .076 .048 .17
"Error" score .058 -.114 .041 -.027
"Need** score .005 -.293* .034 -.037
(p < .05)
The hypothesized relationship between neuroticism and 
sensitivity fared even less well (cf. Table 11:8)
TABLE 11:8 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EPI N SCORES AND THE NUMBER OF 
CORRECT RESPONSES TO DIFFERENT STIMULI
Trials
1 - 2 0
Trials 
21 - 40
Trials 
41 - 60
Trials
1 - 6 0
per per per per
condition condition condition condition
1. Correct "Gain" 
responses .1 .113 .024 .086
TABLE 11:8 (Continued)
4 0 5
2. Correct "Avoid"
responses .16 .111 .09 .131
3. Correct "Neutral"
responses -.003 .056 -.001 .021
"1**/ Total No responses -.113 -.05 -.129 -.157
"2"/Total No responses .071 .108 .019 .0895
None of the correlations between neuroticism and 
correct responding were found to be significant (Table 11:8), 
and if Grays hypothesis were correct one would have expected 
them to be significant.
It seems then that once more the hypothesized 
relationship between sensitivity to cues of reinforcement and 
the Eysenckian dimensions of introversion - extraversion and 
neuroticism has failed to find confirmation. The first 
hypothesis suggesting that the introversion - extraversion 
dimension is related to differential sensitivity received only 
weak support, the second hypothesis relating neuroticism to a 
dimension of general sensitivity to cues of reward received 
no support at all.
Self-Rated and Behavioural Differential Sensitivity to cues 
of Reinforcement
Ss were asked to rate themselves on a nine point scale 
to the following question:
**Are you more motivated by, or sensitive to the likelihood of 
a pleasant outcome or the likelihood of an unpleasant outcome". 
(Question 6 of the self-rating questionnaire). This question 
was intended to function as a self-rating on differential 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement, and in consequence it was
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hypothesized that significant differences would be found 
between high and low self-raters on the "Correct** score. 
(Hypothesis 5:4(i)). On the other hand if Ss were using 
this question to rate themselves as differentially sensitive 
to reinforcement then the significant difference ought to appear 
on the "Need** measure. (Hypothesis 5:4(ii)).
As can be seen from Table 11:9 the significant differences 
are found on the "Correct" measure. For the purpose of 
these analyses Ss were allocated to one of 3 groups:
(i) those classified as differentially more sensitive to cues 
of punishment, scoring half a standard deviation or more 
below the mean
(Ratings 1 - 4 )
(ii) the medium group, sensitive to cues of reward and 
punishment in roughly equal degrees (rating 5 - 7), 
scoring within half a standard deviation of the mean.
(iii) those classified as differentially more sensitive to cues of 
reward (ratings 8 - 9 ) ,  and scoring half a standard 
deviation or more above the mean.
TABLE 11:9 SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING SELF RATINGS 
OF DIFFERENTIAL SENSITIVITY TO CUES OF REINFORCEMENT
AS THE INDEPENDENT
Trials
1 - 2 0
per
condition
VARIABLE
Trials 
21 - 40 
per 
condition
Trials 
41 - 60 
per 
condition
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
condition
**Net** Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
**Total" score N.S. Linear 
Trend 
p = .076
N.S. N.S.
"Correct" score N.S. Linear 
'Trend 
p <.025
Linear 
Trend 
p < .05
Linear 
Trend 
p < .05
"Error** Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
**Need** score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
(All probabilities two tailed)
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Not only are these results significant on the measure 
predicted in hypothesis 5:4(i) but they are also in the 
direction predicted by the Grayian theory (cf. Table 11:10).
TABLE 11:10 GROUP MEANS FOR"CORRECT" MEASURE
Sensitive to 
cues of 
Punishment
Medium
Sensitive to 
cues of 
Reward
Trials 1 -20 
per condition -.1006 +.1058 +.1586
Trials 21-40 
per condition
-.0633 -.02 +.4166
Trials 41-60 
per condition
-.0618 +.0565 +.2778
The Relationship between differential sensitivity and other 
dimensions of personality
The data summarized in Table 11:10 and the analyses 
summarized in Table 11:9 clearly suggest that there is some 
basis to Gray’s contention that people are differentially 
sensitive to cues of different types of reinforcement, it now 
seemspertinent to ask whether the properties of differential 
sensitivity are subsummel under some other well know dimension. S-^
N-Ach.
The first such dimension considered in the introduction 
was need-achievement (n-ach). It was suggested that this 
dimension was quite independent of differential sensitivity, 
and in consequence would not be found to correlate with any 
of the hypothesized measures of differential sensitivity.
As can be seen from Table 11:11 there is no evidence of a 
relationship between n-ach and extraversion, rated sensitivity 
to cues of reward, to cues of punishment, or differential 
sensitivity to cues of reward.
4U8
t a b l e  11:11 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN N-ACH AND VARIOUS OTHER 
SELF REPORT MEASURES
EPI - E
Sensitivity 
to cues of 
Reward
Sensitivity 
to cues of 
Punishment
Differential
Sensitivity
.15 .07 -.087 .195
TABLE 11:12 SUMMARY OF ANALYSES EMPLOYING N-ACH AS THE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Trials
1 - 2 0
per
condition
Trials 
21 - 40 
per 
condition
Trials 
41 - 60 
per 
condition
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
condition
"Net" Score 
"Total" Score 
"Correct" Score 
"Error" Score 
"Need** Score
N.S.
NoSo
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
As can be seen from Table 11:12 no significant 
differences were found between high and low n-ach scorers on 
the "Correct" measure, strengthening the contention that 
n-ach and differential sensitivity are independent qualities. 
However, no difference was found between high and low n-ach 
scorers on the **Need** measure eitlier, where it was predicted 
there would be a significant difference (Hypothesis 5:5(i)).
Locus of Control
The predicted correlation between introversion- extraver­
sion and LoC did not emerge, (-.047, N.S.), but intemality- 
extemality as measured by the Rotter scale was found to
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correlate with neuroticism (.579, p < .001), and Es (-.549, 
p < .001). A moderate correlation between internality and 
n-ach was also observed (-.302, p <  .001)
TABLE 11:13 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ROTTER’S (1966) LOCUS OF 
CONTROL SCALE AND VARIOUS SELF RATING OF LOCUS 
OF CONTROL
Rated Rated Rated
Intemality Externality Relative In. (-ve) In. (+ve)
In - Ex
-.395 .505 .249 .308 .285
(These correlations employ the self-rating on Q’s 8 , 7,
9 , 10, 11 respectively, of the self rating scale)
Given the large number of observations on which the 
correlations reported in Table 11:13 are based,despite their moderate 
size they are all highly significant. Though internality for 
negative outcomes (In-) did correlate with the Rotter scale 
to a greater degree than did intemality for positive outcomes^ 
as was predicted,both correlations are of a moderate size and 
the difference between them is minimal.
As for the relationship between locus of control and
sensitivity to cues of reward neither the correlation between 
In- and sensitivity to cues of punishment (.11) nor that between
In+ and sensitivity to reward (-.003) were found to be
significant. Though interestingly the Rotter scale was found 
to correlate with sensitivity to cues of punishment, but in the 
direction opposite to that which would have been predicted (.367). 
The Rotter scale was not found to correlate with sensitivity 
to cues of reward (.073).
It was predicted (Hypothesis 5:8(i)) that internals 
would have larger "Net" scores than externals, and smaller
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"correct** scores (Hypothesis 5;il). For the purpose of the 
analyses summarized in Table 11:14 Ss scoring 9 or less on the 
Rotter scale were classified as internals, those scoring 10-14 
as average, and those over 15 as externals. These divisions 
correspond approximately to half a standard deviation above 
and below the mean.
TABLE 11:14 SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE EXPLOYING LOCUS
OF CONTROL AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Trials Trials Trials Trials
1 - 20 21 - 40 41 - 60 1 - 6 0
per
condition
per
condition
per
condition
per
condition
"Net" Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Total"Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Correct**Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Error"Score N.S. Linear 
Trend 
p = .017
N.S. Linear
Trend
p = .02 2
**Need** Score N.S. N.S. N.S. Linear 
Trend 
p = .032
TABLE1I:15 SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING LOCUS OF
CONTROL AND DIFFERENTIAL SENSITIVITY TO CUES OF
REINFORCEMENT AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Trials Trials Trials Trials
1 - 2 0 21 - 40 41 - 60 1 -60
per
condition
per
condition
per
condition
per
condition
"Net"Score LoC p=.015 
Loc X
Sensitivity
p = .06
N.S. N.S. LoC p=.038 
LoC X
Sensitivity 
p =.073
**Total**Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Correct Score Sensitivity Sensitivity
p <.05 p = .058
N.S. N.S.
"Error**Score _ N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Need** Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
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For the purpose of the analyses summarized in Table 11:15 
subjects were divided into two groups, those scoring above and 
those scoring below the mean, on the two dimensions.
There appears to be no support for either hypothesis from the 
analyses summarized in Table 11:14. Internals and externals 
are, however, found to obtain significantly different "Net" 
scores in the analyses summarized in Table 11:15, however, 
the results are in the direction opposite to those predicted 
as can be seen from the group means reported in Table 11:16.
TABLE 11:16 GROUP **NET** SCORES MEANS, FOR TRIALS 1-20 
PER CONDITION
Internals Externals
Reward Sensitive -9.615 -8.143
Punishment Sensitive -13 -2.867
TABLE 11:17 GROUP "CORRECT”SCORE MEANS FOR TRIALS 1-20 
PER CONDITION
Internals Externals
Reward Sensitive .244 .122
Punishment Sensitivie -.2 .084
There is no evidence from Tables 11:14, 11:15 or 11:17 that 
internals have gained the lower "Correct** scores, but 
although hypothesis 5:13 is not confirmed in its prediction of 
an interaction the internal-punishment sensitive Ss did obtain 
the lowest mean score. The internal-reward sensitive 
individuals, however, obtained the largest mean score indicating 
that these Ss pressed the **gain**key correctly more often than 
the **avoid** key.
Hypothesis 5:12 predicted an interaction between internals
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for positive and negative outcomes on the "Correct" measure. 
As can be seen from Table 11:18 this interaction was found to 
be significant
TABLE 11:18 SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE EMPLOYING
INTERNALITY FOR POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES 
AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Trials
1 - 2 0
per
Condition
Trials 
21 - 48 
per 
Condition
Trials 
41 - 60 
per 
Condition
Trials 
1 - 60 
per 
Condition
"Net" Score In(-)
p = .012
N.S. N.S. N.S,
**Total" Score In(+) X  
In(-) 
p = .048
N.S. N.S. N.S.
"Correct" Score In(+) X
In(-)
p = .028
In(+) X
In(-)
p = .062
N.S. In(+) X  
In(-) 
p < .025
’’Error** Score N.S, N,S. N.S. N,S.
"Need" Score N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
(Ss scoring 3 or less on the rating 
classified as internals)
; scale were
TABLE 11:19 GROUP "CORRECT** SCORE MEANS FOR In(+) AND '
In(-) GROUPS
Trials 1 - 2 0  Trials 21-40 
per condition per condition
Trials 41-60 
per condition
Trials 1-60 
per condition
Ln(+) Ex(+) In(+) Ex(+) In(+) Ex(+) In(+) Ex(+)
In(-) . -.057 .27 -.04 .201 -.003 -.004 -.033 .156
Ex(-) .34 0 .29 -.099 .226 -.063 ,285 -.054
It is evident from Table 11:19 that hypothesis 5:12 
is only partly confirmed. As expected those who rate themselves 
as either internal or external for both types of outcomes do not
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demonstrate a greater sensitivity for either cue, their mean 
scores not differing greatly from zero. Also as predicted 
the In(+) Ex(-) group displays the highest mean score, but 
the Ex(+) In(-) group do not display the lowest mean score.
Indeed the mean score for this group is larger than the mean 
scores for either the In(+) In(-) or Ex(+) Ex(-) groups.
Classification according to Behaviour
It was suggested in the introduction that we might be 
primarily concerned with what individuals do, and in consequence 
it was decided to reverse the usual question and instead ask 
if people who behave differently also tend to rate themselves 
differently (Hypotheses 5:17 and 5:18)
The "correct" score, it will be recalled, is a measure 
of the tendency to make more correct gain or avoidance responses, 
and in consequence is assummed to reflect differential 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement. A positive score on this 
measure reflects relatively more correct gain responses, a 
negative score relatively more correct avoidance responses.
When individuals were divided into three groups on the basis of 
their scores on this measure, they were not found to rate 
themselves as significantly different with regard to 
introversion-extraversion as measured by the EPI
Individuals were found to rate themselves differently 
with regard to differential sensitivity, however, as can be 
seen from Table 11:20
TABLE 11:20 GROUP "DIFFERENTIAL SENSITIVITY TO CUES OF 
REINFORCEMENT" MEANS FOR THE HIGH, LOW AND 
MEDIUM "CORRECT" SCORING GROUPS
Low Medium High
Correct" (half S.D, below (within half S.D. (half S.D. above 
Score Mean) of Mean) Mean)
Self 4.8 6.0 6.21
rating
(This trend is significant at the .05 level (1 tailed))
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The trend discribed in Table 11.20 is significant only 
for the first epoch (trials 1-20 per condition).
On this same measure during the first epoch a 
significant quadratic trend was found for both EPI N 
scores and scores on the Rotter Locus of Control scale 
(cf. Tables 11:21 and 11:22)
TABLE 11:21 GROUP EPI N MEANS FOR LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH 
"CORRECT" SCORING GROUPS
"Correct" Low Medium High
Score
EPI N 7,9 12.115 7.68
Mean Score
(Quadratic trend, p = .005, 2 tailed)
TABLE 11:22 GROUP LoC MEANS FOR LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH 
"CORRECT" SCORING GROUPS
"Correct"  ^ j • tt*
Score Low Medium High
LoC 8.1 14.261 10.63
Mean Scores
(Scale score in externality direction;
Quadratic trend, p = .001, 2 tailed)
As for n-ach, a quadratic trend was found for^  this measure 
also, but this time in the final epoch of the experiment 
(cf. Table 11:23), and in the direction opposite to the two 
already reported.
TABLE 11:23 GROUP n-ach MEANS FOR LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH 
"CORRECT" SCORING GROUPS
Correct Low Medium High
Score
n-ach 11.73 10.857 11.833
Mean Score
(Quadratic trend, p <.05, 2 tailed)
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As for the groups differentiated on the basis of their 
"Need” scores, these rated themselves differently with respect 
to n-ach, only in the second epoch of the experiment (Table 11:24)
TABLE 11:24 GROUP n-ach MEANS FOR LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH 
"NEED" SCORING GROUPS
"Need" Low Medium High
Score
n-ach 12.188 10.73 11.385
Mean score
(Quadratic trend, p = .011, 2 tailed)
It seems then that those individuals who rated themselves 
as having higher need-achievement might show a preference for 
either the "gain" or the "avoid" key, perhaps suggesting that 
fear of failure, as well as n-ach is being tapped.
Consistency
It was predicted (hypothesis 5:14) that there would be a 
significant degree of consistency in self-ratings. Table 11:25 
reports the relevant correlations.
TABLE 11:25 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELF RATING SCORES ON ,
TWO OCCASIONS
. Correlation
Dimension Co-efficients
Extraversion (EPI) .589
Neuroticism (EPI) .95
Ego-Strength .804
Rated Extraversion .642
Rated Consistency of Extraversion .244 (N.S.)
Rated Impulsivity .894
Rated Consistency of Impulsivity .093 (N.S.)
Rated Neuroticism .813
Rated Consistency of Neuroticism .571
(N = 28)
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All the correlations reported in Table 11:25 are significant, 
with the exception of those for rated consistency of extraversion 
and rated consistency of impulsivity. The magnitude of the 
EPI - E correlation is, however, surprisingly low. (.589)
Turning to those results reflecting behavioural 
consistency, here fewer significant results were expected
TABLE 11:26 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OMISSIONS MADE IN
EXPERIMENTS 4 AND 5
EXPERIMENT 5
H
Expt. 4A 
Fast condition
Extreme
Middle
Centre
Slow Condition
Extreme
Middle
Centre
Expt. 4B
Before first 
reversal
Trials
1-20
per
Condition
.338*
.236
.071
-.143
-.023
-.278
-o045
Trials
21-40
per
Condition
.346:
.212
.072
- .09 
.043
-oil
-.04
Trials
41-60
per
Condition
.368:
.231
-.074
- .088 
.028 
-,044
-.129
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
Condition
.368*
.236
.076
.112
o017
.147
-.075
(* p < .05, 1 tailed)
Only one of the omission scores from experiment 4 is
found to correlate with the number of omissions made in 
experiment 5.
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TABLE 11:27 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMISSION ERRORS MADE IN 
EXPERIMENTS 4 AND 5
Stimulus
Response
EXPERIMENT 5
Positive Negative Neutral
Avoid Neutral Gain Neutral Gain Avoid
g
g
e
Expt 4A
Fast Condition
Extreme
Middle
Centre
Slow Condition
Extreme
Middle
Centre
Expt. 4B
Before first 
reversal
.268 .076
.0325 .111 
.03 .068
.199 .007
.186 -.006 
.024 -.033
-.032 .32*
.14 «036
«075 .058
.133 .25
.133 .286
.261 -.04 
.194 .5*
-.07 .0846
.294
.172
.163
«031
.017
.076
.175
.24
.277
.037
.074
.042
-.132 -.261
(*p <.05, 1 tailed)
There appears to be little evidence of behavioural 
consistency in this data (Table 11:27). It was, of course, 
remarked in experiment 4 that the correlations based on 
commission errors from that experiment might not be too reliable 
as so few commission errors were made, the total number of 
commission errors in the fast condition (experiment 4A) was, 
therefore, correlated with the total number of commission errors 
in the present experiment, but this correlation was not found 
to be significant (.086), nor was the correlation between 
the total number of commission errors made in the slow condition 
(Experiment 4A) and the total number of commission errors in 
the present experiment (.083)
TABLE 11:28 reports the loadings of the personality variables 
on the 10 factors to emerge from the principle components analysis 
Orthogonal factors were extracted using the varimax procedure.
TAnl.E 1 1 : 2 5  FACTOK lOAHINCS
418
Neurotic Kxtravcr- 
isra filon
Consis- Locus Consls- N-Ach Differ- Consls- Consis- General
tcncy of tency entlnl tcncy- tency Sensitiv
with Control of Sens!- of of Ity to
Respect ■ Senslt- tivity Ncurot- Extrovcr- Cues
to LoC ivity iclsra sion
Extraversion (CPI) 
Neuroticism (EPI) 
Ego-Strength 
Locus of C o n t r o l  
(Rotter, I960)
Kecd A c h i e v e m e n t  
(Smith, 1973)
Variables fro m  the 
Self Ratine S cale
Extraversion
Consistency o f  
Extraversion 
Impulsivity 
Consistency o f  
' Impulsivity 
Neuroticism
Consistency o f  
Neuroticism
Sensitivity t o  c u e s  
of P u n ishment
Consistency o f  
Sensitivity to c u e s  
of Punislimcnt
Sensitivity to c u e s  
of Reward
Consistency or 
Sensitivity to c u e s  
of Reward
Differential Sensitivity 
to cues of Reinforcement 
Consistency of Differential 
Sensitivity
Externality
Consistency of Externality 
Intemality
Condistency of Intemality 
Differential Strength of 
Internal-External Beliefs 
Consistency of Differential 
Strength
Internal Ity-Extemal Ity 
ior Success 
Consistency of ln(+) 
Intcmality-Extcmallty
for failure 
Consistency of In(-)
Awareness of Consequences 
f^ Behaviour
Consistency of Awareness
, 9 0 6
.865
-.783
.587 .434
-.616
.799
,772
,787
.536
.73
.403
,766
.^ 28
,638
.609
.634
.669
.773
.555
,467
.708
.814
.792
.758
.804
.65
,431 .427
.652
-.44
(Only loadings greater than .4 have been Included in this table.)
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Table 11:29 reports the inter-correlations between the 11 ratings 
of consistency. As can be seen almost two-thirds of these 
correlations are found to be significant, suggesting that they 
do share something in common. However, very few of the 
correlations are greater than .4 suggesting, as does the 
principle components analysis that, at least for self rating, 
there is no one factor of consistency.
11:5 DISCUSSION
Although a great many results have been reported the 
situation is, nevertheless, a relatively straight forward one. 
Several related questions were being asked:
(i) Are the various performance scores all reflecting the same 
quality, or are they independent of each other? In particular 
are the "Correct" measure, assumed to reflect differential 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement, and the "Need" measure, 
assun^d to reflect preference for one type of reinforcement 
independent of each other?
(ii) Is there a discrete relationship between the "Correct" 
measure and certain theoretically important self report variables?
(iii) What relationship does the Grayian dimension of 
differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement bear to other 
well used constructs which are employed to describe individuals, 
or predict behaviour?
(iv) Is there any evidence that people behave in a consistent 
manner?
GRAY’S MODEL
Differential Sensitivity
The score which seems to be the most obvious measure of 
performance, and, in consequence, the one that it is most 
tempting to employ is the S’s "Net" score. However, as is often
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the case the most obvious measure is also the grossest and 
least precise. Instead it was argued that the two most 
sensitive measure were the "Correct" measure and the "Need" 
measure. If the interpretation of these measures is correct 
then they ought to be substantially independent of one another.
It was, in fact, reported. Table 11:3, that they were found to 
correlate to a significant degree (.287). But the overlap 
is small, and probably reflects the fact that the "Correct" 
measure contains an element of preference for one or other 
type of reinforcement. This, of course, may indicate that 
these two qualities are not, in fact, entirely independent but, 
for example, individuals sensitive to cues of reward also have 
a greater than average desire for reward. However, the two 
measures, and therefore, presumably the two qualities, do 
appear to be substantially independent of each other, a point 
emphasized by the discrete patterns of results obtained.
It seems fair to conclude that for the first time 
empirical support has been found for Gray®s theory, support in 
the form of an independent behavioural dimension predicted 
on the basis of Gray’s theory.
The next step in the investigation would seem to be to 
determine vhether or not this behavioural dimension is related 
in a predictable way to any of the self-report variables of 
theoretical interest: introversion-extraversion, neuroticism, and
self-rated differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement.
As predicted by the theory the HEHN group did obtain the 
highest "Correct" score, and the LEHN group the lowest score 
( cf Table 11:5), reflecting the fact that the neurotic 
extraverted group made more correct "gain" responses than they 
did avoidance responses, whereas the neurotic introverted group 
made more correct avoidance than "gain" responses. However, 
enthusiasm must be tempered with realism and it must be noted
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that the E x N interaction never reached significance, vdiile 
the difference between introverts and extraverts was significant 
only in the first epoch of the experiment (Table 11:4)« This 
hypothesis must, therefore, be regarded as receiving the most 
tentative of support.
A possible explanation for this relative weakness 
of support presents itself in Tables 11:4 and 11:6. It appears 
that the introverted group responds by pressing the "gain" key 
more often than the "avoid** key when the neutral stimulus is 
presented. It has already been mentioned that such a tendency 
will obscure the sensitivity of the "Correct" measure. It 
seems likely that here this tendency in the introverted group 
will have the effect of artificially inflating the number of 
times they press the **gain** key correctly, and so obscure the 
difference between the introverted and extraverted groups on 
the **Correct" measures. Too much must not be made of this 
however, for, on the one hand, with such a large number of 
analysis being performed it is to be expected that some 
differences will be found to be significant by chance; on the 
other hand, even if this result is not due to chance it serves to 
illustrate that the introver s ion-extravers ion dimension 
contributes relatively little variance to the behaviour measured 
by the "Correct** measure.
One might have suggested that this tendency of the 
introverted group to respond with the gain key is complementary 
to their tendency to become aware of contingencies of 
reinforcement, which in turn might well result in more internal 
beliefs as to the source of reinforcement and also lead to 
greater achievement orientation. Such speculation is scotched, 
however, by the fact that introversion-extraversion is found to 
correlate neither with intemality (-.047), nor ln(+) (.08), nor 
with n-ach (.15).
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It has already been remarked several times that the 
link between the Eysenckian dimensions and differential 
sensitivity is in no way essential to the structure of Gray’s 
theory. As no support had been found for the hypothesized 
link in experiments 1 - 3 it was decided in the present 
experiment to ask people to rate themselves with respect to 
differential sensitivity. It was found that those Ss who rated 
themselves as relatively more sensitive to cues of punishment, 
than to cues of reward behaved in such a way as to support their 
self ratings. Similarly those rating themselves as relatively 
more sensitive to cues of reward were found to show a greater 
number of correct responses to cues of reward (cf. Tables 11:9; 
11:10, 11:15, 11:17).
It is noteworthy that, as can be seen from Tables 11:9 
and 11:15, the significant differences occur only on the 
"Correct" measure, strengthening the claim of this to be an 
adequate measure of Gray’s differential sensitivity dimension.
When the question is asked: "is there any relationship
between behavioural and self report data?*,* rather than the one 
that has been asked: **Do groups defined by self report data
behave differently?*.* We find that there is again only the 
weakest of support for the hypothesized relationship between 
introversion and extraversion (cf. Table 11:7), More surprisingly, 
however, the "Correct" measure is found to correlate no more 
highly with self rated differential sensitivity, as can be seen 
from Table 11:30.
TABLE 11:30 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELF RATED DIFFERENTIAL
Trials
1 - 2 0
per
Condition
SENSITIVITY TO CUES OF REINFORCEMENT AND 
*'CORRECT'* SCORES
Trials 
21 - 40 
per 
Condition
Trials
4 - 6 0
per
Condition
Trials
1 - 6 0
per
Condition
.234 .161 -.008 057
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This result is somevdiat surprising, and must be regarded 
as indicating that the possibility of predicting behaviour from 
such global ratings is severely limited. Although this in 
itself is not necessarily a bad thing, and this result might 
serve as a reminder, as might the fact that the magnitude of the 
correlation declines over the three epochs, that we are not 
dealing with an hypothesized trait, that is, not a trait 
regarded as a generalized disposition to behave in a particular 
way. The importance of the Grayian dimension, like the locus 
of control dimension, is in its value in predicting what is 
learned, how it is learned and the elements in the situation 
that are more or less likely to be noticed, and consequently 
determine behaviour. The consequence of this is that this 
variable is unlikely to account, consistently, for a large 
proportion of the variance in all situations. Even if the salience 
of the cues of reinforcement did not vary over time the need 
for various reinforcements would change, and in consequence 
behaviour would be expected to change. In the present 
experiment, for example, after having attempted to respond 
correctly to both **gain** and "avoid" cues for sometime, in 
order to gain the maximum possible score, the subject could 
take a "rest" by responding with the **avoid** key on every trial.
This strategy would allow him to maintain the status quo until 
he was ready to attempt to gain more points, but it would also 
destroy any simple relationship between the self report measure 
and the behavioural measure. Changes in strategy, preferences 
for gaining or avoiding reinforcement, and factors such as 
fatigue will all effect the observed magnitude of the relationship 
between the Grayian dimension of differential sensitivity and 
behaviour. Because of this we can also expect the magnitude of 
the observed relationship to vary across time and across 
situations.
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If this is the case one might be tempted to ask whether 
there is any use in proposing such a dimension. The answer 
would seem to be that it could prove to be extremely fruitful 
as part of the explanation why people leam particular behaviours, 
one of the "person variables" discussed in Chapter 2. It can 
be argued that each person will have a unique repetoire of 
behaviours at his disposal, and also that being differentially 
sensitive to cues of reinforcement we can expect different 
behaviours from people in the same situation. Thus we may have 
uniqueness without chaos.
It might still be argued, however, that this is all fine 
at the theoretical level; that all behaviour is, in principle, 
explicable but so much information would be needed that it is, in 
fact, no more than a pretty argu"n^ t%\t. The present experiment 
is, however, an empirical refutation of such a point. The 
theory deals with the way in which the individual perceives 
things, or to be more strictly accurate the things certain 
individuals are likely to perceive. In simple situations 
where there is an important determinant of behaviour accurate 
predictions may be made of group behaviour. On the other hand 
in more complex situations more information will be needed 
before realistic predictions can be made about behaviour, factors 
such as which elements of the situation the individual uses 
as cues of reinforcement, whether reward or punishment is more 
obviously important in relation to the situation, what 
opportunities for different behaviours are available within the 
person and within the situation, and a host of other factors 
will assume a greater importance in making specific predictions 
on specific occasions.
Generalized Sensitivity
Gray has suggested not only that people differ in their 
differential sensitivity to cues of reward and punishment, but
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that they will also differ in their overall sensitivity to cues 
of reinforcement, irrespective of whether the cues are related 
to reward or punishment. This dimension. Gray suggests, is 
related to the Eysenckian dimension of neuroticism. However,
neuroticism, as measured by the N scale of the EPI was not 
found to correlate with the number of correct responses made 
(cf. Table 11:8) , nor was the E x N interaction found to be 
significant (Table 11:4) when the "Correct" score was used as 
the dependent variable. As already noted the means (Table 11:5) 
are in the predicted direction, but they do not reach an 
acceptable level of significance. It seems then that once 
more we have failed to discover any support for this aspect of 
Gray's model. However, when it is considered that the 
extraversion results were weak, but the self-rating data much 
stronger in support of a dimension of differential sensitivity 
to cues of reinforcement, and bearing in mind the fact that 
the neuroticism results were in the predicted direction it 
would be over-hasty to conclude that no dimension of general 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement exists, A more 
appropriate conclusion at this stage would seem to be that 
such a dimension has not been demonstrated, and that it now 
seems unlikely that, if such a dimension does exist, the EPI 
N scale is an adequate measure of it.
Overall, then, it seems that this experiment has yielded 
a good deal of support for Gray’s theory. However, it ought 
to be made clear just what does seem to have been demonstrated. 
Individuals who rate themselves as relatively more sensitive 
to cues of reward than to cues of punishment responded correctly 
more often to cues of reward than to cues of punishment. Those 
individuals who rated themselves as differentially more sensitive 
to cues of punishment than to cues of reward respond correctly 
more often to cues of punishment. It should be noted that
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what has been contrasted here is an active avoidance response 
and an appetitive response. These, of course, are assume.! , 
in the Grayian model, to be mediated by the same mechanisms 
and so the individuals sensitive to cues of one ought 
to be sensitive to cues of the other. However, it was 
suggested when outlining Gray’s theory that when mildly aversive 
stimuli were employed those individuals sensitive to cues of 
punishment, having a higher arousal level, might leam the 
avoidance response more quickly than those individuals with 
a lower level of arousal. If this suggestion is not acceptable, 
then the present set of results must be regarded as 
disconfirming Gray’s hypothesis. Either way the theory 
obviously needs to be modified.
If one maintains that active avoidance and appetitive 
responses are mediated by the same mechanism and consequently 
that the same individuals will display superiority in tasks 
relating to both these measures, then the analyses employing the 
"Correct** measure must be seen as dis confirming the theory, 
as must the fact that neither the extraverts (Table 11:4) nor 
those who rate themselves as differentially more sensitive to 
cues of reward (Table 11:9) obtain significantly higher 
**Net" scores than the introverts, or those who rate themselves 
as differentially more sensitive to cues of punishment.
N-Ach.
Having pointed out that it is possible to interpret 
the results of the present experiment as supporting Gray’s 
theory, the next step would seem to be to discover how similar 
the construct of differential sensitivity is to other well used 
constructs. In the introduction it was suggested that 
differential sensitivity bore a superficial resemblance to 
n-ach. It was argued, however, that this resemblance was no 
more than superficial as n-ach is really concerned with the
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need and consequent approach behaviour in relation to reinforcement, 
while Gray’s dimension is primarily concerned with a sensitivity 
to cues of reinforcement. It was hypothesized that:
(i) n-ach would not correlate with either the EPI E scale 
nor self report differential sensitivity,
(ii) that no difference between high and low need achievers would 
be evident on the "Correct** measure,
(iii) that high and low need-achievers would be distinguished 
on the **Need** measure.
The first two of these hypotheses were confirmed 
(cf Tables 11:11 and 11:12) although the fact that extraversion 
does not appear to be an adequate measure of differential 
sensitivity, and that self rated differential sensitivity does 
not correlate with the "Correct" score reduces the importance 
of the first hypothesis somewhat. The third of these hypotheses 
was not confirmed, however. This, of course, may be because of 
a limitation in either the **Need** measure, .or in Smith’s 
measure of n-ach.
In this context a recent paper by Vestewig (1978) is of 
importance. Vestewig suggested that Smith’s measure of n-ach 
was not entirely satisfactory. He reports that for a sample 
of 90 American males the test had **an effective range of 5 points 
(4 - 8). None of the males, for example, scored below 4, 
and only three scored above 8." (p.Ill),
Smith does not report the distribution for his British 
sample, but in the present sample the range and distribution 
of scores was found to be far more satisfactory than those 
Vestewig reports for his American sample (cf. Table 11:31),
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TABLE 11:31: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR SMITH’S QUICK MEASURE
OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION (1973)
SCORE ON SMITH’S SCALE
10 11 12 13 14 15
152 Ss 1 6 16 23 39 35 22 9 1
55
Experimental 0 2 6 8  16 10 7 5 1
Ss
No. of S obtaining each score 
As can be seen from Table 11:31 there is little overlap 
between the distribution obtained in the present experiment and 
Vestewig’s. The most likely explanations for the non­
significance of n-ach differences on the "Need" measure are that;
(i) n-ach is a much broader concept than that being tapped by 
the "Need" measure, and (ii) n-ach is not mediated by a simple 
preference for rewards over punishments.
It seems fair to conclude on the basis of the present 
experiment that there is no evidence of an overlap between 
n-ach and the Grayian dimension of differential sensitivity to 
cues of reinforcement.
Locus of Control
It was suggested in the introduction that introverts 
might be found to hold internal beliefs, particularly with 
respect to unpleasant outcomes, this suggestion appears not to 
have been borné out^ for the EPI E scale was not found to correlate 
significantly with either the Rotter scale (-,047), In(-) (-.066) or 
In(+) (-.08). The relation between self-rated differential 
sensitivity and LoC, though significant, was equally 
unimpressive (-.191, p <  .05), The correlation between 
In(-) and self rated differential sensitivity was only slightly
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larger (-.241), but that between self rated differential 
sensitivity and In(+) was not significant (-.003).
It was also predicted, on the basis of Gregory’s 
experiment that Rotter’s scale would correlate more highly with 
In(-) than In(+). Though this expectation was fulfilled the 
difference between the two correlations is minimal, they 
being .308 and .285 respectively. The importance of the form 
taken by the question turned out to be critical. When Ss 
were asked a forced choice question, mimicVUg the style of 
Rotter’s questionnaire, this rating correlated .249 with the 
Rotter scale. When asked to rate their internality, this 
rating produced a correlation of .395, while rated externality 
correlated .505 with the Rotter scale. In(+) and In(-) were 
found to correlate .368. This suggests that even if the Rotter 
scale is somewhat more sensitive to In(-) it is unlikely that 
it measures this exclusively for this, itself, is not totally 
independent of In(+). It also suggests that the form of a 
question may prove to be the critical determinant of an observed 
relationship, or equally may obscure relationships which really 
exist, serving as a salient reminder that to use self-ratings 
on questionnaires without some external validation may 
ultimately prove to be dangerous.
In an attempt to impose some order on this mass of 
correlational data it seems fair to conclude that there may well
be a small overlap between reported locus of control and self
rated differential sensitivity. The relation is in the direction 
of externals rating themselves as sensitive to cues of 
punishment. This pattern appears to be mainly due to Ex(-) 
individuals being more sensitive to cues of punishment. One
might characterize the situation as follows: Those who rate
themselves as more sensitive to cues of punishment, presumably 
attempt to avoid the punishment signalled by these cues.
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When failure to avoid punishment does occur the failure is 
attributed to factors outside themselves. It is interesting 
to note, in this context*that externals tend to rate themselves 
as more sensitive, (as opposed to differentially sensitive), to
cues of punishment than do internals.
A complementary relationship between differential 
sensitivity, or sensitivity, to cues of reward and internality 
does not emerge from the present data.
As predicted externality was found to correlate with 
both neuroticism (.579) and Es (-.549), and as might be 
expected, in view of the failure of neuroticism to emerge as a 
factor of general sensitivity to cues of reinforcement, externality 
was not found to be related to the degree of correct responding
to cues of either reward or punishment. On the other hand,
locus of control was found to be related to the number of correct 
responses made to the neutral stimuli (.222). It seems that 
this result may well be, if not in itself an artifact, at least 
part of a larger effect. For externality was found to 
correlate with the total number of times the "neutral" key was 
used (.271). The experimental situation was such that by 
pressing the "gain" key when appropriate a point could be 
gained, while correctly responding with the "avoid" key enabled 
the S to avoid losing a point, but responding with the neutral 
key, whether correctly or not had no benefit. Most Ss 
abandoned the use of the "neutral" key early in the experiment.
It appears that those Ss who persisted in using this key tended 
to be externals.
Two explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, may 
be offered for this behaviour, both consonant with results 
reported in the introduction; (i) Externals adhere, faithfully, 
to rules given to them for the performance of a task,
(ii) Externals are less adapt, or less willing, than internals
4 3 2
to adopt strategies which allow them to maximize reinforcement.
These observations may also help to explain the correlation 
of .302 between n-ach and internality.
It was suggested that internals would prove to be more 
successful at gaining points than externals, but this did not 
prove to be the case (cf. Table 11:14 and 11:15), and, as 
can be seen from Table 11:16, it was the externals who proved 
to be the more successful.
Another prediction which failed to find any support was 
that there would be a locus of control by rated differential 
sensitivity interaction. The results were in the predicted 
direction (Table 11:17), with the internal-punishment sensitive 
group showing the largest negative score on the "Correct" 
measure, reflecting the fact that they correctly respond with the 
"avoid" key often as compared to their correct responding 
with the "gain" key. The internal-reward sensitive group 
obtained the highest mean score, with both external groups 
yielding intermediate scores. It is interesting that such a 
pattern of results should emerge, for it suggests, once more, 
that the Rotter scale taps both In(+) and In(-).
The predicted In(+) by In(-) was found to be significant, 
(Table 11:18). The significance of this interaction is 
important beyond the fact that it indicates that Locus of Control 
might profitably be divided into two subfactors. If the 
"Correct" measure may be regarded as a behavioural index of 
differential sensitivity, then this significant In(+) x In(-) 
interaction may serve to emphasize the fact that a number of 
factors may determine whether or not this differential 
sensitivity is observed in behaviour. To predict behaviour 
with any degree of accuracy it may well, at times, be necessary 
to know, not only about the situation, but also what the actor 
thinks about ths situation and himself.
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It may be seen from Table 11:19, however, that despite 
the fact that the interaction was significant the results were 
not entirely as predicted. The In(+) Ex(-) had the largest 
mean score, the In(+) In(-) and Ex(+) Ex(-) groups yielded 
scores not markedly different from zero, but the Ex(+)ln(-) group 
who, it was predicted, would yield the largest negative score, 
in fact obtained a relatively large positive score.
One might summarize the situation, then, by noting that 
there is some overlap between locus of control and differential 
sensitivity, with externals seemingly rating themselves as more 
sensitive to cues of punishment. However, this overlap seems to 
be small, there is no evidence that it extends to the behavioural 
level and it appears that the extent of the relationship might 
well be influenced by the manner in which questions are asked.
As for LoC itself this appears to be related, to a limited extent, 
to neuroticism and ego-strength, and also to n-ach. However, 
despite this relationship with n-ach and the fact that externals 
appear to be more rule bound and inefficient internals were not 
found to be more successful than externals at the task in hand.
Behaviourally Defined Croups
To this point groups have been defined on the basis of their 
self ratings and then one has looked to see if these groups 
behaved differently in relation to some behaviour of theoretical 
importance. It was felt that it would be interesting to turn 
this approach to the problem on its head and start, instead, 
from the fact that people do behave differently and ask whether 
or not they also view themselves differently. It was,therefore, 
asked whether high, medium and low "Correct" scorers rate 
themselves differently on the various self report measures 
that were available.
No differences in rating were found with respect to the
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introverSion-extraverSion dimension. However, people who 
behave as if they are more sensitive to cues of reward than 
punishment also rate themselves as differentially more sensitive 
to cues of reward than to cues of punishment. Similarly those 
who are behaviourally more sensitive to cues of punishment rate 
themselves as if this were the case (see Table 11:20 for 
group means).
Individuals who show no stronger sensitivity to cues of 
reward than to cues of punishment tend to regard themselves as 
more neurotic, their fate controlled by external factors and as 
having low need for achievement. Whereas those individuals \dio 
show greater sensitivity to either sort of cues see themselves 
as stable, controlling their own fortunes and motivated to achieve.
It seems reasonable to assume that those individuals who 
show no differential sensitivity for either type of reinforcement 
will find it relatively more difficult to decide on a course 
of action than those who are predominantly sensitive to one type 
of cue. This state of affairs might well lead them into
vacillation and inconsistency with the result that they are 
more likely to rate themselves as neurotic, feel that their 
behaviour is as much determined by outside factors as anything 
they contribute, feeling as they do drawn in opposite directions 
by different cues, the net result being that they cannot see 
themselves as being achievement oriented.
This pattern of results is especially interesting in view 
of the fact that in experiments 2 - 4 it was found that neuroticism 
was related, to some degree, to self rated inconsistency, and 
the pattern of results here suggests that these people may well 
be inconsistent, behaviourally, as compared to the stable, internal* 
achievement oriented individuals.
This set of results then, as might have been anticipated, 
echoes,the support found earlier for the Grayian dimension of
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differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement. This 
dimension does not appear to be adequately tapped by the EPI E 
scale. It appears that differential sensitivity does, at times, 
overlap with other well used dimensions but the relationship is 
not always linear. These relationships do not appear to be 
substantial and may usefully be regarded as factors to be 
taken into account when attempting to predict behaviour relevant 
to Grays theory.
Principle Component Analysis
A principle components analysis was calculated partly 
to see whether a distinct self report differential sensitivity 
factor emerged, but also to look at the factor, or factors, of 
locus of control which might emerge, as well as to see whether 
or not a single factor of self rated consistency would emerge. 
This analysis was limited to self report data, where scores from 
162 individuals were available and some variables were obviously 
related to each other e.g. EPI N, Es and self rated neuroticism, 
or EPI E, self rated extraversion and self rated impulsivity.
It was not felt that it would be reasonable to include the 
behavioural data in this analysis as there were potentially a 
large number of variables, but relatively few Ss (65).
The factor loadings are reported in Table 11:28 
Factors 1 and 2 are clearly neuroticism and extraversion factors 
respectively, though it is interesting to note that externality 
(.587), rated sensitivity to cues of punishment (.403), and also 
n-ach (-.314) also loaded on the first factor reflecting the 
externality, sensitive to cues of failure, low achievement 
pattern discussed earlier.
Factor 2 is a relatively pure factor with the only 
substantial loadings on it being EPI E, rated extraversion and 
rated impulsivity. Though it is worth noting that self rated
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differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement does show a 
small loading on this factor (.398)., which suggests, at the 
self report level at least, that Gray’s speculation relating 
differential sensitivity and introversion-extraversion may not 
have been totally awry though the relationship is nothing like 
as strong as he suggested.
Differential sensitivity does not emerge as a factor 
until the relatively small factor 7. Though it is small it is, 
nevertheless, interesting. As might be expected of such a 
small factor it is relatively pure with only two variables 
showing significantly sized loadings on it: differential
sensitivity and consistency of differential sensitivity.
The two poles of the factor are then, consistent sensitivity 
to cues of reward versus inconsistent sensitivity to cues of 
punishment. This element of consistency - inconsistency gives 
added interest to the factor. Gray developed his theory 
mainly on the basis of physiological investigations and animal 
studies, which may have led to the overlooking or minimizing of 
the interpretation of information in which humans engage.
The consistency-inconsistency dichotomy may bring this into 
more prominence. This dichotomy may be due to the fact that the 
salience of cues, particularly cues of punishment, is not 
constant, or alternatively that "punishment" is not perceived 
as unitary.
These two possibilities, though not incompatible do not, 
necessarily, imply each other. Pleasantness may well be 
regarded as beipg "more unitary'* in our society than punishment. 
Pleasant things are always to be enjoyed, although it may sometimes 
lead to unpleasant outcomes. When these unpleasant outcomes 
are foreseeable then the avoidable cues are no longer cues of 
reward, positive reinforcement, but instead cues of frustration, 
classed by Gray with punishment. Punishment, or unpleasantness,
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do not appear to be nearly so straightforward. Sometimes 
unpleasant situations must be endured either in the hope of 
something pleasant being obtained inconsequence of the unpleasant 
situation, or because there is no alternative. Similarly 
sometimes it is necessary to delay gratification which may produce 
a transient frustration. It would seem to be advantageous to 
be less sensitive to cues of this type of experience, which only 
serves to highlight unpleasant situations. There are other 
occasions, however, vdien it is critical that we notice the 
possibility of an unpleasant outcome. The situation is no doubt 
far more complex than this simple characterization, but if nothing 
else the principle components analysis has proved to be valuable 
in highlighting the possibility that, at least in the way people 
view the world, rewards and punishments may not be unitary concepts, 
and this in itself may be a help in understanding behaviour.
The final factor to emerge from the analysis is loaded 
on by just two variables: sensitivity to cues of reward and
sensitivity cues of punishment. This appears to be the second 
of the Grayian dimensions. It seems, then, that there is 
some evidence at the self report level for both Gray’s 
dimensions, general sensitivity to cues of reinforcement, and 
differential sensitivity.
Factor 4 appears to be the Locus of Control factor.
This factor does not appear to fracture into two factors* 
however, as it was suggested it might. Strangely although 
both the Rotter scale and In(+) load on this factor In(-) 
does not. In(-) instead loads on factor 6 vdiich appears to be 
the need-achievement factor loaded on as it is by n-ach (-.616) 
and also In(+) (.427) and awareness of the consequences of 
of behaviour (-.44). This suggests that internality, believing 
one controls outcomes, is associated with wanting to control 
them. The two poles of this factor seem to be achievement
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orientation coupled with awareness of the consequences of ones 
behaviour and a sense of responsibility for what results from 
ones behaviour, versus low achievement motivation, little 
awareness of the consequences of ones behaviour and a tendency 
to attribute outcomes to external factors.
The four remaining factors all appear to be factors of 
consistency, none of them appearing to be a general factor. 
Admittedly only the first of these consistency factors, F^, 
a factor of consistency of locus of control, contributes a 
substantial proportion of the observed variance. Nevertheless 
it is of theoretical interest that at the self rating level 
the extent to which people say they are consistent in relation 
to one factor is substantially independent of the extent to 
which they feel they are consistent on other factors. The four 
factors to emerge were consistency of locus of control, of 
general sensitivity to cues of reinforcement, of neuroticism 
and of extraversion.
Only limited evidence of consistency in behaviour has 
been found, and this seems easily wiped out with situational 
changes, it now appears that even at the self report level there 
is little evidence of generalized consistency, It appears 
then that if one wishes to talk about consistency, even in the 
senses of relative consistency and coherence one must limit 
oneself to certain dimensions or groups of dimensions and 
situations which the individual sees as equivalent. It seems 
probable that in familiar situations the individual will be 
sensitive to more cues and respond to more subtle changes 
reducing the liklihood that any consistency in behaviour will be 
observed. It is certainly reasonable to suppose he will have 
a larger repertoire of responses available in these situations 
whereas his behaviour in less familiar situations may well have a 
certain stereotypicalness about it.
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The correlations between the various self ratings of 
consistency are reported in Table 11:29. It can be seen that 
although many of the correlations reach significance they are 
generally very small.
Wallach and Leggett (1972), argued that traits and 
consistencies were not necessarily related, but that consistency 
would be observed in those behaviours which might be regarded 
as typical of the individuals style. It has been argued here 
that simple relative consistency will not be found even for 
behaviour regarded as "typical", for this would seem to indicate 
that the individual was not attempting to construe the situation 
and employ an appropriate strategy. This brings us to the final 
questions of the present study (i) do people rate themselves in 
a consistent manner? (ii) Do people behave in a consistent 
manner?.
With respect to the first of these questions (i) there is 
no element evident in the present situation which should lead 
people to give reports of themselves different from those they 
gave in the previous experiment. (ii) As the time between 
the two reports was relatively short, 3 - 4  months, there is no 
reason to suppose that the Ss have experienced situations which 
have caused them to view themselves in a different way. Some 
may well have experienced such a situation, but there is no 
reason to believe a substantial proportion of the sample has.
(iii) Similarly as the two reports were made with a short 
interval there is no reason to believe that Ss will choose 
markedly different sets of behaviours on which to base their 
responses.
The relevant correlations are reported in Table 11:25 
and it does appear that there is considerable consistency in 
self rating. This consistency is not uniformly high, however, 
neuroticism showing a much higher set of correlations than
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extraversion. This result was not anticipated, especially as 
both the self ratings* extraversion and impulsivity^ are found to 
correlate more highly than the EPI E scale. It could, of 
course, be argued that this moderate correlation was a good 
thing, indicating that the EPI E scale is sensitive to change, 
or that the correlation of the E scale is smaller than those 
for the self ratings simply because of the greater specificity of 
its questions, and so its greater accuracy in reflecting 
inconsistency that is really there. This does not really ring 
true, however, given the way the EPI was constructed and 
Eysenck’s own view on the consistency issue.
As for rated consistency, a significant, though 
moderate correlation was found for consistency of neuroticism 
(.571). The relationship between this consistency rating and 
rated neuroticism was again found to be significant, but this 
was inevitable with such a large sample and the correlation 
itself is small, -.292. The correlation between self rated 
consistency for neuroticism and EPI N is even smaller -.138.
It is always possible that this correlation reflects a social 
desirability element. Those individuals who answer the 
neuroticism questions in a socially desirable manner insisting 
that they really are always stable, while those .’’admitting’’ to 
being neurotic are also either limiting this behaviour to 
’’only sometimes’’, or they are genuinely less concerned with 
social desirability and so they take no heed of \diether it is 
desirable or not to be consistent or neurotic and instead reflect 
the true state of things, neuroticism being, a least in this 
non-clinical group, an inconsistent aspect of their behaviour.
The rated consistencies of extraversion and sociability 
were not found to be consistent. It is always possible, of 
course, that this lack of observed consistency is due to the 
questions themselves lacking in validity. It seems more likely.
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however, that this reflects something about perceived consistency, 
particularly in relation to dimensions such as extraversion or 
sociability and impulsivity. As situations, or the frequency 
of different types of situations change so will experienced 
consistency of behaviour. For example, a person may spend much 
of his time with many friends, at which point he will rate 
himself as consistently sociable. Later he may form a 
particular relationship which results in his spending less time 
with other friends and acquaintances. He may still view 
himself as sociable but his behaviour may appear to him less 
consistent, sometimes with many people, often with just one.
If this relationship persists this pattern of being mainly with 
one person, occassionally with many may become the dominant view 
of himself, he may now rate himself as quite sociable, but 
once more consistent.
Turning to behavioural consistency it was not expected 
that any would be found with respect either to commission or 
omission errors. In experiment 4 a strategy which resulted 
in a large number of omission errors seemed to be the most 
appropriate one, while in this present experiment errors could 
result in failing to gain points or actually losing them.
The results are reported in Table 11:25. There seems to be no 
evidence of consistency with respect to omission errors only 
4 of 28 correlations proving to be significant and even these 
being rather small, .338 - .368, in size. One must not dismiss 
these too easily, however, for they do suggest that individuals 
may well have an element of stylistic consistency, but this 
consistency is in no way straight jacketing. That is, 
although a person may have a more or less typical way of 
responding if there are elements in the situation which demand a 
particular response, or even a change of style individuals 
can change appropriately.
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• TABLE 11:27 summarizing the correlations with respect 
to commission errors is included mainly for the sake of 
completeness. There were so few commission errors in 
experiment 4 that it was virtually impossible for any strong 
evidence in favour of the consistency hypothesis to emerge 
from this data.
In conclusion then it seems that for the first time 
results have been obtained which might be interpreted as 
supporting Gray’s concept of differential sensitivity, but it 
appears that different people are differentially sensitive to 
cues of reward and punishment irrespective of the fact that the 
cue of punishment was the stimulus for an active and not a 
passive avoidance response. There was only tentative support 
for the hypothesis that this dimension was related to the 
Eysenckian dimension of introversion-extraversion. Self-
ratings with respect to differential sensitivity proved to be 
a better predictor of behaviour, at the group level, but it was 
concluded that perhaps the dimension ought to be regarded as 
similar to locus of control, reflecting the kind of things the 
individual will attend to, and consequently leam, rather 
than as a predictor of behaviour itself. There does appear 
to be an element of over lap between the dimension of differential 
sensitivity and n-ach and locus of control, but this is slight 
and appears to be curvilinear.
As for the second of the . Grayian dimensions, the only 
evidence for this is that the two questions rating sensitivity 
to cues of reward and punishment load on an independent factor. 
Neuroticism does not appear to be related to this factor.
It was also suggested that the theory may have to be 
modified to take account of the fact that people may not regard, 
especially, punishment as a unitary concept. Which in turn 
leads back once more to the fact that much of the data obtained
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in the present experiment although demonstrating the importance 
of situational variables emphasizes the importance of the way 
in which the individual interprets the situation, the beliefs 
he holds and the strategies he employs in consequence.
With regard to locus of control there does appear to 
be some evidence that there are two subfactors In(+) and In(-) 
but these do not appear to be closely related to differential 
sensitivity, and are themselves closely related to each other, 
not forming two orthogonal independent factors.
With regard to consistency there appears to be only 
the weakest.of possible suggestions that people may have a 
stylistic consistency in behaviour, but even this might be 
easily cast aside when necessary. It appears, from the self 
ratings, that even consistency is not terribly consistent and, 
hardly surprisingly that no one factor of consistency exists, 
at least at the self rating level.
Self-ratings on specific dimensions did appear to be 
reasonably consistent.
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CHAPTER XII; CONCLUSION
Mischel (1968, 1973) has suggested that those 
personality traits put forward to date lack predictive utility, 
and from this seems to have emerged two questions, or rather 
two points of debate;
1. Do traits exist? or perhaps more properly, :Are 
statements made by trait theorists more than dispositional 
statements?
2. Do people behave in a consistent manner?
These two questions have often become so intertwined 
as to obscure each other. At times they have been dealt with 
independently, and then, when dealing with consistency, people 
have found it necessary to distinguish between the various 
meanings of the term. Some authors (e.g. Wallach and Leggett, 
1972) have maintained that people are consistent while rejecting 
the utility of the trait position; others have suggested 
that consistency, itself, might be regarded as a moderator 
variable, or else have suggested that individuals may be found 
to be consistent within their own reference systems.
Two major outcomes seem to have resulted from this 
debate: situational variables were seen as being more important
in determining behaviour than had hithertb been the case, 
at least their importance was explicitly acknowledged; 
idiographic approaches to the study of personality received 
. something of an impulse.
What has been termed *situationalism," viewing the 
situation as the major, if not the sole, determinant of 
behaviour soon gave way to "interactionism" - the explicit 
acknowledgement that the individual, the environment and the
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manner in which these interact are all important determinants 
of behaviour.
Even at this stage, however, there was some lack of 
agreement. Some authors set about partitioning the variance 
observed in different situations and across various samples 
and argued that one or another source of variance was of 
special importance. Other authors, however, took a rather 
different and somewhat more complex view suggesting that though 
one might logically distinguish between the individual, the 
environment or situation and behaviour, such a division was 
misleading for all these elements were both intimately related 
to each other, and constantly influencing one another. The 
relationship is a dynamic one, and as such, the type of 
interaction exemplified by the analysis of variance model was 
clearly inadequate. Bandura (1977) suggested that this state 
of affairs might be better described by the term "reciprocal 
determinism" rather than the more usual term interaction.
The social learning theory approach to behaviour 
acknowledged not only the importance of situational variables 
but also gave some importance to the cognitive aspects of 
behaviour. The perceptions of the individual, the rules he 
abstracts, the strategies he employs and the goals he wishes 
to attain were all given a degree of prominence.
It was observed earlier, however, that to regard one 
approach as enshrining all truth and the other only false 
promises might, to say the least, prove to be short sighted.
The whole situation seemed much more complex than this with 
different authors, or groups of theorists, concentrating on 
different aspects of behaviour and wishing to emphasize 
different facets of behaviour or its organization. It was 
also pointed out that different theorists might well be 
presenting theories and observations properly belonging to
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different levels of explanation and generality, with the result 
that any attempt to translate from one to another might not 
prove to be particularly useful.
Little attempt seems to have been made, so far, to 
integrate the nomothetic and idiographic approaches to 
personality. As these two approaches are not, necessarily, 
mutually exclusive, it was argued, this might prove to be 
a fruitful step. It was speculated that any theory which 
did manage to integrate these two approaches might also yield 
the further advantage of indicating what types of nomothetic 
statements there were to be made. If, for example, all 
behaviour was learned then any detailed description and 
prediction of behaviour would have to rely on an equally 
detailed learning history of the individual being available.
If learning ability itself were predetermined then one could 
make a series of statements of increasing generality,statements 
uniquely true of the individual, statements true of those of 
a similar learning ability living in the same sub-culture, or 
culture, statements universally true of individuals of a 
similar learning ability.
Because of the importance placed on learning in the 
social learning theory approach to individual differences it was 
speculated that a theory which offered a biological basis for 
learning might also provide a suitable basis for a more general 
theory integrating the idiographic and nomothetic approaches 
to individual differences. It was at this point that the 
theories of Gray and Eysenck were introduced, as they do 
explicitly relate personality, biological differences and 
conditioning.
In a series of experiments predictions drawn from these 
two theories were contrasted to see which, if either, might 
prove to be more useful as a touch stone for further speculation.
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The first experiment employed a verbal conditioning 
situation, but because of the differential levels of responding 
of the stable and neurotic groups prior to the introduction 
of reinforcement it was regarded as incautious to attempt to 
draw any firm conclusions from this study, though there was 
no obvious support for either theory. The second experiment, 
however, did produce a clear conditioning effect, though once 
more it proved difficult to find any convincing evidence in 
support of either theory.
Whereas the second experiment had employed a classical 
conditioning situation the third experiment used an operant 
conditioning situation. Again there was a clear conditioning 
effect, and this time the results were interpretable as 
supporting Eysenck’s theory.
Despite these significant results, it was felt that 
Eysenck’s theory lacked the robust generality to be taken 
usefully as the foundation of the type of theory outlined. 
Support for Eysenck’s theory had been found only once in 
three experiments, the conditions needed to demonstrate the 
superior conditioning of the introvert were so difficult to 
contrive that it is difficult to see how one could regard them 
as prevalent in everyday situations, with the result that the 
theory loses its predictive utility as it is impossible to 
say who will,\"\"K fact, condition more efficiently in any but 
the most contrived situations. Even \dien introverts were 
found to condition more efficiently than extraverts the 
introversion-extraversion dimension was found to contribute 
only a trivial proportion of the total observed variance, and 
even this might be easily swamped by other factors. It was 
felt, therefore, that though Eysenck’s theory might be "true" 
to some degree it had little heuristic value.
What was evident from these experiments was the
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frightening efficiency with which people did condition and 
the extent to which physical aspects of the situation influenced 
people’s behaviour. The efficiency with which people 
conditioned, responded to situational cues, displayed 
adaptability, call it what you will, was far more pronounced 
than a mere inspection of the data would ever indicate and it 
would have been easy to become converted to the situationalist 
point of view were it not for an equally strong effect which 
emerged in experiments four and five.
The focus of experiments four and five was partly 
consistency, both behavioural and self report, and partly Gray’s 
suggestion that people are differentially sensitive to cues of 
reward and punishment. The most striking effect to emerge, 
however, was the importance of the strategies employed. These 
determined behaviour and, in consequence, the degree of 
consistency observed. Of course, the physical features of the 
situation and the reinforcement contingencies in part determine 
the strategy which, having been adapted and behaviour- 
initiated, changes the situation at least to the degree that 
the perception of the situation is changed, different cues 
becoming differentially important for the successful execution of 
the strategy. The behaviour, determined by the strategy may 
well change the situation and the reinforcement contingencies 
obtaining.
Before starting these experiments it was suggested that 
theories of personality did not adequately reflect the true 
complexity of human behaviour, and it was suggested that a more 
complex model was needed. What emerged from the experimental 
data was that those suggestions which were made, vague as they 
were,did little more justice to the true extent of that complexity.
With respect to the consistency of behaviour there was 
only the vaguest suggestion that people did behave in a
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consistent manner, and this only a relative consistency in 
making omission errors. The strategy, determined by the 
situation in vÆiich the individual found himself, proved to be 
a far more important determinant of behaviour.
There seemed to be little evidence of a general factor 
of consistency from self ratings, indeed there seemed to 
be little evidence that individuals were consistent with 
respect to the degree of consistency they assummed themselves 
to display either across traits or across situations. This, 
of course, makes it difficult to follow the suggestion that 
consistency, itself, might be used as a moderator variable.
Returning to Gray’s theory, despite the failure to find 
any support for it in experiments 1 - 3 ,  it was decided that it 
ought to be looked at further as it had been investigated 
largely assumming that the \dentification of the Grayian 
with the Eysenckian dimensions was correct. It also seemed 
possible that Gray’s theory might provide some insight into 
behaviour in the guise of indicating which type of strategy 
an individual was most likely to adopt. Experiment 5 did, 
indeed, provide some support for Gray’s contention that people 
are differentially sensitive to cues of reward and punishment; 
though this dimension of differential sensitivity was not 
related to the Eysenckian dimension of introversion-extraversion.
It seems possible that Gray’s dimension functions to a 
greater extent as a performance, rather than.a learning variable, 
determining the strategy adopted because it directs attention 
to one type of cue in preference to another.
It was decided to pursue this possibility in something 
more like a "real life" situation. One might regard phobics 
as adopting a strategy of passive avoidance initiated by cues 
of negative reinforcement. Many of the S who had completed 
the questionnaires used in experiment 5 had also completed the
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Wolpe-LANG(1964) Fear Schedule for J. Mervyn-Smith (1979, 
unpublished)* It was decided to combine these data to discover 
whether individuals who consistently rated themselves as fearful 
also tended to rate themselves as differentially sensitive to 
cues of reinforcement, or as highly sensitive to cues of punishment,
TABLE 12:1 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELF-RATED SENSITIVITY TO CUES 
OF REINFORCEMENT AND SELF-RATED FEARFULNESS
Differential Sensitivity Sensitivity
Sensitivity 
to cues of 
Reinforcement
to cues of 
Reward
to cues of 
Punishment
Fear of 
Noise (4) -.185 .0884 .248*
Fear of Noise 
(5) -.116 -.069 .061
Classical 
Phobias (4) -.0506 .113 .225*
Classical 
Phobias (5) -,132 .135 .175
Fear of 
Animals (4) -.072 -.0445 .163
Fear of 
Animals (5) -.222* .135 .138
Social 
Phobias (4) -.117 ,117 .343*
Social 
Phobias (5) -.27* .0414 ,153
Miscellaneous 
Phobias (4) -.15 .091 .229*
Miscellaneous 
Phobias (5) -.2998* .186 .299*
Fear of Tissue 
damage (4) .008 ,096 .079
Fear of Tissue 
damage (5) -.27* .0414 .153
<  ,05, 2 tailed)
(items belonging to 6 classes of phobia were rated on a five point
scale. The correlations were computed between the number of items 
rated at points 4 and 5 on the fear scale and the ratings for 
sensitivity)
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Although aome of the correlations reported in Table 12:1 
do reach significance they are ganerally small suggesting that 
though differential sensitivity to cues of reinforcement and 
sensitivity to cues of punishment may well play some part in 
determining which individuals will become phobic they are 
neither the sole nor the major determinants. It should be
remarked, of course, that the individuals who took part in this 
study did not find their life disrupted by their fears, and it 
is always possible that a stronger relationship might have 
been found had a more extreme group been employed. It seems, 
then, that one cannot disregard the possibility that differential 
sensitivity to cues of reinforcement may in part determine 
which strategy an individual adopts, though this has not been 
clearly demonstrated here, but it is likely to be only one of 
a number of such factors.
It might be concluded from this set of experiments that 
individuals do alter their behaviour, so as to take advantage of 
the existing reinforcement contingencies. They do this with 
remarkable efficiency, and even in some situations when they 
are unable to report the prevailing contingencies. This 
facility is not always remarked on, especially when one is 
primarily concerned with personality trait variables, and is 
focusing one's attention on the differences between groups of 
individuals or the differential predictions drawn from 
alternative theories.
This, of course, leads one to conclude that the physical 
aspects of a situation are important in determining behaviour, 
and also that learning may be important in determining future 
behaviour. Cognitive variables, however, are also of 
considerable importance and so it seems that Wiat is learned 
in any situation is more than a mere physical response, one 
1earns a whole approach to the situation, a strategy and a
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method of evaluating out comes.
The net effect of this is that unless one establishes 
remarkably similar situations consistency - whether absolute, 
relative or in the form of coherence - is unlikely to be 
observed. On the evidence presented here more than the 
immediate physical aspects of stimuli need to be similar if 
consistency is to be observed.
As for the two theories, Eysenck's and Gray's, from 
which predictions were drawn neither of them seem to be 
adequate for the task of providing the basis for a general 
theory of personality, one which would integrate both the 
nomothetic and idiographic approaches to personality. Hypotheses 
drawn from both theories did receive some measure of support, 
however, suggesting that on one hand neither theory can be 
disregarded at present, and any future theory must be capable 
of either incorporating the relevant elements of these two 
theories or else re-explaining these findings.
Some support did emerge for Eysenck's contention that 
introverts condition more efficiently than extraverts, but one 
must adhere closely to the parameters delineated by the theory, 
and so the differance does not appear to be robust; and the 
percentage of variance contributed by the introversion- 
extraversion dimension is very small. Overall Eysenck's theory 
seems to lack heuristic value.
As for Gray's theory it appears that there may well be 
some truth to his contention that individuals are differentially 
sensitive to cues of reinforcement. It is possible to view 
this differential sensitivity as a "person variable"
(Mischel, 1973), and as such incorporate it into the social 
learning theory frame work. It seems unlikely, however, that 
this variable is related to the Eysenckian trait dimension of 
introversion-extraversion.
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No evidence emerged to suggest that differential 
sensitivity is related to learning or conditioning - though it 
cannot be claimed that this is to any degree established and 
such a relationship might well still emerge if this variable 
were more adequately measured. It also seems probable that 
even in relation to behaviour most obviously related to 
differential sensitivity the differential sensitivity to cues 
of reinforcement of the individual is only one of a number of 
factors which determines the observed behaviour.
It is also worth remarking once more that though it was 
never clearly established there was often a suspicion in the 
data that conditioning itself is not unidimensional and may well 
fracture into at least two components. This, of course, has 
implications not only for the theories of Gray and Eysenck, but 
also for any general theory of personality which sees learning 
as playing an important part in determining behaviour.
Directions for Future Research.
At the more specific level it does appear that more 
research is needed in relation to Gray's theory. Several 
shortcomings of the model were noted in Chapter Five, but what 
proved to be the most important inadequacy of this theory was 
its vagueness when it came to making predictions. This proved 
to be especially true with reference to the concepts of positive 
and negative reinforcement. Gray has equated active avoidance 
and appetitive behaviour with the implication that those 
individuals who are relatively more sensitive to cues for active 
avoidance are also relatively more sensitive to cues of 
appetitive reinforcement. Yet in experiment five this proved 
not to be the case, significant differences were found between 
those who rated themselves more sensitive to cues of reward 
and cues of punishment in their relative sensitivity, or accuracy
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of responding, to cues of appetitive reinforcement and cues 
of active avoidance.
Given the central position of this assumption in the 
building of the theory it seems essential that this aspect of 
the theory must be put to right if the theory is to develop 
in to a model useful to us in the understanding of human behaviour,
It seems, with respect to Gray's theory, that at each 
stage of experimentation one had to abandon more and more of the 
assumptions of the theory and retreat to the more fundamental 
and central ones. Initially it was assum%\ that the Grayian 
and Eysenckian dimensions were related, and these dimensions 
were related in turn to conditionability. This appeared not to
be the case. It was then suggested that perhaps different 
theories, or different personality variables would prove to be 
important in different types of conditioning situations, but 
no evidence was found to support this suggestion. Later it was 
suggested that Gray's theory, or the dimension of differential 
sensitivity might prove to be important as a performance rather 
than as a learning variable, an element of support was found 
for this. Now it is being suggested, on the basis of the data 
from experiment five, that Gray's formulation of the relationships 
between active avoidance, passive avoidance and appetitive 
reinforcement may not be correct.
These problems may, of course, arise because Gray is 
attempting to generalize from one set of empirical findings, not 
all of which were conclusive in themselves, obtain from non­
human subjects to human behaviour, and even human typologies.
It may be that in this case it is simply not possible. It seems 
possible that the elaboration of the higher central nervous 
system in man may well have produced some fundamental changes of 
organization, particularly with respect to learning, in man as 
compared to other animals like the laboratory rat or even monkeys.
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It seems probable that despite the fact that differential 
sensitivity does survive in man the effect of the growing 
importance of the abstract organization of information, and the 
influence of other cognitive variables may well have been to 
reduce the importance of this variable in the determination of 
behaviour. It seems that it might be necessary to rebuild 
Gray's model, repeating and re-evaluating his findings but this 
time exploying, where ever possible, human subjects. This 
would demand a series of experiments on learning and conditioning 
in humans, with particular attention paid to the relative 
effectiveness and the relationships between cues of active and 
passive avoidance and appetitive reinforcement within an 
individual and between groups of individuals.
One would also like to investigate the specific effects 
of drugs e.g. alcohol, on learning to see if findings are in 
line with those reported by Gray for animal subjects.
In line with the results reported earlier in this 
chapter, having developed a reliable measure of differential 
sensitivity one would like to know to what extent this variable 
influences behaviour in general e.g. is it related to depression, 
or phobic reactions or to so called psychopathic behaviour?
In a similar direction it would be interesting to look 
at the effects of various pharmacological agents within the 
framework provided by Gray's theory. For example to what 
degree might it be possible to reduce the dosage of a drug, or 
change from one substance to another to facilitate the 
eradication of one behavioural response and its replacement 
by another?
It seems, then, that Gray's theory itself may suggest 
several areas for research, but before it can provide a useful 
frame work in which these can be integrated some major 
modifications of the theory need to be carried out, most
4Sîj
importantly so that it yields unequivocal predictions.
Leaving aside Gray's theory and turning to theories of 
personality in general it has been an underlying assumption 
here that learning and conditioning play an important role in 
determining behaviour. It was suggested that if one could find 
a dimension, preferably one with a neurological basis, which 
influenced the conditionability of the individual then this 
might be a fruitful place from which to start developing a theory 
of personality. In making this suggestion it was implicitly 
assum , though such an assumption is not necessary, that there 
was some consistency in conditioning or that it was unidimensional, 
and also that we have a sound understanding of the process of 
conditioning. It seems that both these assumptions might be 
seriously questioned. It might, therefore, prove useful, if 
not to abandon the usual western approach of specifying groups 
or dimensions and investigating differences as these determine, 
at least to broaden the approach employed. One approach which 
might prove to be useful is that exemplified by Pavlov,
Teplov, Nebylitsyn and their colleagues. These researchers 
have investigated the various properties of conditioning and 
attempted to relate these to properties of the nervous system 
and then gone on to attempt to determine the extent these 
nervous system properties co-exist within the same individual.
For example to what extent are conditioning to positive and 
negative reinforcement related, or conditioning of passive and 
active avoidance? Are classical and operant conditioning 
related, or does one depend to a greater degree on "cognitive 
abilities"? Does the fast development of a response indicate 
whether or not it will quickly extinguish? To what extent is 
the strength of the stimuli important in relation to these 
other factors?
Having done this kind of research one might attempt to
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develop some sort of typology of individuals based on the clusters 
of conditioning or nervous system properties one had discovered. 
Alternatively after some of the preliminary work one might put 
forward a theoretical model which would predict which nervous 
system properties or aspects of conditioning would co-exist, 
or be manifestations of common processes and in consequence 
which type of "personalities" could exist. As with all such 
models these might prove in the long run to be incorrect or 
inadequate, but until replaced they would help to integrate 
findings and direct future research.
Adopting such a I line of research would also bring 
research on personality more closely into line with the rest of 
experimental psychology.
Some would, no doubt, find such suggestions for the 
future of research in personality particularly unpleasant 
as summing as they do that conditioning and learning are of central 
importance in determining individual differences, and the 
results of the present series of experiments do suggest that 
this research on its own might not prove to be adequate. 
Strategies, planning or the abstracting of rules, it has been 
observed several times, appeared to play a major part in 
determining behaviour, with the result that any description of, 
or theory of, the determinants of behaviour which ignored these 
would be inadequate.
It seems evident even at this stage that one needs to 
refine these concepts and possibly even to sub-divide them, 
never-the-less several questions do spring to mind which seem 
worth asking. To what extend do strategies influence or 
determine behaviour? What determines the selection of a 
particular strategy, as opposed to any other, on a particular 
occassion? How are strategies developed? Do individuals 
have sets of prefered strategies and is it this that produces
458
the aura of consistency? To what extent are strategies 
idiosyncratictWyor situationally or culturally or universally 
determined?
Some of these questions are dealt with in a rather 
vague "common sense" way in social learning theory, but there 
appears to be a lack of precise experimental investigation.
The most satisfactory direction for future research 
would be one that united these diverse suggestions within a 
single theoretical framework, one that explicitly acknowledged 
that each individual is unique, but that behaviour is not 
chaotic and that generalized statements can be made on one hand 
about the determinants of behaviour and on the other 
dispositional statements, describing behaviour typical of the 
individual or group. The ultimate aim would be a theory which 
integrated the nomothetic and idiographic approaches to, and 
traditions of, the study of individual differences; one that 
described the relationships between "person variables," 
learning and conditioning, and cognitive factors such as the 
development and employment of strategies both in general and 
with reference to specific behaviour; a theory that explained 
not only how and why people were different, but also how and why, 
to vdiat extent and in which ways people could be expected to 
be similar.
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APPENDIX I 
ROESSLER
Roess1er has reported a number of studies in Which he 
has attempted to relate the dimension of Ego-Strength (Es) as 
measured by the Barron’s Scale drawn from the MMPI (Barron, 
1956,), to a number of physiological variables.
Roessler, Alexander and Greenfield (1963) presented Ss 
with a series of six tones of 1000 Hz varying in intensity from 
threshold values to 120 dbs. Four physiological measures were 
recorded: skin resistance (SR), heart rate (HR), muscle
potential and finger blood volume (FBV), Es was viewed as a 
measure of coping ability and Ss were divided into high, 
medium and low Es groups. The authors summarized their results 
as follows : "The principle hypothesis tested in this experiment
was that high, middle and low Es groups would rank themselves in 
1, 2, and 3 order respectively, in their responses on any 
physiological measure. Although the relevant co-variance terms 
were not significant for heart rate and did not quite attain 
significance for muscle potential, the trend in the predicted 
direction was evident for these physiological measures as well 
as for skin resistance and finger blood volume where the 
differences were significant." (pp. 150-151).
The results of this experiment are not quite as clear 
cut as Roessler seems to suggest. The Es main effect reaches 
significance only for FBV, although some of the interactions 
were significant e.g. Es x intensity. Sex of S x Es x intensity. 
There was, therefore, some support for Roessler’s hypothesis 
that the high Es group would be more responsive physiologically, 
especially as the largest differences between groups were at 
the lowest levels of intensity. Roessler views this 
responsiveness as adaptive and the data from this experiment to
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some degree justify his assertion that Es "is the psychological 
concept most directly related to the physiological concepts of 
adaptation and homeostasis. The emphasis in the concept of 
Es is upon the capacity to intergrate environmental adaptive 
demands with psychological economy." (p.143)
In a further study (Pfaehler and Roessler, 1955) glucose 
tolerance was the measure employed. Here, as predicted, the 
high Es scorers showed the higher mean level of glucose- on the 
intravenous glucose tolerance test. The high Es group were 
also found to reach the peaks earlier, indicating that the low 
Es scorers were, for some reason using up their glucose more 
quickly.
In a further study (Roessler, Burch and Childers, 1966) 
designed to look at "real life" stress, Ss were tested on four 
occasions at monthly intervals. All Ss were students and the 
third of the testing sessions was held within ten days of their 
examinations. This time no significant differences were found, 
the amplitude of the skin conductance response was the measure 
used, although the high Es group did have the higher mean 
amplitude, as predicted. The stimuli used in this experiment 
were five levels of sound intensity. Roessler, however, has 
offered two possible explanations as to why the predicted effects 
did not appear to a significant degree:
(i) this experimental sessior(Session 3) started too long before 
the examination. To ensure that all Ss were tested the 
pre-examination session had to start ten days before the 
actual examination date, and Roessler felt that stress may 
not have begun to build up until 3 or 4 days immediately 
prior to the examination.
(ii) Roessler also suggested that the experiment was treated as 
a break from examination pressure, at least by some Ss.
This was the third testing session in the series, and in
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line with his suggestion Roessler reports that several Ss actually 
fell asleep in the course of the experiment.
The suggestions received some report when the excreted 
catecholamine levels were examined (Roessler, Burch and 
Meffend, 1967),where differences were in the predicted 
direction. In the high Es group those tested in the 4 days 
immediately prior to the examination showed a significant 
increase in the level of epinephrine (p = .057) and 
norepinephrine (p = .029) over the previous test level. When 
the four Ss tested in the final four days were compared with 
those tested in the previous seven days the former group showed 
a greater increase in epinephrine (p = .115) and norepinephrine 
(p = * .055)
"In the low Es group", Roessler reports, "none of these 
differences reached or approximated significance; even \dien 
threat was imminent these Ss did not respond with greater 
excretion of catecholamines." (p.182)
When the two groups were compared using data over the 
whole 10 day period "the levels of catecholamine excretion of 
the low Es group was less under stress than under basal conditions 
(testing 2) and the high Es group levels were greater under the 
stress than under the control conditions." (p.182).
In order to strengthen his claim that the responsivity 
of the high Es group is adaptive Roessler notes that a number 
of studies e.g. 0*Handlan(1965), Frazier (1966), have found that 
a fall.', in catecholamine excretion during stress was associated 
with a fall in performance, whereas a rise was associated with 
stable performance.
In the fourth testing session (McCollum, Burch and 
Roessler, 1969) respiration amplitude (RA) and respiration rate 
(RR) were recorded and it was found that "high Es Ss showed 
significantly greater excursion and slower rate than low Es Ss."
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Feeling that he had established that high Es scorers 
were more responsive to simple stimuli Roessler turned to the 
differential responding of high and low Es scorers in the face 
of more complex stimuli (Roessler and Collins, 1970). The Ss 
viewed two films, each 12 mins. 50 secs long. SC and HR were 
the measures recorded. The stressor film was an accident 
safety film depicting three accidents. The second film, the 
control, was a nature film. It was found that in all situations 
the high Es group had a higher SC level than the low Es group, 
but this difference was significant only during the stressor film. 
Both groups showed a significant SC level increase to the three 
accidents but the difference between the groups was significant 
only for accident two. It is note worthy that while the range 
of SC scores showed by the high Es group was large and in the 
"appropriate" direction, "the SC of the low Es group was lower 
during most of the stressor film than during the bland film, 
rising above the bland film levels only at the time of the 
second and third accidents." Roessler continues, "This 
parallels the lower catecholamin values found under real life 
stress conditions previously", (p.736)
Roessler draws the following conclusion from this 
experiment; "high Es persons are more responsive in SC to 
complex stimuli of symbolic value as well as to simple ones.
In addition, for the first time, high Es persons have been 
shown to be more responsive to stimuli whose effect is to lower 
levels of physiological activation - i.e. their range of 
activation is greater, varying with the nature of the stimulus 
configurations. High Es Ss appear to be persons who are 
pervasively more responsive to their environment and to changes 
in it. Low Es persons, on the other hand, appear to be 
characterized by relatively less physiological responsivity 
to the environmental changes. They may be employing perceptual
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defence more pervasively and indiscriminantly/* ( p.738).
The point Roessler seems to be stressing in all this is 
not so much that high Es scorers are more responsive, but that 
they are more appropriately responsive than the low Es scorers. 
Roessler *s enthusiasm must, I feel, be tempered by noting 
that the reported differences, from which all the conclusions 
are drawn, were for the SC measure, while no significant 
differences were found in the HR measure. In fact, changes in 
this measure were not all in the predicted direction.
The next step in Roessler*s research strategy was to 
look at a behavioural variable to see if .here too the same 
pattern of superior responsiveness of the high Es group emerged. 
The task employed was a vigilance task under sleep deprived 
conditions (Strausbaugh and Roessler, 1970).
Each S was tested on three occasions; on the first 
occasion the S was required to sleep in the laboratory over night 
and then perform the vigilance task. This session was used to 
familiarize the S with the laboratory and the testing procedure. 
The second run was the same as the first and the data from this 
run was used to establish a baseline. On the third occasion 
the S was required to report to the lab at the same time as on 
the two previous occasions, but this time he was not allowed to 
sleep.
Four conditions were employed:
(i) 20 signals in a 10 period. S had 4.5 secs to respond to a
signal
(ii) as "i" except that S received an electric shock if he failed
to respond with in the time allowed.
(iii) 24 signals in a 10 period, with a 1.88 secs time limit in
which to respond.
(iv) as "iii" except that S received an electric shock if he 
failed to respond within the time limit
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Roessler reports that again the high Es group had a 
higher SC level than the low Es group, the difference being 
significant during sleep deprivation. The high Es group also 
had a higher SC level in the shock condition in the sleep 
deprived situation. High Es Ss had faster reaction times, but 
the Es X  runs interaction was not found to be significant. When 
looking at the number of correct responses a significant inter­
action was found between Es arid conditions but again no Es x runs 
interaction. Thus while there is some eivdence that the high Es 
group were sometimes faster or more efficient in their responding 
there is no evidence to suggest that they were coping better.
When Roessler analysed each run separately he found no 
significant differences between groups in run two (base level), 
but in run three (sleep deprivation),he reports that there were 
significant Es x conditions interactions for SC and all performance 
measures in which the high Es Ss **were the better performers and 
had the higher SC values." (p.675). On the basis of these findings
Roessler feels justified in concluding: "The separate analyses
of Runs II and III with larger groups (16 for run II and 20 for 
run III as opposed to 14 in the previous analyses) of Ss, 
therefore, supports the original analyses and extends them towards 
significant support of the hypotheses 4 (i.e. that high Es Ss 
would show less performance decrement following sleep deprivation 
than low Es Ss)."
In a final experiment (Roessler 1973) Ss were required to 
perform the same vigilance task as in the previous experiment but 
this time instead of using sleep deprivation two levels of drugs 
and placebos were employed. Ss were tested on seven occasions 
and SC and HR were recorded. In line with the predictions the 
high Es group was found to have a higher SC level in the high drug 
condition both as compared with itself in the other conditions 
and with the low Es group. Here again as the low Es group did not
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respond differentially to any test situation whereas the high Es 
group did. Roessler feels that once more that he has demonstrated 
the "discriminative" responding of the high Es group.
This then is the data reported by Roessler and he sums it 
up by saying: "in every experiment the differences described are
difference scores. In general ego-strength groups do not differ 
in resting or pre-stimulus level. In those few instances where 
such differences exist, co-variance adjustments of the change 
score was carried out yielding differences free of any pre­
stimulus effects. In every experiment high Es Ss were found to 
be more responsive." (1973, pp 320 - 321).
The picture Roessler presents is contrary to what one 
might expect. Es is negatively correlated to both anxiety and 
neuroticism, Roessler reports correlations of -.76 with the MA 
scale, and -.72 with the EPI N scale. In Roessler*s scheme of 
things, therefore, it is the less anxious, more stable person 
who appears to be the more appropriately, physiologically 
responsive. Roessler did find that high and low Es groups 
differed on the MA scale, but when groups were redefined on 
the basis of this dimension the physiological differences 
which had previously been apparent disappeared, and,so he feels 
justified in maintaining that it is ego-strength and not anxiety 
which is the dimension responsible for, or which best reflects, 
the physiological differences in responsivity.
Even here, I feel, a note of caution should be added. 
Several measures were employed in a series of experiments but they 
did not all show this differential responsivity, consequently 
"responsivity" may, in the long run, have to be interpreted in a 
very limited sense. HR has proved to be a very poor measure 
of the hypothesised difference between the groups while SC has 
proved to be much more successful, though even with this measure 
there was a notable failure in the Roessler, Childers and Burch
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study. With this in mind, then, it appears that there will 
inevitably be "failures" whilst testing out this theory, until 
such time as all the relevant parameters are specified.
Indeed Roessler himself has noted the limitations of the theory 
at the moment and has remarked: **The percent of total variance
of Es interactions related to SC and performance parameters is 
small but of considerable theoretical interest." (Strausbaugh 
and Roessler, 1970, p.626).
Knowing that Es might be related to responsivity in 
peripheral indices and possibly to some performance variables is, 
of course, of only limited interest, more important is the manner 
in which Roessler conceptualizes Es, He points out that when a 
stimulus is correctly perceived then an appropriate response 
may be expected, however, \dien a stimulus is incorrectly perceived 
there is a high probability that the response will be maladaptive. 
This leads him on to the importance of \diat is termed "reality 
testing".
"Reality testing, the ability to accurately appraise the 
nature and intensity of a stimuli, is one attribute of successful 
coping. Another attribute of successful coping is the ability 
to respond to the need created by stimuli in such a degree and 
in such a pattern so as to fulfill the need. He continues:
"The interpersonal coping abilities most relevant to psychiatry 
include the ability to accurately assess and respond to behaviour 
of others, while at the same time maintaining the integrity of the 
constellation of previously learned self-percepts called the ego. 
The ability to maintain ego integrity is ego-strength. **
(Roessler, 1973, pp. 316 - 317).
This then is how Roessler views Es, the ability to respond 
to situations in such a way as to preserve **ego-integrity**, to 
leave the ego unscathed. There are, of course, two ways in which 
**ego-integrity** might be preserved: (a) to employ many and strong
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defences frequently, the net result being the reduction of the 
intensity of the perceived stimuli. (b) "If a strong ego is 
one characterized by little or no perceptual defence all stimuli 
would be perceived fully, but less threatening ones less intensely 
than more threatening ones. (We would) therefore expect such a 
person to respond more to threatening stimuli and less to non­
threatening ones." (1973, p.325).
The results reported by Roessler support the latter view 
with high Es scorers showing both heightened responsivity to 
stressful stimuli and a more relaxed responsiveness to non­
threatening stimuli, while the differentiation of responses to 
various stimuli appears to be much poorer in the low Es Ss, at 
least as indicated by some peripheral measures.
Pfaehler and Roessler (1965) expressed the idea as follows: 
"Our previous research has lead us to the tentative theoretical 
formation that persons of low ego-strength as compared to presumedly 
more healthy persons are characterized by a greater apparent 
rigidity in response to simple physical stimuli. To state this 
differently, our previous results suggest that \dien persons of 
low ego-strength are subjected to a stimulus which displaces them 
from their physiological pre-stimulus levels, the antithetical 
('homeostatic') physiological responses which are evoked are of 
greater force than those of high ego-strength persons and reduces 
the amplitude of their responses to the displacing stimulus to 
a greater degree. Such physiological rigidity, we speculate, 
parallels the psychological rigidity of such persons. In other 
words, we suspect a relative physiological 'blunting' that para­
llels the well known affective blunting of severly ill 
psychiatric patients." (p.432)
From this Roessler goes on to argue that given a 
threatening situation e.g. the first night in an unfamiliar 
laboratory, the high Es individual will reduce anxiety by
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exploring and appraising the situation, whereas the low Es 
individual would employ defences and attempt to reduce anxiety 
responses by using a deactivating strategy. Consequently, 
though the two groups may have apparently reached the same level 
of e.g. SC, their states - the results of the methods employed 
to reach the observed level - may, in fact, be very different.
The result of utilizing a deactivating strategy will be that low 
Es groups will be less responsive not only to threatening stimuli, 
but as they are using deactivation to return to prestimulus levels 
while leaving the activation constant they can be expected to be 
less responsive to non-threatening, deactivating, stimuli also.
The high Es group, on the other hand, attempt primarily to reduce 
activation by appraising the activating stimuli.
As has already been noted not all physiological indices 
were equally successful in demonstrating the difference in 
responsivity between the two groups with the result that there 
is considerable danger in jumping from the reported data to 
conclusions about behaviour "in general". Roessler, himself 
however, cannot be criticised strongly here. He says : "I am
not content, therefore, to label autonomic responses as behavioural, 
establish a relationship between them and the scorers on the 
MPI scale, and then make the indefensible leap from differences 
of the kind I have described to broad generalizations about 
behaviour generally. If ego-strength is a measure of adapt­
ability or coping ability it should be possible to design 
experiments in \diich adaptive somatomotor behaviours are specified 
and quantified. In other words, the behaviours themselves should 
be the primary criterion of adaptation." (p.322)
As observed earlier most of the data reported by Roessler 
are derived from peripheral indices, and is not consistent 
within itself, so generalizations to more overt behaviour must 
be made cautiously. It seems, given that not all measures were
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equally sensitive to this difference between the high and low 
Es groups in responsivity, that situation and task variables, 
as well as other person variables will all at times attenuate 
any observed relationship between Es and "appropriate" 
responsivity.
Although the results of experiment one of the present 
series were unclear it was suggested that they might be 
interpreted as being consonant with Roessler*s theory, as it 
was the LN Ss who showed the more adaptive responding, using 
the rewarded pronoun more and the punished pronoundiless once 
reinforcement was made contingent on appropriate responding.
No support for Roessler*s theory emerged from 
experiment two but on one hand Es itself was not measured 
while on the other it was suggested that perhaps this theory, 
like the other theories considered, yielded accurate predictions 
only in a restricted range of situations.
In experiment three once again reinforcement will be 
contingent on appropriate responding. If Roessler is correct 
and Es is related to "the ability to accurately appraise the 
nature of stimuli" we can expect the high Es individuals 
to both gain reward and avoid punishment more successfully 
than low Es individuals and so, as Roessler advises we will be 
able to evaluate the differential adaptability of high and low 
Es individuals by observing their behaviour.
APPENDIX II
515
VERBS USED IN EXPERIMENT I
Replied Watched Regulated Emerged Travelled
Restored Applauded Lost Stayed Stood
Freed Bluffed Came Sold Opened
Knew Presented Explained Aspired Fixed
Returned Spoke Said Walked Stated
Swam Cons oled Enclosed Indicated Visited
Chuckled Saw Ran Shrugged Ate
Played Snored Began Looked Obtained
Showed Reached Found Admired Supported
Accepted Approved Entertained Smiled Picked
Sustained Congratulated Called Joined Inquired
Wrote Expressed Told Thought Enj oyed
Attended Saluted Hurried Received Created
Defended Waited Stopped Reported Cheered
Went Misplaced Relieved Heard Carried
Reclined Reassured Surpassed Recited Hoped
Listened Liked Described Arrived Commemorate d
Sent Sympathized Rejoiced Rushed Agreed
Remembered Answered Read Lived Observed
Collected Changed Entered Remained Welcomed
Obeyed Assisted Preserved Decided
Followed Enlarged Completed Heeded
Scribbled Relaxed Brought Danced
Allowed Complimented Mentioned Idolized
Finished Praised Asked Decorated
Planned Continued Befriended HeIped
Compiled Bought Subtracted Honoured
Closed Devoted Assigned Turned
Chose Rewarded Talked Behaved
Ordered Moved Delivered Drove
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Questions used in Experiment One to classify subjects as to 
whether or not they were aware of the reinforcement contingencies 
obtaining:
1. Did you give the first phrase you thought of?
2. How did you go about deciding which pronouns to use?
3. Did you think you were using some pronouns more than others?
4. (if *3* was answered positively)
Can you give any reason vdiy you used the pronoun more 
frequently?
5. Did you notice I said anything?
6. Did you figure out why I said **mmm", (or **tut")?
7. Did you think my saying **mmm** (or **tut") had anything to
do with the sentences you made up?
8. Did you think the **mram" (or **tut") had anything to do with
the pronoun you used?
(Questions were taken from Gidwani, 1971)
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SYLLABLES USED IN EXPERIMENTS
Syllables used in conditioning
XIY YEQ XUF
XIG YEX DUJ
JIH ZEV QUG
YIV ZEJ CUJ
ZIH XEH VUJ
XIG XEB XUJ
SIJ XEY ZUF
NIJ XEK XUD
Y U XEQ XUQ
XIQ VEZ ZUJ
XIK XEN QUH
JIY XEF KUJ
XIF XEG TUJ
HIX NEJ XUW
XIW QEP ZUQ
QIH QEH VUH
CIJ QEF XUH
QIX QEX XUG
ZIQ CEJ QUW
ZIX YEQ XUK
Syllables used in the test ph6
WIJ YEJ XUV
ZIY ZEQ QUJ
XIN ZEH XUP
XIB ZEQ KUQ
QIF VEQ WUQ
ZIJ XEP XUZ
YIX XEV VUY
X U XEM XUG
Q U QEX YUF
K U NEJ QUX
The thirty syllables characterized by the central vowels I and 
U were used as the stimuli in Experiment Three
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STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENT FIVE
TYPE 1 TYPE 2 TYPE 3
(CVC) (VCV) (CGC) (VW)
1. XOJ QUX OXE IQA QXJ ICE
2 . XEJ ZAJ OJE UQA QYX lAO
3o ZOJ QIY UXE UZI YZX AEO
4. QUJ ZIY IZE OZU JYQ EAI
5o XIJ ZUQ OQE AQO JXZ ECU
6 . XUJ XUZ OZE UQA ZXJ UQE
7. XUY YIX OZA U E ZXQ UQI
8 . ZOQ XAY OQA lYU QYJ lAU
9. XIY ZIX CXI UQI QXZ lUO
lOo XOQ QEJ AJE EYA ZYQ UAI
11 YEJ QAZ OZI AJI JQX EIO
12. XUQ ZIQ oxu UQE QJX lEO
13. XOZ YAJ OYE OJA YZQ AUI
14. XAJ YEQ IXE AJO JZQ EUI
15. QIJ ZIJ AZE EJI YXJ AGE
16. QOJ XEY OQU EQA QJY lEA
17. YUJ YEX OXA IXU ZYJ UAE
18. XIZ JEQ U O IXO JQY EIA
19 XOY JIY GYU AXI ZQX UIG
20. QEX QOZ UZE AZU XZJ GUE
21 XA2 QOX UJE UZA QXY IGA
22. ZUJ YOQ UJI UZO ZJY UEA
23. ZEJ YUZ AQI AQU QZX AIG
24. ZEQ ZUY OYI AZI JYZ EAU
25. YIQ ZUX OJU AZO YXQ AGI
26. XAQ YIZ OQI IXA XQJ GTE
27. XEZ YOX AQE UXI ZYX UAG
28. XIQ XUQ AXE OYA ZQY UIA
29. Y U YUX IZO AXO XZQ GUI
30. YOJ QOY UYE IQE XJY GEA
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APPENDIX III
3a. Eysenck Personality Inventory
3b. Barron's Ego-Strength Scale
3co Rotter's Locus of Control Scale
3d. Smith's Quick Measure of Achievement Motivation
3e. Wolpe-Lang Fear Survey Schedule
3fo Self-Rating Questionnaire.
Questions 1 - 3  were used in experiments 2 - 4  
Questions 1 - 12 in experiment 5.
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EPI
F O R M  A
N A M E ............................................................................................... AGE.
O C C U P A T IO N ...........................................................................  SEX.
N = E = L =
Instructions
Here are some questions regarding the way you behave, feel and act. After 
each question is a space for answering "YES" or “ N O ".
Try to decide whether “ YES" or “ N O "  represents your usual way of acting 
or feeling. Then put a cross in the circle under the column headed “ YES" or 
“ N O " . W o rk  quickly, and don't spend too much time over any question; we 
want your first reaction, not a long-drawn out thought process. The whole 
questionnaire shouldn’t take more than a few minutes. Be sure not to omit any 
questions.
Now turn the page over and go ahead. W o rk  quickly, and remember to  answer 
every question. There are no right or wrong answers, and this Isn’t  a test of 
intelligence or ability, but simply a measure of the way you behave.
<1
H O D D E R  & S T O U G H T O N
F O R M  A
1. Do you often long for excitement?
2. Do you often need understanding friends to cheer you up?
3. Are you usually carefree?
4. Do you find it very hard to take no for an answer?
5. Do you stop and think things over before doing anything?
6. If you say you will do something do you always keep your promise, no 
matter how inconvenient it might be to do so?
7. Does your mood often go up and down?
8. Do you generally do and say things quickly without stopping to think?
9. Do you ever feel “ just miserable" for no good reason?
10. W ould you do almost anything for a dare?
11. Do you suddenly feel shy when you want to talk to an attractive stranger?
12. Once in a while do you lose your temper and get angry?
13. Do you often do things on the spur of the moment?
14. Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said?
15. Generally, do you prefer reading to meeting people?
16. Are your feelings rather easily hurt?
17. Do you like going out a lot?
IB. Do you occasionally have thoughts and ideas that you would not like other
people to know about?
19. Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish?
20. Do you prefer to have few but special friends?
21. Do you daydream a lot?
22. W hen people shout at you, do you shout back?
23. Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt?
24. Are all your habits good and desirable ones?
25. Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself a lot at a lively party?
26. Would you call yourself tense or “ highly-strung"?
27. Do other people think of you as being very lively?
YES NO
oo
oo
oooooo
oo
oo
oo
oooooo
O 0oooooo
O 0oo
oo
O 0oo
oo
oooooooooooo
28. A fter you have done something important, do you often come away feeling 
you could have done better?
29. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?
30. Do you sometimes gossip?
31. Do ideas run through your head so that you cannot sleep?
32. If there is something you want to know about, would you rather look it up 
in a book than talk to someone about it?
33. Do you get palpitations or .thumping in your heart?
34. Do you like the kind of work that you need to pay close attention to?
35. Do you get attacks of shaking or trembling?
36. W ould you always declare everything at the customs, even if you knew that 
you could never be found out?
37. Do you hate being with a crowd who play jokes on one another?
38. Are you an Irritable person?
39. Do you like doing things in which you have to act quickly?
40. Do you worry about awful things that might happen?
41. Are you slow and unhurried in the way you move?
42. Have you ever been late for an appointment or work?
43. Do you have many nightmares?
44. Do you like talking to people so much that you never miss a chance of
talking to a stranger?
45. Are you troubled by aches and pains?
46. Would you be very unhappy if you could not see lots of people most of 
the time?
47. W ould you call yourself a nervous person?
48. O f all the people you know, are there some whom you definitely do not like?
49. Would you say that you were fairly self-confident?
50. Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or your work?
51. Do you find it hard to really enjoy yourself at a lively party?
52. Are you troubled with feelings of inferiority?
53. Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party?
54. Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about?
55. Do you worry about your health?
56. Do you like playing pranks on others?
57. Do you suffer from sleeplessness?
PLEASE CHECK T O  SEE TH A T YO U HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
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Below you will find a list of questions. I would like 
you to consider whether they are more true or false for 
you, and answer by putting a tick in the appropriate box; 
T (true) if it is true for you; F (false) if it is false 
for you.
Try to answer all the questions. Remember there are no 
right or wrong answers.
I have a good appetite
I have diarrhoea Once a month or more
At times, I have fits of laughing and crying that I 
cannot control
I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job 
I have had very peculiar and strange experiences 
I have a cough most of the time 
I seldom worry about my health 
My sleep is fitful and disturbed
When I am with people, I am bothered by hearing very 
queer things
I am in just as good physical health as most of my 
friends
Everything is turning out just like the prohets of 
the Bible said it would
Parts of my body often have feelings like burning, 
tingling, crawling or "going to sleep"
I am easily downed in an argument
I do many things which I regret afterwards (I regret 
things more, or more often than others seem to;
I go to a place of worship almost every week
I have met problems so full of possibilities that I
have been unable to make up my mind about them
Some people are so bossy that I feel like doing the 
opposite of what they request, even though I know they 
are right
I like collecting flowers or growing house plants 
I like to cook
During the past few years I have been well most of 
the time
I have never had a fainting spell
When I get bored, I like to stir up some excitement
My hands have not become clumsy or awkward
T
5 2 2
T P
I feel weak all over much of the time 
I have had no difficulty in keeping my balance in walking 
I like to flirt
I believe my sins are unpardonable 
I frequently find myself worrying about something 
I like science 
I like to talk about sex
I get mad easily and then get over it soon 
I brood a great deal
I dream frequently about things that are best kept to 
myself
My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood by 
others
I have had blank spells in which my activities were 
interrupted and I did not know what was going on 
around me
I can be friendly with people who do things which I 
consider wrong
If I were an artist, I would like to draw flowers
When I leave home I do not worry about whether^the door 
is locked and the windows closed
At times I hear so well it bothers me
Often I cross the street in order not to meet someone 
I see
I have strange and peculiar thoughts
Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love
Sometimes some unimportant thought will run through my 
mind and bother me for days
I am not afraid of fire
I do not like to see women smoke
When someone says silly or ignorant things about 
something I know, I try to set him right
I feel unable to tell anyone all about myself
My plans have frequently seemed so full of difficulties 
that I have had to give them up
I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game 
I have had some very unusual religious experiences 
One or more members of my family is very nervous
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T F
I am attracted by members of the opposite sex
The man who had most to do with me when I was a child, 
(such as my father, step-father etc) was very strict 
with me
Christ performed miracles such as changing water into 
wine
I pray several times every week
I feel s;pipathetic towards people who tend to hang on 
to their griefs and troubles
I am afraid of finding myself in a closet or small 
closed place
Dirt frightens or disgusts me
In my home we have always had the ordinary necessities 
(such as enough food, clothing etc.)
I am made nervous by certain animals 
My skin seems to be unusually sensitive to touch 
I feel tired a good deal of the time 
I never attend a sexy show if I can avoid it 
If I were an artist I would like to draw children 
I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces 
I have often been frightened in the middle of the night 
I very much like horseback riding
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 Name Sex
.... Date ___________________  Age
This questionnaire is made lip of a series of pairs of 
statements. Indicate, by putting a tick in the appropriate 
box, which of the two statements you agree with more.
Be sure not to miss out any questions.
1.a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish 
them too much
.b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their
■ • parents are tôo easy with them
2.a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are. 
partly due to bad luck
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they 
make
3-a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because 
people don't take enough interest in politics
b, iThere will always be' wars, no matter how hard people
; try to prevent them
4.a. In: the long run people get the respect they deserve 
in this world
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes 
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries
3#a; The idea that teachers are unfair to students is 
nonsense
"b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their 
grades are influenced by accidental happenings
6 .à. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective 
leader
b.. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not 
taken advantage of their opportunities
I
7*a. No'imatter how hard you try some people just don't 
. - ‘like you
b..People who can't get others to like them don't under- 
stand how to get along with others
8 .aw•Heredity plays the major role in determining one's 
personality
b..It is one's experiences in life which determine what 
.. they're like
I
9 *ai I.have often found that what is going to happen will 
happen
b.’ Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me 
as making a decision to take a definite course of 
i action
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10»a. In the case of the well prepared student there is 
rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test ,
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated 
to course work that studying is really useless
11.a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck 
has little or nothing to do with it
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the 
right place at the- right time
12.a. The average citizen can have an influence in 
government decisions
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and
• there is not much the little guy can do about it
13.a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can
s • make them work
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because 
many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad
• fortune anyhow
14.a. There are certain people who are just no good
b. There is some good in everybody
15-a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing
to do with luck
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do 
by flipping a coin
16.a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was 
lucky enough to be in the right place first
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon 
ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it
17.a. IA.S far as world affairs are concerned, most of us 
are the victims of forces we can neither understand,
■ ■ nor control
b. By taking an active part in political and social
■' affairs the people can control world events
1 8.a. Most people don’t realize the extent to which their
lives are controlled by accidental happenings
b. There really is no such thing as "luck"
I9«a. One should always be willing to admit mistalces
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes
20.a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really 
likes you
: b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a 
person you are
21.a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us 
are balanced by the good ones
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, 
ignorance, laziness, or all three
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22.&. With enough effort we can wipe out political 
corruption
b. It is difficult for people to have much control 
over the things politicians do in office
23.a# Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive 
at the grades they give
b. There is a direct connection, between how hard I 
study and the grades I get '
24.a. A good leader expects people to decide for them­
selves what they should do
• /
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their 
jobs are
23.a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over 
the things that happen to me
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or 
luck plays an important role in my life
26.a. People are lonely because they don't try to be 
friendly
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please 
people, if they like you, they like you
2 7.a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high 
school
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing
b. Sometimes-I feel that I don't have enough control
over the direction Toy life is taking
29*a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians 
behave the way they do
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad 
government on a national as well as on a local level
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Date Age
INSTRUCTIONS
Read each of the following statements. If you think that 
it is true underline the TRUE. If you think that it is 
false underline the RAISE.
Please do not miss out any statements. Even though it may 
be difficult, you must decide one way or the other.
1. I am not clear about the instructions for this 
test TRUE FALSE
2. When I was young I enjoyed the feeling of 
accomplishment after I had done something well TRUE FALSE
3. The feeling of a job well done is a great 
satisfaction TRUE FALSE
4. I don't think I'm.a good trier TRUE FALSE
3. I would sooner admire a winner than win myself TRUE FALSE
6. If it's worth doing, it's worth doing well TRUE FALSE
7. Failure is no sin TRUE FALSE
8. Incentives do more harm than good TRUE FALSE
9. In an unknown situation it doesn't pay to be 
pessimistic TRUE FALSE
10. I dislike red tape TRUE FALSE
11. I work best when I have a job that I like TRUE FALSE
12. It's never best to set one's own challenges TRUE FALSE
13. I don't care what others do, I go my own way TRUE FALSE
14. Even a good poker player can't do much with 
a poor hand TRUE FALSE
13, Modern life isn't too competitive TRUE FALSE
16. You can try too hard sometimes, it's best to 
let the world drift by TRUE FALSE
17. Most people want success because it brings 
respect TRUE FALSE
Please check back to see that you haven't missed any out.
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The items in this questionnaire refer to things and 
experiences that may cause fear or other unpleasant 
feelings. Write the number of each item in the column 
that describes how much you are disturbed by it nowadays,
Not at 
All
A
jittle
A Fair 
Amount Much
Very
Much
1. Noise of vacuum cleaners
2. Open wounds
. 5* Being alone •
4. Being in a strange place
3. Loud voices
6. Dead people
7 . Speaking in public
8. Crossing streets
9 . People who seem insane
10. Falling
11. Automobiles
12. Being teased .
13- Dentists
14. Thunder
13. Sirens
16. Failure
17- Entering a room where other people 
are already seated
18. High places on land
19. Looking down from high buildings
20. Worms
21. Inaginary creatures
22. Strangers
25. Rats
24. Journeys by train
25. Journeys by bus
26. Journeys by car
27. Feeling angry
28. People in authority
29. Flying insects
30. Seeing other people injected
31. Sudden noises
32. Dull weather
33. Crowds
34. Large open spaces
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Not at 
All
A
Little
A Pair
Amount Much
Very
Much
33. Cats
36- One person bullying another
37- Tough looking people
38. Birds
39. Sight of deep water
40. Being watched working
41- Dead animals
42. Weapons
43- Dirt
44. Crawling insects
4 3. Sight of fighting
46. Ugly people
4 7 . Fire
48. Sick people
4 9. Dogs
30. Being criticized
31. Strange shapes
32. Being in an elevator
33. Witnessing surgical operations
34. Angry people
33. Mice
36. Blood
a - Human 
b - Animal 
37- Parting from friends
38. Enclosed places
39- Prospect of a surgical operation
60. Feeling rejected by others
61. Airplanes
62. Medical odors
63- Feeling disapproved of 
64. Harmless snakes
6 3. Cemeteries
66. Being ignored
6 7. Datkness
68. Premature heart beats 
(Missing a beat)
69. Nude Men (a)
Nude Women (b)
7 0. Lightning _____ ___________ _____
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Not At 
All
A
Little
A Fair 
Amount
hi
5.
Doctors
People with deformities 
Making mistakes 
Looking foolish 
Losing control 
Fainting
Becoming nauseous ..
Spiders
Being in charge or responsible for 
decisions
Sight of knives or sharp objects
Beooming mentally ill
Being with a member of the opposite 
sex
Taking written tests 
Being touched by others 
Feeling different' from others 
A lull in conversation "
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Name..... .....................
Sex....................... Age,
Date...................
Occupation......... ............. .
Educational background
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Below you will find a list of 12 descriptions and questions. 
Following each of these will be two scales.
I want you to use the first scale to rate your typical 
behaviour. Put an X in one of the boxes (not on the lines 
between the boxes). The more you feel that one of the 
terms is applicable to you the more towards that end of 
the scale you are to put the cross.
The second scale runs from 'Always’ to 'Sometimes'
(N.B. 'Always' is not on the right-hand side for every 
question). I want you to use this scale to rate what 
you have said in the first scale, e.g. if, in the first 
question, you have put a cross in the last box, at the 
Introvert end of the scale, I want you to use the second 
scale to say whether you always behave in an introverted 
way or only sometimes or something in between.
If you put a cross in the centre box it might be for one 
of two reasons (i) because you feel that your behaviour 
is mid way between Extrovert and Introvert. In this case 
in the second scale you would put a cross towards the 
'always' end of the scale; or (ii) because neither of 
the two terms describes your behaviour better, you 
behave in some situations in one way, in others in the 
other. In this case in the second scale you would put 
your cross towards the 'sometimes' end of the scale.
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1. The typical extravert is a sociable person, likes parties, 
has many friends, needs people to talk to, and does not 
like reading or studying alone-
The typical introvert is a quiet, retiring sort of person; 
he is reserved and distant except to intimate friends.
■ j  t I t t 1 I t t
Extravert Average Introvert
J______ !______ L,_____ !______ !______ !______ !______'____  » t
Always . • Sometimes
2. An impulsive person takes chances, often sticks his neck out 
and acts on the spur of the moment-
A cautious person tends to plan ahead, "looks before he leaps", 
and distrusts impulses of the moment.
J ____________ !_____________!_____________!_____________I_____________I I-  »_____ , *
Cautious Average Impulsive
> I » I t____________ >_____________I t « I
Sometimes Always
3- A nervous person tends to be "highly strung", becomes depressed 
or experiences changes in mood for no good reason; tends to 
worry, sleeps poorly, is easily hurt by criticism and is troubled 
by feelings of inferiority.
I I I I I I I I I I
Nervous Average Not nervous
I I I " I I -____■ _  I____________I   : I ■ _ . _i_
Always Sometimes
4. Are you sensitive to, or motivated to avoid unpleasant things 
or situations?
Very Not at all
Always Sometimes
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5- Are you sensitive to, or motivated to obtain pleasant things 
or situations?
Not at Very
all
Sometimes Always
6. Are you more motivated by, or sensitive to the likelihood of 
a pleasant outcome or the likelihood of an unpleasant outcome?
^  Pleasant * Unpleasant
f i l l ____________________ I____________________ I I t » I
Always Sometimes
7- Do you feel that your behaviour is determined by factors out­
side yourself (such as luck, other people or the situation you 
find yourself in) over which you have no control?
Totally Not at all
Sometimes Always
8. Do you feel you determine your own behaviour? ,
Not at all . Totally
Sometimes Always
9. Which has the greater influence on your behaviour yourself 
or factors outside your self (such as luck, other jpeople or 
the situation you find yourself in)
factors
Always Sometimes
5à5
10. Do you feel that failures you experience are your own fault 
or due to outside factors (such as luck, other people or 
the situation you find yourself in).
-2--------- ---------1------------------- 1___________ I___________ I  ^ '___________ I___________ 1___________ !_________
Outside
factors
Myself
Sometimes Always
11. Do you feel that yom' achi.elements are due to yourself or
to outside factors (such as luck, other people or the situation 
you find yojui'sclf in).
Myself Outside
factors
Always Sometimes
12. Do you take into acc-xnt tjie ccnscquerces of your behaviour?
Yes No
Always Sometimes
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APPENDIX IV;
Raw data from experiments 1-5, including Féar 
Survey Schedule data.
Data from each experiment is recorded on a separate microfiche.
